Showing posts with label James Kanter. Show all posts
Showing posts with label James Kanter. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 28, 2016

A Vertiginous New Year

CORRECTION: Repeatedly I have referred to Dutch and French elections both taking place in the same month in the coming year, March. Not so. My apologies. General elections for the House of Representatives in the Netherlands take place on March 15, while the first round of France's presidential election is April 23, with a run-off between the top two scheduled for May 7. So far it's Marine Le Pen of the National Front versus Francois Fillon of the Republicans. The Socialists hold their primary in January.

James Kanter, The New York Times' man in Brussels, pens a story, "As Hopes for European Unity Dim, New E.U. Headquarters Are Glowing," in today's paper comparing the new EU headquarters to a funeral urn. He waits until the last two paragraphs to mention it, along with French and Dutch earthquakes coming in March, but mention it he does:
With far-right, anti-bloc politicians in France and the Netherlands riding high in the polls ahead of elections in 2017, there is widespread speculation that Britain’s departure may be the start of a great unraveling of the European Union. 
For the first time in its history, the bloc’s survival is being openly discussed. Unsurprisingly, the gloom that has descended on Brussels has given rise to a form of black humor, much of it directed at the Europa building. Among the quips: Rather than serving as a lantern, as Mr. Samyn has called his gently curving structure, it could one day be used as a giant funeral urn, to hold the ashes of a collapsed European Union.
Naked Capitalism this morning publishes Ilargi's "2017: Where The Truth Lies," which appeared yesterday on The Automatic Earth. It is so good I need to quote a lot of it. Ilargi sees 2017 as a year of accelerating collapse. The European Union is coming apart. Brexit and Trump are just the beginning:
As for the EU, is it even possible they’re the worst of the bunch? Europe is falling apart before all of our eyes, and they’re all in full tard denial about it. They are turning Greece into a third world country, they’re alienating Britain to the point where the English will, once they wake up to what’s going on, want to set Brussels on fire. And why? There’s no point left to any of it at all.
Italy’s a goner, once enough Italians realize what the ECB wants to do to their banks. France is such a key member nobody wants to even imagine it falling, so its broke banks are ignored. Holland will come very close to voting in Wilders, which means Nexit. Germany is destabilizing rapidly. Spain has been a hornets’ nest for years. Etc.
And again: why? Well, because the Obama/Merkel model has so dramatically failed. All these places where left and right work together to produce a shapeless blob somewhere in the center that has no identity and doesn’t speak out for anyone.
You just wouldn’t know it from reading the Washington Post. Or any comparable old and respected medium in any of these European countries. It’s not just the politics that have failed, it’s its propaganda machine too.
This is something that manifests itself differently in different places, but it shouldn’t be that hard to see the ties that bind it all together. For one thing, because, not even touched on so far, the amount of fake financial news that has been forced down our throats for decades, and increasingly so: the worse things get, the bigger the lie…
There is no economic recovery. Never was. Not in the US, not in Europe anywhere. It’s a fairy tale. There are plates shifting, sure. You can cherry pick a region stateside that does well if only you select the ‘right’ stats. Like you can say employment is on a roll, if you’re willing to discard the number of ‘newly created’ jobs that are part time.
And yes, if you just completely ignore that 94 million Americans are not counted at all in unemployment numbers, Obama has been a big success. It’s just that those 94 million have a vote, too. We will see that exact same dynamic, and we have already started, play out all across Europe.
It’ll be much messier, for instance because in Holland last time I looked 81 different political parties were vying to take part in the upcoming elections, but the end result will be the same. That is, the existing order will be voted out. Not everywhere, and it won’t be replaced by radically different parties and people in all places, but do please understand that it doesn’t have to.
In Europe, it’s not and/and, it’s if/or. As in, if either Italy or France or Holland vote in a party that wants to leave the EU or the Euro, it’s game over. The endgame will be almighty messed up because of all the laws and regulations the EU has invented, but eventually the walls of Brussels will crumble. Good riddance too.
I’ve said it a hundred times before, all the institutions mentioned before, EU, IMF, UN and yes, even Congress, exist by the grace of growth. People accept them only as long as they can show reasonable proof that they bring economic benefits. As soon as that’s gone (or I should say as soon as people figure it out), so are they.
People are going to vote for someone close to their own lives, their own world, to lead them in times of contraction. That is inevitable. It’s why Trump won, and it’s also why he’s set to fail. Isn’t that a lovely paradox? We’re going to split up into smaller entities, economic contraction guarantees it.
And while everyone tries to talk you into thinking that’s terrible, there’s no reason why it should be. We can work together in many different ways. All these supranational institutions have merely become straight jackets that serve only the people who work inside them and those outside who benefit from keeping up appearances and clinging to power.
That of course gets us back to the Washington Post and its comatose brethren. The US press has been a full accomplice with Washington in reporting fake news about the recovery, and it’s not there. Never has been. The Dow Jones says one thing, the votes for Trump say another. In the end, democracy is that simple. Same goes for Britain, same goes for continental Europe.
And there’s no doubt that Trump is an iceberg-sized gamble, but a change had to come. A change from the monsoon of fake news we have all been fed, but also initially a change that won’t be able to help itself from being replete with more fake news, from all sides.
Put it this way: in 2016, the engine of change got cranked up. In the new year, it will accelerate. That is 2017. That is what the new year will bring. 
Ilargi is certainly right when he says, "And while everyone tries to talk you into thinking that’s terrible, there’s no reason why it should be. We can work together in many different ways." But he underestimates the ruthlessness of the elite when it comes to clinging to vanishing status and privilege. Look at the House of Saud. The Kingdom along with USG enablers have managed to tear up the hundred-year-old Sykes-Picot Middle East. The great postwar project, the European Union, is an associated casualty.

War, and more war, is all the rulers have in store for us. Trump's idea, one can make out the contours of it, is to ratchet down conflict in the Greater Middle East and Europe so as to focus on Obama's Asia pivot. Trump imagines the Dragon can be bum-rushed.

Trump is wrong there. And I think he is wrong to think that he can alter the bellicose direction of the Deep State in the Middle East and the New Cold War with Russia. For perpetual war to end the bottom is going to have to drop out first.

Monday, March 7, 2016

Europe's Unraveling Refugee Deal with Turkey + Election Results in Slovakia & the U.S.

The refugee crisis in Europe is actually a triumph of rationality. The neoliberal and neoconservative leadership class believes that it creates reality, that perpetual and ever-widening wars can be waged while the deleterious effects are skillfully managed. The European refugee crisis is proof that such is not the case.

Today in Brussels the oft-mentioned but never implemented deal with Turkey will be negotiated again. The deal commits Turkey to keep refugees and migrants fleeing war and privation from traveling to Europe; also, Turkey agrees to accept those who Europe designates as economic migrants (such as, unbelievably, Afghans) as opposed to refugees (Syrians and Iraqis). For its part, Europe commits to resettling a number of those warehoused in Turkey designated as refugees; also, it pledges Turkey $3.3 billion, with assurances of more to come.

The problem is that EU parliamentarians are none too happy with the proposal, as James Kanter reports in "NATO to Expand Patrols in Aegean Sea to Stop Human Traffickers":
European Union leaders had raised hopes that such a trade-off with the Turkish prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, could be negotiated at the meeting in Brussels on Monday. They have said, however, that it remains too early for an agreement on the number of people who would be transferred from Europe back to Turkey. 
Another factor that could impede progress at the meeting is a ruling by a Turkish court ordering the seizure of the opposition Zaman newspaper. 
That move has prompted sharp criticism from some European Union parliamentarians who say Europe relies too heavily on Turkey to ease the migration crisis. They say it should instead make a unified effort to help Greece and create an effective coast guard to protect the bloc’s coastlines.
In Greece, a nation still grappling with severe economic problems, many thousands of migrants have become trapped because Macedonia, which is not a member of the European Union, has blocked their passage northward. 
On Sunday, Guy Verhofstadt, the leader of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats group in the European Parliament, said Turkey had so far given little more than “empty promises” on returning migrants. He also warned against making a deal with “a country that imprisons journalists, attacks civil liberties and with a highly worrying human rights situation.” 
As Europe continues to dither over the worst crisis of its kind since the Second World War, the announcement that NATO would expand its operations could, at least, give leaders more time to reach a more united position and wring more concessions from Turkey.
The NATO naval mission in the Aegean at this point is limited to monitoring the refugee flotillas and communicating that information to the Greeks and Turks and Frontex. NATO will intervene to provide emergency assistance.

Slovakia, like Ireland and Spain, has had an election where the results make the formation of a government difficult (see "Slovakia’s Governing Party Loses Majority as Far Right Makes Gains" by Miroslava Germanova). Slovakia is getting attention because a neo-Nazi party, People's Party-Our Slovakia, won 14 seats in a 150 seat parliament. This kind of election we're seeing throughout the West. People are frustrated and desperate over the chokehold that the neoliberal consensus -- the corruption -- has on the political system.

The United States is no different. The GOP power brokers, sensing vulnerability based on the Super Saturday returns, are pouring money into Florida and Illinois to block Trump from locking up the nomination. While I agree that Cruz's victories in Kansas and (particularly) Maine prove that Trump definitely has some weaknesses, the fact is that Trump still won the day with his victories in Kentucky and Louisiana. And Trump is going to win Michigan big; Ohio, too. The Republican establishment is betting everything that Trump can be blocked from winning Florida. Even if the establishment succeeds it is not clear that this will be enough to keep Trump from the number of delegates needed to secure the nomination prior to the convention.

Sanders had an excellent weekend, proof of which is to be found in The New York Times. The newspaper contorted its headlines to read Hillary the big winner because she won Louisiana. Never mind that Sanders won three out of four contests over the weekend. More of the same greets the Gray Lady's readers this morning. Hillary is declared the winner of last night's debate in Flint. I watched the entire two hours. There is absolutely no way to objectively declare Hillary the winner. She was completely demolished. So The New York Times is once again running interference for a woefully weak front-runner.

What is troubling for Sanders is that he is running behind Hillary in Michigan. Bernie, it seems to me, must be able to win a state like Michigan if he has any hope of catching Hillary. But as it stands now it looks like another Massachusetts, a split contest.

Wednesday, January 27, 2016

Geneva III Dies Aborning, Greece to be Sacrificed to Ares

For an excellent snapshot of the stillborn UN-brokered peace process on the war in Syria, which is scheduled to begin this Friday in Geneva, what is being referred to as Geneva III, consult this morning's Reuters story, "Syria Peace Talks Hinge on Envoy's Answers." 

The title of the piece refers to a list of clarifying questions that the handpicked Saudi opposition, which has dubbed itself the High Negotiations Committee (HNC) in an attempt to appear officially legitimate, has submitted to UN special envoy Staffan de Mistura and Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. The questions purportedly have to do with the lifting of sieges on opposition-held territory as a precondition of the peace talks.

The Saudis have no intention of bargaining in good faith. These conditions are an attempt to shift blame for the stillborn Geneva III to the Russians and Syrians. The talks were never going to get off the ground. This became apparent yesterday when de Mistura sent out invitations omitting the Syrian Kurds:
De Mistura's bid to convene the talks has already faced problems, including a dispute over who should represent the opposition. While the Saudi-backed HNC includes powerful rebel factions fighting Assad in western Syria, Russia has been demanding wider participation to include the Syrian Kurds. 
But de Mistura has not invited the Syrian Kurdish PYD party, which is affiliated to the Kurdish YPG militia that controls wide areas of northern and northeastern Syria and has become an important partner in the U.S.-led war on Islamic State.
Turkey, a major sponsor of the rebellion which views the Syrian Kurdish PYD party as a terrorist group, had said it would boycott the talks if had been invited.
Fabius said: "The PYD group was causing the most problems, and Mr de Mistura told me he had not sent them an invitation letter."
The PYD's representative in France, Khaled Eissa, who had been on a list of possible delegates proposed by Russia, blamed regional and international powers, in particular Turkey, for blocking the Kurds and forecast the talks would fail.
"You can't neglect a force that controls an area three times the size of Lebanon," he said. "We will not respect any decision taken without our participation."
One prominent Syrian opposition figure said he would boycott the talks unless the PYD was invited.
"I'll go with my friends or not (at all). There is no compromise in this question," Haytham Manna told Reuters. Manna is co-leader of an opposition group called the Syrian Democratic Council, which includes the PYD and was formed in December in Kurdish-controlled Hasaka province.
Independent Syria dissident Jihad Makdissi said would not attend the initial round of talks in order to help overcome differences over who should represent the opposition.
Not surprisingly, de Mistura's promises of robust participation by women and civil society groups in the peace process have proven hollow. According to Somini Sengupta reporting from Geneva in "An Odd Diplomatic Dance as U.N. Prepares for Syria Peace Talks":
Mr. de Mistura had promised to seek the guidance of women’s groups and civil-society representatives. But none got the mysterious invitations on Tuesday, diplomats said, which galled Mouna Ghanem, a Syrian politician who is not part of either the Russia-backed or Saudi-backed blocs. 
“Just on the doors of Geneva III, majority of men are rushing to negotiate Syrian future,” Ms. Ghanem, coordinator for the Syrian Women Forum for Peace, said in a statement. She called women’s participation “shallow and insignificant.”
De Mistura is dancing to the Saudi fiddler, as is the United States. Or Saudis are dancing to a tune produced at Langley. It is often hard to understand where the U.S. deep state stops and the House of Saud begins, so intertwined are the two. In any event, a couple things are clear at this point: 1) Russian-backed Syrian Arab Army military victories are mounting, and 2) the Saudis and Turks refuse to bargain while their regime-change operation is backpedaling.

Where do the Saudis go from here? The old standby. Terror bombing like the one the other day in the Shiite area of Homs. The Saudis work through multiple proxies, secular and Salafist.

The maintenance of our status quo of perpetual warfare means that Europe will keep its role as escape valve for a disintegrating Middle East. Now that the oft-floated solution to the problem of refugees fleeing perpetual war by bribing Erdogan to warehouse the migrants in Turkey is pretty well accepted to be a public relations gimmick, tossing Greece out the Schengen area seems to be the plan du jour. This from a Reuters story this morning, "EU Gives Greece Warning to Fix Border 'Neglect' ":
BRUSSELS — The EU executive concluded on Wednesday that Greece could face new border controls with other states of the free-travel Schengen zone in May if it does not fix "serious deficiencies" in its management of the area's external frontier. 
"If the necessary action is not being taken and deficiencies persist, there is a possibility to ... allow member states to temporarily close their borders," European Commission Vice President Vice President told a news briefing after the executive accepted a report that Athens had "seriously neglected" its obligations to fellow Schengen states. 
The move is part of a process in which EU governments aim to give them the option of reinstalling controls on their national borders for up to two years, once short-term derogations currently in place expire in May. 
Following the arrival of more than a million irregular migrants in the European Union last year, most of them via Turkey into Greece from where they trekked northward to Germany, other EU member states have instituted emergency controls on their internal Schengen borders and have warned that they might effectively suspend Athens from the passport-free travel zone. 
In practice, Greece has no land borders with the rest of the Schengen zone, so installing new frontier checks would affect only air and sea ports. Diplomats and officials have described the move to penalize tourism-dependent Greece as a means of raising pressure on Athens to implement EU measures intended to identify and register all those arriving from Turkey.
James Kanter had a story ("E.U. Ministers Spar as Bloc’s Promise of Free Movement Wavers") about this move underway in Brussels to penalize Greece for the German-, British- and French-backed Saudi/U.S. war on Syria:
The European Union has been trying to persuade Turkey to take a more active role in resolving the crisis by doing more to look after refugees there and stop them from trying the journey to the European Union. 
Another idea that has gained growing attention is to choke off some of the northward flow of migrants at the border between Greece and Macedonia, potentially leaving huge numbers of migrants in Greece at a time when that country is still recovering from its depression-like downturn. 
On Monday, over lunch at the Dutch National Maritime Museum, the ministers discussed freezing the free movement of people inside parts of the bloc for up to a further two years.
So far, six countries, including Germany and Austria, have suspended the system for a legally permissible period of six months. For Germany and Austria, that six-month period expires in late spring, just as a surge of new arrivals from the Middle East and Africa is expected. 
The ministers also agreed to continue hashing out plans to create a European Border and Coast Guard Agency. 
That plan would double the staff of the current border agency, Frontex, and would create a separate reserve force to be deployed even when a member state rejects help. [!] But some politicians suspect a blunt power grab by Brussels intended to diminish national sovereignty. 
Arriving at the meeting in Amsterdam, the Austrian interior minister, Johanna Mikl-Leitner, warned that “the external Schengen border will move back towards Central Europe” — a thinly veiled threat to exclude Greece from the passport-free area unless Athens acted more forcefully.
Rather than work for peace in the Middle East, Western power brokers will carve up the European Union piecemeal and toss the chunks of flesh on a pyre to Ares.

Thursday, July 16, 2015

The Big Lie: "Extend & Pretend" Debt in Greece & Iranian "Terrorism"

Syriza accomplished its U-turn on austerity last night in Parliament with modest defections. Only 32 of its 149 MPs voted against it. The total vote was 229 out of 300 for austerity. As Yves Smith comments in "Greek Parliament Passes Bailout Legislation":
[Y]ou can see members of Syriza, whose name translates as “Radical Left Coalition,” taking up neoliberal memes. This is a reflection of the success in organizing the economic and political order along neoliberal lines over the past 35 years.
Eventually there will be a price for Tsipras to pay. Defections will mount within his party as last night's protests continue and the government has to actually implement the pension reforms and VAT increases. But for the time being, since Tsipras managed to limit loses within Syriza to the Left Platform, Greece will muddle along and pass the remainder of the Eurogroup austerity diktats next week. Nonetheless, according to Suzanne Daley and James Kanter in "Greece, Its Back to the Wall, Adopts Austerity Steps," a unity government is likely in Greece's future:
Whether Mr. Tsipras will have to fashion a new coalition is unclear. Some party members suggested that with no one calling for a vote of confidence or a new election, he might be able to hang on. 
Other analysts said that he would no doubt eventually have to form a new unity government with other parties.
In the meantime, there is no indication that the European Central Bank is going to raise the liquidity cap on Greek banks, currently at 89 billion euros, until Greece makes bond payments owed the ECB. So says Jack Ewing this morning in "E.C.B. Weighs Whether to Throw Greek Banks a Lifeline":
Most analysts do not expect the central bank to provide more emergency loans to Greek banks, which the lenders need in order to reopen, at least until Monday. The European Central Bank will wait to see if the Greek government makes a payment of 4.25 billion euros, or about $4.7 billion, on bonds held by the central bank. No payment would mean no increase in emergency loans.
Separately, Greece’s eurozone creditors are weighing whether to give the country enough temporary financing to cover the payment to the central bank, as well as another that is due in August. The creditors could agree on a bridge loan on Friday as they continue negotiations on the latest bailout accord for Athens.
Absent liquidity from the ECB, Greek banks will continue to hemorrhage, even with capital controls in place. Yves Smith rails against the ECB maintaining its liquidity cap in "ECB Expected to Continue to Strangle Banks, Not Provide More ELA Funding Today, Despite Greek Parliament Passing Austerity Legislation":
If this comes to pass (the ECB is to make its decision later today), the refusal is utterly insane and horrifically destructive. Even if Greece were to get an ELA increase, it would take time for banks to begin restoring services. The economy will continue to decay at an ever-accelerating rate and the damage will become more and more permanent as businesses fail, which means workers will lose jobs and income.
The apparent rationale is that the ECB is not willing to take any more credit risk and wants its July 20 bond payment in hand first.
*** 
This is the madness the Eurozone has produced. National governments are held responsible for the performance of their economies when they do not control interest rates (and therefore are subject to overheating or unduly low growth via “one rate for all” not necessarily fitting them) and have tight deficit limits, which means they do much in the way of fiscal stimulus. And Greece is in deflation. Its widely-touted spot of growth in 2014 was the result of prices falling even faster than the rate of contraction in nominal GDP! That’s not a sign of improvement, that’s a disaster in progress. 
Yes, the insanity of the Greek debt crisis, now that a third bailout is in the works, is so obvious that the IMF, previously a active collaborator in perpetuating the "extend and pretend" big lie, is calling it out, which makes the politics of passing the new bailout through the various member-state parliaments tricky because hardliner austerian nations led by Germany categorically rule out any debt relief.

So the bottom line here is that with the ECB keeping the spigot shut and a split within the troika over the insanity of a small country like Greece, teetering on the brink of economic collapse, on the hook for what will be, after a third bailout package, nearly 400 billion euros in debt.

The big lie to match the "extend and pretend" big lie in Greece is one tossed about non-stop in Tom Friedman's interview with Obama after the P5+1 agreement on Iran's nuclear program was announced, and that is the one about Iran being a prime sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East. This claim is never substantiated, not a single case is mentioned. Hezbollah is tossed out. But Hezbollah is, among other things, a legitimate political party with representatives in Lebanon's parliament and cabinet. And some incendiary statements of former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are sprinkled on top to spice things up. But the Iranian people lost confidence in him and Ahmadinejad's candidate to replace him as president lost to the moderate Hassan Rouhani.

Basically ISIS and Al Qaeda go largely unmentioned in the interview. After watching the 47-minute lecture by Obama one could not be blamed for thinking that Iran might be behind jihadi terrorist groups. Of course, as everyone who follows the mainstream daily news should know by now, it is Saudi Arabia and its fellow despots in the GCC that support the takfiri jihadists.

"WikiLeaks Cables Show a Saudi Obsession With Iran" by Ben Hubbard and Mayy El Sheikh properly places the horse before the cart where it should be. It is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that is the "troublemaker" in the Middle East and beyond through its funding of Wahhabi fundamentalist arch-conservative Islam:
BEIRUT, Lebanon — For decades, Saudi Arabia has poured billions of its oil dollars into sympathetic Islamic organizations around the world, quietly practicing checkbook diplomacy to advance its agenda. 
But a trove of thousands of Saudi documents recently released by WikiLeaks reveals in surprising detail how the government’s goal in recent years was not just to spread its strict version of Sunni Islam — though that was a priority — but also to undermine its primary adversary: Shiite Iran. 
The documents from Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry illustrate a near obsession with Iran, with diplomats in Africa, Asia and Europe monitoring Iranian activities in minute detail and top government agencies plotting moves to limit the spread of Shiite Islam.
The scope of this global oil-funded operation helps explain the kingdom’s alarm at the deal reached on Tuesday between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program. Saudi leaders worry that relief from sanctions will give Iran more money to strengthen its militant proxies. But the documents reveal a depth of competition that is far more comprehensive, with deep roots in the religious ideologies that underpin the two nations.
The documents indicate an extensive apparatus inside the Saudi government dedicated to missionary activity that brings in officials from the Foreign, Interior and Islamic Affairs Ministries; the intelligence service and the office of the king.
Recent initiatives have included putting foreign preachers on the Saudi payroll; building mosques, schools and study centers; and undermining foreign officials and news media deemed threatening to the kingdom’s agenda.
At times, the king got involved, ordering an Iranian television station off the air or granting $1 million to an Islamic association in India.
“We are talking about thousands and thousands of activist organizations and preachers who are in the Saudi sphere of influence because they are directly or indirectly funded by them,” said Usama Hasan, a senior researcher in Islamic studies at the Quilliam Foundation in London. “It has been a huge factor, and the Saudi influence is undeniable.”
While the documents do not show any Saudi support for militant activity, critics argue that the kingdom’s campaign against Shiites — and its promotion of a strict form of Islam — has eroded pluralism in the Muslim world and added to the tensions fueling conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere.
Why do the Saudis always get a free pass from American officials? Because the U.S. government is a "pay-to-play" system that the Saudis (along with Israelis) have learned to wire over the decades. As long as the United States covers for the monarchs of the Gulf and blames their bad actions on Iran, there will be war in the region. That is why the deal on Iran's nuclear program is a helpful first step, but it in no way alters the underlying dynamic fueling war and instability in the Middle East.

Monday, July 13, 2015

Syriza Crippled, Tsipras Proven a Bootlicker, Neoliberal Austerity Triumphant

My only question is how does Tsipras move his bootlicking surrender through the Greek Parliament.

But first a rundown of Tsipras' capitulation. From the lede story by James Kanter and Andrew Higgins in The New York Times this morning, "European Leaders Reach Agreement to Resolve Greek Debt Crisis":
The total commitment of money has not been disclosed. But a document by the eurozone leaders noted that experts had estimated that Greece might need from 82 billion to 86 billion euros more — $91 billion to $96 billion — to shore up its economy, rebuild its banks and meet its debt obligations over the next three years. The document said Greece and its creditors should seek to “reduce that financing envelope,” if possible.
As part of Greece’s commitments, Ms. Merkel said, a fund will be created to use the proceeds from selling off assets owned by the Greek government to help pay down the country’s debt. That fund would be “to the tune of” €50 billion, she said.
Greece will also be required to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund and to agree to let the organization continue to monitor the country’s adherence to its bailout commitments. The Greek government had resisted a continued role for the I.M.F., seeing the fund’s involvement as unwanted meddling.
The Greek Parliament will also be required to approve the terms of the agreement “without delay,” according to the document released on Monday morning. One of the sticking points in the negotiations over the weekend had been a demand that the Parliament sign off on any deal by Wednesday, but that requirement appears to have been relaxed.
Yves Smith in a post this morning, "Tentative Deal Strips Greece of Sovereignty, Makes Debt Relief Dependent on Compliance," on Naked Capitalism where she quotes extensively from a Financial Times story provides a more detailed reckoning of Tsipras' failure:
Mr Tsipras has promised to pass tough new reform laws, including on tax and pensions, by Wednesday and prepare further rapid reforms, such as labour market liberalisation, opening up closed professions, deregulating Sunday trading and reinforcing the financial sector. In a particularly humbling move, the government has to reverse some of the extra spending measures it introduced earlier this year, when it trumpeted its ambitions to end five years of EU-imposed austerity.
The major terms include:
Increasing and simplify VAT
Cutting pensions. More on that shortly. The terms here look to be vastly worse than the cuts Greece fought a few weeks ago
“Requesting” continued IMF “support” (monitoring as well as financing)
“Introducing quasi-automatic spending cuts in case of deviations from ambitious primary surplus targets after seeking advice from the Fiscal Council and subject to prior approval of the Institutions”
Sequestering €50 billion of assets, nominally supervised by Greece but under strict oversight of the creditors. Half will go to recapitalizing the banking system
Implementing labor market “reforms” along the lines sought by the creditors
Not only is there no debt relief, there is no prospect of any debt relief unless Greece meets targets. And forget about principal reduction. From the letter:
…the Eurogroup stands ready to consider, if necessary, possible additional measures (possible longer grace and payment periods) aiming at ensuring that gross financing needs remain at a sustainable level. These measures will be conditional upon full implementation of the measures to be agreed in a possible new programme and will be considered after the first positive completion of a review. 
The Euro Summit stresses that nominal haircuts on the debt cannot be undertaken.
This is not just failure. To sign off on this agreement is an act of collaboration with a hostile power.

All Syriza's red lines have been crossed, not to mention the 11th-hour addition of the €50 billion privatization to be administered by the creditors.

On top of it all, the ECB will not release additional funds to Greek banks until Parliament approves all the measures contained in the agreement.

By signing this agreement Tsipras validates the European hardliner mantra about Syriza -- that the party was a collection of jejune poseurs more style than substance who had no business being in government and were just wasting everyone's time. This certainly appears to be the case.

The Wednesday in the run up to the "Oxi" referendum Tsipras forwarded a proposal that basically accepted bulk of the troika's austerity demands. The proposal was declined by Merkel in favor of letting the referendum play out. At the time I thought that was foolish of Merkel et al. because what better outcome for the Syriza-hostile troika than to have Tsipras administer the very policies he was elected to overturn. What better way to make the point to a recalcitrant public that "There Is No Alternative" to neoliberal austerity than by having the only anti-austerity party in power in Europe accept and oversee austerity?

The answer to the question of what is better is Syriza implementing even more austere fiscal policies after the public voted overwhelming against austerity. Merkel knew what she was doing. I assumed Tsipras meant what he said when rallied Greeks to vote No.

Syriza is now crippled. It will split, but Tsipras should be able to push the agreement, at least most of it, through Parliament with the help of To Potami, New Democracy and other parties in the opposition.

I don't see how Syriza can survive. Its rise to electoral power was based on a promise that it would not accept further austerity. Now that it has done so it has no rationale.

Nothing more than a youthful Pasok, Syriza will be remembered for its bluffing, its open collars and untucked shirts. What a disappointment. Syriza's spectacular failure will be a blow to the legitimacy of all non-centrist parties -- to Podemos in particular.

Sunday, July 12, 2015

Greek Capitulation Not Good Enough for Schäuble & Co. Grexit Unavoidable

Yves Smith for all the arrows she has absorbed for her pessimism about the bargaining positions of both Greece and her creditors has for the must part been reliably on the money. This morning she writes that "A Grexit Looks Almost Inescapable":
Despite my generally dour outlook, I never thought we’d arrive at the insane juncture we are at now, that of a Grexit being all but baked in. This would be a catastrophic outcome, most of all for the Greek 99%. If a Grexit comes to pass, it should deservedly blacken the names of everyone involved, most of all Merkel, whose incrementalism meant that all of the unresolved contradictions of the Eurozone produced intensifying pressure on its fault lines, and Greece proved to be the breaking point. But as we’ll see soon, her finance minister Wolfgang Schauble would also get a particularly large badge of dishonor. 
You don’t need to know much to know that the odds of Greece escaping a Grezit are becoming vanishingly small as time progresses, and there is perilously little time left. And mind you, this sorry trajectory is occurring even after the Greek government prostrated itself and offered to meet even more stringent conditions than its voters overwhelmingly rejected in a referendum less than a week ago.
The big development is that last night's meeting of eurozone finance ministers adjourned minus any resolution. As James Kanter reports in "Meeting on Greece Debt Breaks Up With No Deal" the hardliners -- Germany, Finland, Slovakia, et al. -- don't believe that Greece will implement its latest austerity proposal:
Despite Greece’s capitulation on those terms, many countries came into this weekend’s final round of negotiations skeptical of the Tsipras government’s commitment to seeing through the changes and putting his country on firmer financial footing — and weary of the constant brinkmanship that has characterized the months of negotiations over Greece’s latest crisis.
Instead of working through the night to hammer out a statement on requirements for Greece, as had been expected, the meeting was suddenly called off shortly before midnight, and ministers left without even holding a formal news conference.
“The issue of credibility and trust was discussed, and also of course the financial issues involved,” Jeroen Dijsselbloem of the Netherlands, the head of the so-called Eurogroup of ministers, told reporters. “It is still very difficult. but work is still in progress,” he said, adding that discussions would continue later Sunday morning.
From the start, it was clear that Mr. Tsipras’s gambit had not entirely won over Germany and other countries that have been skeptical about giving a new round of loans to Greece after years in which successive governments in Athens have struggled to carry out changes that creditors have demanded as a condition of the bailouts.
“We will have exceptionally difficult negotiations,” Wolfgang Schäuble, the hard-nosed German finance minister, said on Saturday before the meeting. “We won’t be able to rely on promises.”
His prediction proved accurate, as he and fellow ministers wrangled with little apparent progress, seeking more assurances from Greece that it was committed to changing its ways, and weighing the desires of France and Italy for a deal against the more skeptical stance of Germany and the possibility of outright opposition from Finland.
What Schäuble did do in the 11th hour was forward a proposal demanding that Greece essentially be placed in receivership and banned from the euro for five years. According to The Guardian's Ian Traynor in "Greece nears euro exit as bailout talks break up without agreement," who Yves Smith quotes at length in an update to her post,
With Greece on the edge of financial and social implosion, eurozone finance ministers met to decide on the country’s fate and on what to do about its debt crisis, after experts from the troika of creditors said that new fiscal rigour proposals from Athens were good enough to form “the basis for negotiations”.
But the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, dismissed that view, supported by a number of northern and eastern European states. “These proposals cannot build the basis for a completely new, three-year [bailout] programme, as requested by Greece,” said a German finance ministry paper. It called for Greece to be expelled from the eurozone for a minimum of five years and demanded that the Greek government transfer €50bn of state assets to an outside agency for sell-off.
Timo Soini, the nationalist True Finns leader, meanwhile, threatened to bring down the government in Helsinki if Alex Stubb, the finance minister, agreed to a new bailout for Greece. Stubb apparently came to the crunch meeting on a new bailout without a mandate to agree one.
“The hawks are very vocal,” said an EU diplomat. “It’s very tough.” Berlin also demanded stronger and more intrusive powers for outside monitors to police the economic and fiscal reforms that Alexis Tsipras, the leftist Greek prime minister, would need to commit to to secure the new bailout.
Saturday night’s talks were not to agree on a third bailout, but were negotiations on whether to launch more talks on Greece’s third rescue package in five years. The ministers faced formidable problems, said Schäuble, who argued debt relief for Greece, broadly seen as essential, was banned by the EU treaties: “Athens’s proposals are far from sufficient. The funding gaps are way beyond anything we’ve seen so far,” he said.
The hard line was echoed by Peter Kazimir, finance minister of Slovakia, who said that new austerity measures tabled by Athens were already past their sell-by date.
The eurozone has been united for five months in the negotiations with Tsipras, but with the stakes rising greatly in the last 10 days, major divisions have surfaced, with the French working tirelessly to save Greece and the hardliners now pushing Greece’s expulsion for the first time openly.
The European commission and the European Central Bank issued dire warnings that a failure to grant Greece new rescue funds of up to €78bn would put the country on a trajectory of complete banking and financial collapse.
The widening gulf between eurozone hawks and doves paves the way for an acrimonious summit on Sunday, with France and Italy lining up against Germany and the northern and eastern Europeans. Matteo Renzi, the Italian prime minister, is expected to tell chancellor Angela Merkel that enough is enough and that Greece should not have to put up with any more humiliation.
Merkel is under intense pressure from the Americans not to “lose” Greece and is worried about her own legacy. But Greece fatigue is becoming endemic in Germany, and she faces growing unrest in her party ranks where Schäuble’s hard line is popular. She was said to have endorsed Schäuble’s tough position.
Whether the U.S. can work its will once again on a reluctant Merkel, as it did in the case of Russian sanctions and the whole smorgasbord of riots, a coup and the downing of the MH17 passenger jet, seems a long shot to me.

The Obama administration has not been particularly assertive about securing an amicable resolution to the Greek debt crisis. Getting the IMF to release its report saying Greece's debt load was unsustainable and that debt relief must be considered was helpful to Syriza in the run up to last Sunday's referendum, but it was far from the kind of full-court press trotted out to get the EU to embrace sanctions on Russia.

The U.S. is allowed to run roughshod over Europe when it comes to NATO force projection. But when the question is Germany's economic hegemony over the continent, Uncle Sam apparently has to wear velvet slippers.

Schäuble's 11th-hour proposal, one that Traynor says Merkel has signed off on, at least clarifies the root of Germany's incessant demands for austerity. It is not about a belief that austerity will lead to growth; that has been debunked long ago. It is about taking possession of Greece lock, stock, and barrel. Likely in the private moments of hardliners among the Finns, Germans and Slovaks are thoughts about Greek women. Why not put the young fertile ones on the auction block too?

Tuesday, July 7, 2015

Deadlines: Greek Debt Negotiations & P5+1 Talks

So we're back to deadline watch in the Greek debt drama. The new make-or-break deadline we're supposed to stay focused on is July 20. That is when 3.5 billion euros that Greece owes to the European Central Bank comes due. If Greece fails to make repayment by July 20, the ECB will be hard pressed to find a way around cutting off liquidity to already cash-strapped Greek banks.

James Kanter publishes a helpful story this morning, "Greece Expected to Offer Proposals as Eurozone Leaders Prepare to Meet," that precedes yet another emergency summit of eurozone leaders in Brussels today. Kanter tilts towards the neoliberal consensus. So his writing is a helpful prism to understand how the U.S./EU elite view recalcitrant Greece:
BRUSSELS — The Greek government was expected to make proposals to eurozone leaders on Tuesday to support its battered economy and keep the country in the single currency area, as Athens and its creditors resume their struggle over an elusive solution to Greece’s long-running economic crisis. 
But a quick fix for Athens looked extremely difficult to achieve. The stakes were rising on Tuesday ahead of the latest emergency summit meeting of European leaders. None of them wants to take the blame for a possible sudden, chaotic departure from the eurozone by Greece. That means that all sides could agree to keep talking even as the crisis reaches new levels of intensity, and even as Greece hurtles toward a deadline — a payment of 3.5 billion euros, or about $3.9 billion, to the European Central Bank on July 20 — that most observers think it cannot miss without leaving the eurozone.
The Eurogroup of finance ministers is scheduled to convene at 1 p.m. in Brussels, followed by an emergency summit meeting of the 19 leaders of eurozone countries at 7 p.m. that is expected to include Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, and Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the president of the Eurogroup.
*** 
A failure to make good on the July 20 bailout payment to the European Central Bank would make it almost inevitable that Greece would have to cut a lifeline for the country’s cash-drained banks. And that could force the country to print a parallel currency that would hasten its departure from the currency bloc. 
That prospect could add pressure on the Greeks this week to commit to a number of short-term changes for bridge financing to avoid defaulting on the European Central Bank, and then conclude a wider program, with debt relief, later in the year. 
But one analyst emphasized on Tuesday that the track record of the government in Athens would make it extremely difficult to take any of its commitments at face value. 
“It remains very unclear whether the Greek government is really trying to avoid an exit from the euro area, or whether it only wants to avoid being held responsible for it by its domestic public opinion,” said Nicolas Véron, a senior fellow at Bruegel, a research organization in Brussels.
I used to be of the opinion that what Tsipras was up to was transforming consciousness in Greece -- enlightening the Greek voter -- to accept the reintroduction of the drachma. But I no longer believe that. I think that Syriza, true to what Tsipras and Varoufakis have long said in public, has no intention of leaving the eurozone. The strategy of Tsipras has been to wear down the members of the troika, and in this he has been successful. France has moved away somewhat from Germany. The IMF has broken with other members of the troika and issued a report declaring Greece's debt load unsustainable.

The problem for Tsipras is that despite the landslide "Oxi" win, the July 20 ECB repayment deadline looms large. For the hardliners in the Eurogroup who want to collapse Greek banks and be done with it, two weeks is a short time to wait. There is no need for Schauble and Dijsselbloem to offer any concessions, particularly on debt forgiveness. It appears that Tsipras will run out of time and no cavalry will ride over the hill to the rescue.

And not one but two deadlines have now been breached in the P5+1 talks in Vienna: first, the June 30 deadline, and today's July 7 deadline. The significant one for Kerry and Obama is Thursday July 9. If no agreement is reached with Iran on its nuclear program in two days then the U.S. Congress will get an additional 30 days to skewer the agreement. USG scribe Michael Gordon reports in "Iran Nuclear Talks Are Extended Once Again":
VIENNA — The talks to complete a landmark accord limiting Iran’s nuclear program have been extended for several days after negotiators acknowledged that they would be unable to meet a Tuesday deadline.
To give negotiators more time to pursue a final accord, the diplomats agreed to extend through Friday an interim nuclear accord called the Joint Plan of Action. That interim agreement, which had been set to expire on Tuesday, freezes much of Iran’s nuclear program in return for modest sanctions relief.
“We are continuing to negotiate for the next couple of days,” Federica Mogherini, the foreign policy chief for the European Union, told reporters here.
This is the second time the talks have been extended since Secretary of State John Kerry arrived here in late June. The original goal was to complete a final accord by June 30.
Ms. Mogherini said that the negotiations had entered “a difficult and sensitive” phase, but she did not discuss the remaining issues.
The unresolved issues in recent days have included what limits would be placed on the development of more efficient types of centrifuges after the first decade of an accord, what steps would be taken to address suspicions about Iran’s past nuclear activities, and the timeline for removing sanctions.
The Obama administration hoped to finish the accord by Thursday, so that it could be submitted to Congress for a 30-day review. If the agreement is finished this summer, the duration of the review period will double.
I don't see Obama walking away from the table. He wants an agreement, not only for his "legacy"
but for the future electoral viability of the Democratic Party. Not much is made of it in the media, but the Democrats' nominal association with a less bellicose foreign-policy perspective is a huge vote-getting advantage. A Democratic administration does not want to squander this.

But give the media monopoly and a Saudi- and Israeli-dominated Congress two months to inveigh and fear-monger, and the chances are high any agreement will be scuttled, which puts the feckless Obama in the difficult position of having to veto a Congressional override to protect his "legacy" agreement. 

It is hard to say at this point which is a stronger character trait in Obama: his desire to go-along-to-get-along or his lust to be inscribed in the history books. Probably the latter. So maybe there is hope for a Iranian nuclear accord after all.

Monday, July 6, 2015

Huge Win for Greece, Varoufakis Sacked, Troika Unlikely to be Placated


Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' first move following the landslide anti-austerity "Oxi" vote in yesterday's referendum was to toss his finance minister and chief troika critic, Yanis Varoufakis, on the pyre. Varoufakis announced his resignation today with the blog post, "Minister No More":
Soon after the announcement of the referendum results, I was made aware of a certain preference by some Eurogroup participants, and assorted ‘partners’, for my… ‘absence’ from its meetings; an idea that the Prime Minister judged to be potentially helpful to him in reaching an agreement. For this reason I am leaving the Ministry of Finance today. 
I consider it my duty to help Alexis Tsipras exploit, as he sees fit, the capital that the Greek people granted us through yesterday’s referendum. 
And I shall wear the creditors’ loathing with pride. 
We of the Left know how to act collectively with no care for the privileges of office. I shall support fully Prime Minister Tsipras, the new Minister of Finance, and our government. 
The superhuman effort to honour the brave people of Greece, and the famous OXI (NO) that they granted to democrats the world over, is just beginning.
There is no indication at this point that the eurozone power brokers are feeling any change of heart after a super-majority of Greeks rejected their last proposal. Jack Ewing reports from the European Central Bank headquarters in Frankfurt that there is a wait-and-see attitude on Greece's access to emergency liquidity assistance (ELA):
The no vote by Greeks on Sunday makes it even more difficult for the European Central Bank to continue propping up Greece’s commercial banks, whose solvency is closely linked to that of the country’s government. 
But the central bank has so far avoided taking action that could force Greece out of the eurozone, a possible outcome if the banks fail. Without a banking system serving as a conduit for euros and a platform for transactions, Greece might have little choice but to begin printing its own currency.
“Pressure has increased further for the E.C.B. to revoke Greek banks’ access to central bank liquidity,” said Mujtaba Rahman, the Europe director for the Eurasia Group, a political risk consulting firm. “Still, the E.C.B. is very likely to keep its liquidity lifeline open for the time being.”
While the central bank probably will not cut off credit to the Greek banks on Monday, it is also unlikely to increase the amount available to them from its current level of 89 billion euros, or about $99 billion. The 25 members of the Governing Council will not want to increase the central bank’s exposure to Greece until there is tangible progress toward an accord with eurozone creditors and with the International Monetary Fund.
Without an increase in credit, Greek banks are in imminent danger of running out of cash to dispense to depositors. They are unlikely to open tomorrow, despite promises to the contrary by Athens.
“The Greek no puts the European Central Bank in a most difficult position,” Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg, a German bank, said in a note to clients. “We look for the E.C.B. to tread very cautiously, though, perhaps even seeing to it that small amounts of euro cash could still be withdrawn from Greek cash machines for a while until the political outlook becomes clearer.”
In other words, the historic "Oxi" vote by the Greek people means nothing to ECB apparatchiks. This attitude is also prevalent in Brussels where James Kanter quotes European Commission VP Valdis Dombrovskis saying "Oxi" will make things worse for Greece:
“The commission is ready to continue its work with Greece,” Mr. Dombrovskis told a daily news conference in Brussels. “But to be clear, the commission cannot negotiate a new program without a mandate from the Eurogroup.” 
Mr. Dombrovskis was referring to the name of the group of finance ministers from countries that use the euro.
The hurdles to a formal resumption of talks, including any official decision by the Eurogroup to begin negotiations on Greece’s third international bailout in five years, were high, Mr. Dombrovskis warned.
“The ‘no’ result unfortunately widens the gap between Greece and other eurozone countries,” he said. 
“There is no easy way out of this crisis,” he added. “Too much time and too many opportunities have been lost.”
Once again, to the eurozone power elite the "Oxi" vote means nothing; in fact, worse than nothing. The democratic referendum, we are told, has raised the costs of the any new bailout deal by tens of billions of euros.

What the "Oxi" vote reveals is the weakness of the "big lie." Greek voters saw clearly what was happening: Banks were shut because the European Central Bank capped ELA when Tsipras called the referendum. The ECB did this in an attempt to shock Greeks and stampede them in the direction of a Yes vote. It failed stupendously. Now, as Krugman outlines in his column, "Ending Greece’s Bleeding," for the ECB to increase ELA would be to acknowledge that the cap on lending was a political intervention meant to topple Greece's Syriza-led government:
The most immediate question involves Greek banks. In advance of the referendum, the European Central Bank cut off their access to additional funds, helping to precipitate panic and force the government to impose a bank holiday and capital controls. The central bank now faces an awkward choice: if it resumes normal financing it will as much as admit that the previous freeze was political, but if it doesn’t it will effectively force Greece into introducing a new currency. 
Specifically, if the money doesn’t start flowing from Frankfurt (the headquarters of the central bank), Greece will have no choice but to start paying wages and pensions with i.o.u.s, which will de facto be a parallel currency — and which might soon turn into the new drachma.
But the big lie must be protected. That is all neoliberalism is at this point. Krugman is not sanguine about the possibility of a new debt deal emerging quickly; and without this, Krugman sees no better alternative for Greece than abandoning the euro:
In the failed negotiations that led up to Sunday’s referendum, the central sticking point was Greece’s demand for permanent debt relief, to remove the cloud hanging over its economy. The troika — the institutions representing creditor interests — refused, even though we now know that one member of the troika, the International Monetary Fund, had concluded independently that Greece’s debt cannot be paid. But will they reconsider now that the attempt to drive the governing leftist coalition from office has failed?
I have no idea — and in any case there is now a strong argument that Greek exit from the euro is the best of bad options.

Of course, Greece no longer has its own currency, and many analysts used to claim that adopting the euro was an irreversible move — after all, any hint of euro exit would set off devastating bank runs and a financial crisis. But at this point that financial crisis has already happened, so that the biggest costs of euro exit have been paid. Why, then, not go for the benefits? 
Would Greek exit from the euro work as well as Iceland’s highly successful devaluation in 2008-09, or Argentina’s abandonment of its one-peso-one-dollar policy in 2001-02? Maybe not — but consider the alternatives. Unless Greece receives really major debt relief, and possibly even then, leaving the euro offers the only plausible escape route from its endless economic nightmare.
And let’s be clear: if Greece ends up leaving the euro, it won’t mean that the Greeks are bad Europeans. Greece’s debt problem reflected irresponsible lending as well as irresponsible borrowing, and in any case the Greeks have paid for their government’s sins many times over. If they can’t make a go of Europe’s common currency, it’s because that common currency offers no respite for countries in trouble. The important thing now is to do whatever it takes to end the bleeding.
Basically we are back to where we were when negotiations first started between Greece and the troika. Absent significant debt write-offs there appears to be no rational alternative to a Grexit.

But a Grexit doesn't appear to be Tsipras' goal; axing Varoufakis is proof of that (though the finance minister didn't seem too broken up about it; at the end of the day, a scholar prefers the quiet of the cloister). Why the troika doesn't grab at the offer Tsipras made last Wednesday after Greece failed to make its repayment to the IMF and be done with the crisis can only be explained by a perception in Brussels, Berlin, and other European capitals (not to mention Washington D.C.) that protecting the big lie of neoliberalism -- at all costs -- is paramount, and this demands that a leftist party like Syriza must go.

Monday, May 11, 2015

Greek Debt Negotiations to Muddle Along, But Things Actually Looking Up for Syriza

It is Monday morning which must mean that there is a meeting in Brussels between eurozone finance ministers and Yanis Varoufakis' Greek negotiating team. Tomorrow is the deadline for repayment of 750 million euros to the IMF. Last week Varoufakis said Greece would make the repayment. The ever-skeptical Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism is not so sure. As she argues in her post today, "Greece Finally Threatens Default as Deal with Creditors Remains Remote,"
The ruling Greek coalition appears to have finally woken up to the fact that it it cornered. As we indicated, the longer the creditors keep Greece in the sweatbox, the more its popularity is destined to decline. 
While the latest polls still show Syriza as the most popular party, its support is now at 36%, a round trip from a huge surge after the government took office to back to where it stood when it was voted into office. Approval ratings of the government’s strategy have dropped precipitously from the very high levels reached shortly after the new government took office. As e pointed out early on, the best strategy for the creditors was simply to remain non-negotiable. Either Syriza would capitulate to their demands, or the government would lose support, paving the way for the return of a more complaint coalition. Syriza appears to realize that following the inertial path of trying to extend its negotiating runway does not work in its favor. Even if Greece were to pull a rabbit out of the hat and make the €750 million IMF payment, it has a total of €1.5 billion coming due to the IMF in June, which it almost certainly can’t satisfy if it fails to unlock the bailout funds.
Yves Smith seems to think that Syriza can either make the IMF payment tomorrow and risk having to issue scrip to pensioners and government workers at the end of the month, or it can stiff the IMF, a course of action that would not immediately precipitate default and Grexit. As Smith explains:
The situation is more fluid than it appears. The odds are high that blame game political calculations will win over sound policy. We’re already seeing jockeying starting to take place. Notice Schauble’s “justifiable conditions” caveat. He’s made clear repeatedly that he’d just as soon see Greece leave the Eurozone, but no one, particularly Merkel, wants to be seen to have pushed Greece out. Thus if Greece plays its cards so it can be depicted to have brought the default (and if it comes to that, an exit), that works to the advantage of the hardliners who see Greece as disposable and believe a default/possible exit can be made painful enough for the Greek people so as to make any other country that might contemplate leaving the Eurozone to see that alternative as too costly.
Despite the continued impasse, and virtual certainty of a default on Tuesday [!], the creditors have quite a lot of choices and options. For instance, despite the IMF’s tough talk about not giving Greece any grace period on a default, an IMF default is not as fine a trigger event at a private sector bond default. As the Financial Times explains:
But that hard line masks a little wiggle room created by the IMF’s own procedures. Under the official timeline plan, it is not until a month after a missed payment that the managing director formally notifies the board and not until three months afterwards that a formal statement to the outside world is expected to be made.
In other words, even if Greece defaults on the loan repayment to the IMF, things can continue to muddle along as they have. The June repayments are larger than this month's. But if missed payments can play out over months before a default is officially declared, there is no reason why this can't repeat itself next month.

In the Business section of today's "newspaper of record" is a slightly more sanguine treatment of the Brussels negotiations. Peter Eavis, Jack Ewing and Landon Thomas, "I.M.F. and Central Bank Loom Large Over Greece’s Debt Talks," see a chink in the troika's armor, and it is not the wiggle room on IMF repayments; it is the risk aversion of the European Central Bank:
It would of course also be a high-stakes gamble for Greece to do anything that could undermine relations with the central bank, which is shoring up Greece’s banking system. It has lent Greek banks more than €110 billion, cash the lenders need to operate but would have trouble raising on international money markets. 
The support to the banks is not the debt that the officials in the Greek government would consider for default. Instead, the idea would be to not repay Greek government bonds held by the central bank. Greece is scheduled to repay nearly €7 billion on those this summer. 
If the Greek banks could not repay their central bank loans, the losses would be passed on to other eurozone countries. An outcry would come from Germany and other countries already fed up with what they regard as Greece’s misbehavior. The central bank’s credibility — probably a central bank’s most important asset — could be damaged. 
Still, the central bank’s deep caution about financial stability would most likely limit how hard it pressed Greece. As the guardian of the single currency, the central bank may not want to do anything that could set off a chain of catastrophic events in Greece’s banking sector that could lead the country to quit the euro. 
“The E.C.B. does not want to be responsible for precipitating a crisis,” said Mujtaba Rahman, practice head for the European Union at Eurasia Group, a political consultancy. “They are very, very concerned about having blood on their hands.”
I know at the end of April when last I wrote about this I said climax was near. Then it looked impossibile that Varoufakis could scrape together the 750 million euros due the IMF on May 12. At the time there was the brouhaha over Varoufakis' obstreperousness; things seemed to be at an unbridgeable impasse and something was going to fracture. But then Tsipras organized a deft cosmetic reshuffling of the bargaining team, with Varoufakis nominally sent to the sidelines, and that seemed to cool things down. Also, I had no idea just how wide the nonpayment wiggle room to the IMF is. Things can continue to go on as they have for months.

Syriza will get some rhetorical help from the Scottish National Party blasting away at austerity. And there is evidence that the U.S. is extremely jealous of Russian pipeline overtures to Greece. So all in all I am more hopeful of some sort of resolution that favors Greece than I have been in months.

Monday, April 27, 2015

Greece and the Troika: Climax Near

Each week since January when Syriza won the election in Greece and formed a new government I have been looking forward to some sort of climax to the battle with the troika and the troika's neoliberal austerity diktats.

If Syriza buckles, and, contrary to all that Tsipras and Varoufakis have promised, accepts the austerity diktats of the troika, the government will fall and we can get on with seeing what to do next. If the troika buckles, and accepts Syriza's non-austerity plan to pay off its creditors, there will be a much-needed crack in reigning neoliberal orthodoxy, a ray of sunshine for non-traditional democratic movements such as Podemos in Spain.

But week in and week out there has been no resolution as acrimonious negotiations have ground along with very little movement if any between the parties.

Now, finally, we seem to be in the home stretch.

I know it seems like we've been here before. But I think this is really it. And not just because of the public display of acrimony in Riga this past Friday (James Kanter, "Eurozone Ministers Admonish Greece for Slow Progress on Overhauls"). As Kanter makes plain, the issues have finally been distilled to the simplest elements. The neoliberal orthodoxy wants Greece to sacrifice pension benefits. Syriza has no more wiggle room because a €750 million payment to the IMF is coming due on May 12:
The frustration with Greece is boiling over more than two months after the international lenders gave Athens until late June to present plans for reforms that would both ease austerity and overhaul its economy. 
The lack of agreement on those plans means European lenders will not release the next allocation of bailout money — a 7.2-billion-euro, or $7.5 billion, payment — to keep the Greek government running and avoid a potential default. 
Mr. Dijsselbloem said it was up to Mr. Varoufakis and his government to present more ambitious proposals, noting that the next scheduled gathering of the Eurogroup would be on May 11, a day before Greece must pay €750 million to the International Monetary Fund as part of its loan agreements.
There was “a great sense of urgency around the room,” acknowledged Mr. Dijsselbloem. 
As negotiations have continued between Greece and representatives of its creditors in recent weeks — meetings separate from the periodic gatherings of the finance ministers — the two sides are said to remain divided on significant issues. Greece has insisted that it cannot cut pensions any further or accept creditors’ demands for a budget that would require a relatively high primary surplus — a surplus when debt repayments are not taken into account.
Greek officials have insisted that these issues are “red lines” that cannot be crossed, and Mr. Varoufakis underscored them in his comments to reporters in Riga.
Some of the antagonism between the Eurogroup and Greece stems from continuing disagreement over whether lenders can conduct fact-finding at Greek ministries in Athens, to verify the true state of the country’s finances, for example, rather than meeting in hotels with Greek officials.
A Finance Ministry official in Athens on Friday, speaking only on the condition of anonymity because of the political tensions surrounding the discussions, said that the Greek government was “not bluffing” in opposing tough measures and was intent on protecting the country’s interests.
Mr. Varoufakis, speaking separately to Greek reporters in Riga on Friday said that the country had submitted a new, revised list of reforms at a discussion between deputy finance ministers this week — but that the document had not been presented to the Eurogroup for procedural reasons that he derided as unnecessarily complicated. He accused eurozone officials of “undermining tactics” and “negativism” and said the climate in Friday’s meeting had been tense, although he denied reports by some news media that officials had verbally attacked him.
Naked Capitalism's Yves Smith has a must-read article this morning, "Eurogroup Demands Varoufakis’ Ouster; Trajectory Toward Default Continues." It is less sneering in tone than her usual posts, which have been very skeptical of the Syriza-led government's negotiating position. Of late, Smith has chosen to emphasize, helpfully, that Tsipras and Varoufakis are moderates, and that about one-third of their governing coalition is to their left; hence, there is little possibility that Tsipras will suddenly kowtow to the troika:
The problem, as we’ve said before, is that the government is boxed in by its coalition members. Even if the moderates in Syriza wanted to make concessions (and Tsipras and Varoufakis are both moderates), they need the support of the hardline left Syriza members, which are about 1/3 of their bloc. And they won’t give in. They’ll bring down the government first. 
What are the bones of contention? We have said that the new government has repeatedly tried end-running the process set forth in the Eurogroup memo, which was for the government to produce a detailed list of structural reforms which would then be approved by the members of the Troika, and finally by the Eurogroup before the bailout funds would be released. The Greek side has instead tried going directly to the Eurogroup to get draft memos approved, going to the European Commission, and going to Merkel, now twice. That’s fed the Eurocrat complaint that the Greeks have wasted time. The various reform lists that the Greek government has produced so far have been dismissed as insufficiently detailed. Just based on media reports on their length, that beef seems to be valid. 
But does that mean the solution is to let the bailout monitors beaver away? While Varoufakis’ detractors may have a point that he wants to negotiate too many issues at the key policy player level, the fact is that the two sides have no agreement at a high level. How does it make sense to work on details?
What appears to be in the offing over the  next several weeks is a default by Greece when it can't re-pay the IMF loan; then it will be up to the ECB to force a Grexit by either cutting off entirely or making further Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to Greek banks so onerous that Greece will have to leave the eurozone. As Yves outlines for her readers:
Defaulting in May is particularly bad for Greece. The Greek public is overwhelmingly opposed to a a Grexit, and as we’ve indicated, it’s the ECB, and not the Greek government, that determines whether a default means a Grexit.
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The Greek government appears to be in denial or paralysis. Officials have made conflicting statements on whether the ruling coalition is willing to hold its ground even if the cost is leaving the EU and on whether the government will have a referendum to resolve the matter if talks break down. On the referendum matter, financial time is already moving faster than political time. In most countries, the process for conducting a referendum involves lead time (a Parliamentary vote and a period of time, often Constitutionally mandated, before polling). With a default likely in early May, and a deal needing to be agreed at breakneck speed to avert that, Greece would seem to be past the point where a referendum could inform decisions.
Diane Shugart points out in a later tweet that the Kapa poll shows Syriza support at 36.9%, or virtually the same level they had when voted into office. However, that is a big drop from recent ratings.
While the cost of a Grexit would be extremely high in economic terms (I’ve seen a forecast of a fall of 20% in GDP, worse than anyone anticipates from continued austerity), Kouvelakis contends that citizens have been given only one side of the story:
The main element fueling this troubled atmosphere is, however, the fact that the scaremongering on the theme of the “Grexit” remains unchallenged at the level of broad public opinion. The right-wing opposition and the mainstream media, increasingly hostile to the government and using all possible arguments to push it towards full surrender, associate the break with the eurozone with an apocalypse — as they have done relentlessly since the start of the crisis.
But the response on the part of the government tends to be that this perspective will be avoided thanks to the “honest compromise” to which the Europeans will finally have to agree. Hardly a discourse, to say the least, that can mobilize Syriza’s base and prepare society for an eventual rupture with Europe.
Both Greece and its creditors look to be sleepwalking into a breakup that both profess they want to avoid. But the mutual distrust and denigration are classic divorce dynamics, and there is no relationship counselor in the mix. Tsipras is right to regard Merkel as his best, or more accurately, only hope, but the fissure may be too far advanced for her to paper it over, assuming that she is willing to do that.
In this scenario, default leads to a Grexident because the parties at this point after months of impasse are thoroughly alienated from one another.

I don't want to seem brutally cavalier -- because a further 20% drop in GDP for Greece already reeling from a depression will be cataclysmic -- but it is high time that something gives here. If Syriza can't deliver on what it promised, an end to austerity, new elections should be called. If the troika is so addicted to austerity, let it force Greece out of the eurozone and bring on the market response.