Showing posts with label Grexit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Grexit. Show all posts

Sunday, July 12, 2015

Greek Capitulation Not Good Enough for Schäuble & Co. Grexit Unavoidable

Yves Smith for all the arrows she has absorbed for her pessimism about the bargaining positions of both Greece and her creditors has for the must part been reliably on the money. This morning she writes that "A Grexit Looks Almost Inescapable":
Despite my generally dour outlook, I never thought we’d arrive at the insane juncture we are at now, that of a Grexit being all but baked in. This would be a catastrophic outcome, most of all for the Greek 99%. If a Grexit comes to pass, it should deservedly blacken the names of everyone involved, most of all Merkel, whose incrementalism meant that all of the unresolved contradictions of the Eurozone produced intensifying pressure on its fault lines, and Greece proved to be the breaking point. But as we’ll see soon, her finance minister Wolfgang Schauble would also get a particularly large badge of dishonor. 
You don’t need to know much to know that the odds of Greece escaping a Grezit are becoming vanishingly small as time progresses, and there is perilously little time left. And mind you, this sorry trajectory is occurring even after the Greek government prostrated itself and offered to meet even more stringent conditions than its voters overwhelmingly rejected in a referendum less than a week ago.
The big development is that last night's meeting of eurozone finance ministers adjourned minus any resolution. As James Kanter reports in "Meeting on Greece Debt Breaks Up With No Deal" the hardliners -- Germany, Finland, Slovakia, et al. -- don't believe that Greece will implement its latest austerity proposal:
Despite Greece’s capitulation on those terms, many countries came into this weekend’s final round of negotiations skeptical of the Tsipras government’s commitment to seeing through the changes and putting his country on firmer financial footing — and weary of the constant brinkmanship that has characterized the months of negotiations over Greece’s latest crisis.
Instead of working through the night to hammer out a statement on requirements for Greece, as had been expected, the meeting was suddenly called off shortly before midnight, and ministers left without even holding a formal news conference.
“The issue of credibility and trust was discussed, and also of course the financial issues involved,” Jeroen Dijsselbloem of the Netherlands, the head of the so-called Eurogroup of ministers, told reporters. “It is still very difficult. but work is still in progress,” he said, adding that discussions would continue later Sunday morning.
From the start, it was clear that Mr. Tsipras’s gambit had not entirely won over Germany and other countries that have been skeptical about giving a new round of loans to Greece after years in which successive governments in Athens have struggled to carry out changes that creditors have demanded as a condition of the bailouts.
“We will have exceptionally difficult negotiations,” Wolfgang Schäuble, the hard-nosed German finance minister, said on Saturday before the meeting. “We won’t be able to rely on promises.”
His prediction proved accurate, as he and fellow ministers wrangled with little apparent progress, seeking more assurances from Greece that it was committed to changing its ways, and weighing the desires of France and Italy for a deal against the more skeptical stance of Germany and the possibility of outright opposition from Finland.
What Schäuble did do in the 11th hour was forward a proposal demanding that Greece essentially be placed in receivership and banned from the euro for five years. According to The Guardian's Ian Traynor in "Greece nears euro exit as bailout talks break up without agreement," who Yves Smith quotes at length in an update to her post,
With Greece on the edge of financial and social implosion, eurozone finance ministers met to decide on the country’s fate and on what to do about its debt crisis, after experts from the troika of creditors said that new fiscal rigour proposals from Athens were good enough to form “the basis for negotiations”.
But the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, dismissed that view, supported by a number of northern and eastern European states. “These proposals cannot build the basis for a completely new, three-year [bailout] programme, as requested by Greece,” said a German finance ministry paper. It called for Greece to be expelled from the eurozone for a minimum of five years and demanded that the Greek government transfer €50bn of state assets to an outside agency for sell-off.
Timo Soini, the nationalist True Finns leader, meanwhile, threatened to bring down the government in Helsinki if Alex Stubb, the finance minister, agreed to a new bailout for Greece. Stubb apparently came to the crunch meeting on a new bailout without a mandate to agree one.
“The hawks are very vocal,” said an EU diplomat. “It’s very tough.” Berlin also demanded stronger and more intrusive powers for outside monitors to police the economic and fiscal reforms that Alexis Tsipras, the leftist Greek prime minister, would need to commit to to secure the new bailout.
Saturday night’s talks were not to agree on a third bailout, but were negotiations on whether to launch more talks on Greece’s third rescue package in five years. The ministers faced formidable problems, said Schäuble, who argued debt relief for Greece, broadly seen as essential, was banned by the EU treaties: “Athens’s proposals are far from sufficient. The funding gaps are way beyond anything we’ve seen so far,” he said.
The hard line was echoed by Peter Kazimir, finance minister of Slovakia, who said that new austerity measures tabled by Athens were already past their sell-by date.
The eurozone has been united for five months in the negotiations with Tsipras, but with the stakes rising greatly in the last 10 days, major divisions have surfaced, with the French working tirelessly to save Greece and the hardliners now pushing Greece’s expulsion for the first time openly.
The European commission and the European Central Bank issued dire warnings that a failure to grant Greece new rescue funds of up to €78bn would put the country on a trajectory of complete banking and financial collapse.
The widening gulf between eurozone hawks and doves paves the way for an acrimonious summit on Sunday, with France and Italy lining up against Germany and the northern and eastern Europeans. Matteo Renzi, the Italian prime minister, is expected to tell chancellor Angela Merkel that enough is enough and that Greece should not have to put up with any more humiliation.
Merkel is under intense pressure from the Americans not to “lose” Greece and is worried about her own legacy. But Greece fatigue is becoming endemic in Germany, and she faces growing unrest in her party ranks where Schäuble’s hard line is popular. She was said to have endorsed Schäuble’s tough position.
Whether the U.S. can work its will once again on a reluctant Merkel, as it did in the case of Russian sanctions and the whole smorgasbord of riots, a coup and the downing of the MH17 passenger jet, seems a long shot to me.

The Obama administration has not been particularly assertive about securing an amicable resolution to the Greek debt crisis. Getting the IMF to release its report saying Greece's debt load was unsustainable and that debt relief must be considered was helpful to Syriza in the run up to last Sunday's referendum, but it was far from the kind of full-court press trotted out to get the EU to embrace sanctions on Russia.

The U.S. is allowed to run roughshod over Europe when it comes to NATO force projection. But when the question is Germany's economic hegemony over the continent, Uncle Sam apparently has to wear velvet slippers.

Schäuble's 11th-hour proposal, one that Traynor says Merkel has signed off on, at least clarifies the root of Germany's incessant demands for austerity. It is not about a belief that austerity will lead to growth; that has been debunked long ago. It is about taking possession of Greece lock, stock, and barrel. Likely in the private moments of hardliners among the Finns, Germans and Slovaks are thoughts about Greek women. Why not put the young fertile ones on the auction block too?

Monday, July 6, 2015

Huge Win for Greece, Varoufakis Sacked, Troika Unlikely to be Placated


Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' first move following the landslide anti-austerity "Oxi" vote in yesterday's referendum was to toss his finance minister and chief troika critic, Yanis Varoufakis, on the pyre. Varoufakis announced his resignation today with the blog post, "Minister No More":
Soon after the announcement of the referendum results, I was made aware of a certain preference by some Eurogroup participants, and assorted ‘partners’, for my… ‘absence’ from its meetings; an idea that the Prime Minister judged to be potentially helpful to him in reaching an agreement. For this reason I am leaving the Ministry of Finance today. 
I consider it my duty to help Alexis Tsipras exploit, as he sees fit, the capital that the Greek people granted us through yesterday’s referendum. 
And I shall wear the creditors’ loathing with pride. 
We of the Left know how to act collectively with no care for the privileges of office. I shall support fully Prime Minister Tsipras, the new Minister of Finance, and our government. 
The superhuman effort to honour the brave people of Greece, and the famous OXI (NO) that they granted to democrats the world over, is just beginning.
There is no indication at this point that the eurozone power brokers are feeling any change of heart after a super-majority of Greeks rejected their last proposal. Jack Ewing reports from the European Central Bank headquarters in Frankfurt that there is a wait-and-see attitude on Greece's access to emergency liquidity assistance (ELA):
The no vote by Greeks on Sunday makes it even more difficult for the European Central Bank to continue propping up Greece’s commercial banks, whose solvency is closely linked to that of the country’s government. 
But the central bank has so far avoided taking action that could force Greece out of the eurozone, a possible outcome if the banks fail. Without a banking system serving as a conduit for euros and a platform for transactions, Greece might have little choice but to begin printing its own currency.
“Pressure has increased further for the E.C.B. to revoke Greek banks’ access to central bank liquidity,” said Mujtaba Rahman, the Europe director for the Eurasia Group, a political risk consulting firm. “Still, the E.C.B. is very likely to keep its liquidity lifeline open for the time being.”
While the central bank probably will not cut off credit to the Greek banks on Monday, it is also unlikely to increase the amount available to them from its current level of 89 billion euros, or about $99 billion. The 25 members of the Governing Council will not want to increase the central bank’s exposure to Greece until there is tangible progress toward an accord with eurozone creditors and with the International Monetary Fund.
Without an increase in credit, Greek banks are in imminent danger of running out of cash to dispense to depositors. They are unlikely to open tomorrow, despite promises to the contrary by Athens.
“The Greek no puts the European Central Bank in a most difficult position,” Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg, a German bank, said in a note to clients. “We look for the E.C.B. to tread very cautiously, though, perhaps even seeing to it that small amounts of euro cash could still be withdrawn from Greek cash machines for a while until the political outlook becomes clearer.”
In other words, the historic "Oxi" vote by the Greek people means nothing to ECB apparatchiks. This attitude is also prevalent in Brussels where James Kanter quotes European Commission VP Valdis Dombrovskis saying "Oxi" will make things worse for Greece:
“The commission is ready to continue its work with Greece,” Mr. Dombrovskis told a daily news conference in Brussels. “But to be clear, the commission cannot negotiate a new program without a mandate from the Eurogroup.” 
Mr. Dombrovskis was referring to the name of the group of finance ministers from countries that use the euro.
The hurdles to a formal resumption of talks, including any official decision by the Eurogroup to begin negotiations on Greece’s third international bailout in five years, were high, Mr. Dombrovskis warned.
“The ‘no’ result unfortunately widens the gap between Greece and other eurozone countries,” he said. 
“There is no easy way out of this crisis,” he added. “Too much time and too many opportunities have been lost.”
Once again, to the eurozone power elite the "Oxi" vote means nothing; in fact, worse than nothing. The democratic referendum, we are told, has raised the costs of the any new bailout deal by tens of billions of euros.

What the "Oxi" vote reveals is the weakness of the "big lie." Greek voters saw clearly what was happening: Banks were shut because the European Central Bank capped ELA when Tsipras called the referendum. The ECB did this in an attempt to shock Greeks and stampede them in the direction of a Yes vote. It failed stupendously. Now, as Krugman outlines in his column, "Ending Greece’s Bleeding," for the ECB to increase ELA would be to acknowledge that the cap on lending was a political intervention meant to topple Greece's Syriza-led government:
The most immediate question involves Greek banks. In advance of the referendum, the European Central Bank cut off their access to additional funds, helping to precipitate panic and force the government to impose a bank holiday and capital controls. The central bank now faces an awkward choice: if it resumes normal financing it will as much as admit that the previous freeze was political, but if it doesn’t it will effectively force Greece into introducing a new currency. 
Specifically, if the money doesn’t start flowing from Frankfurt (the headquarters of the central bank), Greece will have no choice but to start paying wages and pensions with i.o.u.s, which will de facto be a parallel currency — and which might soon turn into the new drachma.
But the big lie must be protected. That is all neoliberalism is at this point. Krugman is not sanguine about the possibility of a new debt deal emerging quickly; and without this, Krugman sees no better alternative for Greece than abandoning the euro:
In the failed negotiations that led up to Sunday’s referendum, the central sticking point was Greece’s demand for permanent debt relief, to remove the cloud hanging over its economy. The troika — the institutions representing creditor interests — refused, even though we now know that one member of the troika, the International Monetary Fund, had concluded independently that Greece’s debt cannot be paid. But will they reconsider now that the attempt to drive the governing leftist coalition from office has failed?
I have no idea — and in any case there is now a strong argument that Greek exit from the euro is the best of bad options.

Of course, Greece no longer has its own currency, and many analysts used to claim that adopting the euro was an irreversible move — after all, any hint of euro exit would set off devastating bank runs and a financial crisis. But at this point that financial crisis has already happened, so that the biggest costs of euro exit have been paid. Why, then, not go for the benefits? 
Would Greek exit from the euro work as well as Iceland’s highly successful devaluation in 2008-09, or Argentina’s abandonment of its one-peso-one-dollar policy in 2001-02? Maybe not — but consider the alternatives. Unless Greece receives really major debt relief, and possibly even then, leaving the euro offers the only plausible escape route from its endless economic nightmare.
And let’s be clear: if Greece ends up leaving the euro, it won’t mean that the Greeks are bad Europeans. Greece’s debt problem reflected irresponsible lending as well as irresponsible borrowing, and in any case the Greeks have paid for their government’s sins many times over. If they can’t make a go of Europe’s common currency, it’s because that common currency offers no respite for countries in trouble. The important thing now is to do whatever it takes to end the bleeding.
Basically we are back to where we were when negotiations first started between Greece and the troika. Absent significant debt write-offs there appears to be no rational alternative to a Grexit.

But a Grexit doesn't appear to be Tsipras' goal; axing Varoufakis is proof of that (though the finance minister didn't seem too broken up about it; at the end of the day, a scholar prefers the quiet of the cloister). Why the troika doesn't grab at the offer Tsipras made last Wednesday after Greece failed to make its repayment to the IMF and be done with the crisis can only be explained by a perception in Brussels, Berlin, and other European capitals (not to mention Washington D.C.) that protecting the big lie of neoliberalism -- at all costs -- is paramount, and this demands that a leftist party like Syriza must go.

Monday, June 15, 2015

Obama's TPP/Asia Pivot Waterloo + Organized Labor Proof of Life + Bad News for Saudis/ISIS + Greek Default and Peak Neoliberalism

There is quite a bit of good news this Monday morning. Dire assessments of Obama's "lame duckery" continue to roll in (Peter Baker, "The Trans-Pacific Partnership and a President’s Legacy") following Friday's failed vote in the House of Representative on trade-promotion authority (Jonathan Weisman, "House Rejects Trade Measure, Rebuffing Obama’s Dramatic Appeal"). Obama's Asia pivot is being declared DOA. This is from Baker's frontpage piece this morning:
The administration tried making a foreign policy argument over the last few weeks, maintaining that if the United States does not seal the trade pact, it will be leaving the field to China, which has been exerting its clout in recent years, whether by investing in energy supplies in Africa and the Middle East or by asserting claims over disputed waters and islands. 
But some on the left argue that the administration is using China to scare lawmakers and exaggerating the competition. “I just don’t buy this China boogeyman stuff,” said Jared Bernstein, a senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and a former economic adviser to Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. “If anything, I see China as being more inward looking, devoting less resources to mercantile-type trade and more to internal investment, consumption and developing human capital.” 
Supporters of the trade pact hope to hold a new vote this week on the part of the trade package rejected by the House on Friday but will need to secure 90 more votes. Representative Paul D. Ryan, the Wisconsin Republican who has worked with the White House to secure trade negotiating authority, said on Sunday that if Mr. Obama wanted to avoid being a “very lame-duck president,” he would have to win over members of his own party. 
“I think that this can be salvaged because I think people are going to realize just how big the consequences are for American leadership,” Mr. Ryan said on “Fox News Sunday.” 
But there was little indication over the weekend that many minds had been changed on the political left. “We need to regroup and come up with a trade policy which demands that corporate America start investing in this country rather than in countries all over the world,” Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, said on “Face the Nation” on CBS.
*** 
“There is no Asia pivot without an economic component, and that component is tied up in T.P.P.,” said Walter Lohman, director of the Asian studies program at the Heritage Foundation. The challenge for Mr. Obama, he added, is that no matter how important the trade pact may be to his foreign policy, Congress will consider it through an economic lens. “Geopolitics gets it very few votes.”
As I said, good news. Good news too that organized labor figured out how to do things properly on this one, both by working in concert with citizen groups and environmentalists, as well as playing hardball with two-faced Dems. This is from Noam Sheiber's weekend story, "Labor’s Might Seen in Failure of Trade Deal as Unions Allied to Thwart It":
Labor’s smartest move was lining up opposition to the president’s trade agenda as early as 2013, when the fight was still a distant prospect. “They did a good job getting out and defining T.P.A. early among Democratic House members, really peeling off an enormous number of folks who didn’t have long history or an understanding of the issue, prior to the White House engaging,” said Simon Rosenberg, president of the advocacy group NDN and a supporter of Mr. Obama’s effort. 
Mr. Rosenberg pointed in particular to a letter labor activists helped circulate late that year, which roughly 150 House Democrats signed. “It was a letter that was going to make it hard to vote for T.P.A. once you signed it,” Mr. Rosenberg said.
***

This time around, not only did the firefighters make a considerable investment — producing ads and paying to broadcast them in five congressional districts — but Mr. Schaitberger personally led the effort within the A.F.L-C.I.O. executive council to freeze all donations to members of Congress by the political action committees of the federation and affiliated unions until after the vote on trade promotion authority. (Mr. Schaitberger, who developed the motion, credits Mr. Trumka with helping create almost unanimous support for it.) 
Mr. Schaitberger acknowledged some apprehension within the labor movement about denying money even to longtime congressional allies, but he argued that it had been the most effective way to persuade friendly members of Congress to pressure wavering Democratic lawmakers. “We wanted to encourage those members to use their influence, their passion for our position, to move some of their colleagues,” he said.
A win for labor, a blow to the Asia pivot, why not add a story about workers at Gawker Media voting to join a union? Rachel Swarns reports in "At Gawker Media, New Economy Workers Strive to Form a New Kind of Union" that
. . . Last year, about 22 percent of recent college graduates were either working part time or unemployed, compared with about 15 percent in 2007, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
That may be one reason young adults view unions more favorably than other age groups. In March, a national survey of 1,500 adults conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 55 percent of those ages 18 to 29 view unions positively, while 29 percent view them unfavorably.
Overseas, peace talks on Yemen begin in Geneva today. The Houthis continue to roll up victories despite the Saudi-led terror bombing. The Kurdish fighters are battering Islamic State in northern Syria, threatening to capture the main ISIS supply route from Turkey to Raqqa. All good news.

Plus, we are now approaching the decisive moment in the Greek-troika debt negotiations. A default by Greece seems unavoidable. Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism is terming this "Peak Neoliberalism":
The resolution of the Greece/creditor deadlock may also mark Peak Neoliberalism. It’s possible, but only remotely so, that Greece and its creditor overlords will back off from their collision. But as we’ve said for years, Germany is wedded to incompatible goals, namely running large trade surpluses but not financing its trade partners. It is destined to burn them down if it fails to find a new course of action. Greece is also wedded to incompatible goals, namely getting a real break from austerity while staying in the Eurozone. 
On the current trajectory, Greece will suffer horribly under a default or Grexit. The creditors have the incentive and the means to make either one more painful than continued austerity so as to force Greek citizens to capitulate and vote in a more compliant government. There is a bloody-minded faction that includes Finland, Latvia, Spain, as well as some ECB governors that is eager to punish Greece and sees that as necessary to preserve the Eurozone. We’ll see soon enough whether these austerity radicals that we call the ultras persuade enough key players to put their plans into action. 
But even in a less punitive scenario, a default or Grexit will do very serious damage to an already fragile and deeply depressed economy. Those who assert that Greece will bounce back quickly don’t have an economy this close to being a failed state as a comparable. 
Our view has been that the most likely scenario is a default in the Eurozone, and that the authorities have likely underestimated the damage if the impasse ultimately leads to a Grexit. Even if they are correct that financial contagion is contained, political contagion over the next few years is another matter entirely. 
But on a bigger frame, no matter how badly things turn out for Greece, the institutions at the core of the European project will emerge with their image badly damaged. The dirty secret has long been that the program of European integration was designed to produce rule by technocrats. Those technocrats, by being captive to bad ideology, have failed to deliver on the basic obligation of government: to provide for the safety and well-being of their populace. In a capitalist society, that means producing enough decently remunerated jobs. 
However, even if neoliberalism winds up receding as a result of the brutal Greek negotiations, it’s naive to assume that the exposure of the bankruptcy of neoliberalism means a return to the old European model of more social welfare and (at least in theory) democratic accountability. Ironically, the train wreck we are seeing now can be presented as a prime example of the dangers of democratic rule: a democratically elected government in Greece demanding better treatment from its jailer/creditors, when the most of the debt is held by democratically elected governments who are not willing to give Greece the breaks it wants. And as we’ve stressed from the outset, the fact that the two sides can’t come to agreement is that Syriza’s red line of pensions is also a red line to voters in the states that have provided funding to Greece. 
Thus even if the Greek denouement does represent Peak Neoliberalism, that does not mean that social democracy will emerge victorious. It simply means we will grope towards a new political order. Only if citizens are vigilant and engaged do they have a hope of coming out as winners.
All very true. But what Smith chooses not to underline is that there is no alternative to scrapping neoliberalism. Yes, the way forward to a new political dispensation is not clear because the neoliberal paradigm is still completely dominant; but a perception that it is bankrupt is now broadly taking root in popular consciousness. With this in mind, tomorrow some thoughts on Hillary Clinton's quixotic makeover as a New Deal populist and a working-class suffragette.

Monday, April 27, 2015

Greece and the Troika: Climax Near

Each week since January when Syriza won the election in Greece and formed a new government I have been looking forward to some sort of climax to the battle with the troika and the troika's neoliberal austerity diktats.

If Syriza buckles, and, contrary to all that Tsipras and Varoufakis have promised, accepts the austerity diktats of the troika, the government will fall and we can get on with seeing what to do next. If the troika buckles, and accepts Syriza's non-austerity plan to pay off its creditors, there will be a much-needed crack in reigning neoliberal orthodoxy, a ray of sunshine for non-traditional democratic movements such as Podemos in Spain.

But week in and week out there has been no resolution as acrimonious negotiations have ground along with very little movement if any between the parties.

Now, finally, we seem to be in the home stretch.

I know it seems like we've been here before. But I think this is really it. And not just because of the public display of acrimony in Riga this past Friday (James Kanter, "Eurozone Ministers Admonish Greece for Slow Progress on Overhauls"). As Kanter makes plain, the issues have finally been distilled to the simplest elements. The neoliberal orthodoxy wants Greece to sacrifice pension benefits. Syriza has no more wiggle room because a €750 million payment to the IMF is coming due on May 12:
The frustration with Greece is boiling over more than two months after the international lenders gave Athens until late June to present plans for reforms that would both ease austerity and overhaul its economy. 
The lack of agreement on those plans means European lenders will not release the next allocation of bailout money — a 7.2-billion-euro, or $7.5 billion, payment — to keep the Greek government running and avoid a potential default. 
Mr. Dijsselbloem said it was up to Mr. Varoufakis and his government to present more ambitious proposals, noting that the next scheduled gathering of the Eurogroup would be on May 11, a day before Greece must pay €750 million to the International Monetary Fund as part of its loan agreements.
There was “a great sense of urgency around the room,” acknowledged Mr. Dijsselbloem. 
As negotiations have continued between Greece and representatives of its creditors in recent weeks — meetings separate from the periodic gatherings of the finance ministers — the two sides are said to remain divided on significant issues. Greece has insisted that it cannot cut pensions any further or accept creditors’ demands for a budget that would require a relatively high primary surplus — a surplus when debt repayments are not taken into account.
Greek officials have insisted that these issues are “red lines” that cannot be crossed, and Mr. Varoufakis underscored them in his comments to reporters in Riga.
Some of the antagonism between the Eurogroup and Greece stems from continuing disagreement over whether lenders can conduct fact-finding at Greek ministries in Athens, to verify the true state of the country’s finances, for example, rather than meeting in hotels with Greek officials.
A Finance Ministry official in Athens on Friday, speaking only on the condition of anonymity because of the political tensions surrounding the discussions, said that the Greek government was “not bluffing” in opposing tough measures and was intent on protecting the country’s interests.
Mr. Varoufakis, speaking separately to Greek reporters in Riga on Friday said that the country had submitted a new, revised list of reforms at a discussion between deputy finance ministers this week — but that the document had not been presented to the Eurogroup for procedural reasons that he derided as unnecessarily complicated. He accused eurozone officials of “undermining tactics” and “negativism” and said the climate in Friday’s meeting had been tense, although he denied reports by some news media that officials had verbally attacked him.
Naked Capitalism's Yves Smith has a must-read article this morning, "Eurogroup Demands Varoufakis’ Ouster; Trajectory Toward Default Continues." It is less sneering in tone than her usual posts, which have been very skeptical of the Syriza-led government's negotiating position. Of late, Smith has chosen to emphasize, helpfully, that Tsipras and Varoufakis are moderates, and that about one-third of their governing coalition is to their left; hence, there is little possibility that Tsipras will suddenly kowtow to the troika:
The problem, as we’ve said before, is that the government is boxed in by its coalition members. Even if the moderates in Syriza wanted to make concessions (and Tsipras and Varoufakis are both moderates), they need the support of the hardline left Syriza members, which are about 1/3 of their bloc. And they won’t give in. They’ll bring down the government first. 
What are the bones of contention? We have said that the new government has repeatedly tried end-running the process set forth in the Eurogroup memo, which was for the government to produce a detailed list of structural reforms which would then be approved by the members of the Troika, and finally by the Eurogroup before the bailout funds would be released. The Greek side has instead tried going directly to the Eurogroup to get draft memos approved, going to the European Commission, and going to Merkel, now twice. That’s fed the Eurocrat complaint that the Greeks have wasted time. The various reform lists that the Greek government has produced so far have been dismissed as insufficiently detailed. Just based on media reports on their length, that beef seems to be valid. 
But does that mean the solution is to let the bailout monitors beaver away? While Varoufakis’ detractors may have a point that he wants to negotiate too many issues at the key policy player level, the fact is that the two sides have no agreement at a high level. How does it make sense to work on details?
What appears to be in the offing over the  next several weeks is a default by Greece when it can't re-pay the IMF loan; then it will be up to the ECB to force a Grexit by either cutting off entirely or making further Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to Greek banks so onerous that Greece will have to leave the eurozone. As Yves outlines for her readers:
Defaulting in May is particularly bad for Greece. The Greek public is overwhelmingly opposed to a a Grexit, and as we’ve indicated, it’s the ECB, and not the Greek government, that determines whether a default means a Grexit.
*** 
The Greek government appears to be in denial or paralysis. Officials have made conflicting statements on whether the ruling coalition is willing to hold its ground even if the cost is leaving the EU and on whether the government will have a referendum to resolve the matter if talks break down. On the referendum matter, financial time is already moving faster than political time. In most countries, the process for conducting a referendum involves lead time (a Parliamentary vote and a period of time, often Constitutionally mandated, before polling). With a default likely in early May, and a deal needing to be agreed at breakneck speed to avert that, Greece would seem to be past the point where a referendum could inform decisions.
Diane Shugart points out in a later tweet that the Kapa poll shows Syriza support at 36.9%, or virtually the same level they had when voted into office. However, that is a big drop from recent ratings.
While the cost of a Grexit would be extremely high in economic terms (I’ve seen a forecast of a fall of 20% in GDP, worse than anyone anticipates from continued austerity), Kouvelakis contends that citizens have been given only one side of the story:
The main element fueling this troubled atmosphere is, however, the fact that the scaremongering on the theme of the “Grexit” remains unchallenged at the level of broad public opinion. The right-wing opposition and the mainstream media, increasingly hostile to the government and using all possible arguments to push it towards full surrender, associate the break with the eurozone with an apocalypse — as they have done relentlessly since the start of the crisis.
But the response on the part of the government tends to be that this perspective will be avoided thanks to the “honest compromise” to which the Europeans will finally have to agree. Hardly a discourse, to say the least, that can mobilize Syriza’s base and prepare society for an eventual rupture with Europe.
Both Greece and its creditors look to be sleepwalking into a breakup that both profess they want to avoid. But the mutual distrust and denigration are classic divorce dynamics, and there is no relationship counselor in the mix. Tsipras is right to regard Merkel as his best, or more accurately, only hope, but the fissure may be too far advanced for her to paper it over, assuming that she is willing to do that.
In this scenario, default leads to a Grexident because the parties at this point after months of impasse are thoroughly alienated from one another.

I don't want to seem brutally cavalier -- because a further 20% drop in GDP for Greece already reeling from a depression will be cataclysmic -- but it is high time that something gives here. If Syriza can't deliver on what it promised, an end to austerity, new elections should be called. If the troika is so addicted to austerity, let it force Greece out of the eurozone and bring on the market response.

Tuesday, March 24, 2015

Grexit -- There Is No Alternative

Yesterday ("Deadlines Near as Greece and Germany Seek a Consensus on Debt" by Alison Smale) leftist Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras was in Berlin meeting with rightist German chancellor Angela Merkel trying to find a path forward out of the funding impasse between Greece and the troika.

Naked Capitalism's Yves Smith ably adumbrated ("Leaked Tsipras Letter to Merkel Shows Increased Desperation, Warns of Imminent Default") the impasse as follows:
If the plan of the Troika was to starve the Tsipras government and produce either capitulation or a loss of domestic credibility, their effort appears to be on track.
FAZ reported that the Greek government is set to run out of funds by April 8. Tonight, the Financial Times reports that Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras sent a desperate-sounding letter to Angela Merkel on March 15. That appears to have led Merkel to meet with him at an EU conference last week and arrange for a one-on-one session tomorrow.
From the Financial Times account:
Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, has warned Angela Merkel that it will be “impossible” for Athens to service debt obligations due in the coming weeks if the EU fails to distribute any short-term financial assistance to the country…
In the letter, Mr Tsipras warns that his government will be forced to choose between paying off loans, owed primarily to the International Monetary Fund, or continue social spending. He blames European Central Bank limits on Greece’s ability to issue short-term debt as well as eurozone bailout authorities’ refusal to disburse any aid before Athens adopts a new round of economic reforms.
The troika refuses to release any new bailout money until Tsipras' Syriza-led government can provide a list of revenue-generators to replace the pension cuts and privatizations agreed to by the previous government of Antonis Samaras, as Jim Yardley explains in "In Greece, Syriza Struggles to Deliver Promises as Money Runs Out":
Greece’s finances have deteriorated as postelection anxiety over uncertainty about the bailout spurred a spike in bank withdrawals. Tax collections also plunged, raising questions about whether the government would be able to pay state workers and meet other obligations.
On Feb. 20, Greek leaders signed a four-month bailout extension with its three main creditors — the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission. Yet creditors have refused to release a critical 7.2-billion-euro, or about $7.8 billion, loan payment (money that Syriza had once vowed not to accept but that is now badly needed) until the government provides a list of acceptable structural reforms to replace pension cuts and other austerity measures that had been under consideration by the previous government.
To counterattack, Tsipras voiced support for the idea of German reparations. This from a story, "Syriza’s Call for German Reparations: A Bolivaran Tsipras?," by Joshua Tartakowsky which appeared on CounterPunch over the weekend:
In his speech to the Hellenic Parliament, Prime Minister Tsipras touched on the issue which both some Anglo-Saxon socialists and Conservative Germans would wish would have avoided. Tsipras brought to public view the issue of reparations of World War II, and the fact Germany did not pay back the interest-free forced loan made on the Greek bank by the German occupation forces until today. While some reparations were paid in the 1950s, these were quite small considering the damage and did not include the forced loan. Tsipras demanded reparations from Germany for the immense damage and killing caused during the brutal German occupation as a necessary act to restore historical justice. The parliament decided on the establishment of a committee led by economists and historians who will pursue the issue of reparations. The Greek Justice Minister said that if necessary, he would consider seizing German assets in Greece, including, for example, the Goethe Institutes in Athens and Thessaloniki and even homes of German citizens.
In the Merkel-Tsipras story that appears in today's paper Smale summarizes the sniping between Greece and Germany as follows:
Verbal hostilities between Greece and Germany mounted in recent weeks, with particular bitterness lacing the remarks of each country’s finance ministers. Last week, a controversy swirled over whether the Greek minister, Yanis Varoufakis, had made a provocative one-fingered gesture at Germany at a conference in Croatia two years ago.
More gravely, the question of whether Germany should pay more reparations to Greece for Nazi war crimes and forced loans has flared, with some leading figures on the German left ready to consider such payments.
The magazine Der Spiegel summed it all up with a cover this week superimposing a picture of Ms. Merkel on an old photograph of Nazi commanders at the Parthenon in Athens under the headline, “The German Übermacht.” In an accompanying article, it argued that fellow Europeans increasingly see Germany, which is Europe’s biggest economy, and its leaders as dominant. “Yet they are rather a weak than a strong hegemon,” Der Spiegel said of the Germans.
In bad news for Greece, Smale reports that Mario Draghi, head of the European Central Bank, refuses to allow Greek banks to issue new loans based on short-term Greek government debt: "In a blow to hard-pressed Greek banks, Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, said on Monday that Greece had not yet met conditions that would allow its debt to again be used to secure central bank loans."

Patience with Syriza-troika impasse, both from the right and the left, appears to be near its end. An unsigned Gray Lady editorial over the weekend, "The Greece Issue Breeds Brinkmanship in the Eurozone," marked this growing testiness among the few tepid Syriza advocates in the mainstream:
There is no doubt that Mr. Tsipras needs to move quickly to reform the Greek economy, which is running low on cash. Tax collections have fallen since his left-wing party, Syriza, took power in January; Greek businesses are complaining that they are not being paid for work they’ve done for the government; and some bigger companies have started moving cash to London. But pushing Greece into default by withholding the short-term financing it needs to pay its bills would be courting disaster.
The rumor is that Tsipras is in Berlin to secure better terms for the privatization of state assets, a red line he promised not to cross.

The fact is that the right is in ascent. The U.S. 2014 midterms, the recent elections in Israel and France, a decent but nonetheless modest showing for Podemos in Spain's Andalusia, all point to an estranged public tacking to the right. Syriza is carrying the weight of not only Greece but the entire global electoral left. A misstep by Tsipras will continue the complete hollowing out of social democracy.

Such high stakes mean that there is little chance of Germany or the troika loosening its chokehold. Syriza will be crushed at all costs in order to leave the field free for the neoliberals to continue a decades-long orgy of looting and pillaging.

Given that, Tsipras must soon realize there is no alternative to a Grexit.

Monday, February 23, 2015

Grexident vs. Kicking the Can Down the Road

Since Friday the Syriza-led government of Greece has suffered a blow to its public image; it was then, despite weeks of avowals to the contrary, that Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis signed a troika memo committing his country to the creditor-dictated austerity program accepted by previous Greek governments.

While there was confusion and despondency in the blogosphere over Syriza's capitulation, there was some gloating in the mainstream prestige press. The opening to "A Deal That Preserves Greece’s Place in Eurozone, and Fiscal Restraints" by Andrew Higgins (well known to readers who have been following for the last year the U.S.-engineered coup in Kiev and the subsequent civil war in the Donbass as a reporter who will parrot the grossest of lies) provides a good example of "There Is No Alternative" schadenfreude:
BRUSSELS — Just a month ago, after being propelled to power by a wave of anger at Greece’s economic miseries, Alexis Tsipras declared his left-wing Syriza party’s election victory the start of a Europe-wide revolt against austerity. “Europe is going to change,” he said before setting off on a tour of European capitals to rally support for a more relaxed new direction. 
The “anti-austerity revolution” proclaimed by Syriza and its fans elsewhere, however, has now fizzled, its passions doused by the political reality that leaders in the rest of Europe do not want to join or, more important, finance the Greek-led revolt.
Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism has been pessimistic from the very beginning regarding Syriza's chances of re-working the troika's austerity program. Her Saturday "morning after" assessment, "Benchmarking the Greece/Eurogroup Bailout Memo and Process," was grim:
General Observations
There is no way of putting a pretty face on this document [the memo released yesterday by Greece and the europgroup]. It represents a huge climbdown for Syriza. Despite loud promises otherwise, they’ve agreed to take bailout funds, and the top and the close of the memo confirm that the baillout framework is still operative (emphasis ours):
The Eurogroup notes, in the framework of the existing arrangement, the request from the Greek authorities for an extension of the Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement (MFFA), which is underpinned by a set of commitments. The purpose of the extension is the successful completion of the review on the basis of the conditions in the current arrangement, making best use of the given flexibility which will be considered jointly with the Greek authorities and the institutions…
We remain committed to provide adequate support to Greece until it has regained full market access as long as it honours its commitments within the agreed framework.
Even writers who take a positive view of what Syriza accomplished are under no illusion as to how far short Syriza has fallen relative to its lofty promises. From Paul Mason’s blog:
I asked Dijsselbloem in the press conference: “What do you say to the Greek people, whose democracy you’ve just trashed.” He replied that he did not think that was a very objective question. We’ll have to agree to differ.
There is also language in the memo that looks to authorize the return of the Troika monitors: “In this context, the Greek authorities undertake to make best use of the continued provision of technical assistance.” The Financial Times reads it the same way:
It also leaves the IMF and EU institutions — the European Central Bank and European Commission — in control of evaluating Greece’s economic reform measures and the disbursement of bailout funds, despite Mr Tsipras’ vow to rid Greece of the hated “troika” of bailout monitors.
Mind you, despite the foregoing, it is doubtful that Greece could have done much better, particularly in light of the way the ECB had worked to intensify the already-in-progress bank run and boxed the Greek government in by giving it only a thin increase in the ELA limits. A contact told me the Greek government would have had to impose capital controls over the weekend in the absence of a deal; the Financial Times reported close to the same thing by stating that Greece was on track to hit the limits of the ELA on Tuesday (the day after a long holiday weekend). And let us not forget that the Greek government is also slotted to run out of cash by February 24.
Then her conclusion:
In sum, it looks very likely that the top priority of the Troika will be to get Syriza to delineate in detail what they intend to do in the way of the 70% of the structural reforms that Varoufakis said that they and his counterparts already agreed to, and only throw a few bones on the humanitarian front out of the other 30% that Varoufakis wants. And if you’ve ever been party to legal agreements, more specific commitments operate to the disadvantage of the party making them.
Moreover, Syriza has already shown a propensity to overpromise and underdeliver. That would be likely to happen independent of what looks like an optimism bias among the leadership team merely by virtue of inexperience, as in underestimating how long it takes to change bureaucracies and design and launch programs.
As I have said, I would be delighted to be wrong, but even if the ambiguities in the memo language all resolve in Syriza’s favor, they have a mammoth task in what is achieving what is set forth in it, and an uphill battle in meeting the Troika’s and the Eurogroup’s reform expectations. I wish them the Greek government the best of luck.
Varoufakis yesterday submitted a draft proposal of reforms that his government plans to implement. The deadline for that proposal is today. Yves Smith comments this morning, "Troika Not Happy with Initial Draft of Greek Reforms; Eurogroup Reported Still in the Mix," that Varoufakis was wise to get his list in early because the troika is not satisfied by its level of specificity; she raises the possibility that the deal could still unravel, giving way to a sloppy "Grexident," though she sees the European Central Bank, the institution that has been steering negotiations behind the scenes, as exerting force on the eurogroup to accept Greece's proposal:
In any event, there is still the possibility that we could see a disorderly Grexit, or what one account called a “Grexident,” an exit triggered by mistakes rather than design.
However, with the ECB not afraid to invoke the Market Gods to beat the Eurogroup into line, the odds favor them using the same approach even if the Greek draft is not up to Troika working staff and/or Eurogroup standards, pushing them to sign off despite reservations.
But if that is how things play out, it would be a mistake to consider it a Greek win. Remember this is only the first step in an interim deal where Greece has to meet other Troika and Eurogroup targets, as well as work on the even more important task of negotiating what happens when other debt matures over the summer. The more that the Troika and Eurogroup continue to think that Syriza is not willing or capable of meeting its demands, the more any ambiguity in the memo will be resolved against Greece, except in those instances where a favorable resolution for Greece happens to coincide with what the Troika wants to do regardless. Similarly, the less smooth the process over the non-bailout baillout period, the less likely the creditors, which includes the Eurogroup, will be likely to be accommodating in negotiation over longer-term arrangements.
Reasonable or not, Greece has been put in the unfortunate position of having to appease its creditors to get any further breaks. They thus need to be good austerity designers and enforcers over the near term. That also means that remarks by Greek officials to the international media that look to be attacking the Troika or fomenting opposition to austerity in other debtor countries with governments that are making their citizens wear the austerity hairshirt would also be treated as demerits.
Thus, unless there is a serious procedural mishap on Monday and Tuesday, Varoufakis is very likely to be proven correct that his revised list of reforms on Monday will be accepted. But how bumpy that process turns out to be has significant implications for the long-term success of his effort to keep Greece in the Eurozone. The flip side is that there is the potential that even if this week is rocky, the Greek government could recover ground with its official minders once it does get control of the government, but it will need to be cognizant of how far it needs to go.
Thus no matter how you look at it, the new Greek government has a gauntlet to run between now and June. And as much as we’ve stressed that a Grexit is almost certainly an even worse outcome than acceding to the Troika’s demands, it is important to recognize that the best cases scenario for Greece is getting austerity lite as opposed to austerity regular. Even Varoufakis’ target of a primary surplus of 1.0% to 1.5% is still contractionary. Bill Mitchell estimates that Greece will need to run budget deficits of 10% of GDP to restore its economy to a semblance of normalcy. The US had unemployment levels in the Great Depression that were comparable to Greece’s now and have to run a much higher lever of deficit spending to pull the economy out of the ditch for good. 
Thus all of these hard-fought efforts by the Greek government are to eke out gains that don’t even begin to reach the level of intervention that Greece needs. So it isn’t simply that last week’s memo is yet another example in a long series of the European elite’s fondness for “kick the can” solutions to pressing problems. It appears that if Greece is indeed the recipient of new and improved flavor of austerity, it’s a higher-order delaying tactic meant to buy years more of sullen acquiescence from long-suffering citizens in periphery countries. 
This analysis sounds correct to me. Dominant neoliberalism survives by maintaining the paradigm at all costs. That is why Syriza has to be crushed even though what Varoufakis has been telling anyone who is willing to listen -- that paying off Greek debt by means of austerity is a cruel fiction -- is widely acknowledged to be true. Better to kick the can down the road and pretend that everything is going to work out.

One scenario that Yves Smith does not entertain, but one taken up by James Kanter and Niki Kitsantonis, "Greece’s Leaders Face a Revolt at Home as They Try to Appease Creditors," is that Syriza's parliamentary majority will fracture over the deal with the troika:
The deal reached Friday allows Mr. Tsipras to ask to drop austerity measures to which the previous government committed but never enforced, such as further cuts to pensions, an increase in a special value-added tax on the Greek islands and the relaxing of restrictions on mass dismissals in the private sector.
In return, Mr. Tsipras and his government are expected to propose other, chiefly structural changes, including some actions that the previous government failed to deliver on, such as a crackdown on tax evasion and corruption.
Such changes, if accepted, might ease the burden on the majority of Greeks who have been hit by austerity over the years, and shift more of it to the rich and privileged who have emerged from the crisis relatively unscathed and who, creditors insist, should shoulder part of the solution.
Indeed, many now expected that the government would propose changes aimed at helping those hit hardest by years of austerity in Greece, perhaps by raising low-income pensions. On Sunday, the changes seemed to be headed in the direction of focusing on a crackdown on tax evasion and corruption, and an overhaul of the public sector, a government official said.
If Greek lawmakers do not like the deal, they can vote it down. The coalition government in Athens has 162 seats in the 300-member House.
*** 
Even as government officials scrambled to complete the list and an accompanying analysis demanded by creditors, there were indications of internal dissent, with many prominent members of Syriza saying Athens should not give in to creditors.
Giorgos Katrougalos, the minister for administrative reform, told Greek television he would resign if “our red lines were not respected.” He said several of the pre-election pledges that brought Mr. Tsipras to power were not up for negotiation, including the rehiring of thousands of dismissed civil servants.
Manolis Glezos, a veteran Greek leftist, denounced backtracking by Syriza and suggested that the party’s leadership had deceived voters by bending to demands by Brussels and by agreeing to prolong the previous program.
"I apologize to the Greek people because I participated in creating this illusion,” Mr. Glezos, a member of the European Parliament, wrote on a blog, Active Citizens Movement, run by a group within the Syriza party.
Mr. Glezos called on “members, friends and supporters of Syriza” to “react before it is too late” by holding emergency meetings at all levels “to decide if they accept this situation.”
A government official responded that Mr. Glezos “may not be well-informed on the tough and laborious negotiation, which is continuing.”
Another group within Syriza, called Communist Tendency, on Saturday described the Eurogroup deal as “submission to the blackmail of the troika” and called on lawmakers to oppose it in Parliament.
Sofia Sakorafa, another member of the European Parliament for Syriza, wrote on her Twitter account on Sunday, “The people gave a mandate for the memorandum to be annulled” and “we have no political justification to do the opposite.”
Clearly not good for Syriza. Whether a Syriza-led government can survive I don't think is the question. I think it can, even if there are some very acrimonious resignations and public recriminations. The question is what kind of government Syriza is going to be. Another Obamaesque "Hope & Change" charade or a popular movement to crack the neoliberal paradigm?

Hugo Dixon of Reuters has a piece today, "Greece Needs to Embrace Radical Reform," urging Tsipras to go all in fulfilling the troika's demands for structural reform, going back to the voters again if need be:
Mr. Tsipras now has to present his own list of reforms by Monday evening. He must resist any temptation to come up with half-hearted proposals that might appease his extremist colleagues.
Instead, Athens should propose radical reforms that the previous conservative-led government was too conflicted to embrace. It should surprise its eurozone partners with its zeal and so help restore their trust.
Mr. Tsipras has long said he wants to combat tax evasion, corruption and special privileges, as well as rein in the oligarchs who control swaths of the economy and stifle enterprise. Now is his chance to prove he means business.
At the top of Athens’ list should be the creation of a genuinely independent tax authority. The last government, led by Antonis Samaras, sacked the authority’s boss. Buttressing it with strong legal safeguards would show that Mr. Tsipras was serious about tackling tax evasion.
The prime minister should also promise to remove tax and social security privileges enjoyed by the rich. For example, judges, generals and senior civil servants should have to wait for their pensions as long as ordinary people.
Similarly, the Greek Orthodox church should lose its exemptions from the country’s unpopular property tax. Nor should the government continue to pay for priests’ pensions and salaries. The church should offer to fund them itself.
Mr. Tsipras should also revive an idea, discarded by Mr. Samaras, to tax the country’s rich ship owners. It is astonishing that they slip through the tax net.
Next on Athens’ list should be liberalizing markets, which are still gummed up by restrictive practices. This would attract investment and give consumers a better deal. 
Mr. Tsipras should also set up a “bad bank” along the lines of what Spain and Ireland have done successfully. Separating nonperforming loans would not just free the banks to provide credit to the economy, it could also help clear up corruption, as many of the bad loans are provided to oligarchs who are clever at pressuring the banks not to foreclose on them. 
There is understandably some fear that a bad bank could end up as a backdoor means of helping corrupt businesses, by writing down their loans while letting their current owners stay in control. 
Greece’s creditors have the country on a short leash. They have not said how they will provide Athens with the money to stop its going bust next month. They have dangled the possibility of relaxing the punishing fiscal austerity but haven’t said by how much. 
If Mr. Tsipras can surprise his eurozone partners with radical reforms, they will be more willing to find Athens the cash to avoid bankruptcy, probably by letting it sell more short-term treasury bills to its banks. They will be more likely to relax the fiscal squeeze, allowing the government to fund some of its more pressing antipoverty policies. They will also be more amenable to relieving Greece’s vast debt burden, an idea currently on the back burner. 
It will not be easy for Mr. Tsipras to do all this, both because of his far left colleagues and vested interests that support his party. But he is popular enough to do this, especially if he secures a new mandate with a referendum or a second election. Now is the time to break with factions and side decisively with the Greek people.
This is the classic "triangulation" move from the neoliberal playbook perfected by both Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. Run against your own party. It is not going to work here. Syriza, like Podemos, is a recent political formulation, which means it is still connected to the rank and file. Tsipras couldn't split his own party without it collapsing.

Which means a Grexident is not out of the question at this point, though, like Yves Smith, I don't see how the neoliberal can does keep getting kicked down the road.

Thursday, February 5, 2015

Maybe Not a Grexit but a Default: Naked Capitalism's Yves Smith on Greece's Efforts to Free Itself From Bloodsucking Austerity

With recent moves by the European Central Bank to force Greece's Syriza government to accept the same neoliberal austerity program that it was elected to reject, the one that has led to 25% unemployment and a 25% reduction in the size of the Greek economy, and to accept it quickly it seems to me that the only option available to Varoufakis and Tsipras is to default.

Naked Capitalism's Yves Smith's writing on Syriza's efforts to beat back austerity, though pessimistic, has been superb. Her "Will the Cavalry Ride Over the Hill in Time for Greece?" is a must read:
We’ve cautioned readers that Greece is in a very weak bargaining position relative to its financial overlords in the Troika. As much as Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis is making sound, logical arguments and presenting proposals that if anything are too accommodating, despite initial cool reactions, many of Greece’s soi disantpartners are diehard neoliberals and/or are politically constrained. Varoufakis is approaching them as if they can deal in good faith, when their idea of “good faith” comes from a punitive parallel universe.
While Varoufakis and presumably Tsipras are unwilling to deploy the one realpolitik tool at their disposal, a threat of Grexit, other parties who have influence on the recalcitrant actors are more sensitive to the fact that much more is at issue than just the fate of Greece. The ongoing game of extend and pretend has managed to forestall what amounts to an existential crisis for the Eurozone. Its founders knew its structure was incomplete and imperfect, but they believed the logic of preventing future wars was so compelling that the inevitable future crises would be resolved by further integration. 
Unfortunately, as we’ve been chronicling off and on since 2010, the northern bloc, and most important, Germany, have not wanted to give up its catbird seat. It has influence in excess of its population, continues to run trade surpluses with the rest of the Eurozone, which is tantamount to stealing demand, yet it is unwilling to accept the inevitable consequence of running sustained trade surpluses, which is that you must finance your trade partners (or to put it in the terms of petrostates, recycle your surpluses). Moving toward integration, particularly more powerful governance at the Eurozone level, and having more fiscal transfers to allow countries like Greece to have enough demand to have manageable levels of production and employment, means that Germany will have to cede power. And Europe still has strong nationalistic impulses, another obstacle to cementing the alliance. 
But it has also been clear, with the rise of ultra-right, anti-Eurozone parties, and to a lesser degree, anti-austerity parties like Syriza and Spain’s Podemos, that this unsustainable status quo is if anything past its sell-by date. Thus for the more forward-thinking technocrats and politicians, Greece’s efforts to free itself from failed austerity policies serve as a focus point for their own agendas to move away from anti-growth, anti-democratic policies. 
The problem for Varoufakis and Syriza generally is that the magnitude of the task before them, of negotiating what they hope is a deal with significant new components, is already difficult to accomplish by June, the longest time frame they are likely to have, even if their interlocutors were more receptive. With limited knowledge of the power structures in the key governments with which they are dealing, it’s well nigh impossible for them to find, let alone work with, mid level and senior level figures who are their natural allies. 
Thus Varoufakis (at least for now) is forced to broadcast his messages when narrowcasting would be better. Broadcasting means he will almost inevitably offend some key audience, given if nothing else how far apart Syriza’s voters and German officials are in their expectations for the negotiations. But the broadcasting is critical to communicating and rallying both insider allies as well as voters in periphery countries, since shifts in poll results increase pressure on the Eurozone reactionaries. Perversely, the best thing for Syriza’s chances were the Hebdo murders, since the boost it gave to anti-Eurozone Front National leader Marine Le Pen is a big wake-up call for the Eurozone elites.
Today, after ECB announced that it will not accept Greek government debt as collateral for new loans, Smith writes in "ECB to Greece: Drop Dead":
Even by the standards of bank thuggishness, the move by the ECB against Greece last night was a stunner. Americans have become used to banks taking houses under dubious pretexts when both the investors and borrowers would do better with a writedown. But to see the ECB try take a country is another matter entirely. As one seasoned pro said, “If anyone had tried something like this against a country with a decent sized military, the tanks would be rolling.” 
The ECB’s bombshell was to put Greece at risk of an intensification of its ongoing bank run in order to pressure it to agree to a deal with the Troika under an impossibly tight timetable, even shorter than the February 28 pre-existing deadline that Greece Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis had planned to extend until June. As we’ve discussed at length previously, a longer negotiation timetable would be necessary to meet Greece’s objective of restructuring of the relationship with the Troika. Greece wanted that to be based on the recognition that Greece could never pay off its debts and that it was in both side’s interest to let Greece implement more growth-oriented policies. But the message from the enforcers at the ECB was unambiguous: Greece has no rights and needs to accept its debtcropper status. 
The ECB has thus also effectively said that it would rather have fascists like Golden Dawn running Greece, which is what will eventually occur if it succeeds in breaking Syriza. It also just handed France’s Marine Le Pen, head of the nationalistic, anti-Eurozone Front National fantastic fodder for her campaign. 
The February 28 date was the result of Greece presumably needing access to so-called bailout funds to pay off an IMF obligation coming due. Varoufakis said he would refuse those funds, and could get by until June, when more loans came due, by relying on existing tax receipts and getting what he regarded as minor waivers from the central bank. He also had some creative ideas for restructuring Greece’s debts and said that he wanted the OECD rather than the Troika to provide auditors on behalf of the lenders. 
Even though we warned that the ECB was likely to use its control over liquidity facilities to stymie Syriza’s plans and force Greece to the negotiating table sooner rather than later, the smackdown was even more brutal than we imagined possible.
***
As we have said before, Greece is in a weak bargaining position. It may be able to go beyond February 28, but probably not very long. Some readers have suggested appealing to Russia, but not only would that unleash even more brutal treatment from the Troika, but the German press has also reported that Russia is not interested. 
Varoufakis has ruled out a Grexit as ultimately hugely detrimental to Greece. Even if the Tsipras government were to decide to reverse course (likely leading Varoufakis to resign), he would probably want a referendum to make sure it had popular support. Most governments have procedures that don’t allow for them to be launched on short order. So even with this averse development, a Grexit seems unlikely. 
The Greek government can implement emergency measures, like capital controls and restrictions on daily bank withdrawals, to reduce the bank run. Measures like nationalizing all domestic banks and implementing a plan to allow foreign banks to leave the country in an orderly manner works only if the Greek central bank can backstop the domestic banks, and that in turn works only in the event of a Grexit, since the central bank needs to be a currency issuer. 
And of course, Greece can default. 
In response to an e-mail tonight, Varoufakis wrote, “One thing we will not do is capitulate.” I hope readers will wish him and his fellow citizens good luck. But the Troika seems determined to destroy Greece if that is what it takes to show that their authority remains unchallenged. But the cost of discipling Greece is likely to be far greater than they imagine, not just in financial terms, but to the Eurozone project itself.