Showing posts with label ELA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ELA. Show all posts

Monday, July 6, 2015

Huge Win for Greece, Varoufakis Sacked, Troika Unlikely to be Placated


Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' first move following the landslide anti-austerity "Oxi" vote in yesterday's referendum was to toss his finance minister and chief troika critic, Yanis Varoufakis, on the pyre. Varoufakis announced his resignation today with the blog post, "Minister No More":
Soon after the announcement of the referendum results, I was made aware of a certain preference by some Eurogroup participants, and assorted ‘partners’, for my… ‘absence’ from its meetings; an idea that the Prime Minister judged to be potentially helpful to him in reaching an agreement. For this reason I am leaving the Ministry of Finance today. 
I consider it my duty to help Alexis Tsipras exploit, as he sees fit, the capital that the Greek people granted us through yesterday’s referendum. 
And I shall wear the creditors’ loathing with pride. 
We of the Left know how to act collectively with no care for the privileges of office. I shall support fully Prime Minister Tsipras, the new Minister of Finance, and our government. 
The superhuman effort to honour the brave people of Greece, and the famous OXI (NO) that they granted to democrats the world over, is just beginning.
There is no indication at this point that the eurozone power brokers are feeling any change of heart after a super-majority of Greeks rejected their last proposal. Jack Ewing reports from the European Central Bank headquarters in Frankfurt that there is a wait-and-see attitude on Greece's access to emergency liquidity assistance (ELA):
The no vote by Greeks on Sunday makes it even more difficult for the European Central Bank to continue propping up Greece’s commercial banks, whose solvency is closely linked to that of the country’s government. 
But the central bank has so far avoided taking action that could force Greece out of the eurozone, a possible outcome if the banks fail. Without a banking system serving as a conduit for euros and a platform for transactions, Greece might have little choice but to begin printing its own currency.
“Pressure has increased further for the E.C.B. to revoke Greek banks’ access to central bank liquidity,” said Mujtaba Rahman, the Europe director for the Eurasia Group, a political risk consulting firm. “Still, the E.C.B. is very likely to keep its liquidity lifeline open for the time being.”
While the central bank probably will not cut off credit to the Greek banks on Monday, it is also unlikely to increase the amount available to them from its current level of 89 billion euros, or about $99 billion. The 25 members of the Governing Council will not want to increase the central bank’s exposure to Greece until there is tangible progress toward an accord with eurozone creditors and with the International Monetary Fund.
Without an increase in credit, Greek banks are in imminent danger of running out of cash to dispense to depositors. They are unlikely to open tomorrow, despite promises to the contrary by Athens.
“The Greek no puts the European Central Bank in a most difficult position,” Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg, a German bank, said in a note to clients. “We look for the E.C.B. to tread very cautiously, though, perhaps even seeing to it that small amounts of euro cash could still be withdrawn from Greek cash machines for a while until the political outlook becomes clearer.”
In other words, the historic "Oxi" vote by the Greek people means nothing to ECB apparatchiks. This attitude is also prevalent in Brussels where James Kanter quotes European Commission VP Valdis Dombrovskis saying "Oxi" will make things worse for Greece:
“The commission is ready to continue its work with Greece,” Mr. Dombrovskis told a daily news conference in Brussels. “But to be clear, the commission cannot negotiate a new program without a mandate from the Eurogroup.” 
Mr. Dombrovskis was referring to the name of the group of finance ministers from countries that use the euro.
The hurdles to a formal resumption of talks, including any official decision by the Eurogroup to begin negotiations on Greece’s third international bailout in five years, were high, Mr. Dombrovskis warned.
“The ‘no’ result unfortunately widens the gap between Greece and other eurozone countries,” he said. 
“There is no easy way out of this crisis,” he added. “Too much time and too many opportunities have been lost.”
Once again, to the eurozone power elite the "Oxi" vote means nothing; in fact, worse than nothing. The democratic referendum, we are told, has raised the costs of the any new bailout deal by tens of billions of euros.

What the "Oxi" vote reveals is the weakness of the "big lie." Greek voters saw clearly what was happening: Banks were shut because the European Central Bank capped ELA when Tsipras called the referendum. The ECB did this in an attempt to shock Greeks and stampede them in the direction of a Yes vote. It failed stupendously. Now, as Krugman outlines in his column, "Ending Greece’s Bleeding," for the ECB to increase ELA would be to acknowledge that the cap on lending was a political intervention meant to topple Greece's Syriza-led government:
The most immediate question involves Greek banks. In advance of the referendum, the European Central Bank cut off their access to additional funds, helping to precipitate panic and force the government to impose a bank holiday and capital controls. The central bank now faces an awkward choice: if it resumes normal financing it will as much as admit that the previous freeze was political, but if it doesn’t it will effectively force Greece into introducing a new currency. 
Specifically, if the money doesn’t start flowing from Frankfurt (the headquarters of the central bank), Greece will have no choice but to start paying wages and pensions with i.o.u.s, which will de facto be a parallel currency — and which might soon turn into the new drachma.
But the big lie must be protected. That is all neoliberalism is at this point. Krugman is not sanguine about the possibility of a new debt deal emerging quickly; and without this, Krugman sees no better alternative for Greece than abandoning the euro:
In the failed negotiations that led up to Sunday’s referendum, the central sticking point was Greece’s demand for permanent debt relief, to remove the cloud hanging over its economy. The troika — the institutions representing creditor interests — refused, even though we now know that one member of the troika, the International Monetary Fund, had concluded independently that Greece’s debt cannot be paid. But will they reconsider now that the attempt to drive the governing leftist coalition from office has failed?
I have no idea — and in any case there is now a strong argument that Greek exit from the euro is the best of bad options.

Of course, Greece no longer has its own currency, and many analysts used to claim that adopting the euro was an irreversible move — after all, any hint of euro exit would set off devastating bank runs and a financial crisis. But at this point that financial crisis has already happened, so that the biggest costs of euro exit have been paid. Why, then, not go for the benefits? 
Would Greek exit from the euro work as well as Iceland’s highly successful devaluation in 2008-09, or Argentina’s abandonment of its one-peso-one-dollar policy in 2001-02? Maybe not — but consider the alternatives. Unless Greece receives really major debt relief, and possibly even then, leaving the euro offers the only plausible escape route from its endless economic nightmare.
And let’s be clear: if Greece ends up leaving the euro, it won’t mean that the Greeks are bad Europeans. Greece’s debt problem reflected irresponsible lending as well as irresponsible borrowing, and in any case the Greeks have paid for their government’s sins many times over. If they can’t make a go of Europe’s common currency, it’s because that common currency offers no respite for countries in trouble. The important thing now is to do whatever it takes to end the bleeding.
Basically we are back to where we were when negotiations first started between Greece and the troika. Absent significant debt write-offs there appears to be no rational alternative to a Grexit.

But a Grexit doesn't appear to be Tsipras' goal; axing Varoufakis is proof of that (though the finance minister didn't seem too broken up about it; at the end of the day, a scholar prefers the quiet of the cloister). Why the troika doesn't grab at the offer Tsipras made last Wednesday after Greece failed to make its repayment to the IMF and be done with the crisis can only be explained by a perception in Brussels, Berlin, and other European capitals (not to mention Washington D.C.) that protecting the big lie of neoliberalism -- at all costs -- is paramount, and this demands that a leftist party like Syriza must go.

Sunday, June 28, 2015

Greece Has Already Won

Well, after half a year of negotiations, a time when the positions of the parties seemed to change not at all, we suddenly have quite a bit of movement.

On Friday, Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras called for a public vote on the troika-creditor-institutions' take-it-or-leave it offer, an offer that included pension cuts that Syriza came to power explicitly rejecting.

Yesterday the troika-creditor-institutions rejected a one-week extension on loans coming due in order to allow the Greek government to conduct the referendum on July 5.

This morning the European Central Bank (ECB) announced that it will freeze Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to the Greek banking system. Given that lines have formed at ATMs since Tsipras' announcement of a referendum on Friday, for the ECB to freeze ELA puts the ball back in Syriza's court. Tsipras will now or very shortly have to impose a bank holiday and then capital controls.

Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis posts this morning on his blog a summation of the breakdown in talks in Brussels, "As it happened – Yanis Varoufakis’ intervention during the 27th June 2015 Eurogroup Meeting," which he prefaces as follows:
The Eurogroup Meeting of 27th June 2015 will not go down as a proud moment in Europe’s history. Ministers turned down the Greek government’s request that the Greek people should be granted a single week during which to deliver a Yes or No answer to the institutions’ proposals – proposals crucial for Greece’s future in the Eurozone. The very idea that a government would consult its people on a problematic proposal put to it by the institutions was treated with incomprehension and often with disdain bordering on contempt. I was even asked: “How do you expect common people to understand such complex issues?”. Indeed, democracy did not have a good day in yesterday’s Eurogroup meeting! But nor did European institutions. After our request was rejected, the Eurogroup President broke with the convention of unanimity (issuing a statement without my consent) and even took the dubious decision to convene a follow up meeting without the Greek minister, ostensibly to discuss the “next steps”. 
Can democracy and a monetary union coexist? Or must one give way? This is the pivotal question that the Eurogroup has decided to answer by placing democracy in the too-hard basket. So far, one hopes.
Varoufakis makes several substantive points. He basically outlines why it is the Greek government wants to hold a referendum: because the troika-creditors-institutions' take-it-or-leave-it offer is an "austerian" proposal that covers a mere five months and therefore guarantees no stability; the Syriza-led government commanded a 40% plurality of the vote last January; hence, the public needs to be consulted. Here is where Varoufakis' statement gets very interesting:
On the question that will be put to the Greek people, much has been said about what it should be. Many of you tell us, advise us, instruct us even, that we should make it a Yes or No question on the euro. Let me be clear on this. First, the question was formulated by the Cabinet and has just been passed through Parliament – and it is “Do you accept the institutions’ proposal as it was presented to us on 25th June in the Eurogroup?” This is the only pertinent question. If we had accepted that proposal two days ago, we would have had a deal. The Greek government is now asking the electorate to answer the question you put it to me Jeroen – especially when you said, and I quote, “you can consider this, if you wish, a take or leave it proposal”. Well, this is how we took it and we are now honouring the institutions and the Greek people by asking the latter to deliver a clear answer on the institutions’ proposal.
To those who say that, effectively, this is a referendum on the euro, my answer is: You may very well say this but I shall not comment. This is your judgement, your opinion, your interpretation. Not ours! There is a logic to your view but only if there is an implicit threat that a No from the Greek people to the institutions’ proposal will be followed up by moves to eject Greece, illegally, out of the euro. Such a threat would not be consistent with basic principles of European democratic governance and European Law.
To those who instruct us to phrase the referendum question as a euro-drachma dilemma, my answer is crystal clear: European Treaties make provisions for an exit from the EU. They do not make any provisions for an exit from the Eurozone. With good reason, of course, as the indivisibility of our Monetary Union is part of its raison d’ etre. To ask us to phrase the referendum question as a choice involving exit from the Eurozone is to ask us to violate EU Treaties and EU Law. I suggest to anyone who wants us, or anyone else, to hold a referendum on EMU membership to recommend a change in the Treaties.
These debt negotiations have always been primarily political and much less about the technicalities of repayment. The IMF itself, the institution that Tsipras has singled out for making unreasonable demands of sacrifice by the Greek people, has acknowledged that austerity has damaged the Greek economy. But neoliberal orthodoxy foresees a low-growth future where the only guaranteed profits to be had are in the further cannibalization of the public sector. Syriza's people first mantra is an existential threat to the neoliberal hive mind.

Since negotiations began this past winter the goal of the parties has been to make the other side throw the first punch and appear as the aggressor. So, given this framing, I think Greece has already won. The troika-creditors-institutions refuse to allow an extra week for a public vote. They have ended negotiations. What are they afraid of?

Clearly the fear is of democracy. As Varoufakis notes above, Syriza would pose the question as a Yes or No on the eurogroup's proposal of June 25th, not on whether to stay in the eurozone. The short run up to the vote next Sunday would not allow for the necessary fearmongering and manipulation to sway the electorate, as the neoliberal orthodoxy was able to do last September in the Scottish referendum on independence. The troika-creditors-institutions saw this and denied the public vote, and have now frozen ELA to force Syriza to implement capital controls, as was done in Cyprus. The hope in the eurogroup is that Syriza will then lose popular support, forcing Tsipras back to the negotiating table humbled.

The troika-creditors-institutions wants Syriza broken and discredited; absent that, they want Greece out of the eurozone. Capital controls are not the end of the world. Cyprus survived. Greece will too.

Tuesday, February 3, 2015

"Syriza is the Only Game in Town"

From time to time we among the news-consuming public are treated to a focusing of the lens that reveals a basic conflict, a sort of good guys versus bad guys, the outcome of which might change before our eyes the world we live in. Cyprus vs. the troika at the beginning of 2013 is an example. It looked for a moment there as if the eurozone might come tumbling down, of which I was in favor because it seemed to me that rather than providing an alternate model of the dominant race-to-the-bottom neoliberalism of the United States, the European Union was copying it, hollowing out the rich social democracies of its member nations.

After Cyprus there was Syria in the summer of 2013. A false flag chemical attack in a Damascus suburb was meant to launch a saturation bombing campaign led by the U.S., the idea being to drive out the ruling Baathists and carve up Syria, re-crafting Sykes-Picot. The Russians intervened with some deft diplomacy, the result of which was that the U.S. would call off its air power campaign in exchange for al-Assad giving up all of Syria's chemical weaponry. This so incensed the Saudis that Islamic State was given the "Go" signal. By the next summer we had a version of the Sykes-Picot reboot that the Gulf sheikhdoms were hankering after all along.

Also last summer there was Cold War 2.0. It looked for a while like the rebels of the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic were going to smash so thoroughly the Ukrainian military that the junta in Kiev might collapse. Then there was the Minsk ceasefire in September. Now that fiction has evaporated and we are back to where we were last summer with "boilers" in the Donbass and the junta military getting its clocked clean.

Right now the good guys vs. bad guys narrative moment of clarity has to do with Greece's new Syriza-led government. Since its convincing election victory ten days ago, Syriza's leader Alexis Tsipras has stepped back from the international limelight and finance minister Yanis Varoufakis has stepped forward.

Varoufakis has been seemingly everywhere of late, parrying with BBC talking heads and eurogroup chief Jeroen Dijsselbloem, flying to Paris to meet with France's finance minister, all in an attempt to break the stranglehold that German-dictated austerity has on the continent.

Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism has been following these perambulations and, despite the outpouring of joy from the Western left that greeted Syriza's election, she has been bearish on Syriza's chances of achieving its aims, i.e., restoring social spending and collective bargaining rights, halting privatization, negotiating a debt jubilee with Greece's creditors.

Smith's post this morning, "Greek Finance Minister Varoufakis Retreats on Debt Writedowns, Public Spending Promises," is a good example:
We’ve said that Greece had a weak negotiating position in trying to get a better deal from its creditors. That is playing out before our eyes. Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis has stepped down some of his early proposals even before formal talks have begun. This is a sad but predictable situation, since the Germans and the other members of the northern bloc are not at all willing to cut Greece much if any slack, since that would lead bigger, more powerful countries to try to slip the yoke of austerity.
The tragic thing about this situation is that Varoufakis is simply describing economic reality and has a number of sound ideas for how to make conditions better for Greece, which in the end will also lead to better results for its lenders. Yet he has run into a massive, if predictable wall, with his willingness to make unvarnished descriptions of the obvious, abject failure of Eurozone economic policies regularly depicted as “confrontational”. One reason Varoufakis may be going this route is to use his newfound high profile to send a message to voters and anti-austerlity politicians throughout Europe, since as we have stressed, the more popular anti-austerity and anti-Eurozone parties become, the more even the Germans will have to fear.
The Germans have a short-sighted view of the stakes. With the ECB holding a sword of Damocles over the Greek banking system, in terms of its ability to cut off access to emergency liquidity facilities, and Syriza and Varoufakis personally having rejected a Grexit, they can dictate terms. In their eyes, the only reason to cut Greece any slack is that, as Varoufakis keeps stressing, Syriza is the sole party that is not loyal to Greek’s oligarchs. If they want corruption tamped down and the tax system cleaned up, Syriza is the only game in town.
Today in a Financial Times interview, Varoufakis walked back his negotiating ask for debt cancellation, instead proposing a series of “debt swaps” that would achieve more or less the same result. He was more obvious that might have been ideal in stating that he regarded this as a fix to placate Germany. From the Financial Times, which broke the story:
Greece’s radical new government revealed proposals on Monday for ending the confrontation with its creditors by swapping outstanding debt for new growth-linked bonds, running a permanent budget surplus and targeting wealthy tax-evaders…
Attempting to sound an emollient note, Mr Varoufakis told the Financial Times the government would no longer call for a headline write-off of Greece’s €315bn foreign debt. Rather it would request a “menu of debt swaps” to ease the burden, including two types of new bonds.
The first type, indexed to nominal economic growth, would replace European rescue loans, and the second, which he termed “perpetual bonds”, would replace European Central Bank-owned Greek bonds.
He said his proposal for a debt swap would be a form of “smart debt engineering” that would avoid the need to use a term such as a debt “haircut”, politically unacceptable in Germany and other creditor countries because it sounds to taxpayers like an outright loss.
But there is still deep scepticism in many European capitals, in particular Berlin, about the new government’s brinkmanship and its calls for an end to austerity policies.
“What I’ll say to our partners is that we are putting together a combination of a primary budget surplus and a reform agenda,” Mr Varoufakis, a leftwing academic economist and prolific blogger, said. “I’ll say, ‘Help us to reform our country and give us some fiscal space to do this, otherwise we shall continue to suffocate and become a deformed rather than a reformed Greece’.”
In a more sophisticated undercutting of Varoufakis than the disgraceful BBC interview of last week, a Financial Times video embedded in the article features a commentator discussing Varoufakis’ progress thus far. The segment depicts Varoufakis as being confrontational and as not having gotten on well with the UK chancellor of the exchequer, and also focuses on the flight of financial assets from Greece and its falling stock market. Does it not occur to anyone that a substantial portion of the money exodus is that of those very oligarchs that Syriza has threatened? The rest of the EU says they want the country cleaned up, yet they attack Syriza for the predictable results of their seriousness.
But while it may seem trivial for them to get their way with Greece, this victory is likely to be Pyrrhic. The more it becomes obvious that the northern countries will keep inflicting pain on Greece out of a desire to keep a bad status quo intact, the more the other victims in better bargaining positions (by virtue of having larger economies and even more fractious voters) are likely to escalate. Indeed, Varoufakis, by challenging the Troika on so many fronts, is conveying a powerful message that subservience is neither necessary nor desirable. No wonder the technocrats are out to discredit him personally.
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard argues that Greece holds the trump cards. Here I disagree. With de facto control over Greece’s banking system, the ECB can bring Greece to heel. We’ll see if the ECB imposes any conditions on its approval of the Greece’s request to use ELA funds on Wednesday. If they are anything other than cosmetic, that means the ECB is supporting the northern countries and is determined to box Syriza in. But I do agree that in a longer time frame, Germany is losing. The problem is it may not lose quickly enough for Greece to get the relief it desperately needs. 
Interestingly, right after Syriza won the election all the talk was that the troika would extend the bailout program set to expire on February 28. Nothing of the sort materialized, and last week Varoufakis staked out the position that Greece would not accept the bailout funds because doing so would lock the country into conditions the new government rejects.

Now, following the post-election bank runs, Smith sees a lot of importance in what position the European Central Bank will take Wednesday regarding Greece's request for Emergency Liquidity Assistance. According to Smith, the game for the Syriza can be up pretty much by tomorrow if the ECB demands onerous conditions to access ELA money.

My sense is that Syriza is shrewder and tougher than Smith is willing to credit. At this point "There Is No Aletrnative" to a party like Syriza, other than, given time, one more to the left or the far right. Varoufakis, it seems to me, is waiting for the troika to overplay its hand. And so far this seems to be transpiring, which is having the effect of radicalizing the public. The point is that the general populous has to be moved from its false consciousness to one that is more real, more radical. That is happening. But as Smith asks, Will Syriza have enough time?