Showing posts with label European Central Bank. Show all posts
Showing posts with label European Central Bank. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 17, 2015

Default Does Not Equal a Grexit: Get Ready for Additional Acts in the Greek Debt Drama

It appears to me, and what I have said on this page in the past, is that there is no alternative to a Greek default on its debt obligation to the troika -- International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and the European Commission; either that or a complete about-face by the troika, capitulating on its demands to cut pensions and loosen labor laws. Germany's strict allegiance to austerity, as well as antipathy towards Greece shared by eurozone states Finland, Spain, et al makes a troika capitulation a long shot.

Several stories this morning (James Kanter and Niki Kitsantonis, "Tsipras Attacks Greece’s Creditors as Pressure Grows on Debts"; Peter Eavis, "Greek Exit Would Shake, but Most Likely Not Shatter, Eurozone") sound the alarm on the coming Greek default. The one story that caught my eye though was an AP piece ("Will Greece Leave the Euro? A Look at Its Options") that problematizes the notion of any clear resolution of the Greek debt drama once the country defaults at the end of this month:
Here are some questions and answers on Greece's future. They could come in handy during Thursday's meeting of eurozone finance ministers in Luxembourg.
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HOW DOES A COUNTRY LEAVE THE EURO? 
Technically, it can't. These are uncharted waters. European Union treaties legally allow members to leave the 28-nation EU, but no mechanism was foreseen to let countries leave the euro. Theoretically, if all 19 nations agree that it's time for Greece to go then a "Grexit" could be negotiated. Some argue the country might have to leave the EU altogether to leave the single currency. 
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WHEN IS THE POINT OF NO RETURN? 
That would be when the European Central Bank decides to cut off emergency credit to Greece's banks, according to Zsolt Darvas, senior fellow at the Breugel think-tank in Brussels. 
That could happen if there is a run on Greek banks — in which case the ECB might not want to risk its money supporting them. Concerns over a run on banks could grow if it becomes clear that Greece will default on its next debt repayment, due June 30.
The ECB could also cut Greek banks loose if the country defaults on debt repayments due to the ECB in July and August. 
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WHAT WOULD HAPPEN THEN? 
Banks would probably have to close for a while and when they reopen, the government would likely put limits on how much money depositors can take out. "People would try to take their money out of the banks. The banks would not be able to pay," Darvas says. "People would try to store their euros at home, not pay taxes, and the whole financial system would come to a halt." 
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HOW CAN GREECE AVOID SUCH A DISASTER? 
Apart from pay its debts on time, some experts believe Greece could limit the damage by engineering its departure in secret. A small group of officials could make the exit preparations and then act on them almost immediately. They would inform their eurozone partners just hours before Greece walks out the door, according Roger Bootle, who heads the research analysis group Capital Economics. The public would be the last to know.
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WHAT MONEY WOULD GREECE USE? 
Greece could go back to using the drachma or introduce a new currency. Either way, volume is essential, and that implies serious challenges. Iraq faced similar issues when it introduced a new dinar in just three months following the U.S.-led invasion. "You would need a huge volume, very quickly. There's also the transportation that is a very big challenge. A lot of police, troops would be required to attend to the cash needs of a country the size of Greek. Logistically it would be a huge challenge," Darvas says. 
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WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO ITS DEBT? 
Greece's bills won't go away, and the jury is out on whether they could be converted to a new currency, although Greece would probably try to redenominate and renegotiate the debt. The one advantage in this for Athens is that all kinds of loans would probably be written down by its creditors. But Darvas says that "all of these technical issues can be resolved. The economic costs of a euro exit — GDP fall and the rise in unemployment — will be far higher."
If you are burnt out on following the debt-negotiating drama don't expect any relief come end of the month. I don't think Greece has any intention of exiting the eurozone; if it had, if preparations were being made to issue drachmas, there would be leaks by now. Once Greece defaults, that is when another round of negotiations will get going. The ECB could force Greek banks to collapse by freezing Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). But by making such a move, the troika would lose the political battle; Syriza would be vindicated.

Monday, April 27, 2015

Greece and the Troika: Climax Near

Each week since January when Syriza won the election in Greece and formed a new government I have been looking forward to some sort of climax to the battle with the troika and the troika's neoliberal austerity diktats.

If Syriza buckles, and, contrary to all that Tsipras and Varoufakis have promised, accepts the austerity diktats of the troika, the government will fall and we can get on with seeing what to do next. If the troika buckles, and accepts Syriza's non-austerity plan to pay off its creditors, there will be a much-needed crack in reigning neoliberal orthodoxy, a ray of sunshine for non-traditional democratic movements such as Podemos in Spain.

But week in and week out there has been no resolution as acrimonious negotiations have ground along with very little movement if any between the parties.

Now, finally, we seem to be in the home stretch.

I know it seems like we've been here before. But I think this is really it. And not just because of the public display of acrimony in Riga this past Friday (James Kanter, "Eurozone Ministers Admonish Greece for Slow Progress on Overhauls"). As Kanter makes plain, the issues have finally been distilled to the simplest elements. The neoliberal orthodoxy wants Greece to sacrifice pension benefits. Syriza has no more wiggle room because a €750 million payment to the IMF is coming due on May 12:
The frustration with Greece is boiling over more than two months after the international lenders gave Athens until late June to present plans for reforms that would both ease austerity and overhaul its economy. 
The lack of agreement on those plans means European lenders will not release the next allocation of bailout money — a 7.2-billion-euro, or $7.5 billion, payment — to keep the Greek government running and avoid a potential default. 
Mr. Dijsselbloem said it was up to Mr. Varoufakis and his government to present more ambitious proposals, noting that the next scheduled gathering of the Eurogroup would be on May 11, a day before Greece must pay €750 million to the International Monetary Fund as part of its loan agreements.
There was “a great sense of urgency around the room,” acknowledged Mr. Dijsselbloem. 
As negotiations have continued between Greece and representatives of its creditors in recent weeks — meetings separate from the periodic gatherings of the finance ministers — the two sides are said to remain divided on significant issues. Greece has insisted that it cannot cut pensions any further or accept creditors’ demands for a budget that would require a relatively high primary surplus — a surplus when debt repayments are not taken into account.
Greek officials have insisted that these issues are “red lines” that cannot be crossed, and Mr. Varoufakis underscored them in his comments to reporters in Riga.
Some of the antagonism between the Eurogroup and Greece stems from continuing disagreement over whether lenders can conduct fact-finding at Greek ministries in Athens, to verify the true state of the country’s finances, for example, rather than meeting in hotels with Greek officials.
A Finance Ministry official in Athens on Friday, speaking only on the condition of anonymity because of the political tensions surrounding the discussions, said that the Greek government was “not bluffing” in opposing tough measures and was intent on protecting the country’s interests.
Mr. Varoufakis, speaking separately to Greek reporters in Riga on Friday said that the country had submitted a new, revised list of reforms at a discussion between deputy finance ministers this week — but that the document had not been presented to the Eurogroup for procedural reasons that he derided as unnecessarily complicated. He accused eurozone officials of “undermining tactics” and “negativism” and said the climate in Friday’s meeting had been tense, although he denied reports by some news media that officials had verbally attacked him.
Naked Capitalism's Yves Smith has a must-read article this morning, "Eurogroup Demands Varoufakis’ Ouster; Trajectory Toward Default Continues." It is less sneering in tone than her usual posts, which have been very skeptical of the Syriza-led government's negotiating position. Of late, Smith has chosen to emphasize, helpfully, that Tsipras and Varoufakis are moderates, and that about one-third of their governing coalition is to their left; hence, there is little possibility that Tsipras will suddenly kowtow to the troika:
The problem, as we’ve said before, is that the government is boxed in by its coalition members. Even if the moderates in Syriza wanted to make concessions (and Tsipras and Varoufakis are both moderates), they need the support of the hardline left Syriza members, which are about 1/3 of their bloc. And they won’t give in. They’ll bring down the government first. 
What are the bones of contention? We have said that the new government has repeatedly tried end-running the process set forth in the Eurogroup memo, which was for the government to produce a detailed list of structural reforms which would then be approved by the members of the Troika, and finally by the Eurogroup before the bailout funds would be released. The Greek side has instead tried going directly to the Eurogroup to get draft memos approved, going to the European Commission, and going to Merkel, now twice. That’s fed the Eurocrat complaint that the Greeks have wasted time. The various reform lists that the Greek government has produced so far have been dismissed as insufficiently detailed. Just based on media reports on their length, that beef seems to be valid. 
But does that mean the solution is to let the bailout monitors beaver away? While Varoufakis’ detractors may have a point that he wants to negotiate too many issues at the key policy player level, the fact is that the two sides have no agreement at a high level. How does it make sense to work on details?
What appears to be in the offing over the  next several weeks is a default by Greece when it can't re-pay the IMF loan; then it will be up to the ECB to force a Grexit by either cutting off entirely or making further Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to Greek banks so onerous that Greece will have to leave the eurozone. As Yves outlines for her readers:
Defaulting in May is particularly bad for Greece. The Greek public is overwhelmingly opposed to a a Grexit, and as we’ve indicated, it’s the ECB, and not the Greek government, that determines whether a default means a Grexit.
*** 
The Greek government appears to be in denial or paralysis. Officials have made conflicting statements on whether the ruling coalition is willing to hold its ground even if the cost is leaving the EU and on whether the government will have a referendum to resolve the matter if talks break down. On the referendum matter, financial time is already moving faster than political time. In most countries, the process for conducting a referendum involves lead time (a Parliamentary vote and a period of time, often Constitutionally mandated, before polling). With a default likely in early May, and a deal needing to be agreed at breakneck speed to avert that, Greece would seem to be past the point where a referendum could inform decisions.
Diane Shugart points out in a later tweet that the Kapa poll shows Syriza support at 36.9%, or virtually the same level they had when voted into office. However, that is a big drop from recent ratings.
While the cost of a Grexit would be extremely high in economic terms (I’ve seen a forecast of a fall of 20% in GDP, worse than anyone anticipates from continued austerity), Kouvelakis contends that citizens have been given only one side of the story:
The main element fueling this troubled atmosphere is, however, the fact that the scaremongering on the theme of the “Grexit” remains unchallenged at the level of broad public opinion. The right-wing opposition and the mainstream media, increasingly hostile to the government and using all possible arguments to push it towards full surrender, associate the break with the eurozone with an apocalypse — as they have done relentlessly since the start of the crisis.
But the response on the part of the government tends to be that this perspective will be avoided thanks to the “honest compromise” to which the Europeans will finally have to agree. Hardly a discourse, to say the least, that can mobilize Syriza’s base and prepare society for an eventual rupture with Europe.
Both Greece and its creditors look to be sleepwalking into a breakup that both profess they want to avoid. But the mutual distrust and denigration are classic divorce dynamics, and there is no relationship counselor in the mix. Tsipras is right to regard Merkel as his best, or more accurately, only hope, but the fissure may be too far advanced for her to paper it over, assuming that she is willing to do that.
In this scenario, default leads to a Grexident because the parties at this point after months of impasse are thoroughly alienated from one another.

I don't want to seem brutally cavalier -- because a further 20% drop in GDP for Greece already reeling from a depression will be cataclysmic -- but it is high time that something gives here. If Syriza can't deliver on what it promised, an end to austerity, new elections should be called. If the troika is so addicted to austerity, let it force Greece out of the eurozone and bring on the market response.

Tuesday, March 24, 2015

Grexit -- There Is No Alternative

Yesterday ("Deadlines Near as Greece and Germany Seek a Consensus on Debt" by Alison Smale) leftist Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras was in Berlin meeting with rightist German chancellor Angela Merkel trying to find a path forward out of the funding impasse between Greece and the troika.

Naked Capitalism's Yves Smith ably adumbrated ("Leaked Tsipras Letter to Merkel Shows Increased Desperation, Warns of Imminent Default") the impasse as follows:
If the plan of the Troika was to starve the Tsipras government and produce either capitulation or a loss of domestic credibility, their effort appears to be on track.
FAZ reported that the Greek government is set to run out of funds by April 8. Tonight, the Financial Times reports that Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras sent a desperate-sounding letter to Angela Merkel on March 15. That appears to have led Merkel to meet with him at an EU conference last week and arrange for a one-on-one session tomorrow.
From the Financial Times account:
Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, has warned Angela Merkel that it will be “impossible” for Athens to service debt obligations due in the coming weeks if the EU fails to distribute any short-term financial assistance to the country…
In the letter, Mr Tsipras warns that his government will be forced to choose between paying off loans, owed primarily to the International Monetary Fund, or continue social spending. He blames European Central Bank limits on Greece’s ability to issue short-term debt as well as eurozone bailout authorities’ refusal to disburse any aid before Athens adopts a new round of economic reforms.
The troika refuses to release any new bailout money until Tsipras' Syriza-led government can provide a list of revenue-generators to replace the pension cuts and privatizations agreed to by the previous government of Antonis Samaras, as Jim Yardley explains in "In Greece, Syriza Struggles to Deliver Promises as Money Runs Out":
Greece’s finances have deteriorated as postelection anxiety over uncertainty about the bailout spurred a spike in bank withdrawals. Tax collections also plunged, raising questions about whether the government would be able to pay state workers and meet other obligations.
On Feb. 20, Greek leaders signed a four-month bailout extension with its three main creditors — the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission. Yet creditors have refused to release a critical 7.2-billion-euro, or about $7.8 billion, loan payment (money that Syriza had once vowed not to accept but that is now badly needed) until the government provides a list of acceptable structural reforms to replace pension cuts and other austerity measures that had been under consideration by the previous government.
To counterattack, Tsipras voiced support for the idea of German reparations. This from a story, "Syriza’s Call for German Reparations: A Bolivaran Tsipras?," by Joshua Tartakowsky which appeared on CounterPunch over the weekend:
In his speech to the Hellenic Parliament, Prime Minister Tsipras touched on the issue which both some Anglo-Saxon socialists and Conservative Germans would wish would have avoided. Tsipras brought to public view the issue of reparations of World War II, and the fact Germany did not pay back the interest-free forced loan made on the Greek bank by the German occupation forces until today. While some reparations were paid in the 1950s, these were quite small considering the damage and did not include the forced loan. Tsipras demanded reparations from Germany for the immense damage and killing caused during the brutal German occupation as a necessary act to restore historical justice. The parliament decided on the establishment of a committee led by economists and historians who will pursue the issue of reparations. The Greek Justice Minister said that if necessary, he would consider seizing German assets in Greece, including, for example, the Goethe Institutes in Athens and Thessaloniki and even homes of German citizens.
In the Merkel-Tsipras story that appears in today's paper Smale summarizes the sniping between Greece and Germany as follows:
Verbal hostilities between Greece and Germany mounted in recent weeks, with particular bitterness lacing the remarks of each country’s finance ministers. Last week, a controversy swirled over whether the Greek minister, Yanis Varoufakis, had made a provocative one-fingered gesture at Germany at a conference in Croatia two years ago.
More gravely, the question of whether Germany should pay more reparations to Greece for Nazi war crimes and forced loans has flared, with some leading figures on the German left ready to consider such payments.
The magazine Der Spiegel summed it all up with a cover this week superimposing a picture of Ms. Merkel on an old photograph of Nazi commanders at the Parthenon in Athens under the headline, “The German Übermacht.” In an accompanying article, it argued that fellow Europeans increasingly see Germany, which is Europe’s biggest economy, and its leaders as dominant. “Yet they are rather a weak than a strong hegemon,” Der Spiegel said of the Germans.
In bad news for Greece, Smale reports that Mario Draghi, head of the European Central Bank, refuses to allow Greek banks to issue new loans based on short-term Greek government debt: "In a blow to hard-pressed Greek banks, Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, said on Monday that Greece had not yet met conditions that would allow its debt to again be used to secure central bank loans."

Patience with Syriza-troika impasse, both from the right and the left, appears to be near its end. An unsigned Gray Lady editorial over the weekend, "The Greece Issue Breeds Brinkmanship in the Eurozone," marked this growing testiness among the few tepid Syriza advocates in the mainstream:
There is no doubt that Mr. Tsipras needs to move quickly to reform the Greek economy, which is running low on cash. Tax collections have fallen since his left-wing party, Syriza, took power in January; Greek businesses are complaining that they are not being paid for work they’ve done for the government; and some bigger companies have started moving cash to London. But pushing Greece into default by withholding the short-term financing it needs to pay its bills would be courting disaster.
The rumor is that Tsipras is in Berlin to secure better terms for the privatization of state assets, a red line he promised not to cross.

The fact is that the right is in ascent. The U.S. 2014 midterms, the recent elections in Israel and France, a decent but nonetheless modest showing for Podemos in Spain's Andalusia, all point to an estranged public tacking to the right. Syriza is carrying the weight of not only Greece but the entire global electoral left. A misstep by Tsipras will continue the complete hollowing out of social democracy.

Such high stakes mean that there is little chance of Germany or the troika loosening its chokehold. Syriza will be crushed at all costs in order to leave the field free for the neoliberals to continue a decades-long orgy of looting and pillaging.

Given that, Tsipras must soon realize there is no alternative to a Grexit.

Thursday, February 5, 2015

Maybe Not a Grexit but a Default: Naked Capitalism's Yves Smith on Greece's Efforts to Free Itself From Bloodsucking Austerity

With recent moves by the European Central Bank to force Greece's Syriza government to accept the same neoliberal austerity program that it was elected to reject, the one that has led to 25% unemployment and a 25% reduction in the size of the Greek economy, and to accept it quickly it seems to me that the only option available to Varoufakis and Tsipras is to default.

Naked Capitalism's Yves Smith's writing on Syriza's efforts to beat back austerity, though pessimistic, has been superb. Her "Will the Cavalry Ride Over the Hill in Time for Greece?" is a must read:
We’ve cautioned readers that Greece is in a very weak bargaining position relative to its financial overlords in the Troika. As much as Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis is making sound, logical arguments and presenting proposals that if anything are too accommodating, despite initial cool reactions, many of Greece’s soi disantpartners are diehard neoliberals and/or are politically constrained. Varoufakis is approaching them as if they can deal in good faith, when their idea of “good faith” comes from a punitive parallel universe.
While Varoufakis and presumably Tsipras are unwilling to deploy the one realpolitik tool at their disposal, a threat of Grexit, other parties who have influence on the recalcitrant actors are more sensitive to the fact that much more is at issue than just the fate of Greece. The ongoing game of extend and pretend has managed to forestall what amounts to an existential crisis for the Eurozone. Its founders knew its structure was incomplete and imperfect, but they believed the logic of preventing future wars was so compelling that the inevitable future crises would be resolved by further integration. 
Unfortunately, as we’ve been chronicling off and on since 2010, the northern bloc, and most important, Germany, have not wanted to give up its catbird seat. It has influence in excess of its population, continues to run trade surpluses with the rest of the Eurozone, which is tantamount to stealing demand, yet it is unwilling to accept the inevitable consequence of running sustained trade surpluses, which is that you must finance your trade partners (or to put it in the terms of petrostates, recycle your surpluses). Moving toward integration, particularly more powerful governance at the Eurozone level, and having more fiscal transfers to allow countries like Greece to have enough demand to have manageable levels of production and employment, means that Germany will have to cede power. And Europe still has strong nationalistic impulses, another obstacle to cementing the alliance. 
But it has also been clear, with the rise of ultra-right, anti-Eurozone parties, and to a lesser degree, anti-austerity parties like Syriza and Spain’s Podemos, that this unsustainable status quo is if anything past its sell-by date. Thus for the more forward-thinking technocrats and politicians, Greece’s efforts to free itself from failed austerity policies serve as a focus point for their own agendas to move away from anti-growth, anti-democratic policies. 
The problem for Varoufakis and Syriza generally is that the magnitude of the task before them, of negotiating what they hope is a deal with significant new components, is already difficult to accomplish by June, the longest time frame they are likely to have, even if their interlocutors were more receptive. With limited knowledge of the power structures in the key governments with which they are dealing, it’s well nigh impossible for them to find, let alone work with, mid level and senior level figures who are their natural allies. 
Thus Varoufakis (at least for now) is forced to broadcast his messages when narrowcasting would be better. Broadcasting means he will almost inevitably offend some key audience, given if nothing else how far apart Syriza’s voters and German officials are in their expectations for the negotiations. But the broadcasting is critical to communicating and rallying both insider allies as well as voters in periphery countries, since shifts in poll results increase pressure on the Eurozone reactionaries. Perversely, the best thing for Syriza’s chances were the Hebdo murders, since the boost it gave to anti-Eurozone Front National leader Marine Le Pen is a big wake-up call for the Eurozone elites.
Today, after ECB announced that it will not accept Greek government debt as collateral for new loans, Smith writes in "ECB to Greece: Drop Dead":
Even by the standards of bank thuggishness, the move by the ECB against Greece last night was a stunner. Americans have become used to banks taking houses under dubious pretexts when both the investors and borrowers would do better with a writedown. But to see the ECB try take a country is another matter entirely. As one seasoned pro said, “If anyone had tried something like this against a country with a decent sized military, the tanks would be rolling.” 
The ECB’s bombshell was to put Greece at risk of an intensification of its ongoing bank run in order to pressure it to agree to a deal with the Troika under an impossibly tight timetable, even shorter than the February 28 pre-existing deadline that Greece Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis had planned to extend until June. As we’ve discussed at length previously, a longer negotiation timetable would be necessary to meet Greece’s objective of restructuring of the relationship with the Troika. Greece wanted that to be based on the recognition that Greece could never pay off its debts and that it was in both side’s interest to let Greece implement more growth-oriented policies. But the message from the enforcers at the ECB was unambiguous: Greece has no rights and needs to accept its debtcropper status. 
The ECB has thus also effectively said that it would rather have fascists like Golden Dawn running Greece, which is what will eventually occur if it succeeds in breaking Syriza. It also just handed France’s Marine Le Pen, head of the nationalistic, anti-Eurozone Front National fantastic fodder for her campaign. 
The February 28 date was the result of Greece presumably needing access to so-called bailout funds to pay off an IMF obligation coming due. Varoufakis said he would refuse those funds, and could get by until June, when more loans came due, by relying on existing tax receipts and getting what he regarded as minor waivers from the central bank. He also had some creative ideas for restructuring Greece’s debts and said that he wanted the OECD rather than the Troika to provide auditors on behalf of the lenders. 
Even though we warned that the ECB was likely to use its control over liquidity facilities to stymie Syriza’s plans and force Greece to the negotiating table sooner rather than later, the smackdown was even more brutal than we imagined possible.
***
As we have said before, Greece is in a weak bargaining position. It may be able to go beyond February 28, but probably not very long. Some readers have suggested appealing to Russia, but not only would that unleash even more brutal treatment from the Troika, but the German press has also reported that Russia is not interested. 
Varoufakis has ruled out a Grexit as ultimately hugely detrimental to Greece. Even if the Tsipras government were to decide to reverse course (likely leading Varoufakis to resign), he would probably want a referendum to make sure it had popular support. Most governments have procedures that don’t allow for them to be launched on short order. So even with this averse development, a Grexit seems unlikely. 
The Greek government can implement emergency measures, like capital controls and restrictions on daily bank withdrawals, to reduce the bank run. Measures like nationalizing all domestic banks and implementing a plan to allow foreign banks to leave the country in an orderly manner works only if the Greek central bank can backstop the domestic banks, and that in turn works only in the event of a Grexit, since the central bank needs to be a currency issuer. 
And of course, Greece can default. 
In response to an e-mail tonight, Varoufakis wrote, “One thing we will not do is capitulate.” I hope readers will wish him and his fellow citizens good luck. But the Troika seems determined to destroy Greece if that is what it takes to show that their authority remains unchallenged. But the cost of discipling Greece is likely to be far greater than they imagine, not just in financial terms, but to the Eurozone project itself. 

Thursday, January 15, 2015

ECB's QE: Too Little, Too Late

Proof that Mario Draghi has the votes he needs to launch a European Central Bank (ECB) version of the U.S Federal Reserve's quantitative easing (bond buying) program when bank governors next meet on January 22 is David Jolly's "Swiss National Bank Abandons Minimum Exchange Rate Against Euro":
The Swiss National Bank said in a statement that it was giving up the minimum exchange rate of 1.20 Swiss francs per euro, less than a month after it had reiterated a pledge to continue to support that floor by buying the euro in “unlimited quantities” if needed.
***
The euro, used by 19 nations, has been a one-way bet since last May, falling about 15 percent against the dollar to a nine-year low, partly because of expectations that the European Central Bank would announce its intention next week to combat economic weakness and deflationary pressures by buying eurozone government bonds on a large scale. 
In that policy, known as quantitative easing, the central bank would effectively be printing money, increasing the supply of euros relative to other currencies and driving down its market price. 
Phyllis Papadavid, foreign exchange strategist at BNP Paribas in London, said after the Swiss central bank action that monetary authorities were “still sensitive” to the overvaluation of the franc, but that they had adapted to changed conditions — particularly the dollar’s recent rise — by changing course.
With prices dropping 0.2 percent in December, deflation has come to Europe. This, along with a favorable appeals court opinion yesterday supporting the ECB's earlier 2012 announcement that it would purchase government bonds of eurozone member states on the open market, has strengthened Draghi against the German naysayers. For an excellent summary of the ECB's planned foray into quantitative easing (QE) see Jack Ewing's "Devil May Be in the Details on European Central Bank Bond-Buying":
A solid majority on the central bank’s 25-member Governing Council appears, based on recent public statements, to favor broad bond-buying. Their position was strengthened by the opinion submitted to the highest European appeals court on Wednesday in response to a lawsuit by German citizens seeking to block a previously planned bond-buying program that Mr. Draghi announced in 2012 but never deployed.
The ECB's QE is already being criticized as too little, too late. Analysts doubt that purchasing €1-trillion worth of government bonds will cure deflation which has to do with withered demand. Plus, the Governing Council will most likely not act until March; it will only make a commitment to a QE program at its January meeting, but details won't be available until it reconvenes in March.

From now until then the ECB will have to figure out a formula for which bonds to buy. There are no "eurozone" bonds, only bonds issued by member nations. As Ewing clearly summarizes:
Because of the large number of unanswered questions, the European Central Bank may not be ready to announce details of a bond-buying program next week.
“It’s almost impossible for the E.C.B. in this environment not to act,” said Mujtaba Rahman, an analyst at Eurasia Group. But, he said, “We think it’s a two-step move — announcement in January, further details in March.”
Some elements of such a program are a given. The central bank would buy bonds on the open market — not directly from governments, which would be a violation of its charter.
But the bank will have to figure out how to deal with the lack of Pan-European assets comparable to the United States Treasury bonds that the Fed purchased in its quantitative easing program.
The simplest and most likely option would be to buy bonds in proportion to each eurozone country’s share of the central bank’s capital, which is calculated according to each member state’s population and gross domestic product.
The drawback to this method is that it would mean buying large quantities of German government bonds, which are already in heavy demand — so much so that on Wednesday the yield on the 10-year German bond reached a new low. 
Germany accounts for 18 percent of the European Central Bank’s capital, more than any other country. (Malta, with 0.65 percent of the central bank’s capital, has the smallest share.) Market interest rates on some other German government bonds are already below zero. So it is not clear what purpose, if any, would be served by pushing the rates even lower, as would happen if the European Central Bank started buying.
A second option would be to buy only highly rated government bonds — those of France, Finland and Germany, say, while avoiding the bonds of governments with riskier finances, like Portugal or Greece. That approach would answer German concerns that taxpayers could be stuck with the bill if some eurozone governments were to default on their debt.
In theory, if the European Central Bank drove up the prices of highly rated bonds, private investors would turn to the bonds of weaker countries instead. But it is not certain that would happen. If not, the E.C.B. would not achieve its goal of providing relief in heavily indebted countries like Italy.
A third option would be to buy bonds in proportion to the outstanding debt of each eurozone country — the higher the debt level, the more bonds the central bank would buy. This alternative would favor countries that are the most deeply in debt and need the most help, like Italy. But conservative critics in Germany would probably complain that these countries were being rewarded for irresponsibly running up huge debts.
It is hard to imagine a situation where Germany would green-light option three, the only option that Ewing brutes that might have a meaningful impact. So Draghi's QE will not be enough to arrest eurozone deflation.

Draghi has made clear that he wants no part in any candidacy for the Italian presidency (Elisabetta Povoledo, "Resignation of President Will Test Italy’s Premier"). Hopefully this augurs ill for the fresh-faced neoliberal PM Matteo Renzi.

Neoliberalism has to be torn down. Syriza is maintaining its narrow lead going into Greece's January 25 parliamentary elections. If elections were held today in Spain, Podemos would gain a majority (see Vicente Navarro's excellent "What is Going On in Spain? The End of an Era and the Beginning of Podemos").

The mainstream parties of the big three -- Germany, France and the UK -- are under assault from the Right. That is not going to change. The left-hand of the mainstream political duopolies will rush to defend the right, which will have the effect of further disillusioning voters in each nation. Maybe out of this disillusionment real Leftist parties will arise in the big three.

If Hillary is nominated, a similar hopeful possibility will confront voters in the U.S.

The answer to European deflation is obvious. Why not a continent-wide building program similar to China's massive investment in infrastructure?

Tuesday, January 6, 2015

Grexit Sturm und Drang

Europe has problems. A barrel of Brent crude fell below $52, causing the euro to drop to a nine-year low, $1.19, against the dollar. A contentious meeting of the European Central Bank will be held on January 22, a few days prior to the election in Greece, to consider some form of quantitative easing in order to stave off deflation. As Jack Ewing explains in "Falling Euro Fans Fears of a Regional Slowdown":
The further declines in the euro and in oil did not change expectations that when the European Central Bank meets on Jan. 22 that it would unveil further stimulus, broad-based purchases of government bonds, so-called quantitative easing. 
When deciding policy, E.C.B. officials are probably focused on the inflation rate more than the value of the euro or the price of oil, and the German data indicated that inflation continues to fall to levels considered dangerously close to deflation — a downward price spiral that is poisonous for corporate profits. 
German inflation was just 0.1 percent in December, according to an estimate by the government statistics office. 
An official estimate of inflation in the eurozone as a whole is to be released on Wednesday. Analysts expect the rate to fall to close to zero or even below it, putting further pressure on the European Central Bank to act.
Germany, which is dealing with a burgeoning nativist movement that is eroding the base of support for mainstream conservative parties (Alison Smale, "Anti-Immigration Rallies in Germany Defy Calls to Desist"), will argue against quantitative easing. The Germans will reason that the oil-price drop will act as a form of stimulus:
There are still many economists and public officials, though, who maintain that in fact cheap oil and a cheap currency are overwhelmingly good for Europe. One of them is Jens Weidmann, president of the Bundesbank and an influential member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. 
“The cheaper oil price works like a stimulus program,” he said in an interview published Sunday by the Frankfurter Allgemeine newspaper. “Consumers and companies have to spend less and can consume and invest more.” 
The statement was a signal by Mr. Weidmann that he remains skeptical about whether more E.C.B. stimulus was needed. 
While a majority of the E.C.B. Governing Council appears to support embarking on a quantitative easing program, members may be reluctant to risk alienating Mr. Weidmann and the larger German public whose views he represents. Germany worries that it might get stuck paying a big part of the bill if the European Central Bank loses money on any eurozone government bonds it might buy as part of quantitative easing.
These German worries of being left holding a huge bag of worthless bond paper are compounded by Syriza's lead in the Greek polls. Alexis Tsipras, the leader of Syriza, has promised if elected to renegotiate and possibly repudiate loans with the troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, IMF). For the last week German government officials have been lecturing Greeks to stay in line and not monkey with austerity. Liz Alderman has a helpful summary today ("Euro Countries Take Tough Line Toward Greece") of this hectoring:
On Monday, Germany’s economics minister, Sigmar Gabriel, said Europe would not accept undermining the stability that has returned to the eurozone in the last couple of years.
“We aren’t vulnerable to blackmail,” he said in an interview with the German newspaper Hannoversche Allgemeine. “We expect from the Greek government — regardless of who will form it — that the agreements made with the E.U. will be respected.”
Last week, Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, cautioned Greece against moving away from its current economic reforms, saying: “If Greece takes another path, it will be difficult. Any new government will have to stick to the agreements made by its predecessor.”
In an acknowledgment of the delicacy of the situation, German officials on Monday quickly backed away from a weekend report by the magazine Der Spiegel that suggested that Chancellor Angela Merkel and Mr. Schäuble believed that the eurozone could cope if Greece quit the euro and returned to the drachma.
A government spokesman denied that contingency plans had been made for such a possibility, and insisted that Germany wanted Greece to remain in the eurozone.
Officials in Brussels, too, emphasized Monday that membership in the euro bloc was “irrevocable,” although they left open to what extent Greece could renegotiate the terms of its bailout after the election.
“The euro is here to stay,” said a European Commission spokeswoman, Annika Breidthardt.
Guy Verhofstadt, a former Belgian prime minister who leads the Liberal group in the European Parliament, called the idea of a Greek exit, or “Grexit,” from the eurozone “nonsense,” not only because most Greeks do not want to leave the euro, but also because European taxpayers would wind up losing billions of euros that Greece owes them.
If Greeks can hold on and weather the threats and fear mongering (incumbent prime minister Antonis Samaras is campaigning on a purely fear-based appeal asserting that a havoc-plagued Grexit will result if Syriza triumphs) and Syriza can form a government, Tsipras will have a solid bargaining position. Europe is engaged in a pestilential fiction that an austerity-ravaged Greece can actually pay back the loans she has been awarded.

Alderman concludes her story by quoting two Commerzbank economists, Jörg Krämer and Christoph Weil, who say that renegotiation is the most politically expedient option Germany has, despite all the threatening noises from Schäuble et al.:
Still, most observers expect a Greece run by Mr. Tsipras would stay within the eurozone, and that a new Greek government would reach an agreement with its European creditors following a period of turmoil. After all, if Greece were to return to the drachma, the country would likely face new economic upheaval that it could ill afford. 
Preventing a Greek exit is also still desirable for Germany and other countries, since billions of euros in European taxpayer money could be wiped out if Greece were to leave the euro, raising the risk of a political backlash against leaders in those countries, said Jörg Krämer and Christoph Weil, the Commerzbank economists. 
“It would be much easier politically to renegotiate a compromise with Greece, albeit a lame one, and thus maintain the fiction that Greece will pay back its loans at some point in time,” they said.
The fear mongering has just begun. Greeks will pummeled with every type of propaganda and every form of thought control over the next three weeks. Dire warnings of anarchy will be broadcast. The proud Scots were made to buckle recently. Can we expect the Greeks to act rationally and vote to reject the pestilential fiction of austerity?

Last week I was sanguine. Years of brutal benefit cuts and high unemployment would inure the Greek voter to fear mongering at the polls. Now I am not so sure. Deflation on the European continent is going to up the ante and turn the January 25 poll into total war. No effort will be spared to maintain the neoliberal credo of austerity. Alderman reports that Tsipras has only a three-point lead with 20 percent undecided. Not terrific numbers.

Monday, December 29, 2014

Greece's Syriza Soon to Deliver a Mighty Blow to Empire

The announcement this morning (Niki Kitsantonis, "Greece Heading to Early Elections After Presidential Vote Fails") that Greek Prime Minister Antonis Samaras failed to force through the election of his candidate, Stavros Dimas, for president means that there will be early general elections by the end of next month. Syriza, the leftist party that for years has been seeking to renegotiate the bloodthirsty debt agreement with the troika -- the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund -- is favored to win:
Opinion polls show the leftists firmly ahead of Mr. Samaras’s conservative New Democracy party, although Syriza’s lead has narrowed in recent weeks as the prospect of protracted political and financial uncertainty has grown. The Athens Stock Exchange fell by 10 percent during the vote, trimming losses to 7.4 percent later in the day.

The yield on 10-year government bonds, which moves in the opposite direction to the price, spiked nearly a full point to 9.3 percent. The outcome of the parliamentary vote also weighed on markets in the overall eurozone, with the Euro Stoxx 50 blue-chip index losing about 1 percent. The euro was little changed at $1.2199. 
In an interview with state television over the weekend, Mr. Samaras pushed opposition legislators to align with the government in Monday’s vote, saying that failing to elect a president would be “political blackmail” and would result in “pointless upheaval” for the country. 
Despite furious lobbying by the government, Mr. Dimas received only 168 votes, the same number as in the second ballot last week and eight more than in the first vote on Dec. 17. [Votes needed: 180]
Mr. Samaras accused Syriza of “foolish bravado,” adding that the leftists’ economic program was “full of unilateral moves” that would upset Greece’s creditors and jeopardize the country’s fragile return to growth.
Mr. Samaras’s coalition government is working with the so-called troika of lenders, which has granted Greece two bailouts worth 240 billion euros, or about $292 billion, since 2010 to keep the country liquid. In return, the troika has demanded an array of austerity measures that has slashed household incomes by a third and pushed unemployment above 25 percent. 
Negotiations with the members of the troika — the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund — on a tough economic program have been dragging amid rising opposition in Greece to austerity. But eurozone officials have expressed their readiness to extend Greece a precautionary credit line next year.
The possibility of Syriza coming to power is threatening to upend the economic negotiations. Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister and a champion of austerity in Greece and other countries, said in an interview with the German daily Bild on Saturday that any Greek government would have to honor existing agreements. 
“New elections won’t change anything about Greece’s debt,” he said, referring to a debt burden equal to 174 percent of gross domestic product, the highest rate in the eurozone. 
Mujtaba Rahman, an analyst at the London-based Eurasia Group, said the domestic troubles in Greece had the potential to once again bring broader consequences for Europe. 
“France and Italy will be vulnerable economically, as both have done little to reform since the days of the debt crisis,” he said, adding that the southern periphery would be more immune in economic terms. “They will be at risk politically, given their own troubles with populist parties.” [In other words, "Watch out, neoliberal elites. The people are pissed and aren't going to take it anymore."]
The key to investor confidence, he said, will be the E.C.B. and whether it undertakes bond buying at the turn of the year. “If the E.C.B. does not deliver, this could be the trigger for a major reversal in Europe wide market sentiment,” Mr. Rahman said. 
Mr. Tsipras insisted over the weekend that his party’s program for tackling the “humanitarian crisis” in Greece was “not negotiable,” though Syriza has not explained how the Greek state would pay for the promised benefits.
Here the reporter, Niki Kitsantonis, is either being lazy or disingenuous because Tsipras does explain how Syriza will pay for a return of benefits that have been slashed to feed the austerity beast. ZNet recently published the Syriza program, "What the SYRIZA Government Will Do." Tsipras plans to negotiate a growth clause. Meaning that debt payments will come only after growth has returned to the Greek economy. Funds from the troika will be used to promote growth first:
THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATION 
We demand immediate parliamentary elections and a strong negotiation mandate with the goal to: 
  • Write-off the greater part of public debt’s nominal value so that it becomes sustainable in the context of a «European Debt Conference». It happened for Germany in 1953. It can also happen for the South of Europe and Greece.
  • Include a «growth clause» in the repayment of the remaining part so that it is growth-financed and not budget-financed.
  • Include a significant grace period («moratorium») in debt servicing to save funds for growth.
  • Exclude public investment from the restrictions of the Stability and Growth Pact.
  • A «European New Deal» of public investment financed by the European Investment Bank.
  • Quantitative easing by the European Central Bank with direct purchases of sovereign bonds.
  • Finally, we declare once again that the issue of the Nazi Occupation forced loan from the Bank of Greece is open for us. Our partners know it. It will become the country’s official position from our first days in power.
On the basis of this plan, we will fight and secure a socially viable solution to Greece’s debt problem so that our country is able to pay off the remaining debt from the creation of new wealth and not from primary surpluses, which deprive society of income.
This is all Econ 101, nothing radical or something to be dismissed as frothing-at-the-mouth lunacy of an atavistic Marxist; it is the kind of reasoning often found in Paul Krugman's column. That's why it is troubling that the Gray Lady's reporter dismisses Syriza's program without comment.

One key predictor of how the Obama administration is going to react to Greece's early election -- and, therefore, how Empire is going to react -- is to see what Krugman says about Syriza. Krugman has been nothing if not consistent in debunking the "austerian" credo. He has written countless columns from the outset of the Great Recession pointing out the devastating consequences of slashing government budgets while the economy is contracting. For Krugman not to endorse Syriza's program for Greece means the fix is in.

But Krugman opposed Scottish independence. And recently he has engaged in pathetic Putin bashing. So it might well be that 1) he either avoids commenting altogether, or 2) he carries water for Obama yet again and bashes Tsipras.

While it is true that the Scots were made to buckle at the polls in September because of threats and scaremongering, it seems to me that Greeks who have lost a third of their household wealth will be more immune to such tactics.

What is certainly true, based on last May's European Parliament elections and the recent U.S. midterm poll, is that there is massive erosion in support of, belief in, allegiance to the large, established, mainstream political parties of the West.  These political formations have been completely captured by a corrupt, disconnected, neoliberal power elite and a majority of people have woken up to this fact.

A clue to the direction of where it will all end will be provided by Syriza in January. The people have reached a level of disgust with the status quo that is going to start manifesting itself positively. The real question is going to be, "How destructive will the Empire be in maintaining the status quo?"

I have to say, "Plenty."

Wednesday, December 17, 2014

Oil-Price Drop Russian Currency Collapse: The Lunacy of the Washington-Riyadh Axis

A top story today is the collapse of Russia's currency. Yesterday, despite the central bank raising interest rates to 17%, the ruble reached the depths of 80 to the dollar before climbing back to 68. The ruble has lost half its value since the beginning of the year. 

What's the cause of this panic? The oil-price drop engineered by the Saudis. Saudi Arabia has refused to cut production despite demands from others in OPEC. Mike Whitney has a helpful primer on the issue, "The Oil Coup: US-Saudi Subterfuge Send Stocks and Credit Reeling," which appeared yesterday on the Counterpunch web site:
Here’s what’s happening: Washington has persuaded the Saudis to flood the market with oil to push down prices, decimate Russia’s economy, and reduce Moscow’s resistance to further NATO encirclement and the spreading of US military bases across Central Asia. The US-Saudi scheme has slashed oil prices by nearly a half since they hit their peak in June. The sharp decline in prices has burst the bubble in high-yield debt which has increased the turbulence in the credit markets while pushing global equities into a tailspin. Even so, the roiled markets and spreading contagion have not deterred Washington from pursuing its reckless plan, a plan which uses Riyadh’s stooge-regime to prosecute Washington’s global resource war. Here’s a brief summary from an article by F. William Engdahl titled “The Secret Stupid Saudi-US Deal on Syria”:
The details are emerging of a new secret and quite stupid Saudi-US deal on Syria and the so-called IS. It involves oil and gas control of the entire region and the weakening of Russia and Iran by Saudi Arabian flooding the world market with cheap oil. Details were concluded in the September meeting by US Secretary of State John Kerry and the Saudi King . . . 
. . . [T]he kingdom of Saudi Arabia, has been flooding the market with deep discounted oil, triggering a price war within OPEC… The Saudis are targeting sales to Asia for the discounts and in particular, its major Asian customer, China where it is reportedly offering its crude for a mere $50 to $60 a barrel rather than the earlier price of around $100. That Saudi financial discounting operation in turn is by all appearance being coordinated with a US Treasury financial warfare operation, via its Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, in cooperation with a handful of inside players on Wall Street who control oil derivatives trading. The result is a market panic that is gaining momentum daily. China is quite happy to buy the cheap oil, but her close allies, Russia and Iran, are being hit severely . . . 
According to Rashid Abanmy, President of the Riyadh-based Saudi Arabia Oil Policies and Strategic Expectations Center, the dramatic price collapse is being deliberately caused by the Saudis, OPEC’s largest producer. The public reason claimed is to gain new markets in a global market of weakening oil demand. The real reason, according to Abanmy, is to put pressure on Iran on her nuclear program, and on Russia to end her support for Bashar al-Assad in Syria….More than 50% of Russian state revenue comes from its export sales of oil and gas. The US-Saudi oil price manipulation is aimed at destabilizing several strong opponents of US globalist policies. Targets include Iran and Syria, both allies of Russia in opposing a US sole Superpower. The principal target, however, is Putin’s Russia, the single greatest threat today to that Superpower hegemony.
The danger of the the Washington-Riyadh oil-price-drop strategy to bring Russia to heel is that the panic will spread globally. The Dow has already dropped close to 1,0000 points in a week, while yesterday European markets were roiled. As Jack Ewing reports in "Anxiety Over European Banks Amid Ruble Crisis," companies perceived to have exposure to Russia took a hit. Ewing makes clear this is panic selling. European banks are much less exposed to Russia than, say, for instance, tiny Greece. Part of the problem is lack of information. When the European Central Bank ran its stress tests earlier this year it failed to include Russian loans because the ruble was perceived to be stable. Now -- after a year that saw a U.S.-backed coup in Kiev, the EU herded into a sanctions campaign against Russia following Crimea joining the Russian Federation, a civil war in Ukraine, and the recent oil-price drop -- things look very different.
Adding to the nervousness on Tuesday was the lack of precise, up-to-date information about which European banks might have large holdings of, say, Russian government debt. When the European Central Bank began its examination of the resilience of eurozone lenders at the beginning of the year, a ruble decline seemed like a remote possibility. Hardly anyone anticipated the steep fall in energy prices that would undercut the Russian economy. 
As a result, the European Central Bank did not include a ruble crisis among the hypothetical scenarios it used to test banks’ ability to withstand stress. Data released by the central bank in October following the bank review provide detailed information on individual banks’ exposure to the government debt of countries like Malta or Slovenia, but not Russia. 
The European Central Bank declined to comment on Tuesday, but a person with knowledge of its bank supervisory arm said that officials were closely monitoring banks that are exposed to the Russian economy or Russian debt.
In the vacuum of public data, investors ganged up on banks and other companies known to have large Russian holdings. The targets included Raiffeisen Bank International in Vienna and the Danish brewer Carlsberg. 
Shares of Carlsberg, whose Baltika brand is the biggest selling beer in Russia, fell 7.5 percent. A Carlsberg spokesman declined to comment, except to refer to an earnings report published last month that described the Russian market as “difficult.” Shares of Raiffeisen Bank, which earned more than 70 percent of its pretax profit from its Russian subsidiary in the first nine months of this year, fell more than 8 percent on Tuesday. 
“All financials with exposure to Russia are currently suffering,” Ingrid Krenn-Ditz, a Raiffeisen spokeswoman, said in an email. “In Russia we continue to pursue a policy of selective underwriting” with a focus on customers, she added.
The flames of panic are being fanned, and on top of this the U.S. Congress has weighed in with a new sanctions bill which also includes $350 million in direct military aid to the Kiev junta. Peter Baker writes ("Obama Signals Support for New U.S. Sanctions to Pressure Russian Economy") that the legislation empowers Obama to go after Gazprom (I wonder if this means that U.S. citizens can no longer purchase Gazprom stock); it also provides for tens of millions in "democracy promotion" in the former Soviet Union:
The legislation also authorizes the president — but does not require him — to impose sanctions on international companies that invest in certain types of unconventional Russian crude-oil energy projects and to further restrict the export of equipment for use in Russia’s energy sector. And it authorizes the president to bar investment or credit to Gazprom, the Russian state energy giant. 
In addition, the legislation authorizes the provision of lethal arms to the Ukraine government, including antitank weapons, tactical surveillance drones and counter-artillery radar. Mr. Obama has resisted sending weaponry to Kiev on the theory that it would only escalate the fighting in eastern Ukraine, so it is not clear whether he will follow through on the authorization. 
The measure went beyond only penalties to authorize $10 million in each of the next three fiscal years to counter Russian propaganda in the former Soviet Union and prioritize Russian-language broadcasting in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. And it authorized $20 million in each of the next three years to promote democracy, independent news media, uncensored Internet access and anticorruption efforts in Russia.
But under pressure from the Obama administration, lawmakers removed elements that would have tied the president’s hands, including a provision that would have barred lifting sanctions until Russia was not only out of Ukraine but Moldova and Georgia, too, where lingering conflicts are not likely to be resolved soon. 
“President Putin bears responsibility for any outcomes that flow from his actions and breach of the international order,” said Senator Robert Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who pushed for the sanctions along with the panel’s senior Republican, Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee. “The United States Congress stands with Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression,” Mr. Menendez said.
What we need are some of those millions of dollars to be spent here at home, starting with Menendez's New Jersey. If only we could have real democracy in New Jersey then the planet wouldn't be cursed with a blatantly corrupt, bought-and-paid-for neocon machine pol like Bob Menendez. The nation would also be spared the likes of dangerous Chris Christie.

And the reason I have hope is that we are on the cusp of a democratic awakening here in the United States. I am almost convinced that popular consciousness has been raised to a level sufficient to reject Hillary Clinton's presidential candidacy. What this portends -- merely a GOP victory, another false Dem messiah (Elizabeth Warren?), or an actually split in the Democratic Party with the possibility for a third-party alternative movement -- is yet to be determined. Something is definitely happening here. The power elite are out of touch to such extent that they think they can jigger and job their way out of the mess that they have created and maintain their death grip on the control switch. The status quo is so bent and corrupted the people in charge will blow up the planet to maintain the power they have amassed

Tuesday, February 25, 2014

Bill for Ukraine's Putsch Comes Due

Now the bill for the putsch in Ukraine comes due: Austerity by International Monetary Fund mandate. I always wondered why anti-government Ukrainians were so fervent about aligning with the European Union when the price of membership was obvious for all to see. All one need do is look to Greece, a country being dismantled by the IMF and European Central Bank according to the usual neoliberal prescriptions: privatize public assets, reduce social benefits and slash public sector employment. This is what is in store for Ukraine and her citizens, and this is why President Viktor Yanukovych balked at the the trade deal with the EU last November: It would have been political suicide if he would have signed it. David Herszenhorn outlines the precarious nature of Ukrainian finances in an offering today, "Regional Rifts Pose Hurdle to New Coalition in Ukraine":
The I.M.F. has made clear it is unwilling to help Ukraine without a commitment from the country to undertake painful austerity measures and other restructuring. Mr. Yanukovych’s resistance to those demands was a principal reason he backed away from a trade deal with Europe and sought help from Russia instead.

In a statement on Monday, the acting finance minister, Yuriy Kolobov, said Ukraine would need a staggering $35 billion in assistance between now and the end of next year, as well as an emergency loan within the next two weeks that he said was expected from Poland or the United States. 
In his statement, Mr. Kolobov said he hoped to organize a conference with international donors. “The situation in the financial sector as a whole is complex but controlled,” he said. 
That could change at any moment, however, should Russia decide to follow through on previous threats of devastating trade sanctions if Ukraine moves closer to Europe.
Given the animosity of the new Ukrainian government toward Russia, Ivan Tchakarov, an analyst with Citibank, said that Ukraine could turn only to the West for help, and would inevitably face demands for tough reforms and a near-certain recession as a result.
“Assuming that Russia will pass, it will be up to the I.M.F. and E.U. to pick up the tab,” Mr. Tchakarov said. “The I.M.F. will impose hard constraints on the economy, and these will most probably mean a recession in 2014.”
Still, Mr. Tchakarov noted that there would be long-term benefits to Ukraine’s undertaking desperately needed measures, like ending subsidies of gas prices and cutting the thickets of business regulations that weigh down the economy. These actions could potentially allow it to emerge far stronger, like its neighbors Poland and the Baltic countries, he said.
To gauge the economic strength of a Baltic neighbor, let's take a look at Latvia, care of an article, "Ukraine's Sickness," by Eric Draitser:
The Ukrainian people however would do well to examine the precedent of Latvia to understand what lies in store for them. As renowned economists Michael Hudson and Jeffrey Sommers wrote in 2012:
What enabled Latvia to survive the crisis were EU and IMF bailouts…Elites aside, many emigrated…Demographers estimate that 200,000 have departed the past decade – roughly 10 per cent of the population…Latvia experienced the full effects of austerity and neoliberalism. Birth rates fell during the crisis – as is the case almost everywhere austerity programs are imposed. It continues having among Europe’s highest rates of suicide and of road deaths caused by drunk driving. Violent crime is high, arguably, because of prolonged unemployment and police budget cuts. Moreover, a soaring brain drain moves in tandem with blue-collar emigration.
The myth of prosperity to follow EU integration and bailouts is just that, a myth. The reality is pain and suffering on a scale far greater than the poverty and unemployment Ukraine, especially the western portion of the country, have already experienced. The most highly educated, those most equipped to take up the mantle of leadership, will flee en masse. Those leaders who remain will do so while lining their pockets and ingratiating themselves to the European and American financiers who will flock to Ukraine like vultures to carrion. In short, the corruption and mismanagement of the Yanukovich government will seem like a pleasant memory. 
The “liberalization” that Europe demands will create massive profits for speculators, but very few jobs for working people. The best land will be sold to foreign corporations and land-grabbers, while the resources, including the highly regarded agricultural sector, will be stripped and sold on the world market, leaving farmers and city dwellers alike in grinding poverty, their children going to bed hungry. This will be the “success” of Ukraine. One shudders to think what failure would look like.
Herein lies the rub. Western governments (at least for public consumption) have labeled events in Ukraine a people-power uprising by pro-democracy activists, rather than a putsch by armed, back-mask-wearing hooligans, as Russia sees it. So what happens when the Ukrainian citizenry rises up and rebels against the austerity that is shooting down the pike? According to Andrew Higgins' story, "Ukrainian Protesters See Too Many Familiar Faces in Parliament After Revolution," a rumbling is already audible:
[T]he prospect of a new order dominated by established opposition parties, almost as discredited in the eyes of many Ukrainians as Mr. Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, has left a bitter feeling that what comes next could end up disappointing as much as the government that followed the 2004 Orange Revolution.
“We need new people who can say no to the oligarchs, not just the old faces,” said Ms. Nikanchuk, referring to the wealthy billionaires who control blocks of votes in the Parliament but who, with a few exceptions, hedged their bets until the end about which side to support in a violent struggle that left more than 80 protesters dead between Mr. Yanukovych and his opponents. 
***
“The problem is that the old forces are trying to come back to take their old chairs,” said Vasily Kuak, a shipping broker who stood outside parliament waving a sign that read: “Revolution, Not a Court Coup!”

*** 
All the same, the sight of luxury cars dropping off members of Parliament at the colonnaded legislature building, is now guarded by “self-defense” units that previously battled government forces, has stirred dismay and anger.

“Again we see Mercedes and BMWs bringing deputies who are supposed to represent the people,” said Mr. Kuak, “We don’t want to see these people again. We want to see people from the square, from the revolution.”
***  
“We need people from Maidan, not people like you,” screamed an angry woman as Volodymyr Lytvyn, a former speaker of the Parliament known for shifting with the wind, left the legislature building. As he tried to answer questions from the crowd, protected by two bodyguards and a solid wrought iron fence, a cry went up clamoring for “lustration of everybody,” a term usually associated with the purge of officials and politicians suspected of serving Communist regimes before the revolutions of 1989 across Eastern and Central Europe. 
Peppered with angry demands that the Parliament raise pensions, reopen closed hospitals and find work for the jobless, Mr. Lytvyn struggled to respond but basically called for patience, a virtue that is likely to be in short supply if the interim government does not manage to convince people it is working to improve their lives, not line its own pockets.
Will Obama publicly demand restraint when violence is directed at the Ukrainians demonstrating to reopen hospitals and restore slashed pensions? Of course not.

But first things first. The putschists have to actually form a government that can accept the U.S./Poland financial lifeline and the bailout package from the IMF. Putting aside the question of whether this government will actually be legal -- remember, just like the United States, Ukraine has a constitutional process for removal of a president; it's called impeachment; and nothing I have read has said impeachment proceedings are underway in the Rada -- Oleksandr Turchynov, new speaker of the Rada, has said he will form a government by Thursday.

There are two things it would be wise to keep our eyes on here. First, Russia. Russia holds all the cards, as the Gray Lady makes clear in her pathetic editorial this morning, "Ukraine's Uncertain Future": "Ukraine is broke, and a vindictive Russia could easily make things more miserable by closing the border or raising gas prices." Second, by now it should be apparent that like his predecessor, W., everything that Obama touches turns to shit. Run down the list: NATO intervention in Libya, the roll-out of his signature healthcare law, his kowtowing to the Gulf sheikhdoms on Syria, his inability to get any pro-worker legislation through Congress, and on and on. There is no reason to believe that Ukraine will be any different. In other words, we can expect an outcome that is not the one intended by the West.

Saturday, March 23, 2013

Damage to Cyprus Already Done

Once again the news coming out of Cyprus is not encouraging. Yesterday Cyprus' Parliament came up with a new bailout plan to present to the troika Sunday evening, though it still has to vote on one proposal to confiscate a quarter of all bank deposits above the insured amount of 100,000 euros for Laiki Bank account holders. Parts of the plan that passed, as Liz Alderman and James Kanter report today, include capital controls to prevent withdrawals and account closings as well as the shutting down of Laiki, creating a bad bank for the non-performing accounts and rolling its good accounts into the Bank of Cyprus. Parliament also voted to confiscate the pension funds of state-run companies.

I've seen reports that this might not satisfy the troika. The troika wants the legislation to apply to all Cypriot banks not just Laiki. Cypriot president Anastasiasdes jets to Brussels tomorrow to take his lumps.

The message from all of this -- banks have been closed for over a week now in Cyprus -- is that the damage has already been done. Even if the new bailout plan is accepted by the ECB, the IMF and the European Commission, Cyprus' days as a financial hub are over and capital flight from eurozone countries with vulnerable banks like Spain will likely commence posthaste. As naked capitalism opines in "Cyprus Capitulates to Eurozone (Updated)":
The imposition of capital controls has the potential to alarm depositors in periphery countries even more than deposit seizure. While the Eurocrats can try claiming that the deposit grab is a one-off, the result of Cyprus having a huge financial sector that was heavily deposit funded, it was already troubling that they didn’t go after equity or bondholders. But the imposition of capital controls effectively creates another currency without the benefit of allowing the currency to revalue.
As we’ve indicated, the big risk coming out of the cramdown of Cyprus is a resumption of the flow of deposits out of periphery countries, which had been underway last year but was arrested by the introduction of the OMT. You’d be nuts to keep your money in a Spanish bank after the brutal treatment of Cypriot depositors. Expect Swiss, German, American, and, as Dizard put it, “banco de Mattress” to be the beneficiaries.
So far U.S. markets have dismissed Cyprus as inconsequential. Let's see what the prevailing wisdom is next week. The 17-nation eurozone appears about to shrink.