Showing posts with label Niki Kitsantonis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Niki Kitsantonis. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 17, 2015

Default Does Not Equal a Grexit: Get Ready for Additional Acts in the Greek Debt Drama

It appears to me, and what I have said on this page in the past, is that there is no alternative to a Greek default on its debt obligation to the troika -- International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and the European Commission; either that or a complete about-face by the troika, capitulating on its demands to cut pensions and loosen labor laws. Germany's strict allegiance to austerity, as well as antipathy towards Greece shared by eurozone states Finland, Spain, et al makes a troika capitulation a long shot.

Several stories this morning (James Kanter and Niki Kitsantonis, "Tsipras Attacks Greece’s Creditors as Pressure Grows on Debts"; Peter Eavis, "Greek Exit Would Shake, but Most Likely Not Shatter, Eurozone") sound the alarm on the coming Greek default. The one story that caught my eye though was an AP piece ("Will Greece Leave the Euro? A Look at Its Options") that problematizes the notion of any clear resolution of the Greek debt drama once the country defaults at the end of this month:
Here are some questions and answers on Greece's future. They could come in handy during Thursday's meeting of eurozone finance ministers in Luxembourg.
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HOW DOES A COUNTRY LEAVE THE EURO? 
Technically, it can't. These are uncharted waters. European Union treaties legally allow members to leave the 28-nation EU, but no mechanism was foreseen to let countries leave the euro. Theoretically, if all 19 nations agree that it's time for Greece to go then a "Grexit" could be negotiated. Some argue the country might have to leave the EU altogether to leave the single currency. 
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WHEN IS THE POINT OF NO RETURN? 
That would be when the European Central Bank decides to cut off emergency credit to Greece's banks, according to Zsolt Darvas, senior fellow at the Breugel think-tank in Brussels. 
That could happen if there is a run on Greek banks — in which case the ECB might not want to risk its money supporting them. Concerns over a run on banks could grow if it becomes clear that Greece will default on its next debt repayment, due June 30.
The ECB could also cut Greek banks loose if the country defaults on debt repayments due to the ECB in July and August. 
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WHAT WOULD HAPPEN THEN? 
Banks would probably have to close for a while and when they reopen, the government would likely put limits on how much money depositors can take out. "People would try to take their money out of the banks. The banks would not be able to pay," Darvas says. "People would try to store their euros at home, not pay taxes, and the whole financial system would come to a halt." 
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HOW CAN GREECE AVOID SUCH A DISASTER? 
Apart from pay its debts on time, some experts believe Greece could limit the damage by engineering its departure in secret. A small group of officials could make the exit preparations and then act on them almost immediately. They would inform their eurozone partners just hours before Greece walks out the door, according Roger Bootle, who heads the research analysis group Capital Economics. The public would be the last to know.
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WHAT MONEY WOULD GREECE USE? 
Greece could go back to using the drachma or introduce a new currency. Either way, volume is essential, and that implies serious challenges. Iraq faced similar issues when it introduced a new dinar in just three months following the U.S.-led invasion. "You would need a huge volume, very quickly. There's also the transportation that is a very big challenge. A lot of police, troops would be required to attend to the cash needs of a country the size of Greek. Logistically it would be a huge challenge," Darvas says. 
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WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO ITS DEBT? 
Greece's bills won't go away, and the jury is out on whether they could be converted to a new currency, although Greece would probably try to redenominate and renegotiate the debt. The one advantage in this for Athens is that all kinds of loans would probably be written down by its creditors. But Darvas says that "all of these technical issues can be resolved. The economic costs of a euro exit — GDP fall and the rise in unemployment — will be far higher."
If you are burnt out on following the debt-negotiating drama don't expect any relief come end of the month. I don't think Greece has any intention of exiting the eurozone; if it had, if preparations were being made to issue drachmas, there would be leaks by now. Once Greece defaults, that is when another round of negotiations will get going. The ECB could force Greek banks to collapse by freezing Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). But by making such a move, the troika would lose the political battle; Syriza would be vindicated.

Tuesday, June 2, 2015

Greek Zero Hour: Default or Lickspittlry

The flurry of activity yesterday and today surrounding Greek debt negotiations is succinctly framed by this two-sentence paragraph found in "European Leaders Assemble for Urgent Meeting on Greek Crisis," by Liz Alderman, Niki Kitsantonis and Jack Ewing:
Unless they strike an agreement soon, Greece may not be able to make a series of coming debt payments. On Friday, Greece must make a €300 million loan repayment to the International Monetary Fund, and it owes €1.2 billion later this month.
Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism, "Greece’s Creditors Meet to Prepare Offer (Updated – Creditors Agree on Terms)," seems confident that Greece can meet Friday's deadline and has enough wiggle room to survive the month:
The press is awash with reports of a high-level meeting convened yesterday by Angel Merkel and attended by Francois Hollande, Christine Lagarde and Mario Draghi. The upshot is that Greece’s creditors have agreed to sort out their differences and come up with a proposal to present to Greece in the next few days. Greece is generally believed to be able to make its €300 milllion payment due to the IMF on Friday; if not, it has the expedient of asking to bundle payments under an existing IMF rule, which would give it till the end of the month to remit the €1.5 billion it has coming due in June.
So why the splashy optics of a Monday-night emergency powwow of big shots? There are several "technical" issues in play. Two key ones are pension overhaul and the value-added tax. The euro honchos convened to finalize an agreement on which of Syriza's "red lines" Greek leader Alexis Tsipras must cross.

Smith says that Tsipras is giving ground on pensions, agreeing to raise the retirement age to 67. The endgame here is to cripple Syriza and beat back any challenge to a bankrupt neoliberal orthodoxy. If Tsipras is made to kneel, violating his own campaign promises to protect if not increase pensions, and schlep a pension-cut deal back to parliament for approval, the troika will have won. Syriza's parliamentary majority will splinter. Already the Left Platform bloc of Syriza is gaining momentum. Left Platform wants to default on debt payments and return Greece to the drachma. As Alderman, Kitsantonis and Ewing explain:
Far-left Syriza lawmakers have become increasingly agitated recently, accusing Mr. Tsipras of making too many compromises on the anti-austerity pledges that helped sweep the party to power in January’s elections.
A new political uproar broke when a group of Syriza lawmakers refused to back the government’s nominee for a new representative at the International Monetary Fund, Elena Panaritis, a former Greek parliamentarian who once worked at the World Bank. In a letter on Sunday, more than 40 Syriza members, mostly lawmakers, took issue with her support of Greece’s last international bailout agreement in 2012, which the party considered to have been unfair and overly harsh. Ms. Panaritis withdrew from consideration on Monday, citing the opposition.
Although symbolic, it was the latest in a series of uprisings within Syriza, which during the election campaign had promised to take a hard line with Greece’s creditors in debt negotiations and to resist austerity measures. A hard-left faction recently pressed for but lost an internal central committee party vote to have Athens stop paying its creditors altogether if they demanded further austerity.
Mr. Tsipras is facing an array of pressures as critics from both the left and right in the Greek government question whether he has a viable plan to restart the economy, which slid back into a recession in the first quarter. At the same time, Greece’s creditors, the I.M.F. in particular, have resisted unlocking any aid unless the government can show that it will put its finances on a sound footing and run enough of an operating surplus to make regular debt payments. 
The dispute over Ms. Panaritis on Monday “shows that there’s a lot of exasperation in Syriza ahead of a deal with creditors,” said Harry Papasotiriou, a professor of political science at the Panteion University in Athens and the head of the Institute of International Relations. 
Even if dissent within Syriza deepens, the government would probably band together to push through any legislation needed to secure the bailout funds. Few lawmakers want to precipitate a default or force Greece to exit the currency union. But the hard-liners of Mr. Tsipras’s party could eventually break away, analysts said, especially the Left Platform, a faction that has already pushed for Greece to stop paying its creditors if they continue with “blackmailing tactics.”
This is the outcome I believe Merkel, Largarde, Hollande, Draghi et al are after. They want to force Tsipras into "Obama mode." Talk "hope & change" and deliver more of the same. Syriza's governing majority collapses as a result, and the moral to the story becomes, "See, that is what happens when you try to change the order of things."

AP is reporting this morning (Elena Becatoros "Greece submits draft bailout plan, creditors say not enough") that Tsipras has delivered a proposal to the creditors, and he's talking tough:
"It is now clear that the decision for whether they want to adapt to realism and emerge from the crisis without the division of Europe ... belongs to the political leadership of Europe," Tsipras said.
In the end, this is all a Kabuki. There is no alternative to a default. Greece has been hemorrhaging capital and must soon implement controls. This is the last paragraph from the Alderman et al piece:
In the meantime, Greece’s finances continue to deteriorate as deepening political uncertainty accelerates a decline in tax receipts and withdrawals of deposits from the nation’s banks. Last week, Greece’s central bank reported that deposits fell in April to €133 billion, the lowest level in a decade, after savers withdrew nearly €5 billion from the banks during the month. More than €30 billion was withdrawn between the end of last November and the end of April, according to the Bank of Greece.
And yet the troika persists in maintaining the fiction of robust primary surplus targets. According to Smith:
Things are even worse than they appear. The target for this year was 3%, and 4.5% for 2016. Most observers thought both figures were insane. And remember, when Syriza assumed office, Greece has a small primary surplus. As of April, the IMF projected a deficit of 1.5%, and matters can’t have gotten any better. To just meet Greece’s ask of 1% now means a swing of a full 2.5% of GDP, almost the unreasonable level they were expected to hit for 2015. Even if the creditors make what they think is a generous offer of 2% for 2015, that is equivalent to an asphyxiating 3.5% consolidation from the new starting point of negative 1.5%. 
So the creditors may have read too much into Tsipras’ offer to negotiate on pensions. Or they may feel they have to go this step regardless of whether their gambit will work. Or they may be in denial as to how badly Tsipras has been boxed in by his Left Forum (although he can always cut a deal with To Potami). At a minimum, both sides appear to finally be about to get out of the Groundhog Day phase of these negotiations to an end game. 
Zero Hour is rapidly approaching (although this has been said many times before). The "Either/Or" here seems clearer than before. Either Greece defaults on its debt, or Tsipras brings back the creditors' crummy deal to parliament and manages to get it approved only to see Syriza splinter, and with it the momentum of a resurgent Left.

Tuesday, March 10, 2015

A Few Rays of Possible Sunshine, Greece & Ferguson, in a Darkening Sky

A few rays of sunshine were evident last week. It became apparent that eurozone finance ministers led by Jeroen Dijsselbloem were not completely successful in vanquishing the Syriza-led Greek government. Greece's finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, continues to insist he has not caved in on Syriza's campaign pledges to roll back troika-dictated austerity. Tomorrow, technical talks begin between Greece and the troika (James Kanter and Niki Kitsantonis, "Greece’s Tense Talks With Its Creditors Escalate to the Next Phase"). The troika says no money will be released until Greece makes good on implementing structural adjustment. Greece needs to makes payments on or refinance €6 billion this month. It is make or break time. Varoufakis got himself into some trouble when he suggested a referendum might be a possible way out of the impasse with the troika:
In an interview with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera on Saturday, Mr. Varoufakis said Greece could call elections or a referendum in the event that its proposed overhauls are rejected by international creditors. As the Greek news media feverishly speculated over the weekend about a possible referendum on the country’s membership in the eurozone, the government accused the newspaper of distorting the minister’s comments, saying he had not suggested Greece would hold a referendum on the euro but on the country’s economic program and fiscal policy. 
Panos Kammenos, Mr. Tsipras’s junior coalition partner and the defense minister, also suggested on Saturday that a referendum could be an option. 
Antonis Samaras, the former prime minister, on Sunday rejected a potential referendum as a “very bad development,” saying it would allow the government to shirk its responsibilities. The criticism continued on Monday with central members of Mr. Samaras’s conservative party describing Mr. Varoufakis as “dangerous” because of both the referendum idea and his proposal to employ Greeks and tourists as undercover agents to bolster a tax evasion crackdown. 
Some officials of the Syriza-led government also expressed reservations about a referendum, which the prominent legislator Alexis Mitropoulos described as “naïve and thoughtless.” 
At his news conference late on Monday, Mr. Varoufakis denounced the way his comments had been presented in Corriere della Serra as part of a “process of misinformation.” Mr. Varoufakis said any reference that he made to a referendum had been entirely “hypothetical” because he was referring to the improbable circumstance that European lenders rejected all of Greece’s proposed reforms. 
Opinion polls consistently indicate that most Greeks want the country to remain in the eurozone, but a majority continue to back the government’s tough stance against creditors.
Varoufakis likely floated the idea of a referendum to Corriere della Sera in the hopes of creating a little leverage in the upcoming negotiations with the troika. But when he backtracked it made him look unprepared and vacillating.

The outcome Jeroen Dijsselbloem wants to see is Syriza implementing all the austerity diktats -- pension cuts, privatization, tearing up labor agreements -- as the troika dribbles out the cash in small allotments. This Varoufakis will not do. I am still confident of this. So some sort of rupture is coming, hopefully, by the end of this week. The troika is certain it can break Syriza. I think a referendum is a fine idea.

The second ray of sunshine visible last week was the Department of Justice report on the Ferguson Police Department in the wake of the Mike Brown shooting last summer. The DOJ lays out how Jim Crow works nowadays. "Driving while black" is a chief income source that suburban municipalities like Ferguson rely on to balance their books.

The first scalp of that report was raised yesterday (Eli Yokley and John Eligon, "Missouri Court Assigns a State Judge to Handle Ferguson Cases") when it was announced by the Missouri Supreme Court that the Missouri Court of Appeals would take over Ferguson's municipal court and "current municipal judge, Ronald J. Brockmeyer, who was repeatedly cited in the Justice Department report for abusive practices, announced his resignation after holding the position for more than a decade."

The problem is that what happened to Ferguson needs to happen in municipalities throughout the United States, and there is no indication that this is in the offing.

In fact, there is every indication that we are at the "creative destruction" tipping point in the United States. In by far the best story I read this morning -- the best, but easily the most depressing -- is Monica Davey's "Unions Suffer Latest Defeat in Midwest With Signing of Wisconsin Measure."

In describing Scott Walker's "shot heard 'round the world" declaration for a 2016 White House run, the Wisconsin governor presiding over the creation of a new right-to-work law in his state, Davey lines out the the present political history of the United States, the death of its unions, and the projected path forward for American-style neoliberalism -- full on cannibalization.

Key to Davey's synopsis of present political history is the GOP landslide of 2010 (At that time a national party that just two years earlier was thoroughly disgraced and in free fall successfully recreated itself by lurching hard to the right with its Tea Party re-branding, the core of which is white supremacy):
Central to the new momentum behind the laws were sweeping Republican victories in state elections in 2010, when the party got full control — in the chambers and the governor’s office — of states that included Wisconsin, Michigan and Indiana. Republicans made more gains in 2014, now controlling 68 of the 98 chambers around the country and the most state legislative seats since 1920. But it was the victories in 2010 that set off a new flood of right-to-work legislation in the Midwest, which had rarely seen it.
Soon after taking office, Mr. Walker pressed for a bill that cut collective bargaining for most public sector workers and removed requirements that they pay fees if they chose not to join unions that represented them. Republicans elsewhere followed suit, but not all of those measures flew through. Ohio, where Republicans had taken sole control of state government, passed a measure limiting collective bargaining, but it was rejected months later in a statewide ballot measure. 
Then, for right-to-work advocates, there came an even more memorable turning point: In November 2012, voters in Indiana (where a law was repealed in the 1960s) re-elected Republican legislative majorities even after labor leaders pledged to defeat them for passing a right-to-work law earlier in the year. On the same election night, voters in Michigan rejected a labor-backed ballot measure to enshrine collective bargaining rights in the State Constitution. 
“The combination sent a clear message to elected officials in the region: You can end forced dues by passing right-to-work, and voters will reward you for it,” said Patrick Semmens, a spokesman for the National Right to Work Committee, who keeps a copy of The Indianapolis Star outside his office from the day after the law passed there.
A month after the 2012 election, the Republican-held Legislature in Michigan, a cradle of the American labor movement, passed a right-to-work measure, which was promptly signed by Gov. Rick Snyder, a Republican who had said the matter was not on his agenda. 
Lee Saunders, the president of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, called it “a concerted effort by the folks who have a lot of wealth and power to get more wealth and power.” 
“They’ve had these plans a long time, and now they’ve come to fruition,” he said.
Now the path forward is quite clear: Right to work anywhere and everywhere. If you don't control the state legislature or the governor's office, pass it at the county level:
Battles over union fees are also emerging in other states. Republican legislators in Missouri and New Mexico are weighing similar measures. In Kentucky, where a split Legislature and a Democratic governor pose obstacles to a statewide bill, leaders in more than a dozen counties have approved or are weighing measures, officials there said on Saturday, and efforts in six other counties are awaiting final approval.
And in Illinois, a long-held Democratic territory with Democratic supermajorities in the legislature, the new Republican governor, Bruce Rauner, announced an executive order barring state workers who opt out of unions from being forced to pay fees based on a constitutional argument, offering a new model for states where split partisan politics have slowed right-to-work policies. 
Federal law already permits workers not to join unions. But these laws go further, permitting workers to not pay fees to them. Unions argue that the fees are fair for nonunion members who still benefit from the contracts they negotiate, and that without a requirement, their membership, financial support and very existence are threatened.
And where is the leadership of the international unions? Holed up in executive suites in Washington D.C. living well-remunerated lives of great privilege. Where is the plan to fight back? Don't hold your breath. There isn't one.

Tuesday, February 24, 2015

Syriza's About-Face and Why We Should Stomach It

Yesterday, a Monday back at work to begin another week in a series of weeks that will lead eventually to May and Memorial Day, the sense of hopelessness and fatigue was palpable. I kept checking for signs of life from Brussels, wishing that Syriza had discovered a path forward to foil the eurogroup of finance ministers and their neoliberal austerity.

But no such luck was mine. The reporting was sparse and eventually, I think it was late morning Pacific Standard Time, it was reported that Greece would submit her proposals Tuesday morning, today.

First reports (James Kanter and Niki Kitsantonis, "European Lenders to Review Greece Overhaul Plan") this morning are not encouraging:
Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the head of the Eurogroup of finance ministers, that he could not yet give a “positive assessment” of the list submitted by Athens, as the overhauls first needed to be reviewed for their effects on the Greek budget. A conference call among the 19 finance minister of the Eurogroup was set for Tuesday afternoon.
“I think they are serious,” Mr. Dijsselbloem, referring to the attitude of the government in Athens, told lawmakers on an influential economics committee at the European Parliament during scheduled testimony on Tuesday.
Among the overhauls are plans to improve management of the national budget, and to enact changes to Greece’s taxation system, including changes to the collection of sales taxes “with a view to limiting exemptions while eliminating unreasonable discounts,” according to a letter that Yanis Varoufakis, the Greek finance minister, submitted to Mr. Dijsselbloem.
The government also committed not to reverse existing privatization plans and said it would review planned sell-offs with a focus on bolstering “the state’s long-term benefits.”
In addition to streamlining the public sector, the government will review public spending at every level and will modernize the pension system in an effort to end “an excessive rate of early retirements.”
The country still plans to raise the minimum wage, one of the government’s pre-election promises, but pledges to do so in a way that safeguards competitiveness, the letter said.
The opportunity for Greece to submit the proposals was one of the few concrete concessions it won in an accord reached with its creditors late on Friday in Brussels. That accord brought to an end the bitter standoff that began when Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras pledged to redraw or scrap the bailout agreement after he came to power in January.
European and Greek officials spent much of Monday exchanging drafts of the proposals to pare back austerity measures while ensuring that Greece can still meet fiscal obligations.
The government of Mr. Tsipras had an opportunity to put its “political stamp” on a bailout plan if it respected budget targets, Mr. Dijsselbloem told the parliamentary committee.
The deal to extend the country’s bailout program with European creditors by four months is subject to the approval of the Greek Parliament, where members of Mr. Tsipras’s radical-left Syriza party have called the plan a capitulation after the party’s anti-austerity campaign promises.
Also on the list submitted by Mr. Varoufakis are plans to crack down on the smuggling of fuel and tobacco, which cost the Greek economy billions of euros a year, to address tax arrears and nonperforming bank loans, and to support struggling homeowners who are unable to meet their mortgage payments.
The overhauls will also address what Syriza has described as Greece’s “humanitarian crisis,” referring to the need for food stamps and other assistance to poor families, but Athens said the measures would be mostly “nonpecuniary” and would have “no negative fiscal effect.”
You will recall shortly after Syriza's victory at the end of January the consensus opinion was that Tsipras would be unable to crack the troika's austerity diktats; that the best Greece could hope for was a few scraps of social-welfare spending tossed from the master's table. Then Syriza's finance minister Yanis Varoufakis went on the offensive against the cruel fiction of neoliberal austerity and the fantasy that governments can cut their way to growth. Commentators zipped their lips. Maybe little Greece was going to shake up the neoliberal consensus.

Well, it appears the original conventional wisdom is going to be proven true.

The commitments to existing privatization plans and streamlining the public sector (highlighted in red in the Kanter and Kitsantonis story above) are truly ominous and confirm the view that Tsipras and Varoufakis have indeed performed an about-face. In a post yesterday, "Eurogroup to Review Greek Reform Proposals; Meeting Set for Tuesday (Updated)," Yves Smith is troubled by the Greek proposal's commitment to EU "best practices" on labor:
“EU best practices” on labor is very disconcerting, since it implies a forced embrace of “labor flexibility” as in further reduction of labor protections and bargaining rights. That would seem to be inconsistent with earlier reports, including a government announcement, that Greece was seeking an increase in the minimum wage. Perhaps that section is more of a mixed bag than the headline for that section suggests.
After the work day was done yesterday, a co-worker, the only one who really pays attention to the news, offered me a ride to the train station. I tried to explain why I felt that even though it would be damaging to us -- because our retirement is in the form of a 401(a) defined contribution pension plan that floats along the waves of the market, and the markets would most likely freak out in a bearish direction upon Greece's leaving the eurozone -- and damaging to the citizens of Greece I wanted to see the eurozone come tumbling down.

I don't think I was very articulate. What I said was something to the effect that if the eurozone cracks then U.S. hegemony is diminished. For instance, the ability of the United States to stampede the EU into Cold War 2.0 by sanctioning Russia becomes much more difficult. And this has to be considered a desirable outcome. No one wants to be incinerated in a nuclear war.

But is this true? If Greece is forced to leave the eurozone -- which I don' think is going to happen, unless Syriza MPs revolt -- does this necessarily mean Greece leaves the European Union? I don't think it does. But even if it does, and Greece is cast out entirely from all European institutions, how does this lessen U.S. foreign policy leverage on the remaining European Union states? It doesn't.

Rather, Syriza can exert more influence, even if only as a "fly in the ointment," if Tsipras and Varoufakis keep Greece in the eurozone and the EU. The EU operates by consensus. Greece can block the TTIP and future Russian sanctions, two big pieces of juicy fruit.

For a not very effective apologia of Syriza's about-face there is Mike Whitney's "Varoufakis Keeps Greece in the Eurozone, by its Fingernails: A Valiant Effort." Whitney brings up an argument I have seen elsewhere: that Varoufakis' negotiations with the eurogroup will be enormously successful so long as he is able to keep the Greek primary surplus target frozen at 1.5 percent:
The new deal also allows Greece to decide its own reform package rather than the troika dictating what government expenses to cut or which publicly owned assets to sell.  Here’s another excerpt from Haring’s post:   “Most important change of the whole document: Addition of 'The institutions will, for the 2015 primary surplus target, take the economic circumstances in 2015 into account.' Excessive, self-defeating austerity is off.  Only the target for 2015 is mentioned, because everything further out would have to be part of a new arrangement, still to be negotiated.”
So Varoufakis has achieved his goal of reducing austerity. Not only is there greater flexibility operationally but, also, Greece will control the levers of decision-making  in the “field of tax policy, privatisation, labour market reforms, financial sector, and pensions”. Naturally, the lower the primary surplus, the more fiscal stimulus is available for economic growth. (Running a surplus during a depression is absolute madness, but this is the lousy hand Varoufakis was dealt.)
Haring’s final comments are a good summary of Varoufakis’s achievement:
“Was it worth the hassle to reject the draft of 16 February, just to accept the statement four days later? For Athens it most certainly was. It got the promise that no self-defeating, excessive austerity would be asked of it any more, the assurance that it could devise its own economic and social policies, as long as they did not impact negatively on the interests of its partners, rather than having to execute and leaving in place all the measures accepted by the former government and strongly rejected by the people. These are huge improvements for Athens, with no significant counterbalancing downside compared to 16 February.”  (“Was it worth it? Concessions to Greece relative to the rejected draft of 16 February”, Nobert Haring)
A reduction in the primary surplus is a big win, no doubt. But we need to wait and see if that is something that Varoufakis really achieved.

For the time being, I am keeping my eyes focused on the veto power a Syriza-led Greece will hold over operations in Brussels going forward. "Better to run away and live again to fight another day."

Monday, February 23, 2015

Grexident vs. Kicking the Can Down the Road

Since Friday the Syriza-led government of Greece has suffered a blow to its public image; it was then, despite weeks of avowals to the contrary, that Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis signed a troika memo committing his country to the creditor-dictated austerity program accepted by previous Greek governments.

While there was confusion and despondency in the blogosphere over Syriza's capitulation, there was some gloating in the mainstream prestige press. The opening to "A Deal That Preserves Greece’s Place in Eurozone, and Fiscal Restraints" by Andrew Higgins (well known to readers who have been following for the last year the U.S.-engineered coup in Kiev and the subsequent civil war in the Donbass as a reporter who will parrot the grossest of lies) provides a good example of "There Is No Alternative" schadenfreude:
BRUSSELS — Just a month ago, after being propelled to power by a wave of anger at Greece’s economic miseries, Alexis Tsipras declared his left-wing Syriza party’s election victory the start of a Europe-wide revolt against austerity. “Europe is going to change,” he said before setting off on a tour of European capitals to rally support for a more relaxed new direction. 
The “anti-austerity revolution” proclaimed by Syriza and its fans elsewhere, however, has now fizzled, its passions doused by the political reality that leaders in the rest of Europe do not want to join or, more important, finance the Greek-led revolt.
Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism has been pessimistic from the very beginning regarding Syriza's chances of re-working the troika's austerity program. Her Saturday "morning after" assessment, "Benchmarking the Greece/Eurogroup Bailout Memo and Process," was grim:
General Observations
There is no way of putting a pretty face on this document [the memo released yesterday by Greece and the europgroup]. It represents a huge climbdown for Syriza. Despite loud promises otherwise, they’ve agreed to take bailout funds, and the top and the close of the memo confirm that the baillout framework is still operative (emphasis ours):
The Eurogroup notes, in the framework of the existing arrangement, the request from the Greek authorities for an extension of the Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement (MFFA), which is underpinned by a set of commitments. The purpose of the extension is the successful completion of the review on the basis of the conditions in the current arrangement, making best use of the given flexibility which will be considered jointly with the Greek authorities and the institutions…
We remain committed to provide adequate support to Greece until it has regained full market access as long as it honours its commitments within the agreed framework.
Even writers who take a positive view of what Syriza accomplished are under no illusion as to how far short Syriza has fallen relative to its lofty promises. From Paul Mason’s blog:
I asked Dijsselbloem in the press conference: “What do you say to the Greek people, whose democracy you’ve just trashed.” He replied that he did not think that was a very objective question. We’ll have to agree to differ.
There is also language in the memo that looks to authorize the return of the Troika monitors: “In this context, the Greek authorities undertake to make best use of the continued provision of technical assistance.” The Financial Times reads it the same way:
It also leaves the IMF and EU institutions — the European Central Bank and European Commission — in control of evaluating Greece’s economic reform measures and the disbursement of bailout funds, despite Mr Tsipras’ vow to rid Greece of the hated “troika” of bailout monitors.
Mind you, despite the foregoing, it is doubtful that Greece could have done much better, particularly in light of the way the ECB had worked to intensify the already-in-progress bank run and boxed the Greek government in by giving it only a thin increase in the ELA limits. A contact told me the Greek government would have had to impose capital controls over the weekend in the absence of a deal; the Financial Times reported close to the same thing by stating that Greece was on track to hit the limits of the ELA on Tuesday (the day after a long holiday weekend). And let us not forget that the Greek government is also slotted to run out of cash by February 24.
Then her conclusion:
In sum, it looks very likely that the top priority of the Troika will be to get Syriza to delineate in detail what they intend to do in the way of the 70% of the structural reforms that Varoufakis said that they and his counterparts already agreed to, and only throw a few bones on the humanitarian front out of the other 30% that Varoufakis wants. And if you’ve ever been party to legal agreements, more specific commitments operate to the disadvantage of the party making them.
Moreover, Syriza has already shown a propensity to overpromise and underdeliver. That would be likely to happen independent of what looks like an optimism bias among the leadership team merely by virtue of inexperience, as in underestimating how long it takes to change bureaucracies and design and launch programs.
As I have said, I would be delighted to be wrong, but even if the ambiguities in the memo language all resolve in Syriza’s favor, they have a mammoth task in what is achieving what is set forth in it, and an uphill battle in meeting the Troika’s and the Eurogroup’s reform expectations. I wish them the Greek government the best of luck.
Varoufakis yesterday submitted a draft proposal of reforms that his government plans to implement. The deadline for that proposal is today. Yves Smith comments this morning, "Troika Not Happy with Initial Draft of Greek Reforms; Eurogroup Reported Still in the Mix," that Varoufakis was wise to get his list in early because the troika is not satisfied by its level of specificity; she raises the possibility that the deal could still unravel, giving way to a sloppy "Grexident," though she sees the European Central Bank, the institution that has been steering negotiations behind the scenes, as exerting force on the eurogroup to accept Greece's proposal:
In any event, there is still the possibility that we could see a disorderly Grexit, or what one account called a “Grexident,” an exit triggered by mistakes rather than design.
However, with the ECB not afraid to invoke the Market Gods to beat the Eurogroup into line, the odds favor them using the same approach even if the Greek draft is not up to Troika working staff and/or Eurogroup standards, pushing them to sign off despite reservations.
But if that is how things play out, it would be a mistake to consider it a Greek win. Remember this is only the first step in an interim deal where Greece has to meet other Troika and Eurogroup targets, as well as work on the even more important task of negotiating what happens when other debt matures over the summer. The more that the Troika and Eurogroup continue to think that Syriza is not willing or capable of meeting its demands, the more any ambiguity in the memo will be resolved against Greece, except in those instances where a favorable resolution for Greece happens to coincide with what the Troika wants to do regardless. Similarly, the less smooth the process over the non-bailout baillout period, the less likely the creditors, which includes the Eurogroup, will be likely to be accommodating in negotiation over longer-term arrangements.
Reasonable or not, Greece has been put in the unfortunate position of having to appease its creditors to get any further breaks. They thus need to be good austerity designers and enforcers over the near term. That also means that remarks by Greek officials to the international media that look to be attacking the Troika or fomenting opposition to austerity in other debtor countries with governments that are making their citizens wear the austerity hairshirt would also be treated as demerits.
Thus, unless there is a serious procedural mishap on Monday and Tuesday, Varoufakis is very likely to be proven correct that his revised list of reforms on Monday will be accepted. But how bumpy that process turns out to be has significant implications for the long-term success of his effort to keep Greece in the Eurozone. The flip side is that there is the potential that even if this week is rocky, the Greek government could recover ground with its official minders once it does get control of the government, but it will need to be cognizant of how far it needs to go.
Thus no matter how you look at it, the new Greek government has a gauntlet to run between now and June. And as much as we’ve stressed that a Grexit is almost certainly an even worse outcome than acceding to the Troika’s demands, it is important to recognize that the best cases scenario for Greece is getting austerity lite as opposed to austerity regular. Even Varoufakis’ target of a primary surplus of 1.0% to 1.5% is still contractionary. Bill Mitchell estimates that Greece will need to run budget deficits of 10% of GDP to restore its economy to a semblance of normalcy. The US had unemployment levels in the Great Depression that were comparable to Greece’s now and have to run a much higher lever of deficit spending to pull the economy out of the ditch for good. 
Thus all of these hard-fought efforts by the Greek government are to eke out gains that don’t even begin to reach the level of intervention that Greece needs. So it isn’t simply that last week’s memo is yet another example in a long series of the European elite’s fondness for “kick the can” solutions to pressing problems. It appears that if Greece is indeed the recipient of new and improved flavor of austerity, it’s a higher-order delaying tactic meant to buy years more of sullen acquiescence from long-suffering citizens in periphery countries. 
This analysis sounds correct to me. Dominant neoliberalism survives by maintaining the paradigm at all costs. That is why Syriza has to be crushed even though what Varoufakis has been telling anyone who is willing to listen -- that paying off Greek debt by means of austerity is a cruel fiction -- is widely acknowledged to be true. Better to kick the can down the road and pretend that everything is going to work out.

One scenario that Yves Smith does not entertain, but one taken up by James Kanter and Niki Kitsantonis, "Greece’s Leaders Face a Revolt at Home as They Try to Appease Creditors," is that Syriza's parliamentary majority will fracture over the deal with the troika:
The deal reached Friday allows Mr. Tsipras to ask to drop austerity measures to which the previous government committed but never enforced, such as further cuts to pensions, an increase in a special value-added tax on the Greek islands and the relaxing of restrictions on mass dismissals in the private sector.
In return, Mr. Tsipras and his government are expected to propose other, chiefly structural changes, including some actions that the previous government failed to deliver on, such as a crackdown on tax evasion and corruption.
Such changes, if accepted, might ease the burden on the majority of Greeks who have been hit by austerity over the years, and shift more of it to the rich and privileged who have emerged from the crisis relatively unscathed and who, creditors insist, should shoulder part of the solution.
Indeed, many now expected that the government would propose changes aimed at helping those hit hardest by years of austerity in Greece, perhaps by raising low-income pensions. On Sunday, the changes seemed to be headed in the direction of focusing on a crackdown on tax evasion and corruption, and an overhaul of the public sector, a government official said.
If Greek lawmakers do not like the deal, they can vote it down. The coalition government in Athens has 162 seats in the 300-member House.
*** 
Even as government officials scrambled to complete the list and an accompanying analysis demanded by creditors, there were indications of internal dissent, with many prominent members of Syriza saying Athens should not give in to creditors.
Giorgos Katrougalos, the minister for administrative reform, told Greek television he would resign if “our red lines were not respected.” He said several of the pre-election pledges that brought Mr. Tsipras to power were not up for negotiation, including the rehiring of thousands of dismissed civil servants.
Manolis Glezos, a veteran Greek leftist, denounced backtracking by Syriza and suggested that the party’s leadership had deceived voters by bending to demands by Brussels and by agreeing to prolong the previous program.
"I apologize to the Greek people because I participated in creating this illusion,” Mr. Glezos, a member of the European Parliament, wrote on a blog, Active Citizens Movement, run by a group within the Syriza party.
Mr. Glezos called on “members, friends and supporters of Syriza” to “react before it is too late” by holding emergency meetings at all levels “to decide if they accept this situation.”
A government official responded that Mr. Glezos “may not be well-informed on the tough and laborious negotiation, which is continuing.”
Another group within Syriza, called Communist Tendency, on Saturday described the Eurogroup deal as “submission to the blackmail of the troika” and called on lawmakers to oppose it in Parliament.
Sofia Sakorafa, another member of the European Parliament for Syriza, wrote on her Twitter account on Sunday, “The people gave a mandate for the memorandum to be annulled” and “we have no political justification to do the opposite.”
Clearly not good for Syriza. Whether a Syriza-led government can survive I don't think is the question. I think it can, even if there are some very acrimonious resignations and public recriminations. The question is what kind of government Syriza is going to be. Another Obamaesque "Hope & Change" charade or a popular movement to crack the neoliberal paradigm?

Hugo Dixon of Reuters has a piece today, "Greece Needs to Embrace Radical Reform," urging Tsipras to go all in fulfilling the troika's demands for structural reform, going back to the voters again if need be:
Mr. Tsipras now has to present his own list of reforms by Monday evening. He must resist any temptation to come up with half-hearted proposals that might appease his extremist colleagues.
Instead, Athens should propose radical reforms that the previous conservative-led government was too conflicted to embrace. It should surprise its eurozone partners with its zeal and so help restore their trust.
Mr. Tsipras has long said he wants to combat tax evasion, corruption and special privileges, as well as rein in the oligarchs who control swaths of the economy and stifle enterprise. Now is his chance to prove he means business.
At the top of Athens’ list should be the creation of a genuinely independent tax authority. The last government, led by Antonis Samaras, sacked the authority’s boss. Buttressing it with strong legal safeguards would show that Mr. Tsipras was serious about tackling tax evasion.
The prime minister should also promise to remove tax and social security privileges enjoyed by the rich. For example, judges, generals and senior civil servants should have to wait for their pensions as long as ordinary people.
Similarly, the Greek Orthodox church should lose its exemptions from the country’s unpopular property tax. Nor should the government continue to pay for priests’ pensions and salaries. The church should offer to fund them itself.
Mr. Tsipras should also revive an idea, discarded by Mr. Samaras, to tax the country’s rich ship owners. It is astonishing that they slip through the tax net.
Next on Athens’ list should be liberalizing markets, which are still gummed up by restrictive practices. This would attract investment and give consumers a better deal. 
Mr. Tsipras should also set up a “bad bank” along the lines of what Spain and Ireland have done successfully. Separating nonperforming loans would not just free the banks to provide credit to the economy, it could also help clear up corruption, as many of the bad loans are provided to oligarchs who are clever at pressuring the banks not to foreclose on them. 
There is understandably some fear that a bad bank could end up as a backdoor means of helping corrupt businesses, by writing down their loans while letting their current owners stay in control. 
Greece’s creditors have the country on a short leash. They have not said how they will provide Athens with the money to stop its going bust next month. They have dangled the possibility of relaxing the punishing fiscal austerity but haven’t said by how much. 
If Mr. Tsipras can surprise his eurozone partners with radical reforms, they will be more willing to find Athens the cash to avoid bankruptcy, probably by letting it sell more short-term treasury bills to its banks. They will be more likely to relax the fiscal squeeze, allowing the government to fund some of its more pressing antipoverty policies. They will also be more amenable to relieving Greece’s vast debt burden, an idea currently on the back burner. 
It will not be easy for Mr. Tsipras to do all this, both because of his far left colleagues and vested interests that support his party. But he is popular enough to do this, especially if he secures a new mandate with a referendum or a second election. Now is the time to break with factions and side decisively with the Greek people.
This is the classic "triangulation" move from the neoliberal playbook perfected by both Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. Run against your own party. It is not going to work here. Syriza, like Podemos, is a recent political formulation, which means it is still connected to the rank and file. Tsipras couldn't split his own party without it collapsing.

Which means a Grexident is not out of the question at this point, though, like Yves Smith, I don't see how the neoliberal can does keep getting kicked down the road.

Thursday, February 19, 2015

Grexit + Serious Trouble in Kiev

Greece has asked for a six-month extension of its loan agreement with the troika (Niki Kitsantonis and James Kanter, "Greece Requests Extension of Loan Agreement and Meets Resistance From Germany"). A meeting will be held tomorrow afternoon in Brussels between eurogroup chief Jeroen Dijsselbloem and Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis. They will attempt for the third time to arrive at an understanding.

The question, as explored in depth this morning by Yves Smith, "Obama Administration Throws Greece Under the Bus; ECB Leak Recommends Capital Controls; Greece Weighing Capitulation," is whether Greece's six-month extension request is a capitulation to the troika's austerity demands. Smith sees it as such:
Things are not going well for Greece. It appears Syriza has largely capitulated to the demands of the Troika. Greece has submitted a request for a loan extension that the Eurogroup will consider Friday. From ekathimerini:
Government officials on Wednesday worked until late finalizing a proposal…
Specifically the government is expected to seek an extension to the so-called Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement, the official name for the European Financial Stability Facility’s loan contract. That contract stipulates, however, that the dispensation of financial assistance is dependant on Greece honoring the terms of the so-called memorandum, which contains the economic reforms that the previous government committed to and which the current SYRIZA-led coalition has contested. Indeed, former Prime Minister Antonis Samaras had made the same request in December last year when he sought to extend the European part of Greece’s bailout program, from the end of the year to February 28. Kathimerini understands that Samaras’s request had then used the words “technical extension to the existing Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement,” the same phrase that the new government was said to be considering last night.
The compromise is expected to satisfy both sides as it would mean Athens can avoid using the phrase “extension of the existing program” and the creditors can avoid using the term “loan agreement.” In substance, however, there would be little difference from the extension sought by Samaras as the terms of the memorandum would have to be respected in order for rescue loans to be disbursed.
This means that Greece is effectively asking for an extension of the bailout, which is what it had refused to do. And that means keeping the “conditionality” as in privatizations and labor-crushing structural reforms, intact. Greece is still fighting to keep some flexibility there but it is not clear they will obtain much. Again from ekathimerini:
The European Commission’s vice president for eurozone affairs, Valdis Dombrovskis, said efforts were under way to reach a compromise by finding “common ground for an extension of the current program.”
He insisted that “the best way forward is to extend the existing program with its conditionality.” Dombrovskis noted, however, that if Greece wants to substitute some of the existing measures in the memorandum with alternatives, it could do so.
In other words, this is a “peace with honor” solution.
Smith then goes on to list what led to the presumed capitulation: 1) the Syriza-led government was abandoned by the United States (no surprise there); 2) Greece is going to run out of a cash February 24, much earlier than originally anticipated; and, most importantly, 3) the European Central Bank (ECB) is fanning a bank run and then restricting the amount of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) that Greece could tap (basically, the ECB has been working to crater the Greek banking system to force Tsipras and Varoufakis to kneel).

The problem for the troika is that clearly Greek's Syriza-led government has no intention of implementing the austerity diktats contained in the loan memo. Can you imagine a situation in Athens (approval for Syriza is sky high) where Tsipras starts taking bids on publics assets and issuing pink slips to government workers? It is not going to happen.

If there is any wiggle room in the six-month extension document, Dijsselbloem will try to eliminate it. For one, Greece insists that the troika's auditors will not be welcomed back to Athens to oversee implementation of the diktats. According to Yves Smith,
[I]t may be that even the concessions that they are apparently prepared to offer will not be deemed sufficient. For instance, it does not appear that Syriza has agreed to let the Troika monitors back in, one of the five demand seen as critical by the Germans. And even though the European Commission spokesperson Valdis Dombrovskis said there might be some negotiating room on specific conditions, that is also inconsistent with the FAZ description of the German stance. Recall that it was a European Commission trial document that Varoufakis said Greece was willing to sign but was firmly nixed by the Eurogroup. 
So it may be that this last round of concessions is meant not as a capitulation but to demonstrate how much Greece was willing to give in the face of implacable Eurogroup demands and was still rebuffed. We’ll know the outcome either way shortly.
This has been my feeling all along about the underlying strategy of Syriza. Syriza is a pro-EU party. Varoufakis spoke eloquently and sincerely -- and in an impromptu manner -- about European unity during his Monday press conference. But if Syriza can prove that the status quo is irrational, which Varoufakis has made some headway communicating over the last several weeks, then a Grexit and the resulting turmoil will not be blamed on Syriza but on the troika.

Kitsantonis and Kanter are reporting that Germany is opposed to Greece's six-month extension request:
Germany is probably the central eurozone member in [Friday's] proceedings, and a German Finance Ministry spokesman, Martin Jäger, said in a statement on Thursday that the letter from Athens was “not a substantial proposal to resolve matters.” He added: “The written document does not meet the criteria agreed in the Eurogroup on Monday.”
Germany's intention is to break Syriza, de-legitimize it. Smith said the German ambassador to Greece requested that Varoufakis be replaced as finance minister. Germany sees Greece as a serf in bondage, and Germany will not accept an outcome that places the nations on equal footing.

The temptation in the West to interpret every relationship as one of lordship and bondage is on display in Ukraine. The junta's loss in Debaltseve is clearly a turning point. The Ukrainian Army which was cracking prior to Debaltseve (to the point that the Gray Lady was reporting plans floated in Kiev to create a brand new army) will probably not be able to recover from the rout it suffered this week. The Saker outlines the Debaltsve turning point as follows:
The real problem for Kiev is that more or less all of the current line of contact can become a potential counter-offensive point for the Novorussians who, by the way, have never concealed their desire to get back all of the historical Novorussian lands. So while the current (relative) cease-fire is all nice and dandy, I think that by this spring, when the Novorussians will have reinforced their infantry with up to 100'00 more men the situation for the Kiev regime will become absolutely horrific and no amount of US weapon deliveries will change that. This might well be the beginning of the end for the Nazi experiment in Kiev. 
The implications for the AngloZionist empire are rather clear: if the 1%ers have any kind of sense of reality left, they should toss out Poroshenko and the rest of the crazies and foster some kind of government of technocrats in charge of drafting a new constitution and organizing a referendum on federalization simply because the folks in Kiev better negotiate while there still is something left to negotiate then to way to be hiding in a surrounded bunker like their hero Hitler did. Alas, I don't think Uncle Sam or the Eurocretins have any common sense left in them. 
Whatever may be the case, by the ballot or by the bullet, but we *are* winning.
With the Ukrainian Army mortally wounded, Poroshenko is trying to get UN peacekeepers introduced to Donbass. Russia has nixed the move.

Would the U.S. try to piece together a "coalition of the willing"? I don't think so; such a move would invite an enormous Russian response.

No, Kiev's days are numbered, and so too apparently the eurzone's.

Tuesday, February 10, 2015

Seeds of Europe's Destruction Likely to be Planted Tomorrow

The future of Europe will be decided tomorrow. First, in an emergency meeting between Greek officials, presumably led by finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, and representatives of the troika the Syriza-led government will reveal their financing plan for Greece. Then in Minsk, leaders from Russia, Germany, France and Ukraine will meet to negotiate a new ceasefire for the Donbass.

These two issues -- the troika-dictated neoliberal austerity in Greece and the civil war in Ukraine -- are connected because both are being pursued by the the political class in the West absent a popular mandate. Indications are that the political class will continue to move in the opposite direction of its citizenry. For Greece, this will mean a prolongation of the Grexit crisis; for Ukraine, more war; both will translate to more loses for the established governing parties in Europe. The U.S. is relatively insulated from this because of a duopoly where both parties cater to the super-rich.

First, to Liz Alderman and Niki Kitsantonis in "Greece to Propose a Debt Compromise Plan to Creditors":
ATHENS — Hoping to defuse a standoff that has set Europe and financial markets on edge, Greek officials intend to propose a detailed compromise plan at an emergency meeting with creditors on Wednesday in Brussels, a finance ministry official here said on Monday. 
The plan will include the possibility of tapping part of a bailout loan disbursement of 7 billion euros, or $7.9 billion, that Athens had been saying it would reject, according to the official, who insisted on anonymity because the plans had not yet been made public. 
Greece still plans to reject some of the harshest austerity conditions attached to Greece’s bailout loans, but will propose retaining about 70 percent of the terms, according to the official. 
Athens will propose replacing the remaining 30 percent of the austerity conditions with new reforms that the Greek government will devise together with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The O.E.C.D. represents about three dozen of the world’s richest economies, including those of many of the European countries to which Greece owes money. 
The proposal, to be made at a gathering of eurozone finance ministers on Wednesday in Brussels, would also significantly extend the period Greece proposes for reaching a “new contract” with its creditors — by asking for a bridge-financing program through the end of August, instead of the May time frame Greek officials had previously discussed. 
The offer was being pulled together as the dispute escalated between Greece and its European creditors. In a speech in Parliament on Sunday, the new prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, appeared to draw a hard line, saying he was determined to eliminate Greece’s “cruel” austerity program. German officials have insisted that Greece would get no money to help pay debts unless it adhered to the conditions of the bailout program agreed to in 2012. 
Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany appeared to show little leeway on Monday. “The basic rules” of the Greek bailout program “have always been the same,” she said at a joint news conference with President Obama in Washington. “You put in your own efforts and on the other side you’re being shown solidarity. A quid pro quo.”
Reading about the speech Tsipras delivered to Parliament on Sunday (Niki Kitsantonis, "Prime Minister of Greece Will Not Prolong Bailout") was like hearing for the first time that life had been discovered on another planet, so alien it is to have a politician say he is going to restore collective bargaining rights or give laid-off workers their jobs back:
Mr. Tsipras said extending the bailout would be tantamount to continuing the “mistakes and disaster” of the past, and he said his government needed “fiscal space” for discussion on restructuring of debt. 
“We only have one commitment: to serve the interests of our people, the good of society,” he said, noting that it was an “irreversible decision” of his government to fulfill its promises “in their entirety.” 
Mr. Tsipras also pledged to replace a hated unified property tax, which combines several levies, with a new tax on large property and to increase the tax-free threshold on annual income to €12,000 from the current €5,000. Cracking down on tax evasion and corruption were also underlined as priorities. 
Immediate action will be taken, he said, to restore collective wage bargaining, bringing unions back into negotiations on workers’ salaries and working conditions. He also pledged to gradually restore the minimum wage to €751 a month from €586. 
As a jab at Germany, which has been leading the austerity drive in Europe, Mr. Tsipras said it was Greece’s historical duty to seek war reparations and the repayment of a loan it was forced to make to Germany in World War II.
This was a shrewd move by Tsipras; basically, he burned the bridge at his back. The troika has been put on notice that Syriza will implement the pledges that brought them to power. If Syriza reneges, the Greek government will fall and Golden Dawn, currently the third largest party, will surge.

What I find interesting is that the conventional wisdom soon after Syriza came out on top in the election several Sundays back was that the troika was going to be willing to bargain, that bridge loans would be provided and negotiations would be extended into the summer, allowing Syriza's mojo to peter out gradually. In the end the troika would be willing to hand Tsipras and Varoufakis a few crumbs off the master's table to peddle to their pauperized public, maybe a free home heating program for the destitute.

So far, the opposite has been the case. European leaders have played hardball, demanding strick adherence to austerity and even fomenting a bank run. Yves Smith explains this morning in "Obama, Treasury Pushing Back Against Troika Grexit Threats; Bernie Sanders Presses for Fed to Prod ECB":
But what is far more worrisome is what we hear from a source with knowledge of the [U.S.] Treasury discussions, namely, that they are worried about the run on the Greek banking system. As readers may know, that started with the Syriza win and we suspect was in large measure due to oligarchs voting with their feet. However, the ECB kneecapping of Greece, by effectively ending its access to financial markets, has had the additional effect of re-stoking depositor worries about the banking system, since it called attention to the fact that the backstop, the Emergency Liquidity Assistance program, is subject to reauthorization every two weeks. Now in fairness, the ECB gave a big boost to the amount the Greek central bank could access under the ELA, from €15 billion to €60 billion. I am cynical enough to believe, and plenty of others share my views, that the ECB wanted to keep the bank run going to pressure Greece but have plausible deniability about what they were up to. And the continued impasse has led to a considerable ratchet up in media chatter about Grexit, which is another reason for depositors to take flight.
What is particularly troubling about the word from Treasury is that their concern about the Greek banking system is tantamount to saying that the ECB might withdraw the ELA. This would be catastrophic for Greece, and it would also mean that no depositor in the Eurozone could regard his deposits as safe, since the supposed leader of last resort reneged on that commitment for strictly political ends.
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard confirms this reading. From the Telegraph, emphasis ours:
The EU authorities have told Mr Tsipras that a series of crucial meetings in Brussels this week are his last chance to retreat from hot campaign rhetoric and agree to an extension of the Troika bail-out.
The clear threat is that the European Central Bank will cut off €60bn of emergency liquidity support for the Greek financial system when the existing Troika arrangement expires on February 28. This would force Greece to impose capital controls, nationalize the banks, and reintroduce the drachma within days.
Even if the ECB agrees to a stay of execution, Athens will start to run out of money in March, when it faces repayments to the International Monetary Fund, followed by other creditors. Tax revenues have dried up over recent weeks as Greeks wait to see what Syriza does in office. The treasury’s cash reserves have fallen to €1.5bn.
It is also worth noting that even if Obama gets something of a respite for Greece, it won’t amount to much. Given that the Administration is firmly neoliberal, we suspect they won’t do much to support Greece in its desire to improve wage and employments levels, and will instead push for a mere lessening of the severity of austerity. So rather than the Troika breaking Greece on the rack, its citizens will have to continue to labor in the salt mines.
Much is being made about the split between Europe and the United States about widening the war in Ukraine by supplying heavy "defensive" weapons to the junta. With this move, which is basically a done deal as far as the Obama administration is concerned, there goes the entire Ostpolitik raison d'être of the German state for the last 40 years.

A ceasefire is a longshot at Minsk because the Kiev junta, backed by the U.S., is not willing to accept its territorial loses since the original ceasefire was agreed to last September. What never gets reported in the atrocious Western press is that the junta never followed the original ceasefire. Read Israel Shamir's excellent "Putin Prefers a Bad Peace: From Syria to Donbass, Russians Endorse Peace, Americans Push for War":
Peace in Ukraine can be reached through federalisation, my source told me. That’s why two most important parameters of Minsk accords (between Kiev and Donetsk) were those we never hear about: constitutional and socio-economic reforms. Russia wants to secure territorial integrity of the Ukraine (minus Crimea) but it can be achieved only through federalisation of Ukraine with a degree of autonomy being given to its regions. Its west and east speak different languages, worship different heroes, have different aspirations. They could manage together, just, if the Ukraine were a federal state, like the US or Switzerland or India.
In Minsk, the sides agreed to establish a joint commission for constitutional reforms, but Kiev regime reneged on it. Instead, they created a small and secretive constitutional committee of the Rada (Parliament). This was condemned by the Venice Commission, a European advisory body on constitutional matters. Donetsk people wouldn’t accept it, either, and it is not what was agreed upon in Minsk.
As for integration, it was agreed in Minsk to reintegrate Donbass within Ukraine. This was disappointing for Donbass, but they accepted it, – while Kiev laid siege to Donbass, cut off its banks, ceased buying Donbass coal, stopped to pay pensions. Kiev troops daily shell Donetsk, a city of a million inhabitants (in peaceful times!). Instead of amnesty for rebels, as agreed in Minsk, there are more government troops pouring eastwards.
The Russians did not give up on Minsk accords. The Minsk agreements could bring peace, but they have to be implemented. Perhaps president Poroshenko of Kiev would like to, but Kiev war party with its western support will unseat Poroshenko if he goes too far. Paradoxically, the only way to force him to peace is war, – though Russia would prefer the West to put pressure on its clients in Kiev. The rebels and their Russian supporters used warfare to force him to sign Minsk accords: their offensive on Mariupol on the Black Sea was hugely successful, and Poroshenko preferred to go to Minsk in order to keep Mariupol. Since then, Kiev and Donetsk had a few cease-fires, they exchanged POWs, but Kiev refuses to implement constitutional and socio-economic demands of Minsk accord.
It does not make sense to cease fire, if Kiev uses it to regroup and attack again. Cease fire should lead to a constitutional reform, said my source, a reform negotiated in an open and transparent dialogue of the regions and Kiev. Without a reform, Donbass (or Novorussia) will go to war. So the Debaltsevo operation can be considered as a way to force Poroshenko to sue for peace.
Russia does not intend to take part in the war, or in peace negotiations, said the source. The Russians are adamant to stay out, while the Americans are equally adamant to present Russia as a side to conflict.
Meanwhile, the Russian-American relations were moved forty years back to Jackson-Vanik amendment of 1974 by the Ukraine Freedom [Support Act of 2014]. The US Secretary of State John Kerry considered this act an unfortunate development, but a temporary one. The Russians are not that optimistic: for them, the Act codified anti-Russian sanctions. The US tries to turn other states against Russia, with some success. In one sweep the German Kanzlerin Angela Merkel eliminated all organisations, structures and ties built between Germany and Russia for many years. Every visit of Joe Biden causes a conflagration.
The Russians are upset with the story of the Malaysian Boeing. In every high-level encounter with the Americans, they remind of the hysterical accusations and claims that the liner was downed by the rebels using Russian missiles. Six months passed since the tragedy; still the Americans did not present a single proof of Russian and/or rebel involvement. They did not present photos of their satellites, nor records of their AWACS aircraft hovering over Eastern Europe. My source told me that the American high-ranking officials do not insist anymore that Russians/rebels are involved, but they stubbornly refuse to apologise for their previous baseless accusations. They never say they are sorry.
The U.S. can supply all the weapons it wants, Kiev will not win. But the European Union as presently configured certainly will lose. Le Pen's National Front will rise to become the most popular party in France, and she has promised to take France out of the European Union. It is hard for "guns and no butter," austerity and war, to be maintained indefinitely in a democracy.