Showing posts with label Cyprus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cyprus. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 14, 2015

Greek Debt Deal Not Done + Agreement Reached on Iran's Nuclear Program, Get Ready for Plenty of Netanyahu

Everywhere there are deadlines. Deadlines come and deadlines go. Deadlines are breached; then deadlines reappear. There was a Sunday deadline for Greece to reach an agreement with her creditors. The deadline was extended until Monday morning at which time the government of Alexis Tsipras found it expedient to surrender the sovereignty of the Greek nation.

Now the new deadline is tomorrow. The Greek Parliament has to pass components of the new debt deal by July 15. Then the remainder by yet another deadline, next Wednesday, July 22.

Already obstacles are beginning to appear. Yves Smith reports ("Greeks Rebel Against Bailout, Risk Collapse") that Greek Speaker of Parliament, Zoi Konstantopoulou, on record opposing the austerity package that Tsipras schlepped to Brussels this past weekend, might not be willing to expedite voting on the new agreement, effectively upending the deadlines established at the Euro Summit.

Public-sector unions have called strikes; Syriza's coalition partner, Independent Greeks, sounds as if it might not support the latest bailout; and, last but not least, Greek banks, still waiting for the ECB to turn the spigot back on, are likely insolvent.

Yves Smith's post this morning features Wolf Richter's "It Starts: Greeks Rebel Against Bailout, Risk Collapse." It is definitely worth reading because it shows even if everything goes according to schedule and the Tsipras capitulation is legislatively solemnized by the Greek Parliament, Greek banks are insolvent and will require a Cyprus-type bail-in:
Greece’s union of civil servants, Adedly, called for a 24-hour strike on Wednesday, and for a series of demonstrations, the first one tonight at Syntagma Square, just below the Parliament, and another one on Wednesday evening, when Parliament is expected to vote on the new, even tougher, and immensely hated bailout package. 
The union for local government employees, Poe-Ota, also called for a 24-hour strike on Wednesday, the AFP reported. Two other demonstrations against austerity and the “euro” are planned for Monday night, one organized via social networks, the other by Antarsya, an anti-euro party that didn’t make it into Parliament.
It would be the first strike against the leftwing Syriza coalition since it came to power six months ago. An ironic plot twist in this tragedy.
Syriza was the big force in the demonstrations against the two prior bailout packages, totaling €240 billion from taxpayers in other countries, conditioned on economic reforms pushed through Parliament by the conservative governments at the time. Now Syriza is looking at having to pass even tougher measures, including an increase in the Value Added Tax and pension reform, in return for only €86 billion in new money from taxpayers in other countries.
Syriza’s junior coalition partner, the Independent Greeks, is already getting cold feet.
“The agreement speaks of €50 billion worth of guarantees concerning public property, of changes to the law including the confiscation of homes… We cannot agree to that,” explained Panos Kammenos, the party’s leader, adding that the party would nevertheless remain in the coalition. With “confiscation of homes” he probably meant foreclosing on homes with defaulted mortgages.
Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is already struggling with strong dissent within Syriza. But ironically, the pro-euro opposition parties, those maligned creatures that ran the show before, may support him in getting these despised measures passed.
Just how bad is the financial situation? Greece will default on a €450-million loan repayment to the IMF today, two sources told Reuters, on top of the €1.6 billion in debt to the IMF it defaulted on in June. For July alone, Greece faces debt payments of €8 billion, including the IMF payment, none of which it can pay without new money.
And the banks are closed. At first, it was going to be for six days, to prevent them from collapsing on the spot when the ECB decided not to raise the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). They’re illiquid and insolvent. They’re toast, but complicated toast [read… The Biggest Greek Banks “Have Failed,” and “Resolving” Them Won’t Work: Fitch].
Now they’ve been closed for two weeks, and there is still no reliable indication when they might reopen, under what conditions they might reopen, and how much of their deposits people will get back.
The €25 billion to recapitalize the banks as part of the bailout is supposed to be guaranteed by privatizations. Good luck, given Greece’s history with privatizations. Even the prior conservative governments and technocrats had trouble privatizing these government-owned enterprises that have long provided reliable opportunities for corruption and vote-buying. And now the leftwing Syriza, which swore up and down it would never privatize any of them, is supposed to vote to privatize them and then actually follow through?
But they will have to be privatized to guarantee the recapitalization of the banks. If not….
Even if it works out, the holes in the banks’ balance sheets will be much larger by the time the banks reopen, if they reopen. About two-fifth of their loans were already bad before capital controls were imposed. But here’s the thing: given the capital controls and Greeks’ distrust in their own banking system, only an idiot would still make loan payments.
So the loans are now deteriorating at lightning speed. And that €25 billion won’t be enough. But don’t worry, depositors….
“The recapitalization is so secure that it fully safeguards deposits,” Economy Minister George Stathakis told his compatriots on Monday to soothe their nerves. The ELA would be increased once Parliament approves the reforms, he said, thus pointing his own gun at Parliament.
Alas, the Greeks themselves know better than anyone else to never believe anything that their government publicly says about Greek banks. Hence, the near incessant withdrawals that have now lasted for years and that have finally helpto ed topple the banks.
Turns out, one of the measures to be passed by the Greek parliament no later than July 22 is Europe’s new directive on the resolution of banks. It provides that even senior creditors, including depositors, get haircuts before taxpayers are called in to pick up the tab. The fact that the Greek Parliament has to pass this law in a hurry shows that the dreaded bail-ins of depositors may be part of what’s next.
Eurozone officials like to lecture about a dearth of trust between Brussels and Athens. What about the lack of trust between voters and their elected representatives? Government heads don't seem to factor this into a calculation of how this all plays out. If an honest appraisal were to be made, one would have to conclude that the failure of Syriza is going to erode Greek institutions even more, and the crisis will deepen.

The P5+1 talks concluded today with an agreement. Obama has promised a veto of any Congressional override, which is likely in the next 60 days, putting it on a parallel track with the federal budget impasse and looming government shutdown in September.

The politics don't favor Netanyahu and the neocons on this one. Possibly in a world where people were not constantly reminded about the savagery of ISIS, Iran might be demonized and enough voters made afraid that Congress could muster veto-proof numbers to scuttle the nuclear deal. But we are on the runway to a presidential election year, and the most popular policy positions are the ones that embrace peace not war.

People are exhausted with open-ended war. They might not have a firm grasp on the various sects and takfiri groups or how to distinguish the GCC from Iran, but most know by now -- after Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya --  that bombing a country into submission does not create peace and prosperity; it just makes things incalculably worse.

Hillary will have to support the deal because to do otherwise within the Democratic Party with its ample peace wing would be extremely damaging to her standing in the polls.

As for Congress, we shall see the extent to which it is Israeli- and Saudi-occupied territory. Coming so soon after TPP and so close to a presidential election, I don't think it has the ability to override a veto. But it is still too early to say.

Sunday, June 28, 2015

Greece Has Already Won

Well, after half a year of negotiations, a time when the positions of the parties seemed to change not at all, we suddenly have quite a bit of movement.

On Friday, Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras called for a public vote on the troika-creditor-institutions' take-it-or-leave it offer, an offer that included pension cuts that Syriza came to power explicitly rejecting.

Yesterday the troika-creditor-institutions rejected a one-week extension on loans coming due in order to allow the Greek government to conduct the referendum on July 5.

This morning the European Central Bank (ECB) announced that it will freeze Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to the Greek banking system. Given that lines have formed at ATMs since Tsipras' announcement of a referendum on Friday, for the ECB to freeze ELA puts the ball back in Syriza's court. Tsipras will now or very shortly have to impose a bank holiday and then capital controls.

Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis posts this morning on his blog a summation of the breakdown in talks in Brussels, "As it happened – Yanis Varoufakis’ intervention during the 27th June 2015 Eurogroup Meeting," which he prefaces as follows:
The Eurogroup Meeting of 27th June 2015 will not go down as a proud moment in Europe’s history. Ministers turned down the Greek government’s request that the Greek people should be granted a single week during which to deliver a Yes or No answer to the institutions’ proposals – proposals crucial for Greece’s future in the Eurozone. The very idea that a government would consult its people on a problematic proposal put to it by the institutions was treated with incomprehension and often with disdain bordering on contempt. I was even asked: “How do you expect common people to understand such complex issues?”. Indeed, democracy did not have a good day in yesterday’s Eurogroup meeting! But nor did European institutions. After our request was rejected, the Eurogroup President broke with the convention of unanimity (issuing a statement without my consent) and even took the dubious decision to convene a follow up meeting without the Greek minister, ostensibly to discuss the “next steps”. 
Can democracy and a monetary union coexist? Or must one give way? This is the pivotal question that the Eurogroup has decided to answer by placing democracy in the too-hard basket. So far, one hopes.
Varoufakis makes several substantive points. He basically outlines why it is the Greek government wants to hold a referendum: because the troika-creditors-institutions' take-it-or-leave-it offer is an "austerian" proposal that covers a mere five months and therefore guarantees no stability; the Syriza-led government commanded a 40% plurality of the vote last January; hence, the public needs to be consulted. Here is where Varoufakis' statement gets very interesting:
On the question that will be put to the Greek people, much has been said about what it should be. Many of you tell us, advise us, instruct us even, that we should make it a Yes or No question on the euro. Let me be clear on this. First, the question was formulated by the Cabinet and has just been passed through Parliament – and it is “Do you accept the institutions’ proposal as it was presented to us on 25th June in the Eurogroup?” This is the only pertinent question. If we had accepted that proposal two days ago, we would have had a deal. The Greek government is now asking the electorate to answer the question you put it to me Jeroen – especially when you said, and I quote, “you can consider this, if you wish, a take or leave it proposal”. Well, this is how we took it and we are now honouring the institutions and the Greek people by asking the latter to deliver a clear answer on the institutions’ proposal.
To those who say that, effectively, this is a referendum on the euro, my answer is: You may very well say this but I shall not comment. This is your judgement, your opinion, your interpretation. Not ours! There is a logic to your view but only if there is an implicit threat that a No from the Greek people to the institutions’ proposal will be followed up by moves to eject Greece, illegally, out of the euro. Such a threat would not be consistent with basic principles of European democratic governance and European Law.
To those who instruct us to phrase the referendum question as a euro-drachma dilemma, my answer is crystal clear: European Treaties make provisions for an exit from the EU. They do not make any provisions for an exit from the Eurozone. With good reason, of course, as the indivisibility of our Monetary Union is part of its raison d’ etre. To ask us to phrase the referendum question as a choice involving exit from the Eurozone is to ask us to violate EU Treaties and EU Law. I suggest to anyone who wants us, or anyone else, to hold a referendum on EMU membership to recommend a change in the Treaties.
These debt negotiations have always been primarily political and much less about the technicalities of repayment. The IMF itself, the institution that Tsipras has singled out for making unreasonable demands of sacrifice by the Greek people, has acknowledged that austerity has damaged the Greek economy. But neoliberal orthodoxy foresees a low-growth future where the only guaranteed profits to be had are in the further cannibalization of the public sector. Syriza's people first mantra is an existential threat to the neoliberal hive mind.

Since negotiations began this past winter the goal of the parties has been to make the other side throw the first punch and appear as the aggressor. So, given this framing, I think Greece has already won. The troika-creditors-institutions refuse to allow an extra week for a public vote. They have ended negotiations. What are they afraid of?

Clearly the fear is of democracy. As Varoufakis notes above, Syriza would pose the question as a Yes or No on the eurogroup's proposal of June 25th, not on whether to stay in the eurozone. The short run up to the vote next Sunday would not allow for the necessary fearmongering and manipulation to sway the electorate, as the neoliberal orthodoxy was able to do last September in the Scottish referendum on independence. The troika-creditors-institutions saw this and denied the public vote, and have now frozen ELA to force Syriza to implement capital controls, as was done in Cyprus. The hope in the eurogroup is that Syriza will then lose popular support, forcing Tsipras back to the negotiating table humbled.

The troika-creditors-institutions wants Syriza broken and discredited; absent that, they want Greece out of the eurozone. Capital controls are not the end of the world. Cyprus survived. Greece will too.

Thursday, June 11, 2015

NYT's Report on Crowdfunding for Novorossiya: Raising the Steel Curtain Back Up in the Western Mind

Jo Becker and Steven Lee Myers are back at work grubbing up their phony "Deep Throat" investigative reporting directed at Russia. This morning's offering has to do efforts by Novorossiya's supporters to raise money online, "Russian Groups Crowdfund the War in Ukraine." The lifeless opening three paragraphs read as follows:
WASHINGTON — The Novorossiya Humanitarian Battalion boasts on its website that it provided funds to buy a pair of binoculars used by rebels in eastern Ukraine to spot and destroy an armored vehicle. Another group, Save the Donbass, solicits donations using a photograph of a mortar shell inscribed with its web address and the names of donors. Yet another, Veche, states that its mission is to “create modern, combat-ready” military units fighting Ukraine’s central government. 
These organizations are part of an online campaign that is brazenly raising money for the war in eastern Ukraine, using common tactics that have at least tacit support from the government of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia. Although they often portray their mission as humanitarian, most of the groups explicitly endorse the armed insurgency and vow to help equip forces in the two regions at the center of the fighting, Donetsk and Luhansk.
An examination by The New York Times of the groups’ websites, social media postings and other records found more than a dozen groups in Russia that are raising money for the separatists, aiding a conflict that has killed more than 6,400 people and plunged Russia’s relations with the West to depths not seen since the Cold War.
It is a lengthy, soporific story, complete with online "smoking gun" screen-shots, that is bereft of the obvious: There is a lot of public support for Ukraine's pro-Russian rebels, something revealed in the recent Pew survey (Michael Gordon, "Survey Points to Challenges NATO Faces Over Russia"):
The findings on Russians’ attitudes are likely to be disappointing for NATO supporters. 
Western officials have calculated that economic sanctions will eventually erode Russian support for Mr. Putin’s decision to intervene in eastern Ukraine, but he has remained extremely popular by riding a wave of nationalism and controlling much of the news media. Most Russians are unhappy with the state of the economy, but they tend to blame not Mr. Putin but the drop in oil prices and the West’s efforts to punish Russia. 
Eighty-eight percent of Russians said they had confidence in Mr. Putin to do the right thing on international affairs, the highest rating since Pew started taking polls on the question in 2003. 
“The Ukrainian situation continues to be very good for Vladimir Putin with his own people,” Mr. Stokes said. “The Russians feel the pain of the economy, but they blame it on the West, not on Putin.”
I wish Becker and Myers would have included links to Strelkov's web site. I would make a donation. Instead, this is what we get:
The Western sanctions lists, for their part, have not kept up with the groups’ ever-changing names. Mr. Strelkov’s Novorossiya Movement, for instance, stopped soliciting funds after the European Union placed sanctions on it in February. Instead, it asked that the funds be sent to a related group, not blacklisted, called Global Initiatives, run by the movement’s chief of staff and chaired by Mr. Strelkov. 
In early May, it morphed yet again, redirecting funds to yet another related group, ANO KNB. Later in the month, a group identified by the Novorossiya Movement as its partner, Strelkov Info, wrote that because of constant blocking of its accounts, “we’ve decided to not post them in places open to all”; donors could send an email “to find out transfer details.”

One interesting aspect of the Becker and Myers piece is its description of the virtual-payment company QIWI (a blue QIWI terminal is pictured above, photo by James Hill for NYT):
But the widespread use of QIWI has created potential risks for its partner, Visa. Nearly all the fund-raising groups solicit donations through QIWI, a virtual payment company founded in 2004 and later incorporated, like many Russian companies, in Cyprus. QIWI provides consumers in Russia — and increasingly other countries — with a variety of ways to make payments online or through a network of tens of thousands of terminals that act like reverse A.T.M.s, allowing users to deposit cash and then pay participating vendors.
Users can also move money to individuals — or charitable organizations — as long as they have accounts linked to working telephone numbers. Its partnership with Visa, begun in 2012, allows customers to use a QIWI-Visa credit card to pay vendors outside QIWI’s network. 
The system has become wildly popular, used by 17 million Russians, but it has also skirted legal trouble. The company’s terminals and credit cards — along with the failure to require identification for transactions, as demanded by Russian law since last year — can be easily exploited to transfer proceeds from illicit activities, from drug dealing to tax evasion.
Once the again the Gray Lady is pumping out the column inches, making it appear as if she is documenting massive Russian corruption, and in the end there is really nothing much there.

It is illuminating in one aspect though. We are witnessing the erection of another steel curtain in the Western mind.

Tuesday, April 7, 2015

Russia Moves to Quickly Win New Cold War

To get a sense of what Greece is up against in trying to resist the troika's austerity diktats read the Reuters piece by Hugo Dixon, "Greece Must Walk the Talk, and Soon." Saying that finance minister Yanis Varoufakis has come up with the 458 million euros to meet an April 9 IMF deadline, Dixon opines:
Athens has scraped together enough cash to meet the I.M.F. payment, in part by extracting liquidity from quasi state entities. However, the left-wing government has pretty much exhausted its techniques for squeezing blood from a stone. Meanwhile, it has largely wasted two and a half months in office by lecturing its creditors, sending out mixed messages about its willingness to default and coming up with amateurish overhaul plans.

Now the government needs to get serious and — unless Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is really willing to default — impose vicious capital controls and exit the euro. 
Athens’s eurozone creditors are still hanging tough. Although they do not want Greece to enter a spiral of self-destruction and are worried about the fallout it if does, they do not trust what the government says. As a result, the creditors rightly want to see some meaningful actions before they lend Greece more money. 
Mr. Tsipras needs to show he means business, by suffering some political cost at home as a result of implementing unpopular measures. Otherwise, there is a risk that the government will take the cash, continue to speak with a forked tongue and still default in June if it can’t get a new long-term deal to its liking.
This is the dominant thinking within the troika: Syriza-led Greece is a mendacious, troublesome political upstart that needs to be made an example of, that needs to be broken publicly on the wheel so every Spanish voter looking to support Podemos or Mick pining for Sinn Féin will think twice before questioning the status quo.

The troika's version of the domino theory for the New Cold War that Washington D.C. explicitly launched last year in Kiev with the coup of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich actually got its start a year earlier with eurogroup chief Jeroen Dijsselbloem's bail-in scheme for Cyprus. At the time Russia did not take kindly to the bail in, interpreting it as a direct attack on her large depositors in Cyprus.

But as Andrew Higgins reports in "Waving Cash, Putin Sows E.U. Divisions in an Effort to Break Sanctions" all is now forgiven:
NICOSIA, Cyprus — When Cyprus seized hundreds of millions of dollars from bank depositors, many of them Russians, as part of an internationally brokered deal two years ago to rescue its collapsing financial system, the Russian leader, Vladimir V. Putin, denounced the move as “dangerous” and “unfair,” warning of a sharp chill in relations. 
But Mr. Putin was all smiles recently when he received Cyprus’s president, Nicos Anastasiades, in Moscow. He hailed relations with the Mediterranean nation as “always being truly friendly and mutually beneficial” and agreed to extend — on greatly improved terms for Cyprus — a $2.5 billion Russian loan.
The shift from fury to declarations of eternal friendship displayed Mr. Putin’s well-known flair for tactical back flips. But it also showed his unbending determination to break out of sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and the European Union for Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and support for armed rebels in eastern Ukraine.
Mr. Putin has methodically targeted, through charm, cash, and the fanning of historical and ideological embers, the European Union’s weakest links in a campaign to assert influence in some of Europe’s most troubled corners. One clear goal is to break fragile Western unity over the conflict in Ukraine.
On Wednesday, Greece’s new left-wing prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, will be the next to visit Moscow. Ahead of the trip, Mr. Tsipras declared himself opposed to sanctions on Russia, describing them as a “dead-end policy.”
On Sunday, Mr. Putin’s efforts to peel away supporters from the European Union opened a new rift, after the United States ambassador in Prague criticized a decision by the president of the Czech Republic, Milos Zeman, to attend a military parade in Moscow on May 9. And in February, Mr. Putin visited Hungary, the European Union’s autocratic backslider, peddling economic deals.
Russia has so far been unable to turn such hand-holding into something more concrete against sanctions that require the approval of all 28 European Union members. But pressure for a rupture is building.
The rupture might be supplied by Poroshenko's obvious backsliding on the Mink 2.0 ceasefire. As David Herszenhorn reports in "Ukrainian Leader Is Open to a Vote on Regional Power":
MOSCOW — President Petro O. Poroshenko of Ukraine on Monday denounced calls for “federalization” of the country, which Russia has endorsed as a way of granting political autonomy to the areas of eastern Ukraine controlled by pro-Russian separatists.
Establishing greater local autonomy and governmental authority is widely viewed as crucial to settling the nearly yearlong war in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, and it was a central plank in a cease-fire accord signed in February. But there are fierce disagreements over how to shape those powers, and how far they would extend.
Speaking at the first meeting of a commission charged with developing amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution, Mr. Poroshenko described federalization as tantamount to breaking apart the country, and said he was so certain Ukrainians would reject the idea that he was willing to put it to a national referendum.
“Why do I dwell in great detail on the idea of federalization?” Mr. Poroshenko said. “Because it is like an infection, a biological weapon, which is being imposed on Ukraine from abroad. Its bacteria are trying to infect Ukraine and destroy our unity.”
Leaders of the self-declared people’s republics in Donetsk and Luhansk have complained bitterly in recent weeks that Mr. Poroshenko and other officials in Kiev, including members of Parliament, were refusing to take the necessary steps to carry out the political provisions in the cease-fire agreement, which was signed in Minsk, Belarus.
***
. . . Separatist leaders noted that they had not been invited to join the commission on constitutional changes, and they took issue with Mr. Poroshenko’s remarks, including his insistence that Ukraine would remain a “unitary state” and his declaration that Ukrainian would remain the country’s only official language.
“These things are absolutely unacceptable,” Andrei Purgin, head of the Donetsk People’s Republic, told the Interfax news agency. “Everything they now say and do contradicts the Minsk agreements that took so much work to achieve.”
As for the commission and the constitutional amendment process, Mr. Purgin told Interfax: “We did not receive any invitations. We don’t have any representatives there.”
I have learned not to underestimate the obedience of the French and Germans when it comes to complying with U.S. orders, but this abrogation of Minsk 2.0 by the junta in Kiev seems impossible to defend. France, Germany, Poland, etc., might fall into the neocon line but it will be hard to secure the unanimity of all 28 EU members for increased Russian sanctions when fighting resumes in Donbass.

That is why it seems like a slam dunk that Putin will extend an offer of financial assistance to Alexis Tsipras when he visits Moscow tomorrow. If favorable terms can be found to extend a $2.5 billion loan to Cyprus, why not the bigger, politically far more important Greece?

Higgins ends his story on Russian rapprochement with Cyprus explaining the result of Dijsselbloem's bail-in. It backfired:
Vasilis Zertalis, the head of Prospectacy, a financial service company, described Cyprus as a “small piece on a big chessboard.” Europe, he said, tried to advance its own position during the 2013 banking crisis by seeking to end Cyprus’s role as a haven for Russian money. 
“They wanted to scare the Russians away,” he said. “But the money that left was from Britain, from other European countries and from America.” 
Ordinary Cypriots and politicians, he said, “all gave up on the European Union” because of the harsh bailout terms in 2013 and “know that the United States will never take a stand against Turkey.” 
“So,” he said, “the only allies Cyprus really has are Russia and maybe China.”
Putin has an opportunity to reach back into the slipstream of time and make a move that Stalin should have made. Stalin should have aided Greece instead of letting the British Empire re-install the monarchy there, setting the stage for the decades-long Cold War.

The choice should be clear now for Tsipras. The heads of the EU want to crush Syriza. I say he has no other choice at this point. He must accept Russia's offer of financial aid.

Saturday, April 13, 2013

Troika Wants More from Cyprus

Just getting around this morning to reading Yves Smith's post about Cyprus from yesterday, "Troika Demands Another €6 Billion from Cyprus, Making “Rescue” Bigger Than GDP." It's definitely worth checking out, particularly the assessment of the European Commission's economic forecast for Cyprus. As Smith comments, "So get this, sports fans: not only did the Eurocrats underestimate how badly their little program would hurt the economy, they are continuing to underestimate how brutal it will be."

This morning I can't get enough of Bert Jansch (1965), the self-titled debut album from the Scottish folk guitarist. This is second-to-last track, "Dreams of Love":

Friday, April 12, 2013

Cyprus Economy Predicted to Shrink 12.5%

Cyprus' economy is now predicted to shrink by 12.5% over the next two years (though even this is probably too optimistic) according to a report by the European Commission that Liz Alderman writes about today in her story, "Future Looks Bleaker Than Anticipated in Cyprus, Its Creditors Claim":
According to a bleak assessment released Thursday by its European partners, Cyprus will fall into a downward spiral for at least the next two years, with the economy contracting up to 12.5 percent during the period as the country reduces a banking sector that had ballooned to more than five times its gross domestic product.
And because the economy will do worse than expected, Cyprus must soon raise 13 billion euros ($17 billion) — nearly twice the amount the government thought it would have to come up with just a month ago — to keep its debt and deficit from spinning out of control and to meet the terms of a 10 billion euro ($13.1 billion) international bailout secured last month by the newly elected president, Nicos Anastasiades.
Cyprus plans on selling 10 tons of gold from its 13-ton reserve. Such a sale, Alderman says, would generate around 400 million euros. Unemployment now at close to 15% will increase. Pressure on Cyprus to develop its substantial offshore natural reserves will lead to conflict with Turkey.

Monday, April 8, 2013

Portuguese Judiciary Deals a Blow to Austerity

Portugal is in the news because its constitutional court tossed out part of its austerity package. This from a story today by Raphael Minder, "Portuguese Debt Crisis Brings New Trouble for Euro":
In an address to his beleaguered nation on Sunday, Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho warned that his government would be forced to cut spending more and that lives “will become more difficult” after a court on Friday struck down some of the austerity measures put in place after a bailout package two years ago. 
The renewed tension in Portugal raised the threat of further trouble elsewhere in the euro zone, where ailing members have struggled to rebuild economic growth after enduring wrenching spending cuts. 
“The risks in the euro zone have increased markedly over the past six weeks or so,” wrote Nicholas Spiro, managing director of Spiro Sovereign Strategy, a London-based consultancy that assesses risk on sovereign debt. 
A critical moment for the latest trouble took place on Friday, when Portugal’s Constitutional Court struck down four of nine contested austerity measures that the government introduced as part of a 2013 budget that included about 5 billion euros, or $6.5 billion, of tax increases and spending cuts. The ruling left the government short about 1.4 billion euros of expected revenue, or more than one-fifth of the 2013 austerity package. 
Specifically, the court, which began reviewing the legality of the government’s austerity measures in January, ruled as unconstitutional and discriminatory the government’s plans to cut holiday bonuses for civil servants and pensioners, as well as to reduce sick leave and unemployment benefits.
Minder also quotes Jens Weidmann, the head of Bundesbank, saying Cyprus may need an additional bailout:
Cyprus received a bailout of 10 billion euros from international creditors last month. It may need even more to save its banks, a top German policy maker said on Sunday. 
“The situation in Cyprus has stabilized in the last few days,” Jens Weidmann, president of the Bundesbank, the German central bank, told Deutschlandfunk radio. “However, I wouldn’t rule out that the need for liquidity in Cyprus could increase.” 
The crisis in Cyprus reflects how urgent it is for the euro zone to establish a means to shut down failed banks without burdening taxpayers or endangering the financial system, Mr. Weidmann said. 
“There continues to be a problem with banks that may be too connected and too big to wind down without creating a danger for the financial system,” he said.
Last Friday Landon Thomas Jr. had a story, "Ex-Bank Officials Named in Cyprus Inquiry," about the findings of an investigative report commissioned by the central bank of Cyprus. Known as the Alvarez report after the financial consulting firm Alvarez & Marsal that the central bank hired to look into why the Bank of Cyprus doubled down on risky Greek bonds, it establishes what has already been widely reported. According to Thomas,
The Bank of Cyprus, long considered the better run of the two large banks that have been at the center of the Cypriot bailout debacle, decided to speculate in high-yielding Greek bonds by accumulating a 2.4 billion euro position from late December 2009 until June 2010, just as the Greece government was running out of money. 
That decision resulted in a loss of 1.9 billion euros, or about $2.4 billion, when bond investors were eventually forced to take a 75 percent haircut under the final terms of the Greek bailout, worked out last year. 
That loss and a larger one at the other big Cypriot bank, Laiki Bank, on a similarly misguided investment foray, totaled 4.5 billion euros. That was more than Cyprus, with a gross domestic product of 18 billion euros, was able to sustain. And the losses resulted in a near-collapse of the Cypriot banking sector, leading the country’s government to seek a 10 billion euro bailout from the troika of international lenders: the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank.
The Alvarez report provides new details on the extent to which Bank of Cyprus officials were hoping that the high yields generated by the Greek bonds would cover the bank’s imploding loan book. 
Alvarez investigators said that, according to the records they were able to secure from the bank, the decision to buy the bonds was based on a last gasp effort by the bank to generate profits as their loan book began to sour in late 2009 and through the spring of 2010. 
Investigators also said that the bank, like others in Europe at the time, made use of cheap financing from the European Central Bank to make these bets. As a result, executives in the bank’s treasury department bought the riskiest high-yielding bonds available and found willing sellers in banks eager to reduce their exposure to Greece. 
When it became clear not long after the Greek bailout in May 2010 that some form of debt restructuring would have to take place, the Bank of Cyprus found itself stuck with a 2.4 billion euro portfolio of Greek bonds.
Annie Lowrey has a story today, "Lew to Press for Growth in Europe," about Treasury secretary Jacob Lew's trip this week to Europe to ostensibly jawbone leaders there to dial back on austerity. What's interesting about the story is that the normally excellent Lowrey undercuts her lead halfway through the article:
But countries like Germany have shown little willingness to ease the constraints of austerity for peripheral European countries, or to engage in stimulus spending themselves. And for years, European officials have bridled at being lectured by officials from Washington — particularly because many feel that their financial crisis was largely caused by American financial products exported around the world by American banks. 
Though Mr. Lew will travel to Europe with a familiar message from Washington, it may not be delivered as urgently as in the past. The European crisis continues to weigh on American growth, cutting into exports, but many economists believe that the United States has entered a cycle of self-sustaining economic growth driven by a turnaround in housing and improving household budgets. 
Moreover, American companies have over the last few years steeled themselves against Europe’s financial woes, and the risk of contagion is perceived to be relatively low. 
Europe was the primary international concern for Timothy F. Geithner, Mr. Lew’s predecessor as Treasury secretary and a familiar face on the Continent. But perhaps as a sign of Europe’s diminishing threat to United States economic stability, Mr. Lew’s first overseas trip as Treasury secretary, last month, was not to Paris or Berlin or Brussels, but to Beijing.
Apparently what Lew is really in Europe to do is continue negotiations on a free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union. In other words, it is neoliberalism full speed ahead. Talk up stimulus, continue with austerity, and finalize the free trade agreement.

Thursday, April 4, 2013

Troika Approves MOU on Cyprus

The troika has finalized a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the Cyprus bailout. The MOU won't be made public until after a meeting of eurozone finance ministers in Dublin next week. According to a story by James Kanter, "I.M.F. and Europe Set Tough Terms for Cyprus Bailout,"
Though it has not yet been made public, officials say the agreement includes budget cuts, the privatization of state-owned assets and other conditions Cyprus must meet.
The MOU has to be approved  by not only the Cypriot Parliament but by the 16 other eurozone countries as well. Managing director of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, who according to Kanter has been the bad cop in these bailout negotiations, says the main fiscal measure in the MOU is raising the corporate tax in Cyprus to 12.5% from 10%.

The question I have: Why, if you're a member of parliament in Cyprus, would you voluntarily opt to go the way of Greece?

Wednesday, April 3, 2013

Any Courage in Cyprus?

Cyprus, as it turns out, has the ability to block the bailout deal with the troika. This from a story today by Liz Alderman and James Kanter about the resignation of finance minister Michalis Sarris, "Cyprus Chief of Finance Quits Post":
But the Cypriot Parliament must still vote on a memorandum of understanding with the so-called troika of international organizations — the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund — that agreed to the bailout. 
That memorandum, still being drafted, will outline the budget cuts and other conditions Cyprus will have to meet to receive its allotments of money. A parliamentary vote is expected in coming weeks. The governments of Germany and Finland, under their national rules on bailout loans, are also expected to seek the approval of their Parliaments. 
The memorandum will probably be the subject of heated debate in Nicosia. Many lawmakers, already unhappy with the tough capital controls that have been slapped on bank accounts for the better part of a month, are dismayed by what they see as harsh terms that will tip Cyprus’s already enfeebled economy over the edge. 
But Mr. Sarris’s resignation should “help the Cypriot government win approval for the bailout program in the Cypriot Parliament,” said Mr. Rahman, the analyst.
The Cypriot Parliament has all the evidence it needs to scrap the deal. This is from today's story by David Jolly, "Unemployment in Euro Zone Reaches 12%":
The jobless crisis is hitting hardest in the south of Europe. Eurostat said Greece, with its economy in free fall, had the euro zone’s highest unemployment rate ,at 26.4 percent in December, the latest month for which data are available. Among Greek youth, the jobless rate has hit a staggering level, 58.4 percent. 
Spain, where the economy has contracted sharply after the collapse of the global credit bubble, posted the second-highest unemployment rate in the euro zone in February, at 26.3 percent. 
Cyprus’s jobless rate, at 14.0 percent, is almost certain to rise because the country’s recently negotiated bailout deal will crimp the economy for years to come, said Mr. Cliffe, of ING. “We’ve already seen how this story plays out in Greece,” he said. “We’re about to see it play out again in Cyprus.”
The question is do the elected leaders of Cyprus have the courage to leave the eurozone and go their own way. In the short term such a move would likely cause a drop in the markets, but in the long run Cyprus would be doing all of us an enormous favor by driving a stake through the zombie brain that can think only of bigger being better and that austerity somehow magically generates growth. Sadly, politicians, whether east or west or north or south, have a consistent track record of cowardice and plutocratic capture; so to expect emancipatory leadership is naive. But there is always hope. Hope is the anchor.

Ben Judah has an article on the Opinion page, "Did Putin Sink Cyprus?," that argues that Putin's failed promise to bring law and order to Russia along with the cultivation of his cult of personality has led to billions in capital flight. Judah concludes the piece by casting some blame the EU's way:
Whatever remains of the Russian fortunes in Nicosia seems sure to flee again — but not back to Russia. It may go to other European havens, like the Dutch Antilles and the British Virgin Islands. Malta and Luxembourg are possibilities, but analysts have both on bailout watch. 
Meanwhile, Brussels is not impotent. The European Union must clamp down on offshore havens, insist on transparent banking and toughen up on money laundering. This is austerity Europe — and bloated tax havens not only put Europe at risk but also make its financial system complicit with offshore corruption. 
But it cannot erase the truths exposed by the Nicosia bust. Europe, it turns out, is studded with vulnerable, contagious tax islands, and their availability only compounds Russia’s deeper problem: it is both too corrupt and too paranoid to keep its billions at home.

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

Cyprus Synopsis

The Cyprus bailout crisis is retold this morning by Liz Alderman in a story, "Cypriots Feel Betrayed by the European Union," that focuses on an average Joe, Charalambos Alexandrou, who owns a roofing business, and his wife, Aliki Perganti, who works for a ceramics company. The contours of a standard narrative are taking shape. Cyprus joins the EU in 2004; the eurozone, in 2008. In doing so, it moves away from agriculture and manufacturing and refashions itself along the lines of Switzerland and Luxembourg as a strategic money hub uniquely situated to serve Europe, Asia and the Middle East. And the money flows in, creating a real estate boom. Then in 2010 the chickens come home to roost. Risky loans begin to default. The coup de grace is the haircut on Greek government bonds the Cypriot banks are forced to take as part of the troika engineered bailout of Greece. When it was Cyprus' turn to go hat in hand to the troika Germany made sure, because of an intelligence assessment that Cypriot banks were flush with ill-gotten Russian wealth, that any bailout would have to include a bail-in, a.k.a., inflicting pain and suffering on depositors. As Alderman says,
And with losses of up to 60 percent being imposed on deposit accounts above 100,000 euros at the Bank of Cyprus, [Charalambos Alexandrou] said, even many of his friends — not just Russian oligarchs — were losing big portions of savings they so diligently tucked away during the good years.
An unsigned editorial in today's Opinion section of the New York Times, "Cyprus Is Not an Exception," points out that in the eurozone it's not just Cyprus that has a banking sector that is at a large multiple of GDP; both Malta and Luxembourg have banking sectors that are larger than Cyprus':
Luxembourg and Malta, which have established themselves as tax havens serving big global corporations and the superrich, have banking systems that are even larger. Luxembourg’s bank assets are a staggering 22 times its gross domestic product, and Maltese bank assets clock in at eight times the size of its economy. 
Leaders of both countries have insisted that they should not be compared with Cyprus and that they expected European leaders to stand behind their governments and banks come what may. Speaking of his banking system, the finance minister of Luxembourg, Luc Frieden, said: “We want to expand it further, not to downsize it.” 
Banks in Luxembourg and Malta, many owned by big European and American financial firms, are healthier than those in Cyprus, according to the International Monetary Fund. But the I.M.F. raised concerns about the ability of the countries to properly monitor their banks or support them in a crisis. In other words, the euro zone and the I.M.F. would have to step in to bail them out if they ran into trouble. 
In any case, the euro zone needs urgently to finish work on a banking union that would allow the European Central Bank to supervise large banks instead of leaving that task to national policy makers who may be too protective of their banks. Europe should also have a common process to restructure troubled banks, which should reduce the risk of Cyprus-like debacles. A banking union would also give savers more confidence that their insured deposits are truly guaranteed, an assurance that was deeply shaken by what happened in Cyprus. 
Thankfully, the crowds were not as big and chaotic as people had feared when banks in Cyprus reopened last week after for two weeks — but only after the country imposed tough capital controls to prevent depositors from fleeing. Europeans may not be as lucky next time.
There seems to be a lot of clucking satisfaction from those who championed the view that Cyprus was a little one-off that so far there is no evidence of a run on banks. I say it's early yet. People are still in shock. Events are still unfolding in Italy. Give it some time.

Saturday, March 30, 2013

Destruction of the Economy in Cyprus

One small Cyprus story this morning by Landon Thomas Jr., "Some Savers in Cyprus May Lose 60 Percent," buried on page B7 of the New York Times Busines section belies its importance. Deposits above 100,000 euros at the nation's largest bank, the Bank of Cyprus, will be confiscated to the tune of 60% to 77.5%. According to Thomas,
Over the past week, government officials have been saying that depositor losses would not exceed 40 percent — even though bankers and lawyers involved in the negotiations have been warning for some time that the final figure would need to be higher if the bank was to re emerge as a viable entity. 
Under the terms of the transaction, large depositors would have 77.5 percent of their savings turned into different forms of equity. 37.5 percent would be direct equity, in the bank with the rest coming in the form of securities that may convert into shares at a certain period. The remaining 22.5 percent would be a frozen, non-interest-bearing deposit that they would be able to access in the future. 
As a result of this arrangement, the bank’s largest depositors will initially become its major shareholders. 
If the bank does well, depositors would be able to sell their stock. But even in the best case, in which the bank thrives on the back of a quickly recovering economy — a long shot most economists believe — the loss is likely to exceed 60 percent and could well be much more than that. 
Lawyers and bankers who have analyzed the transaction believe the ultimate loss to the depositor could be anywhere between 60 and 77.5 percent.
To get a sense of the implications of this latest development check out today's must-read post by Yves Smith on naked capitalism, "Destruction of Cyprus Economy Proceeding Ahead of Schedule,"  which concludes as follows:

Now remember, Laiki and Bank of Cyprus were the core of the payments system in Cyprus. And it would be very difficult for a business of meaningful size not to have over €100,000 in deposits. If you freeze a significant majority of the commercial balances, how can you operate? How can these businesses even survive and pay each other? By e-mail, Antonis Polemitis of Ledra Capital teased out the implications:
If the Reuters story is correct, for the purposes of liquidity on Tuesday morning, that is a 100% haircut. 
If that is what they do, I am not sure how Cyprus can engage in economic activity on Tuesday without going to barter or scrips. 
I mean, that basically will mean 100% of the large deposits (all the business accounts) at Laiki and BoC are lost or not available as of next week. The Laiki wipe out may have been survivable. If you wipe (for liquidity purposes at least), both Laiki and BoC, then we are not talking about whether or not GDP drops X%, we are talking about ‘how do you actually engage in commerce?’ 
If they do this, there is little chance it can last more than a month — the economy will simply fail at even basic functions…
And if the plan has been accurately reported and plays out as Polemitis fears, it will undermine the “Cyprus is a special case” narrative. This Eurozone fiasco is making Geithner look good. The former Treasury secretary used the need to keep the confidence fairy alive as the excuse for any and every sop to the banks, from coddling miscreant executives to foaming the runway with mortgage borrowers to stealth bailouts. But the Eurocrats have completely ignored the impact of undermining confidence in the banking system. The fact that Cyprus has a decent-sized population of English retirees means that the British media will report on the Cyprus meltdown, which will be a stark contrast with Greece, where the economic devastation has not gotten the coverage it warrants. Grim accounts of the destruction wrought by the tender ministrations of the Troika should strengthen the position of the growing Euroskeptic sentiment in Italy, borne out by the success of Berlusconi and Grillo in the recent elections. Playing into the hands of Italian refuseniks should be the last thing Brussels and Berlin want. The cost of getting tough with Cyprus is likely to be far greater than they anticipate.
It's hard to find fault with this analysis, unless some sort of exception is made for business accounts, which is probably illegal (but capital controls in the eurozone were supposed to be illegal too). Bersani can't form a government in Italy. The next month should be a momentous one for Europe. Get those sell orders in.

Friday, March 29, 2013

Cyprus Temporary Capital Controls Likely To Last a Long Time

Cyprus' capital controls, only to last for one week, will now be in effect for at least a month. This from a story today by Andrew Higgins and Liz Alderman, "Long Lines as Banks Reopen in Cyprus After Freeze":
Not since the introduction of the euro in January 1999 has a European country blocked bank depositors from having full access to their own cash. Under European Union treaties, such restrictions are normally forbidden. But the European Commission, the union’s administrative arm, issued a statement Thursday morning that the Cyprus controls were legal — though urging that they be rescinded as soon as possible. Originally, the controls were to be in place for one week. But on Thursday, the Cypriot foreign minister, Ioannis Kasoulides, said that restrictions on financial transactions would not be lifted for a month.
A naked capitalism cross post from VoxEU today by Jon Danielsson, Director of the ESRC funded Systemic Risk Centre, London School of Economics, argues that the example of Iceland proves that temporary capital controls should, for all intents, be considered permanent:
Another European country was forced to implement `temporary’ capital controls in its crisis – Iceland, as discussed here on Vox (Danielsson and Arnason 2011). 
The Icelandic government, its central bank and the IMF considered the controls necessary because so many foreigners, and the occasional wealthy Icelander, had lost faith in the economy and only wanted to take their money out. While such individuals were considered misguided, their exit would have had disastrous consequences. Hence it was thought necessary to `temporarily’ prevent capital outflows. 
The authorities said at the time the controls would be temporary and limited in scope – lasting a few weeks or, at worst, a month or two. Half a decade later, the capital controls are still in place and getting more and more restrictive. 
This was the second time Iceland had implemented `temporary’ capital controls. The first time it did so, in the 1930s, led to the controls being in place until 1993. This is in line with the historical evidence; once capital controls are imposed, they are really hard to abolish, and a temporary arrangement usually ends up being permanent.
Reporting from Nicosia, Landon Thomas Jr. says the prevailing wisdom appears to be holding. Cyprus is a one-off and will not spread:
“People have lost all their money,” screamed a young financier Wednesday night, as he knocked back drink after drink at a local nightclub — which, despite the earsplitting din of Greek rap music, was half empty. “To me, that feels like war.” 
But on a global scale, investors have refused to panic, other than unloading the risky bonds of second-tier banks in Spain and Italy. 
And while the bond yields of Italian government debt have spiked in recent days, a signal of investor wariness, and the euro has traded down against the dollar, the view, for now, is that even though Europe’s handling of the crisis has been a mess, broader contagion has largely been avoided. 
“This does not worry us at all — Cyprus is just not systemic,” said a senior executive at a large sovereign wealth fund based in the Middle East, who was not authorized to speak publicly. 
Even Cypriot government bonds that are due to reach maturity this June are holding up fairly well, trading at 88 cents, not far from their recent high of 94 cents earlier this week, though a 12 percent discount from their face value.
But Floyd Norris in a High & Low Finance column that appears side by side with Thomas' piece sees signs of a spreading instability:
The fact the hot money stayed even after it became clear the Cypriot banks were in trouble — in large part because of all the Greek bonds they owned — is a testament to the false security the euro provided even after the Greek crisis erupted. That security has faded, at least a little. The cost of credit-default swaps on European banks has been rising since Cyprus got into trouble, suggesting the market thinks bank defaults have grown more likely. That cost continued to rise after the latest plan was announced. It does not help that European leaders seem unable to decide whether the Cypriot deal would set a precedent if banks in other countries get into trouble. It does, whatever they say, or at least it could. 
A few months ago, Europe was supposed to be on the way to a banking union, an arrangement that it was hoped would prevent what has now happened in Cyprus. What happens to those plans will be an indication of whether Europe can continue to hold the euro zone together. 
It may help that Cyprus is so insignificant. Its economy is about one-tenth the size of Ireland’s, which itself is among the smaller economies in the euro zone. It is even smaller than Vermont’s, which is smaller than that of any other state. We can only shudder at what might happen if banks in a big euro zone country got into a lot of trouble.
The next small eurozone country headed to the troika for a bailout, according to naked capitalism's Yves Smith, is Slovenia.

Thursday, March 28, 2013

Capital Controls in Cyprus, Bank Lines Not as Long as Expected

Banks opened today in Cyprus. There were lines but not as long as some anticipated. The S&P 500 established a new record, 1569.19, breaking the old one set in October of 2007. I'd say it's time to start selling.

The capital controls in Cyprus include the following: funds cannot be electronically transferred to another country; a maximum of 3,000 euros in cash can be taken out of the country; allowable ATM withdrawals have been increased to 300 euros a day from 100 euros; credit and debit card charges are limited to 5,000 euros a person a month; banks will accept payroll checks as deposits but will not cash them. This info can all be found in Liz Alderman's story, "Cyprus Sets Up Tight Controls as Banks Prepare to Reopen," from this morning.

Imagine the same restrictions in the United States. There would be an armed insurrection.

The EU is coming under fire. As Alderman says,
Under European Union treaties, restricting the free movement of capital is forbidden. Critics say that what is happening in Cyprus shows that union rules will be flouted when the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and European Union leaders find it convenient to do so.
By imposing capital controls, European and Cypriot officials have effectively created two classes of euro: cash that can be freely spent, and cash that is locked up by capital controls, effectively diminishing its value.
“It has to be acknowledged that this is something entirely new,” said Nicolas Véron, a senior fellow at Bruegel, a research group in Brussels, and a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “This will shape expectations in other countries, and the issue is whether capital controls can be avoided in future episodes.”
Borrowing rates for Italy and Spain increased yesterday.

Wednesday, March 27, 2013

Cyprus: "The Money is Going to Stay There for a Very Long Time"

Banks are scheduled to open tomorrow in Cyprus and rules outlining how people can access their money are still being promulgated. This is from today's story, "In Cyprus, Big Losses Expected on Deposits," by Landon Thomas Jr.:
The government is also struggling to come up with some form of capital controls in a bid to prevent too much money from draining from the banks and leaving the country. Given that more than 30 percent of the Bank of Cyprus’s 14 billion euros in long-term deposits belongs to foreigners — mostly Russians and Greeks — who would not hesitate to take their money out of the country, the restrictions on those funds are likely to be onerous, bankers say. 
“That money is going to stay there for a very long time,” said one person who has been involved in the discussions, but who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly.
Beyond the challenge of dealing with the large depositors is the question of what to do with about 27 billion euros in deposits in accounts under 100,000 euros that now carry the Cypriot government’s full backing, following last weekend’s reversal of the decision to tax those deposits, too. That figure alone exceeds Cyprus’s annual gross domestic product of 18 billion euros. 
If the banks reopen on Thursday, as planned, Cyprus’s shellshocked citizens will have access to their insured deposits for the first time in more than a week. With their bills and fears mounting, it is widely expected that many will immediately seek to remove these funds from the banks. 
For now, officials say, it is likely that uninsured depositors will face stiff restrictions when it comes to withdrawing money from an automated teller machine or sending money abroad. But if a depositor at Bank of Cyprus wanted to transfer funds to, say, Hellenic Bank, a smaller institution that is in better shape, the controls would be less severe because that money would remain within the Cypriot banking system. Such arcane mechanisms are now being thrashed out in Brussels and Frankfurt.
With more time to consider the bailout an assessment has gone from bad to worse. The low end of the haircut, 30%, for uninsured depositors at the Bank of Cyprus has given way to the high end, 40%, because the bailout estimate of a 3% contraction of Cyprus' economy is being reassessed as too modest; now, according to Thomas' story, economists are predicting a shrinkage of 5%-10% within a year.

Andrew Higgins and Liz Alderman have a good "how we got here" story today, "Europeans Planted Seeds of Crisis in Cyprus." The Eurogroup's decision in October 2011 to make private-sector investors take a 50% write-down on Greek government bonds doomed Laiki Bank. Higgins and Alderman conclude their story with seven paragraphs that pretty much sum up the whole story heretofore. And the gist of it is that the eurozone is finished:
After the Greek write-down, Cyprus compounded its problems by dithering on whether to seek a bailout from the European Union. At first, it appealed to Russia, which provided a 2.5 billion-euro loan in December 2011. But this money quickly ran out, and when Cyprus did finally go cap-in-hand to its European partners for a lifeline, it received a rude shock: Germany, already gearing up for an election this year, wanted not just budget cuts and other conventional austerity measures but a complete overhaul of Cyprus’s economic model, built around financial services for foreigners seeking ways to dodge taxes and, Berlin suspected, launder dirty money. 
“They did not want the Cypriot model to exist as it did — they wanted Cyprus to stop being a financial center,” said Pambos Papageorgiou, a former central bank board member who is now a member of parliament and on its finance committee. “It was very brutal, like warfare.” 
Mr. Papageorgiou complained that the European Union had shown “the opposite of solidarity” in its dealings with one of its weakest and most vulnerable members. 
In the three years since Europe’s rolling debt crisis first exploded in Greece, governments and citizens in the hardest-hit nations have fumed that decisions made in Brussels pay little heed to their interests and are dictated instead by the economic concerns and election cycles of Germany. Whether in Athens, Dublin, Rome, Madrid or Nicosia, people increasingly ask whether the European Union serves their own aspirations or those of remote institutions dominated by others, particularly Germans. 
Such questions have grown to a furious pitch in Cyprus, where terms set early Monday for a 10 billion-euro bailout will deepen an already painful recession and send unemployment — now at 15 percent — soaring. They require the dismantling of Laiki Bank, with the loss of around 2,500 jobs, and a significant reduction in the country’s role as an offshore financial center. 
“We are looking at a very grim future for Cyprus,” said Michael Olympios, chairman of the Cyprus Investor Association, a lobbying group. “Even firm believers in European project like myself see now that it was a bad idea and that we should have at least stayed out of the euro.” 
As jobs disappear and the economy contracts, Mr. Olympios said, faith in Europe will wither. “I used to be a believer. Not anymore.”
The eurozone will continue on for some time of course. But this is the beginning of the end. Bigger is not always better. The idea has finally sunk in.

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Cyprus Augurs End of Euro

Why is Cyprus so important? Because it marks the end of the euro as we know it. This from today's excellent offering from Liz Alderman and Landon Thomas Jr., "With or Without Bailout, Cypriots Lose Trust in Banks":
“For the first time, we have capital controls in the euro zone,” said Nicolas Véron, a senior fellow at Bruegel, a policy research group in Brussels, and a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “The next time there is a crisis somewhere else in the world, people will think of what happened in Cyprus and will try to get their money out much faster. These are the new rules of the game.”
My interest in and concern with Cyprus is what happens to markets once the realization sinks in that the eurozone is starting to disintegrate. Yesterday, after Eurogroup head Jeroen Dijsselbloem said that Cyprus would be a model going forward, European markets dropped. This from Alderman and Thomas:
Stocks were down broadly in Europe on Monday, after the head of the Eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, suggested that the idea of skimming savers’ accounts to bail out banks could be considered a “template” for other countries. The borrowing costs of the financially shaky Spain and Italy surged upward as the markets digested the Cyprus news — and the broader implications for the euro currency union.
Dijsselbloem later disavowed this statement, saying that Cyprus was a one-off, and in this he was supported by officials from the ECB (for more, check out the story this morning by Liz Alderman and David Jolly, "Head of Cyprus's Biggest Bank Resigns"). But even if it's not true, and bail-ins are not the new normal, the impression created by the Cyprus bailout negotiations is one of chaos. As the New York Times sums up in an editorial this morning:
Though it is better than the initial plan, the new agreement does not inspire much hope. It represents the latest in a series of slapdash and last-minute European efforts to prevent financial Armageddon in one country or another. Many analysts have noted that this deal leaves the government of Cyprus with an impossibly high debt burden, about 140 percent of its gross domestic product, and will impose many years of hardship and pain on its people and its economy.
For Spain, Italy and other troubled euro zone countries, Cyprus is an unnerving example. Individuals and businesses in those countries will probably split up their savings into smaller accounts or move some of their money to another country. If a lot of depositors withdraw cash from the weakest banks in those countries, Europe could have another crisis on its hands. 
The way to prevent financial catastrophes like this is to impose strong centralized regulations on all banks and recapitalize or restructure weakened ones. Most important, the policy makers need to scrap austerity programs that are making it nearly impossible for the European economy and financial system to recover.
Suffering is certainly ahead for Cypriots as they go the way of Greece and Portugal and Ireland and Spain. The question is whether that pain finds its way to our shores. A scenario that has to be contemplated is one where U.S. markets react negatively as the eurozone's disintegration accelerates. We are not flush with economic health in this country; we cannot sustain another significant market drop. Yesterday at work I saw a Reuter's headline online, "Student loan write-offs hit $3 billion in first two months of year" -- up 36% from the same period last year. More people are going back to school. Why? Because there is nothing else to do. There is not enough work.

Monday, March 25, 2013

Dijsselbloem's Deal with Anastasiades

A deal is reported to have been struck between the Eurogroup, led by Jeroen Dijsselbloem of the Netherlands, and Cyprus President Nicos Anastasiades. Here's how it breaks down, according to a cross post by Cyprus.com this morning on naked capitalism:
  1. Laiki is resolved via good bank / bad bank, with uninsured depositors (4.2B) most likely losing everything (along with shareholders and bond holders). 
  2. Bank of Cyprus will have a bail-in of uninsured depositors, with them losing between 30-40% most likely. Shareholders and bond holders will be wiped out. 
  3. Troika will lend 10B to the Cyprus government, solely for fiscal purposes and based on a memorandum to be determined. None of the troika funds will be used for the bank bailout.
  4. Insured depositors will be protected (sub 100K euros). 
  5. The 9B of ELA [Emergency Liquidity Assistance] at Laiki will be transferred to Bank of Cyprus. This is the single most bizarre and unfair part of the agreement. It has not been discussed why the Bank of Cyprus creditors should be paying for the ELA of Laiki and no reporter pressed with a follow-up question. 
  6. Note that for the most part the bailout is NOT hitting the Russian depositors that hard but will hit local Cyprus depositors hard. Russian depositors were not largely at Bank of Cyprus.
Gone is the specific demand that Cyprus raise 5.8 billion euros since none of the 10 billion euros the Troika is lending is going to a bank bailout. There is some question whether the deal needs to be approved by Cyprus' Parliament. Dijsselbloem is quoted in today's New York Times saying that it can implemented immediately. But naked capitalism raises the possibility that this is not the case:
I have been operating on the assumption ... that the deal negotiated in the early AM in Brussels was set because it relied on the bailout provisions already passed by the Cypriot parliament and did not require additional approvals. And of course, one of the biggest tricks in deal land is to act like something is done even if the remaining “technical” details aren’t technical but are actually substantive and could be used to stymie consummation of the transaction. 
However, Richard Smith has found a tweet that suggests otherwise:

If this source is right, it’s still possible for the Parliament to reject the deal. Consistent with that being possible, I noticed how the recent rounds of messaging about the pact considerably downplayed how bad the hits to Cypriot borrower would be (as in it seemed to be more in sales mode than I would have expected). The early estimates (not official, just based on a look at the balance sheet and knowledge of what was on it) was that the Laiki depositors >€100,000 would be very lucky to get anything back, and the Bank of Cyprus losses for the over €100,000 depositors had been 22% to 25%, and that may not include the ELA transfer, which would presumably increase the losses considerably. 
Admittedly, at this point, the inertial course would be to approve the agreement. However, the influential Archbishop of Cyprus advocated leaving the Eurozone over the weekend. That plus a show of outrage from the population could undo what seems to be a settled deal. And that would have more immediate, unexpected ramifications.
Krugman in his column this morning welcomes the imposition of capital controls in Cyprus and provides a little historical perspective:
I am, of course, not the first person to notice the correlation between the freeing up of global capital and the proliferation of financial crises; Harvard’s Dani Rodrik began banging this drum back in the 1990s. Until recently, however, it was possible to argue that the crisis problem was restricted to poorer nations, that wealthy economies were somehow immune to being whipsawed by love-’em-and-leave-’em global investors. That was a comforting thought — but Europe’s travails demonstrate that it was wishful thinking. 
And it’s not just Europe. In the last decade America, too, experienced a huge housing bubble fed by foreign money, followed by a nasty hangover after the bubble burst. The damage was mitigated by the fact that we borrowed in our own currency, but it’s still our worst crisis since the 1930s. 
Now what? I don’t expect to see a wholesale, sudden rejection of the idea that money should be free to go wherever it wants, whenever it wants. There may well, however, be a process of erosion, as governments intervene to limit both the pace at which money comes in and the rate at which it goes out. Global capitalism is, arguably, on track to become substantially less global. 
And that’s O.K. Right now, the bad old days when it wasn’t that easy to move lots of money across borders are looking pretty good.
Predictions are that Cyprus' economy, 45% of which is in financial services, will shrink 20% to 30% in the next two years.

Sunday, March 24, 2013

Bailout Agreements Getting Worse

The Cyprus bailout deal seems to have changed from when I posted yesterday. Now what's being reported by James Kanter and Liz Alderman is that the uninsured deposits above 100,000 euros to be hit with a levy are at the Bank of Cyprus not Laiki Bank, and the tax will be 20% not 22% to 25%. There will a 4% tax on all uninsured deposits at all banks; also, gone is the nationalization of pension funds from state-run companies. According to Kanter and Alderman,
The revised terms under discussion would assess a one-time tax of 20 percent on deposits above 100,000 euros at the Bank of Cyprus, which has the largest number of savings accounts on the island. Because the Bank of Cyprus suffered huge losses on reckless bets that it took on Greek bonds, the government appears to be taking depositors’ money to help plug the hole. 
A separate tax of 4 percent would be assessed on uninsured deposits at all other banks, including the 26 foreign banks that operate in Cyprus. 
Under the plan, savings under 100,000 euros would not be touched — a significant difference from the original plan, which not only enraged Cypriot citizens but ignited fear that precedent had been set for euro zone governments to tap insured bank savings in times of a national emergency. 
Cypriot officials have also backed off a proposal that would have sought to raise billions of additional euros by nationalizing state-owned pension funds. Germany, whose political and financial clout dominates euro zone policy, had indicated it opposes the move.
Naked capitalism is keeping it real per usual with a cross post from Professor Yanis Varoufakis, who blogs regularly on the euro crisis, "While waiting for Cyprus' Godot....":
Every bailout agreement, beginning with Greece’s in May 2010, seems less logical and more toxic than the previous one. The culmination was of course Cyprus this past week. Think about it: In one short week, Europe has managed:
  • To put in jeopardy the hitherto sacrosanct concept of state guaranteed deposit insurance
  • The monetary integrity of the Eurozone
  • The European Union’s single market principle according to which capital controls are a no-no.

Saturday, March 23, 2013

Damage to Cyprus Already Done

Once again the news coming out of Cyprus is not encouraging. Yesterday Cyprus' Parliament came up with a new bailout plan to present to the troika Sunday evening, though it still has to vote on one proposal to confiscate a quarter of all bank deposits above the insured amount of 100,000 euros for Laiki Bank account holders. Parts of the plan that passed, as Liz Alderman and James Kanter report today, include capital controls to prevent withdrawals and account closings as well as the shutting down of Laiki, creating a bad bank for the non-performing accounts and rolling its good accounts into the Bank of Cyprus. Parliament also voted to confiscate the pension funds of state-run companies.

I've seen reports that this might not satisfy the troika. The troika wants the legislation to apply to all Cypriot banks not just Laiki. Cypriot president Anastasiasdes jets to Brussels tomorrow to take his lumps.

The message from all of this -- banks have been closed for over a week now in Cyprus -- is that the damage has already been done. Even if the new bailout plan is accepted by the ECB, the IMF and the European Commission, Cyprus' days as a financial hub are over and capital flight from eurozone countries with vulnerable banks like Spain will likely commence posthaste. As naked capitalism opines in "Cyprus Capitulates to Eurozone (Updated)":
The imposition of capital controls has the potential to alarm depositors in periphery countries even more than deposit seizure. While the Eurocrats can try claiming that the deposit grab is a one-off, the result of Cyprus having a huge financial sector that was heavily deposit funded, it was already troubling that they didn’t go after equity or bondholders. But the imposition of capital controls effectively creates another currency without the benefit of allowing the currency to revalue.
As we’ve indicated, the big risk coming out of the cramdown of Cyprus is a resumption of the flow of deposits out of periphery countries, which had been underway last year but was arrested by the introduction of the OMT. You’d be nuts to keep your money in a Spanish bank after the brutal treatment of Cypriot depositors. Expect Swiss, German, American, and, as Dizard put it, “banco de Mattress” to be the beneficiaries.
So far U.S. markets have dismissed Cyprus as inconsequential. Let's see what the prevailing wisdom is next week. The 17-nation eurozone appears about to shrink.