Showing posts with label Eurogroup. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Eurogroup. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 4, 2015

TPP on the Ropes: Trucks, Cheese and Drugs

Talks in Maui between 12 nations trying to hammer out a trade agreement known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership foundered last Friday. Good news for the overwhelming majority of workers, but bad news for the power elite who run the show. Even if new negotiation dates could be established and the sticking points smoothed over, any final TPP agreement would most likely be pitched into 2016 and the thick of U.S. presidential and congressional elections. And since free-trade agreements are broadly unpopular across the spectrum of voters from the radical left to the Birchite right, a delay in substantive action on the TPP until sometime in 2017 is the safest bet.

This is not preventing legacy junkie John Kerry from trumpeting the benefits of the TPP to his Singapore hosts, as Michael Gordon reports this morning in "Kerry Hails Progress Toward Trans-Pacific Trade Pact, Despite Delays":
“No country can expect its economy to grow simply by buying and selling to its own people,” Mr. Kerry added. “It is just not going to happen. It defies the law of economics. Trade is a job creator and prosperity builder, period.” 
The trade pact has been a top priority for the Obama administration, which has proclaimed a policy of focusing more on Asia as part of a “rebalancing” of American interests. 
The White House had hoped that Congress’s passage in June of “fast track” negotiating powers would pave the way for concluding the accord, which would be the largest regional trade pact in history. 
But the 12-nation talks have been snagged by differences over access to agricultural markets and protections for drug companies, among other issues. Trade ministers meeting in Hawaii failed to reach a final agreement on Friday, raising concerns that the discussions would be extended into the politically charged presidential election campaign in the United States. 
Mr. Kerry acknowledged in his speech that the negotiations had been tough and that there were still “details to be hashed out,” though he did not discuss any of the obstacles to progress or suggest how they might be overcome.
To understand why trade -- in particular, these large, multinational, corporate-managed trade agreements -- is not always a job creator all one need to is read a story written last month by Bill Vlasic, "Wariness as Auto Industry Eyes Mexico for Growth." In order to win huge concessions from the United Auto Workers, Ford is making plans to move its successful and lucrative compact-car production line from Michigan across the border -- thanks to previous trade agreement, NAFTA -- to Mexico:
DETROIT — The unlikely comeback of the American auto industry has generated tens of thousands of new jobs at Fiat Chrysler, Ford andGeneral Motors. 
But as the United Automobile Workers union enters talks on new contracts with the Detroit car companies, perhaps its biggest worry is losing vehicle production to lower-wage nations like Mexico. 
Ford, which starts negotiations with the union on Thursday, stunned U.A.W. leaders this month with its unexpected decision to move small-car production from a Michigan assembly plant in 2018 to an undisclosed location. 
The union’s president, Dennis Williams, bristled when asked last week to comment on the possibility that Ford may send the work to Mexico. 
“I will save my comments on Ford for when we open up negotiations,” Mr. Williams said. “But it is always concerning to me when any company invests outside the United States.”
The rapid growth of the Mexican auto industry has been a growing source of concern for the union, particularly because many of the products built south of the border are destined to be sold in American showrooms. 
Auto plants in Mexico are on track to export about 70 percent of their production this year to the United States, according to the Mexican Automobile Industry Association trade group. 
And automakers are stepping up their investments further to take better advantage of cheaper labor costs and Mexico’s attractive trade environment, made possible by pacts like the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
Companies like Toyota and Volkswagen are constructing new plants in Mexico, and Ford and G.M. have announced big new investments in existing facilities there. At the same time, the number of unionized manufacturing plants in the United States has remained largely static. 
“In the past two years, there has been about $19 billion in new investments announced for Mexico,” said Harley Shaiken, a professor at the University of California, Berkeley who has studied the growth of the Mexican auto industry. “This raises enormous competitive issues for the U.A.W.” 
Mr. Williams has consistently criticized decisions by American companies to invest in Mexico, where autoworkers are paid as little as $9 an hour compared with the top U.A.W. wage of $28 in the United States. 
“They’re using cheap labor, and they’re shipping products here to sell,” Mr. Williams said at a press briefing last month. “That’s wrong for the United States of America.”
But the union is fighting an uphill battle. Free-trade pacts are expanding to Asia and elsewhere, rather than contracting. And Mexico is an increasingly attractive destination for companies trying to maximize profit margins, particularly on small cars. 
Ford has not specified where it will move production of its Focus sedan and C-Max hybrids. But it is already cutting 700 jobs at the plant in Wayne, Mich., where they are built, and plans to ship the remaining production elsewhere in three years. 
The company said the future of the plant, which has employed as many as 4,700 workers, would be decided at the bargaining table.
Interestingly, the fast-growing Mexico auto industry was one of the reasons, along with Canadian dairy and U.S. pharmaceuticals, that this last round of TPP talks failed, as Jonathan Weisman reports in his excellent recap, "Trans-Pacific Partnership Session Ends With Heels Dug In":
Mexico’s secretary of the economy, Ildefonso Guajardo, is taking a particularly hard line against Japan’s automotive industry, a position that some negotiators said helped dash any hope of completing the trade deal in Maui.
At issue is the definition of a car or truck from one of the Trans-Pacific Partnership countries. Mexico wants only vehicles with around 65 percent of their components made in the T.P.P. region to qualify for lower tariff barriers under the deal. That would favor Mexican trucks made with American and Japanese parts. Japan wants that “rule of origin” threshold set closer to 50 percent, favoring its parts suppliers in China and Thailand.
“The auto industry in Mexico is the seventh-largest producer in the world and the fourth-largest exporter,” Mr. Guajardo said late on Friday. “What you can accuse me” of “is putting myself to the front to really push the interest of my country.”
New Zealand and Canada are at loggerheads over dairy. While tiny New Zealand produces just 3 percent of the world’s dairy products, it is the world’s largest dairy exporter. Canada’s government, embattled ahead of parliamentary elections in October, showed little inclination to let New Zealand’s cheese and eggs compete with its own.
Mr. Groser, the New Zealand negotiator, noted that his country was the first to propose a trade accord linking both sides of the Pacific Ocean. He wrote one of the first briefs championing it.
“I don’t really feel emotionally in the space of wanting to leave the party. No, we will not be pushed out of this agreement,” he said.
With so many countries angered by Canada’s closed-door stand on dairy, Ed Fast, Ottawa’s minister of international trade, was left to defend his stance. “Canada came to Maui ready to conclude a T.P.P. We were active, constructive partners at the table,” he said.
The biggest problem may be intractable differences over intellectual property protections, especially for pharmaceutical companies developing the next generation of medicines known as biologics. A copy of the still-incomplete intellectual property chapter, viewed by The New York Times, shows just how isolated the United States’ position is.
In one section, the United States and Japan want language saying a lack of enforcement resources is no excuse for failure to ensure compliance. That position is opposed by New Zealand, Vietnam, Mexico, Peru, Australia, Malaysia and Brunei.
In another section, 11 negotiating nations propose language to ensure judicial authorities have the power to force a company that “abuses enforcement procedures” to compensate a party “wrongfully enjoined or restrained” if a case is lost. Only the United States opposes that.
Much of the intellectual property dispute revolves around the protection of major pharmaceutical companies, which want the United States’ 12 years of data protection on new drugs expanded to the other 11 T.P.P. countries. Republicans in Congress, especially Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and a key ally of the president’s on trade, demand that the White House hold firm.
But most of the other countries — and most international health groups — oppose that position strenuously. They say it would keep drug prices high, drain government coffers and put new biologic medicines out of reach for the developing world.
“That is the toughest nut to crack,” Mr. Schott said.
Those of us who root for any defeat of the "radical center," the neoliberal consensus that governs the globe, experienced a somersault of emotions in June and July when at first it looked like Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives killed the TPP by blocking TPA (Trade Promotion Authority), a.k.a., Fast Track, for Obama. But the administration with the help of GOP majority leader Mitch McConnell was able to salvage TPA in the Senate. Then in early July another somersault. Greek voters stood tall and strong with their overwhelming "Oxi" vote against austerity only to have prime minister Alexis Tsipras abjectly surrender to the diktats of the Eurogroup. But now just as the TPP is looking wobbly on the ropes so too is the future of any new bailout deal for Greece.

The neoliberal paradigm completely dominates the political landscape but this does not mean that it can erase the cracks in its foundation. Change we can believe in might indeed be fast approaching.

Sunday, July 12, 2015

Greek Capitulation Not Good Enough for Schäuble & Co. Grexit Unavoidable

Yves Smith for all the arrows she has absorbed for her pessimism about the bargaining positions of both Greece and her creditors has for the must part been reliably on the money. This morning she writes that "A Grexit Looks Almost Inescapable":
Despite my generally dour outlook, I never thought we’d arrive at the insane juncture we are at now, that of a Grexit being all but baked in. This would be a catastrophic outcome, most of all for the Greek 99%. If a Grexit comes to pass, it should deservedly blacken the names of everyone involved, most of all Merkel, whose incrementalism meant that all of the unresolved contradictions of the Eurozone produced intensifying pressure on its fault lines, and Greece proved to be the breaking point. But as we’ll see soon, her finance minister Wolfgang Schauble would also get a particularly large badge of dishonor. 
You don’t need to know much to know that the odds of Greece escaping a Grezit are becoming vanishingly small as time progresses, and there is perilously little time left. And mind you, this sorry trajectory is occurring even after the Greek government prostrated itself and offered to meet even more stringent conditions than its voters overwhelmingly rejected in a referendum less than a week ago.
The big development is that last night's meeting of eurozone finance ministers adjourned minus any resolution. As James Kanter reports in "Meeting on Greece Debt Breaks Up With No Deal" the hardliners -- Germany, Finland, Slovakia, et al. -- don't believe that Greece will implement its latest austerity proposal:
Despite Greece’s capitulation on those terms, many countries came into this weekend’s final round of negotiations skeptical of the Tsipras government’s commitment to seeing through the changes and putting his country on firmer financial footing — and weary of the constant brinkmanship that has characterized the months of negotiations over Greece’s latest crisis.
Instead of working through the night to hammer out a statement on requirements for Greece, as had been expected, the meeting was suddenly called off shortly before midnight, and ministers left without even holding a formal news conference.
“The issue of credibility and trust was discussed, and also of course the financial issues involved,” Jeroen Dijsselbloem of the Netherlands, the head of the so-called Eurogroup of ministers, told reporters. “It is still very difficult. but work is still in progress,” he said, adding that discussions would continue later Sunday morning.
From the start, it was clear that Mr. Tsipras’s gambit had not entirely won over Germany and other countries that have been skeptical about giving a new round of loans to Greece after years in which successive governments in Athens have struggled to carry out changes that creditors have demanded as a condition of the bailouts.
“We will have exceptionally difficult negotiations,” Wolfgang Schäuble, the hard-nosed German finance minister, said on Saturday before the meeting. “We won’t be able to rely on promises.”
His prediction proved accurate, as he and fellow ministers wrangled with little apparent progress, seeking more assurances from Greece that it was committed to changing its ways, and weighing the desires of France and Italy for a deal against the more skeptical stance of Germany and the possibility of outright opposition from Finland.
What Schäuble did do in the 11th hour was forward a proposal demanding that Greece essentially be placed in receivership and banned from the euro for five years. According to The Guardian's Ian Traynor in "Greece nears euro exit as bailout talks break up without agreement," who Yves Smith quotes at length in an update to her post,
With Greece on the edge of financial and social implosion, eurozone finance ministers met to decide on the country’s fate and on what to do about its debt crisis, after experts from the troika of creditors said that new fiscal rigour proposals from Athens were good enough to form “the basis for negotiations”.
But the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, dismissed that view, supported by a number of northern and eastern European states. “These proposals cannot build the basis for a completely new, three-year [bailout] programme, as requested by Greece,” said a German finance ministry paper. It called for Greece to be expelled from the eurozone for a minimum of five years and demanded that the Greek government transfer €50bn of state assets to an outside agency for sell-off.
Timo Soini, the nationalist True Finns leader, meanwhile, threatened to bring down the government in Helsinki if Alex Stubb, the finance minister, agreed to a new bailout for Greece. Stubb apparently came to the crunch meeting on a new bailout without a mandate to agree one.
“The hawks are very vocal,” said an EU diplomat. “It’s very tough.” Berlin also demanded stronger and more intrusive powers for outside monitors to police the economic and fiscal reforms that Alexis Tsipras, the leftist Greek prime minister, would need to commit to to secure the new bailout.
Saturday night’s talks were not to agree on a third bailout, but were negotiations on whether to launch more talks on Greece’s third rescue package in five years. The ministers faced formidable problems, said Schäuble, who argued debt relief for Greece, broadly seen as essential, was banned by the EU treaties: “Athens’s proposals are far from sufficient. The funding gaps are way beyond anything we’ve seen so far,” he said.
The hard line was echoed by Peter Kazimir, finance minister of Slovakia, who said that new austerity measures tabled by Athens were already past their sell-by date.
The eurozone has been united for five months in the negotiations with Tsipras, but with the stakes rising greatly in the last 10 days, major divisions have surfaced, with the French working tirelessly to save Greece and the hardliners now pushing Greece’s expulsion for the first time openly.
The European commission and the European Central Bank issued dire warnings that a failure to grant Greece new rescue funds of up to €78bn would put the country on a trajectory of complete banking and financial collapse.
The widening gulf between eurozone hawks and doves paves the way for an acrimonious summit on Sunday, with France and Italy lining up against Germany and the northern and eastern Europeans. Matteo Renzi, the Italian prime minister, is expected to tell chancellor Angela Merkel that enough is enough and that Greece should not have to put up with any more humiliation.
Merkel is under intense pressure from the Americans not to “lose” Greece and is worried about her own legacy. But Greece fatigue is becoming endemic in Germany, and she faces growing unrest in her party ranks where Schäuble’s hard line is popular. She was said to have endorsed Schäuble’s tough position.
Whether the U.S. can work its will once again on a reluctant Merkel, as it did in the case of Russian sanctions and the whole smorgasbord of riots, a coup and the downing of the MH17 passenger jet, seems a long shot to me.

The Obama administration has not been particularly assertive about securing an amicable resolution to the Greek debt crisis. Getting the IMF to release its report saying Greece's debt load was unsustainable and that debt relief must be considered was helpful to Syriza in the run up to last Sunday's referendum, but it was far from the kind of full-court press trotted out to get the EU to embrace sanctions on Russia.

The U.S. is allowed to run roughshod over Europe when it comes to NATO force projection. But when the question is Germany's economic hegemony over the continent, Uncle Sam apparently has to wear velvet slippers.

Schäuble's 11th-hour proposal, one that Traynor says Merkel has signed off on, at least clarifies the root of Germany's incessant demands for austerity. It is not about a belief that austerity will lead to growth; that has been debunked long ago. It is about taking possession of Greece lock, stock, and barrel. Likely in the private moments of hardliners among the Finns, Germans and Slovaks are thoughts about Greek women. Why not put the young fertile ones on the auction block too?

Wednesday, July 8, 2015

Collapse: Greece + Yemen

The situation for Greece seems hopeless this morning. Reports over at Naked Capitalism highlight 1) that Tsipras never expected, never wanted to win the referendum and now has no idea what to do, that is why apparently Varoufakis' replacement, new finance minister Euclid Tsakalotos, showed up in Brussels without any proposal to present; and 2) complete capitulation by Syriza is coming fast. A proposal must be submitted by tomorrow and final agreement reached by Sunday. The new D-Day is now July 12, not July 20.

Though Yves Smith is reporting that Tsipras is already signalling his intention to accept most parts of the austerity package that was overwhelming rejected by Greeks at the polls this past Sunday, this might not be enough to satisfy the hardliners in the eurogroup, who are now rallying for even more austerity.

I think we have arrived at the point of Grexident. I suppose Tsipras can abjectly surrender to the eurogroup, that might have been the point of convening all parliamentary parties in a show of solidarity heading into negotiations. But then how does Syriza survive politically after receiving that 61% "Oxi" vote? It can't.

So it looks like drachmas it is. A lot of chaos is coming.

Which brings us to what I wanted to mention this morning -- Yemen. Yemen is infrequently covered in the "newspaper of record." Whether because its "Mad Max" landscape prevents Times' reporters from being dispatched to a war zone, or the more malign reason that the Gray Lady shares the foreign policy goals of the Obama administration, and the Obama administration is actively involved in the Saudi-led genocidal campaign against the poorest Arab country, New York Times readers are not receiving daily coverage of the ongoing slaughter in Yemen.

The numbers of dead as reported by CNN are as follows:
In total, more than 3,260 people have been killed in Yemen since March, [Stephen O'Brien, the top U.N. humanitarian affairs official, said Tuesday] and close to 1.3 million people have been displaced.

Of the dead, more than 1,500 are civilians, according to the U.N. human rights office.
The Gray Lady did publish a topnotch unsigned editorial yesterday, "As Yemen Collapses":
Yemen has now been added to the United Nations’ list of most severe humanitarian emergencies, along with South Sudan, Syria and Iraq. It is a tragic distinction, highlighting the peril to 80 percent of the country’s 25 million citizens. The international community, including the United States, is not doing enough to push for an immediate cease-fire in the war that is ravaging the country to make it possible to deliver aid.
Yemen, a poor country, was deeply unstable even before a coalition, led by Saudi Arabia and backed by the United States, started bombing the Houthi rebel movement in late March. Last week, Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations secretary general, declared the situation a “catastrophe.”
The coalition is seeking to reinstate the government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who is now in exile in Riyadh. Mr. Hadi was ousted by the Houthis, an indigenous Shiite group allied with Iran. Most Yemenis are Sunnis, and Saudi Arabia, a leading Sunni country, has feared that a Houthi takeover would extend the influence of Iran, its regional rival.
The statistics are staggering. Over the past three months, the conflict has forced over a million Yemenis to flee their homes, and 21 million are in need of immediate help. Close to 13 million people are hungry and nearly half the provinces are “one step away” from famine, the United Nations said. Some 15 million people have no health care, and outbreaks of dengue fever and malaria are raging unchecked, in part because a fuel shortage has cut the electricity that keeps water pumps functioning.
The armed conflict is the biggest obstacle for United Nations relief agencies and private groups that are trying to reach desperate Yemenis, but a Saudi-imposed blockade along the coastline is also impeding crucial supplies from getting to those in need.
Mr. Ban and his special envoy, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, have been working to arrange a pause in the fighting so humanitarian aid can be delivered, and late last week aid groups were told that a cease-fire lasting about five days could begin soon. But the Saudi-led coalition may have hurt that goal by unleashing more airstrikes in the past few days against the Houthis and causing scores of new civilian casualties. One attack, on a marketplace near the city of Aden on Monday, killed more than 45 civilians, The Associated Press reported. In all, the United Nations has said 3,000 Yemenis have died since March, half of them civilians.
Some aid groups say five days is not enough time to resupply the millions of civilians caught in the fighting. And even if there is a pause, the conflict could grow worse unless all sides pledge not to use it to seize more territory. The Houthis did exactly that in the last brief break in the fighting.
What is needed is a permanent political solution that will ensure the Houthis, who have some legitimate grievances and are unlikely to give up, get a significant role in any new government. Negotiations should be started without preconditions. But Saudi Arabia and its allies have appeared intent on forcing the Houthis to surrender, no matter what the cost to civilians and Yemen’s cities and villages.
Yemen has been a breeding ground for extremists, including Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the most lethal Qaeda affiliate. Its further unraveling will make it impossible to contain those threats, and that is a consequence all sides should fear.
Add to this the two Islamic State in Yemen car bombs that struck Sana yesterday, and you have a picture of superpower backed states bombing from above while its takfiri proxies Islamic State and AQAP bomb from down below.

At this point it is obvious that even if all Houthis were to spontaneously combust, Yemen would remain a cracked, failed state, a staging ground for takfiri jihad for the foreseeable future.

We have entered that stage of the dialectic where state powers in order to maintain their hegemony are destroying the possibility of any peace.

Tuesday, July 7, 2015

Deadlines: Greek Debt Negotiations & P5+1 Talks

So we're back to deadline watch in the Greek debt drama. The new make-or-break deadline we're supposed to stay focused on is July 20. That is when 3.5 billion euros that Greece owes to the European Central Bank comes due. If Greece fails to make repayment by July 20, the ECB will be hard pressed to find a way around cutting off liquidity to already cash-strapped Greek banks.

James Kanter publishes a helpful story this morning, "Greece Expected to Offer Proposals as Eurozone Leaders Prepare to Meet," that precedes yet another emergency summit of eurozone leaders in Brussels today. Kanter tilts towards the neoliberal consensus. So his writing is a helpful prism to understand how the U.S./EU elite view recalcitrant Greece:
BRUSSELS — The Greek government was expected to make proposals to eurozone leaders on Tuesday to support its battered economy and keep the country in the single currency area, as Athens and its creditors resume their struggle over an elusive solution to Greece’s long-running economic crisis. 
But a quick fix for Athens looked extremely difficult to achieve. The stakes were rising on Tuesday ahead of the latest emergency summit meeting of European leaders. None of them wants to take the blame for a possible sudden, chaotic departure from the eurozone by Greece. That means that all sides could agree to keep talking even as the crisis reaches new levels of intensity, and even as Greece hurtles toward a deadline — a payment of 3.5 billion euros, or about $3.9 billion, to the European Central Bank on July 20 — that most observers think it cannot miss without leaving the eurozone.
The Eurogroup of finance ministers is scheduled to convene at 1 p.m. in Brussels, followed by an emergency summit meeting of the 19 leaders of eurozone countries at 7 p.m. that is expected to include Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, and Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the president of the Eurogroup.
*** 
A failure to make good on the July 20 bailout payment to the European Central Bank would make it almost inevitable that Greece would have to cut a lifeline for the country’s cash-drained banks. And that could force the country to print a parallel currency that would hasten its departure from the currency bloc. 
That prospect could add pressure on the Greeks this week to commit to a number of short-term changes for bridge financing to avoid defaulting on the European Central Bank, and then conclude a wider program, with debt relief, later in the year. 
But one analyst emphasized on Tuesday that the track record of the government in Athens would make it extremely difficult to take any of its commitments at face value. 
“It remains very unclear whether the Greek government is really trying to avoid an exit from the euro area, or whether it only wants to avoid being held responsible for it by its domestic public opinion,” said Nicolas Véron, a senior fellow at Bruegel, a research organization in Brussels.
I used to be of the opinion that what Tsipras was up to was transforming consciousness in Greece -- enlightening the Greek voter -- to accept the reintroduction of the drachma. But I no longer believe that. I think that Syriza, true to what Tsipras and Varoufakis have long said in public, has no intention of leaving the eurozone. The strategy of Tsipras has been to wear down the members of the troika, and in this he has been successful. France has moved away somewhat from Germany. The IMF has broken with other members of the troika and issued a report declaring Greece's debt load unsustainable.

The problem for Tsipras is that despite the landslide "Oxi" win, the July 20 ECB repayment deadline looms large. For the hardliners in the Eurogroup who want to collapse Greek banks and be done with it, two weeks is a short time to wait. There is no need for Schauble and Dijsselbloem to offer any concessions, particularly on debt forgiveness. It appears that Tsipras will run out of time and no cavalry will ride over the hill to the rescue.

And not one but two deadlines have now been breached in the P5+1 talks in Vienna: first, the June 30 deadline, and today's July 7 deadline. The significant one for Kerry and Obama is Thursday July 9. If no agreement is reached with Iran on its nuclear program in two days then the U.S. Congress will get an additional 30 days to skewer the agreement. USG scribe Michael Gordon reports in "Iran Nuclear Talks Are Extended Once Again":
VIENNA — The talks to complete a landmark accord limiting Iran’s nuclear program have been extended for several days after negotiators acknowledged that they would be unable to meet a Tuesday deadline.
To give negotiators more time to pursue a final accord, the diplomats agreed to extend through Friday an interim nuclear accord called the Joint Plan of Action. That interim agreement, which had been set to expire on Tuesday, freezes much of Iran’s nuclear program in return for modest sanctions relief.
“We are continuing to negotiate for the next couple of days,” Federica Mogherini, the foreign policy chief for the European Union, told reporters here.
This is the second time the talks have been extended since Secretary of State John Kerry arrived here in late June. The original goal was to complete a final accord by June 30.
Ms. Mogherini said that the negotiations had entered “a difficult and sensitive” phase, but she did not discuss the remaining issues.
The unresolved issues in recent days have included what limits would be placed on the development of more efficient types of centrifuges after the first decade of an accord, what steps would be taken to address suspicions about Iran’s past nuclear activities, and the timeline for removing sanctions.
The Obama administration hoped to finish the accord by Thursday, so that it could be submitted to Congress for a 30-day review. If the agreement is finished this summer, the duration of the review period will double.
I don't see Obama walking away from the table. He wants an agreement, not only for his "legacy"
but for the future electoral viability of the Democratic Party. Not much is made of it in the media, but the Democrats' nominal association with a less bellicose foreign-policy perspective is a huge vote-getting advantage. A Democratic administration does not want to squander this.

But give the media monopoly and a Saudi- and Israeli-dominated Congress two months to inveigh and fear-monger, and the chances are high any agreement will be scuttled, which puts the feckless Obama in the difficult position of having to veto a Congressional override to protect his "legacy" agreement. 

It is hard to say at this point which is a stronger character trait in Obama: his desire to go-along-to-get-along or his lust to be inscribed in the history books. Probably the latter. So maybe there is hope for a Iranian nuclear accord after all.

Monday, July 6, 2015

Huge Win for Greece, Varoufakis Sacked, Troika Unlikely to be Placated


Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' first move following the landslide anti-austerity "Oxi" vote in yesterday's referendum was to toss his finance minister and chief troika critic, Yanis Varoufakis, on the pyre. Varoufakis announced his resignation today with the blog post, "Minister No More":
Soon after the announcement of the referendum results, I was made aware of a certain preference by some Eurogroup participants, and assorted ‘partners’, for my… ‘absence’ from its meetings; an idea that the Prime Minister judged to be potentially helpful to him in reaching an agreement. For this reason I am leaving the Ministry of Finance today. 
I consider it my duty to help Alexis Tsipras exploit, as he sees fit, the capital that the Greek people granted us through yesterday’s referendum. 
And I shall wear the creditors’ loathing with pride. 
We of the Left know how to act collectively with no care for the privileges of office. I shall support fully Prime Minister Tsipras, the new Minister of Finance, and our government. 
The superhuman effort to honour the brave people of Greece, and the famous OXI (NO) that they granted to democrats the world over, is just beginning.
There is no indication at this point that the eurozone power brokers are feeling any change of heart after a super-majority of Greeks rejected their last proposal. Jack Ewing reports from the European Central Bank headquarters in Frankfurt that there is a wait-and-see attitude on Greece's access to emergency liquidity assistance (ELA):
The no vote by Greeks on Sunday makes it even more difficult for the European Central Bank to continue propping up Greece’s commercial banks, whose solvency is closely linked to that of the country’s government. 
But the central bank has so far avoided taking action that could force Greece out of the eurozone, a possible outcome if the banks fail. Without a banking system serving as a conduit for euros and a platform for transactions, Greece might have little choice but to begin printing its own currency.
“Pressure has increased further for the E.C.B. to revoke Greek banks’ access to central bank liquidity,” said Mujtaba Rahman, the Europe director for the Eurasia Group, a political risk consulting firm. “Still, the E.C.B. is very likely to keep its liquidity lifeline open for the time being.”
While the central bank probably will not cut off credit to the Greek banks on Monday, it is also unlikely to increase the amount available to them from its current level of 89 billion euros, or about $99 billion. The 25 members of the Governing Council will not want to increase the central bank’s exposure to Greece until there is tangible progress toward an accord with eurozone creditors and with the International Monetary Fund.
Without an increase in credit, Greek banks are in imminent danger of running out of cash to dispense to depositors. They are unlikely to open tomorrow, despite promises to the contrary by Athens.
“The Greek no puts the European Central Bank in a most difficult position,” Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg, a German bank, said in a note to clients. “We look for the E.C.B. to tread very cautiously, though, perhaps even seeing to it that small amounts of euro cash could still be withdrawn from Greek cash machines for a while until the political outlook becomes clearer.”
In other words, the historic "Oxi" vote by the Greek people means nothing to ECB apparatchiks. This attitude is also prevalent in Brussels where James Kanter quotes European Commission VP Valdis Dombrovskis saying "Oxi" will make things worse for Greece:
“The commission is ready to continue its work with Greece,” Mr. Dombrovskis told a daily news conference in Brussels. “But to be clear, the commission cannot negotiate a new program without a mandate from the Eurogroup.” 
Mr. Dombrovskis was referring to the name of the group of finance ministers from countries that use the euro.
The hurdles to a formal resumption of talks, including any official decision by the Eurogroup to begin negotiations on Greece’s third international bailout in five years, were high, Mr. Dombrovskis warned.
“The ‘no’ result unfortunately widens the gap between Greece and other eurozone countries,” he said. 
“There is no easy way out of this crisis,” he added. “Too much time and too many opportunities have been lost.”
Once again, to the eurozone power elite the "Oxi" vote means nothing; in fact, worse than nothing. The democratic referendum, we are told, has raised the costs of the any new bailout deal by tens of billions of euros.

What the "Oxi" vote reveals is the weakness of the "big lie." Greek voters saw clearly what was happening: Banks were shut because the European Central Bank capped ELA when Tsipras called the referendum. The ECB did this in an attempt to shock Greeks and stampede them in the direction of a Yes vote. It failed stupendously. Now, as Krugman outlines in his column, "Ending Greece’s Bleeding," for the ECB to increase ELA would be to acknowledge that the cap on lending was a political intervention meant to topple Greece's Syriza-led government:
The most immediate question involves Greek banks. In advance of the referendum, the European Central Bank cut off their access to additional funds, helping to precipitate panic and force the government to impose a bank holiday and capital controls. The central bank now faces an awkward choice: if it resumes normal financing it will as much as admit that the previous freeze was political, but if it doesn’t it will effectively force Greece into introducing a new currency. 
Specifically, if the money doesn’t start flowing from Frankfurt (the headquarters of the central bank), Greece will have no choice but to start paying wages and pensions with i.o.u.s, which will de facto be a parallel currency — and which might soon turn into the new drachma.
But the big lie must be protected. That is all neoliberalism is at this point. Krugman is not sanguine about the possibility of a new debt deal emerging quickly; and without this, Krugman sees no better alternative for Greece than abandoning the euro:
In the failed negotiations that led up to Sunday’s referendum, the central sticking point was Greece’s demand for permanent debt relief, to remove the cloud hanging over its economy. The troika — the institutions representing creditor interests — refused, even though we now know that one member of the troika, the International Monetary Fund, had concluded independently that Greece’s debt cannot be paid. But will they reconsider now that the attempt to drive the governing leftist coalition from office has failed?
I have no idea — and in any case there is now a strong argument that Greek exit from the euro is the best of bad options.

Of course, Greece no longer has its own currency, and many analysts used to claim that adopting the euro was an irreversible move — after all, any hint of euro exit would set off devastating bank runs and a financial crisis. But at this point that financial crisis has already happened, so that the biggest costs of euro exit have been paid. Why, then, not go for the benefits? 
Would Greek exit from the euro work as well as Iceland’s highly successful devaluation in 2008-09, or Argentina’s abandonment of its one-peso-one-dollar policy in 2001-02? Maybe not — but consider the alternatives. Unless Greece receives really major debt relief, and possibly even then, leaving the euro offers the only plausible escape route from its endless economic nightmare.
And let’s be clear: if Greece ends up leaving the euro, it won’t mean that the Greeks are bad Europeans. Greece’s debt problem reflected irresponsible lending as well as irresponsible borrowing, and in any case the Greeks have paid for their government’s sins many times over. If they can’t make a go of Europe’s common currency, it’s because that common currency offers no respite for countries in trouble. The important thing now is to do whatever it takes to end the bleeding.
Basically we are back to where we were when negotiations first started between Greece and the troika. Absent significant debt write-offs there appears to be no rational alternative to a Grexit.

But a Grexit doesn't appear to be Tsipras' goal; axing Varoufakis is proof of that (though the finance minister didn't seem too broken up about it; at the end of the day, a scholar prefers the quiet of the cloister). Why the troika doesn't grab at the offer Tsipras made last Wednesday after Greece failed to make its repayment to the IMF and be done with the crisis can only be explained by a perception in Brussels, Berlin, and other European capitals (not to mention Washington D.C.) that protecting the big lie of neoliberalism -- at all costs -- is paramount, and this demands that a leftist party like Syriza must go.

Sunday, June 28, 2015

Greece Has Already Won

Well, after half a year of negotiations, a time when the positions of the parties seemed to change not at all, we suddenly have quite a bit of movement.

On Friday, Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras called for a public vote on the troika-creditor-institutions' take-it-or-leave it offer, an offer that included pension cuts that Syriza came to power explicitly rejecting.

Yesterday the troika-creditor-institutions rejected a one-week extension on loans coming due in order to allow the Greek government to conduct the referendum on July 5.

This morning the European Central Bank (ECB) announced that it will freeze Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to the Greek banking system. Given that lines have formed at ATMs since Tsipras' announcement of a referendum on Friday, for the ECB to freeze ELA puts the ball back in Syriza's court. Tsipras will now or very shortly have to impose a bank holiday and then capital controls.

Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis posts this morning on his blog a summation of the breakdown in talks in Brussels, "As it happened – Yanis Varoufakis’ intervention during the 27th June 2015 Eurogroup Meeting," which he prefaces as follows:
The Eurogroup Meeting of 27th June 2015 will not go down as a proud moment in Europe’s history. Ministers turned down the Greek government’s request that the Greek people should be granted a single week during which to deliver a Yes or No answer to the institutions’ proposals – proposals crucial for Greece’s future in the Eurozone. The very idea that a government would consult its people on a problematic proposal put to it by the institutions was treated with incomprehension and often with disdain bordering on contempt. I was even asked: “How do you expect common people to understand such complex issues?”. Indeed, democracy did not have a good day in yesterday’s Eurogroup meeting! But nor did European institutions. After our request was rejected, the Eurogroup President broke with the convention of unanimity (issuing a statement without my consent) and even took the dubious decision to convene a follow up meeting without the Greek minister, ostensibly to discuss the “next steps”. 
Can democracy and a monetary union coexist? Or must one give way? This is the pivotal question that the Eurogroup has decided to answer by placing democracy in the too-hard basket. So far, one hopes.
Varoufakis makes several substantive points. He basically outlines why it is the Greek government wants to hold a referendum: because the troika-creditors-institutions' take-it-or-leave-it offer is an "austerian" proposal that covers a mere five months and therefore guarantees no stability; the Syriza-led government commanded a 40% plurality of the vote last January; hence, the public needs to be consulted. Here is where Varoufakis' statement gets very interesting:
On the question that will be put to the Greek people, much has been said about what it should be. Many of you tell us, advise us, instruct us even, that we should make it a Yes or No question on the euro. Let me be clear on this. First, the question was formulated by the Cabinet and has just been passed through Parliament – and it is “Do you accept the institutions’ proposal as it was presented to us on 25th June in the Eurogroup?” This is the only pertinent question. If we had accepted that proposal two days ago, we would have had a deal. The Greek government is now asking the electorate to answer the question you put it to me Jeroen – especially when you said, and I quote, “you can consider this, if you wish, a take or leave it proposal”. Well, this is how we took it and we are now honouring the institutions and the Greek people by asking the latter to deliver a clear answer on the institutions’ proposal.
To those who say that, effectively, this is a referendum on the euro, my answer is: You may very well say this but I shall not comment. This is your judgement, your opinion, your interpretation. Not ours! There is a logic to your view but only if there is an implicit threat that a No from the Greek people to the institutions’ proposal will be followed up by moves to eject Greece, illegally, out of the euro. Such a threat would not be consistent with basic principles of European democratic governance and European Law.
To those who instruct us to phrase the referendum question as a euro-drachma dilemma, my answer is crystal clear: European Treaties make provisions for an exit from the EU. They do not make any provisions for an exit from the Eurozone. With good reason, of course, as the indivisibility of our Monetary Union is part of its raison d’ etre. To ask us to phrase the referendum question as a choice involving exit from the Eurozone is to ask us to violate EU Treaties and EU Law. I suggest to anyone who wants us, or anyone else, to hold a referendum on EMU membership to recommend a change in the Treaties.
These debt negotiations have always been primarily political and much less about the technicalities of repayment. The IMF itself, the institution that Tsipras has singled out for making unreasonable demands of sacrifice by the Greek people, has acknowledged that austerity has damaged the Greek economy. But neoliberal orthodoxy foresees a low-growth future where the only guaranteed profits to be had are in the further cannibalization of the public sector. Syriza's people first mantra is an existential threat to the neoliberal hive mind.

Since negotiations began this past winter the goal of the parties has been to make the other side throw the first punch and appear as the aggressor. So, given this framing, I think Greece has already won. The troika-creditors-institutions refuse to allow an extra week for a public vote. They have ended negotiations. What are they afraid of?

Clearly the fear is of democracy. As Varoufakis notes above, Syriza would pose the question as a Yes or No on the eurogroup's proposal of June 25th, not on whether to stay in the eurozone. The short run up to the vote next Sunday would not allow for the necessary fearmongering and manipulation to sway the electorate, as the neoliberal orthodoxy was able to do last September in the Scottish referendum on independence. The troika-creditors-institutions saw this and denied the public vote, and have now frozen ELA to force Syriza to implement capital controls, as was done in Cyprus. The hope in the eurogroup is that Syriza will then lose popular support, forcing Tsipras back to the negotiating table humbled.

The troika-creditors-institutions wants Syriza broken and discredited; absent that, they want Greece out of the eurozone. Capital controls are not the end of the world. Cyprus survived. Greece will too.

Monday, May 11, 2015

Greek Debt Negotiations to Muddle Along, But Things Actually Looking Up for Syriza

It is Monday morning which must mean that there is a meeting in Brussels between eurozone finance ministers and Yanis Varoufakis' Greek negotiating team. Tomorrow is the deadline for repayment of 750 million euros to the IMF. Last week Varoufakis said Greece would make the repayment. The ever-skeptical Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism is not so sure. As she argues in her post today, "Greece Finally Threatens Default as Deal with Creditors Remains Remote,"
The ruling Greek coalition appears to have finally woken up to the fact that it it cornered. As we indicated, the longer the creditors keep Greece in the sweatbox, the more its popularity is destined to decline. 
While the latest polls still show Syriza as the most popular party, its support is now at 36%, a round trip from a huge surge after the government took office to back to where it stood when it was voted into office. Approval ratings of the government’s strategy have dropped precipitously from the very high levels reached shortly after the new government took office. As e pointed out early on, the best strategy for the creditors was simply to remain non-negotiable. Either Syriza would capitulate to their demands, or the government would lose support, paving the way for the return of a more complaint coalition. Syriza appears to realize that following the inertial path of trying to extend its negotiating runway does not work in its favor. Even if Greece were to pull a rabbit out of the hat and make the €750 million IMF payment, it has a total of €1.5 billion coming due to the IMF in June, which it almost certainly can’t satisfy if it fails to unlock the bailout funds.
Yves Smith seems to think that Syriza can either make the IMF payment tomorrow and risk having to issue scrip to pensioners and government workers at the end of the month, or it can stiff the IMF, a course of action that would not immediately precipitate default and Grexit. As Smith explains:
The situation is more fluid than it appears. The odds are high that blame game political calculations will win over sound policy. We’re already seeing jockeying starting to take place. Notice Schauble’s “justifiable conditions” caveat. He’s made clear repeatedly that he’d just as soon see Greece leave the Eurozone, but no one, particularly Merkel, wants to be seen to have pushed Greece out. Thus if Greece plays its cards so it can be depicted to have brought the default (and if it comes to that, an exit), that works to the advantage of the hardliners who see Greece as disposable and believe a default/possible exit can be made painful enough for the Greek people so as to make any other country that might contemplate leaving the Eurozone to see that alternative as too costly.
Despite the continued impasse, and virtual certainty of a default on Tuesday [!], the creditors have quite a lot of choices and options. For instance, despite the IMF’s tough talk about not giving Greece any grace period on a default, an IMF default is not as fine a trigger event at a private sector bond default. As the Financial Times explains:
But that hard line masks a little wiggle room created by the IMF’s own procedures. Under the official timeline plan, it is not until a month after a missed payment that the managing director formally notifies the board and not until three months afterwards that a formal statement to the outside world is expected to be made.
In other words, even if Greece defaults on the loan repayment to the IMF, things can continue to muddle along as they have. The June repayments are larger than this month's. But if missed payments can play out over months before a default is officially declared, there is no reason why this can't repeat itself next month.

In the Business section of today's "newspaper of record" is a slightly more sanguine treatment of the Brussels negotiations. Peter Eavis, Jack Ewing and Landon Thomas, "I.M.F. and Central Bank Loom Large Over Greece’s Debt Talks," see a chink in the troika's armor, and it is not the wiggle room on IMF repayments; it is the risk aversion of the European Central Bank:
It would of course also be a high-stakes gamble for Greece to do anything that could undermine relations with the central bank, which is shoring up Greece’s banking system. It has lent Greek banks more than €110 billion, cash the lenders need to operate but would have trouble raising on international money markets. 
The support to the banks is not the debt that the officials in the Greek government would consider for default. Instead, the idea would be to not repay Greek government bonds held by the central bank. Greece is scheduled to repay nearly €7 billion on those this summer. 
If the Greek banks could not repay their central bank loans, the losses would be passed on to other eurozone countries. An outcry would come from Germany and other countries already fed up with what they regard as Greece’s misbehavior. The central bank’s credibility — probably a central bank’s most important asset — could be damaged. 
Still, the central bank’s deep caution about financial stability would most likely limit how hard it pressed Greece. As the guardian of the single currency, the central bank may not want to do anything that could set off a chain of catastrophic events in Greece’s banking sector that could lead the country to quit the euro. 
“The E.C.B. does not want to be responsible for precipitating a crisis,” said Mujtaba Rahman, practice head for the European Union at Eurasia Group, a political consultancy. “They are very, very concerned about having blood on their hands.”
I know at the end of April when last I wrote about this I said climax was near. Then it looked impossibile that Varoufakis could scrape together the 750 million euros due the IMF on May 12. At the time there was the brouhaha over Varoufakis' obstreperousness; things seemed to be at an unbridgeable impasse and something was going to fracture. But then Tsipras organized a deft cosmetic reshuffling of the bargaining team, with Varoufakis nominally sent to the sidelines, and that seemed to cool things down. Also, I had no idea just how wide the nonpayment wiggle room to the IMF is. Things can continue to go on as they have for months.

Syriza will get some rhetorical help from the Scottish National Party blasting away at austerity. And there is evidence that the U.S. is extremely jealous of Russian pipeline overtures to Greece. So all in all I am more hopeful of some sort of resolution that favors Greece than I have been in months.

Monday, April 27, 2015

Greece and the Troika: Climax Near

Each week since January when Syriza won the election in Greece and formed a new government I have been looking forward to some sort of climax to the battle with the troika and the troika's neoliberal austerity diktats.

If Syriza buckles, and, contrary to all that Tsipras and Varoufakis have promised, accepts the austerity diktats of the troika, the government will fall and we can get on with seeing what to do next. If the troika buckles, and accepts Syriza's non-austerity plan to pay off its creditors, there will be a much-needed crack in reigning neoliberal orthodoxy, a ray of sunshine for non-traditional democratic movements such as Podemos in Spain.

But week in and week out there has been no resolution as acrimonious negotiations have ground along with very little movement if any between the parties.

Now, finally, we seem to be in the home stretch.

I know it seems like we've been here before. But I think this is really it. And not just because of the public display of acrimony in Riga this past Friday (James Kanter, "Eurozone Ministers Admonish Greece for Slow Progress on Overhauls"). As Kanter makes plain, the issues have finally been distilled to the simplest elements. The neoliberal orthodoxy wants Greece to sacrifice pension benefits. Syriza has no more wiggle room because a €750 million payment to the IMF is coming due on May 12:
The frustration with Greece is boiling over more than two months after the international lenders gave Athens until late June to present plans for reforms that would both ease austerity and overhaul its economy. 
The lack of agreement on those plans means European lenders will not release the next allocation of bailout money — a 7.2-billion-euro, or $7.5 billion, payment — to keep the Greek government running and avoid a potential default. 
Mr. Dijsselbloem said it was up to Mr. Varoufakis and his government to present more ambitious proposals, noting that the next scheduled gathering of the Eurogroup would be on May 11, a day before Greece must pay €750 million to the International Monetary Fund as part of its loan agreements.
There was “a great sense of urgency around the room,” acknowledged Mr. Dijsselbloem. 
As negotiations have continued between Greece and representatives of its creditors in recent weeks — meetings separate from the periodic gatherings of the finance ministers — the two sides are said to remain divided on significant issues. Greece has insisted that it cannot cut pensions any further or accept creditors’ demands for a budget that would require a relatively high primary surplus — a surplus when debt repayments are not taken into account.
Greek officials have insisted that these issues are “red lines” that cannot be crossed, and Mr. Varoufakis underscored them in his comments to reporters in Riga.
Some of the antagonism between the Eurogroup and Greece stems from continuing disagreement over whether lenders can conduct fact-finding at Greek ministries in Athens, to verify the true state of the country’s finances, for example, rather than meeting in hotels with Greek officials.
A Finance Ministry official in Athens on Friday, speaking only on the condition of anonymity because of the political tensions surrounding the discussions, said that the Greek government was “not bluffing” in opposing tough measures and was intent on protecting the country’s interests.
Mr. Varoufakis, speaking separately to Greek reporters in Riga on Friday said that the country had submitted a new, revised list of reforms at a discussion between deputy finance ministers this week — but that the document had not been presented to the Eurogroup for procedural reasons that he derided as unnecessarily complicated. He accused eurozone officials of “undermining tactics” and “negativism” and said the climate in Friday’s meeting had been tense, although he denied reports by some news media that officials had verbally attacked him.
Naked Capitalism's Yves Smith has a must-read article this morning, "Eurogroup Demands Varoufakis’ Ouster; Trajectory Toward Default Continues." It is less sneering in tone than her usual posts, which have been very skeptical of the Syriza-led government's negotiating position. Of late, Smith has chosen to emphasize, helpfully, that Tsipras and Varoufakis are moderates, and that about one-third of their governing coalition is to their left; hence, there is little possibility that Tsipras will suddenly kowtow to the troika:
The problem, as we’ve said before, is that the government is boxed in by its coalition members. Even if the moderates in Syriza wanted to make concessions (and Tsipras and Varoufakis are both moderates), they need the support of the hardline left Syriza members, which are about 1/3 of their bloc. And they won’t give in. They’ll bring down the government first. 
What are the bones of contention? We have said that the new government has repeatedly tried end-running the process set forth in the Eurogroup memo, which was for the government to produce a detailed list of structural reforms which would then be approved by the members of the Troika, and finally by the Eurogroup before the bailout funds would be released. The Greek side has instead tried going directly to the Eurogroup to get draft memos approved, going to the European Commission, and going to Merkel, now twice. That’s fed the Eurocrat complaint that the Greeks have wasted time. The various reform lists that the Greek government has produced so far have been dismissed as insufficiently detailed. Just based on media reports on their length, that beef seems to be valid. 
But does that mean the solution is to let the bailout monitors beaver away? While Varoufakis’ detractors may have a point that he wants to negotiate too many issues at the key policy player level, the fact is that the two sides have no agreement at a high level. How does it make sense to work on details?
What appears to be in the offing over the  next several weeks is a default by Greece when it can't re-pay the IMF loan; then it will be up to the ECB to force a Grexit by either cutting off entirely or making further Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to Greek banks so onerous that Greece will have to leave the eurozone. As Yves outlines for her readers:
Defaulting in May is particularly bad for Greece. The Greek public is overwhelmingly opposed to a a Grexit, and as we’ve indicated, it’s the ECB, and not the Greek government, that determines whether a default means a Grexit.
*** 
The Greek government appears to be in denial or paralysis. Officials have made conflicting statements on whether the ruling coalition is willing to hold its ground even if the cost is leaving the EU and on whether the government will have a referendum to resolve the matter if talks break down. On the referendum matter, financial time is already moving faster than political time. In most countries, the process for conducting a referendum involves lead time (a Parliamentary vote and a period of time, often Constitutionally mandated, before polling). With a default likely in early May, and a deal needing to be agreed at breakneck speed to avert that, Greece would seem to be past the point where a referendum could inform decisions.
Diane Shugart points out in a later tweet that the Kapa poll shows Syriza support at 36.9%, or virtually the same level they had when voted into office. However, that is a big drop from recent ratings.
While the cost of a Grexit would be extremely high in economic terms (I’ve seen a forecast of a fall of 20% in GDP, worse than anyone anticipates from continued austerity), Kouvelakis contends that citizens have been given only one side of the story:
The main element fueling this troubled atmosphere is, however, the fact that the scaremongering on the theme of the “Grexit” remains unchallenged at the level of broad public opinion. The right-wing opposition and the mainstream media, increasingly hostile to the government and using all possible arguments to push it towards full surrender, associate the break with the eurozone with an apocalypse — as they have done relentlessly since the start of the crisis.
But the response on the part of the government tends to be that this perspective will be avoided thanks to the “honest compromise” to which the Europeans will finally have to agree. Hardly a discourse, to say the least, that can mobilize Syriza’s base and prepare society for an eventual rupture with Europe.
Both Greece and its creditors look to be sleepwalking into a breakup that both profess they want to avoid. But the mutual distrust and denigration are classic divorce dynamics, and there is no relationship counselor in the mix. Tsipras is right to regard Merkel as his best, or more accurately, only hope, but the fissure may be too far advanced for her to paper it over, assuming that she is willing to do that.
In this scenario, default leads to a Grexident because the parties at this point after months of impasse are thoroughly alienated from one another.

I don't want to seem brutally cavalier -- because a further 20% drop in GDP for Greece already reeling from a depression will be cataclysmic -- but it is high time that something gives here. If Syriza can't deliver on what it promised, an end to austerity, new elections should be called. If the troika is so addicted to austerity, let it force Greece out of the eurozone and bring on the market response.

Wednesday, February 25, 2015

Neoliberalism Triumphant

The post-mortem on Greece's clash with eurozone finance ministers, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank over terms of its bailout is either a wash (Jim Yardley, "In Greek Crisis, Rare Moment of Consensus") or a loss for Greece (Yves Smith, "ECB and IMF to Greece: No Escaping the Austerity Hairshirt."

Both agree that the can has been kicked down the road and now the Syriza-led government of prime minister Alexis Tsipras has very little room to maneuver, caught as it is between promises to restore pension benefits, collective bargaining rights and undo privatization while it has just signed on the dotted line to implement the troika's structural adjustment which is predicated on cutting pension benefits, rolling back labor laws and fast-tracking privatization.

The collapse of the eurozone, as I had hoped for, does not seem to be in the offing. Neoliberalism remains the dominant paradigm. Despite the planetary crisis of climate change and the spread of war, a forty-year-old paradigm (a decade older than the social-democratic consensus that governed the West following World War Two) shows no sign of giving way to something different. There is no significant rival ideology in the West to neoliberalism. Syriza, a throwback to what would be considered a standard social democratic party of the 1950s and 1960s, had its momentum killed in Brussels.

The only counter to neoliberalism is the epiphenomenon of Wahhabism. One begets the other, a yin and yang thing.

But there is always the problem of overreach. The U.S. overreached in Ukraine. And it can't seem to admit defeat. Next up is Iran, the conclusion of negotiations on its nuclear program and Netanyahu's coronation in Congress.

Tuesday, February 24, 2015

Syriza's About-Face and Why We Should Stomach It

Yesterday, a Monday back at work to begin another week in a series of weeks that will lead eventually to May and Memorial Day, the sense of hopelessness and fatigue was palpable. I kept checking for signs of life from Brussels, wishing that Syriza had discovered a path forward to foil the eurogroup of finance ministers and their neoliberal austerity.

But no such luck was mine. The reporting was sparse and eventually, I think it was late morning Pacific Standard Time, it was reported that Greece would submit her proposals Tuesday morning, today.

First reports (James Kanter and Niki Kitsantonis, "European Lenders to Review Greece Overhaul Plan") this morning are not encouraging:
Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the head of the Eurogroup of finance ministers, that he could not yet give a “positive assessment” of the list submitted by Athens, as the overhauls first needed to be reviewed for their effects on the Greek budget. A conference call among the 19 finance minister of the Eurogroup was set for Tuesday afternoon.
“I think they are serious,” Mr. Dijsselbloem, referring to the attitude of the government in Athens, told lawmakers on an influential economics committee at the European Parliament during scheduled testimony on Tuesday.
Among the overhauls are plans to improve management of the national budget, and to enact changes to Greece’s taxation system, including changes to the collection of sales taxes “with a view to limiting exemptions while eliminating unreasonable discounts,” according to a letter that Yanis Varoufakis, the Greek finance minister, submitted to Mr. Dijsselbloem.
The government also committed not to reverse existing privatization plans and said it would review planned sell-offs with a focus on bolstering “the state’s long-term benefits.”
In addition to streamlining the public sector, the government will review public spending at every level and will modernize the pension system in an effort to end “an excessive rate of early retirements.”
The country still plans to raise the minimum wage, one of the government’s pre-election promises, but pledges to do so in a way that safeguards competitiveness, the letter said.
The opportunity for Greece to submit the proposals was one of the few concrete concessions it won in an accord reached with its creditors late on Friday in Brussels. That accord brought to an end the bitter standoff that began when Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras pledged to redraw or scrap the bailout agreement after he came to power in January.
European and Greek officials spent much of Monday exchanging drafts of the proposals to pare back austerity measures while ensuring that Greece can still meet fiscal obligations.
The government of Mr. Tsipras had an opportunity to put its “political stamp” on a bailout plan if it respected budget targets, Mr. Dijsselbloem told the parliamentary committee.
The deal to extend the country’s bailout program with European creditors by four months is subject to the approval of the Greek Parliament, where members of Mr. Tsipras’s radical-left Syriza party have called the plan a capitulation after the party’s anti-austerity campaign promises.
Also on the list submitted by Mr. Varoufakis are plans to crack down on the smuggling of fuel and tobacco, which cost the Greek economy billions of euros a year, to address tax arrears and nonperforming bank loans, and to support struggling homeowners who are unable to meet their mortgage payments.
The overhauls will also address what Syriza has described as Greece’s “humanitarian crisis,” referring to the need for food stamps and other assistance to poor families, but Athens said the measures would be mostly “nonpecuniary” and would have “no negative fiscal effect.”
You will recall shortly after Syriza's victory at the end of January the consensus opinion was that Tsipras would be unable to crack the troika's austerity diktats; that the best Greece could hope for was a few scraps of social-welfare spending tossed from the master's table. Then Syriza's finance minister Yanis Varoufakis went on the offensive against the cruel fiction of neoliberal austerity and the fantasy that governments can cut their way to growth. Commentators zipped their lips. Maybe little Greece was going to shake up the neoliberal consensus.

Well, it appears the original conventional wisdom is going to be proven true.

The commitments to existing privatization plans and streamlining the public sector (highlighted in red in the Kanter and Kitsantonis story above) are truly ominous and confirm the view that Tsipras and Varoufakis have indeed performed an about-face. In a post yesterday, "Eurogroup to Review Greek Reform Proposals; Meeting Set for Tuesday (Updated)," Yves Smith is troubled by the Greek proposal's commitment to EU "best practices" on labor:
“EU best practices” on labor is very disconcerting, since it implies a forced embrace of “labor flexibility” as in further reduction of labor protections and bargaining rights. That would seem to be inconsistent with earlier reports, including a government announcement, that Greece was seeking an increase in the minimum wage. Perhaps that section is more of a mixed bag than the headline for that section suggests.
After the work day was done yesterday, a co-worker, the only one who really pays attention to the news, offered me a ride to the train station. I tried to explain why I felt that even though it would be damaging to us -- because our retirement is in the form of a 401(a) defined contribution pension plan that floats along the waves of the market, and the markets would most likely freak out in a bearish direction upon Greece's leaving the eurozone -- and damaging to the citizens of Greece I wanted to see the eurozone come tumbling down.

I don't think I was very articulate. What I said was something to the effect that if the eurozone cracks then U.S. hegemony is diminished. For instance, the ability of the United States to stampede the EU into Cold War 2.0 by sanctioning Russia becomes much more difficult. And this has to be considered a desirable outcome. No one wants to be incinerated in a nuclear war.

But is this true? If Greece is forced to leave the eurozone -- which I don' think is going to happen, unless Syriza MPs revolt -- does this necessarily mean Greece leaves the European Union? I don't think it does. But even if it does, and Greece is cast out entirely from all European institutions, how does this lessen U.S. foreign policy leverage on the remaining European Union states? It doesn't.

Rather, Syriza can exert more influence, even if only as a "fly in the ointment," if Tsipras and Varoufakis keep Greece in the eurozone and the EU. The EU operates by consensus. Greece can block the TTIP and future Russian sanctions, two big pieces of juicy fruit.

For a not very effective apologia of Syriza's about-face there is Mike Whitney's "Varoufakis Keeps Greece in the Eurozone, by its Fingernails: A Valiant Effort." Whitney brings up an argument I have seen elsewhere: that Varoufakis' negotiations with the eurogroup will be enormously successful so long as he is able to keep the Greek primary surplus target frozen at 1.5 percent:
The new deal also allows Greece to decide its own reform package rather than the troika dictating what government expenses to cut or which publicly owned assets to sell.  Here’s another excerpt from Haring’s post:   “Most important change of the whole document: Addition of 'The institutions will, for the 2015 primary surplus target, take the economic circumstances in 2015 into account.' Excessive, self-defeating austerity is off.  Only the target for 2015 is mentioned, because everything further out would have to be part of a new arrangement, still to be negotiated.”
So Varoufakis has achieved his goal of reducing austerity. Not only is there greater flexibility operationally but, also, Greece will control the levers of decision-making  in the “field of tax policy, privatisation, labour market reforms, financial sector, and pensions”. Naturally, the lower the primary surplus, the more fiscal stimulus is available for economic growth. (Running a surplus during a depression is absolute madness, but this is the lousy hand Varoufakis was dealt.)
Haring’s final comments are a good summary of Varoufakis’s achievement:
“Was it worth the hassle to reject the draft of 16 February, just to accept the statement four days later? For Athens it most certainly was. It got the promise that no self-defeating, excessive austerity would be asked of it any more, the assurance that it could devise its own economic and social policies, as long as they did not impact negatively on the interests of its partners, rather than having to execute and leaving in place all the measures accepted by the former government and strongly rejected by the people. These are huge improvements for Athens, with no significant counterbalancing downside compared to 16 February.”  (“Was it worth it? Concessions to Greece relative to the rejected draft of 16 February”, Nobert Haring)
A reduction in the primary surplus is a big win, no doubt. But we need to wait and see if that is something that Varoufakis really achieved.

For the time being, I am keeping my eyes focused on the veto power a Syriza-led Greece will hold over operations in Brussels going forward. "Better to run away and live again to fight another day."