Showing posts with label eurozone. Show all posts
Showing posts with label eurozone. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 14, 2015

Greek Debt Deal Not Done + Agreement Reached on Iran's Nuclear Program, Get Ready for Plenty of Netanyahu

Everywhere there are deadlines. Deadlines come and deadlines go. Deadlines are breached; then deadlines reappear. There was a Sunday deadline for Greece to reach an agreement with her creditors. The deadline was extended until Monday morning at which time the government of Alexis Tsipras found it expedient to surrender the sovereignty of the Greek nation.

Now the new deadline is tomorrow. The Greek Parliament has to pass components of the new debt deal by July 15. Then the remainder by yet another deadline, next Wednesday, July 22.

Already obstacles are beginning to appear. Yves Smith reports ("Greeks Rebel Against Bailout, Risk Collapse") that Greek Speaker of Parliament, Zoi Konstantopoulou, on record opposing the austerity package that Tsipras schlepped to Brussels this past weekend, might not be willing to expedite voting on the new agreement, effectively upending the deadlines established at the Euro Summit.

Public-sector unions have called strikes; Syriza's coalition partner, Independent Greeks, sounds as if it might not support the latest bailout; and, last but not least, Greek banks, still waiting for the ECB to turn the spigot back on, are likely insolvent.

Yves Smith's post this morning features Wolf Richter's "It Starts: Greeks Rebel Against Bailout, Risk Collapse." It is definitely worth reading because it shows even if everything goes according to schedule and the Tsipras capitulation is legislatively solemnized by the Greek Parliament, Greek banks are insolvent and will require a Cyprus-type bail-in:
Greece’s union of civil servants, Adedly, called for a 24-hour strike on Wednesday, and for a series of demonstrations, the first one tonight at Syntagma Square, just below the Parliament, and another one on Wednesday evening, when Parliament is expected to vote on the new, even tougher, and immensely hated bailout package. 
The union for local government employees, Poe-Ota, also called for a 24-hour strike on Wednesday, the AFP reported. Two other demonstrations against austerity and the “euro” are planned for Monday night, one organized via social networks, the other by Antarsya, an anti-euro party that didn’t make it into Parliament.
It would be the first strike against the leftwing Syriza coalition since it came to power six months ago. An ironic plot twist in this tragedy.
Syriza was the big force in the demonstrations against the two prior bailout packages, totaling €240 billion from taxpayers in other countries, conditioned on economic reforms pushed through Parliament by the conservative governments at the time. Now Syriza is looking at having to pass even tougher measures, including an increase in the Value Added Tax and pension reform, in return for only €86 billion in new money from taxpayers in other countries.
Syriza’s junior coalition partner, the Independent Greeks, is already getting cold feet.
“The agreement speaks of €50 billion worth of guarantees concerning public property, of changes to the law including the confiscation of homes… We cannot agree to that,” explained Panos Kammenos, the party’s leader, adding that the party would nevertheless remain in the coalition. With “confiscation of homes” he probably meant foreclosing on homes with defaulted mortgages.
Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is already struggling with strong dissent within Syriza. But ironically, the pro-euro opposition parties, those maligned creatures that ran the show before, may support him in getting these despised measures passed.
Just how bad is the financial situation? Greece will default on a €450-million loan repayment to the IMF today, two sources told Reuters, on top of the €1.6 billion in debt to the IMF it defaulted on in June. For July alone, Greece faces debt payments of €8 billion, including the IMF payment, none of which it can pay without new money.
And the banks are closed. At first, it was going to be for six days, to prevent them from collapsing on the spot when the ECB decided not to raise the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). They’re illiquid and insolvent. They’re toast, but complicated toast [read… The Biggest Greek Banks “Have Failed,” and “Resolving” Them Won’t Work: Fitch].
Now they’ve been closed for two weeks, and there is still no reliable indication when they might reopen, under what conditions they might reopen, and how much of their deposits people will get back.
The €25 billion to recapitalize the banks as part of the bailout is supposed to be guaranteed by privatizations. Good luck, given Greece’s history with privatizations. Even the prior conservative governments and technocrats had trouble privatizing these government-owned enterprises that have long provided reliable opportunities for corruption and vote-buying. And now the leftwing Syriza, which swore up and down it would never privatize any of them, is supposed to vote to privatize them and then actually follow through?
But they will have to be privatized to guarantee the recapitalization of the banks. If not….
Even if it works out, the holes in the banks’ balance sheets will be much larger by the time the banks reopen, if they reopen. About two-fifth of their loans were already bad before capital controls were imposed. But here’s the thing: given the capital controls and Greeks’ distrust in their own banking system, only an idiot would still make loan payments.
So the loans are now deteriorating at lightning speed. And that €25 billion won’t be enough. But don’t worry, depositors….
“The recapitalization is so secure that it fully safeguards deposits,” Economy Minister George Stathakis told his compatriots on Monday to soothe their nerves. The ELA would be increased once Parliament approves the reforms, he said, thus pointing his own gun at Parliament.
Alas, the Greeks themselves know better than anyone else to never believe anything that their government publicly says about Greek banks. Hence, the near incessant withdrawals that have now lasted for years and that have finally helpto ed topple the banks.
Turns out, one of the measures to be passed by the Greek parliament no later than July 22 is Europe’s new directive on the resolution of banks. It provides that even senior creditors, including depositors, get haircuts before taxpayers are called in to pick up the tab. The fact that the Greek Parliament has to pass this law in a hurry shows that the dreaded bail-ins of depositors may be part of what’s next.
Eurozone officials like to lecture about a dearth of trust between Brussels and Athens. What about the lack of trust between voters and their elected representatives? Government heads don't seem to factor this into a calculation of how this all plays out. If an honest appraisal were to be made, one would have to conclude that the failure of Syriza is going to erode Greek institutions even more, and the crisis will deepen.

The P5+1 talks concluded today with an agreement. Obama has promised a veto of any Congressional override, which is likely in the next 60 days, putting it on a parallel track with the federal budget impasse and looming government shutdown in September.

The politics don't favor Netanyahu and the neocons on this one. Possibly in a world where people were not constantly reminded about the savagery of ISIS, Iran might be demonized and enough voters made afraid that Congress could muster veto-proof numbers to scuttle the nuclear deal. But we are on the runway to a presidential election year, and the most popular policy positions are the ones that embrace peace not war.

People are exhausted with open-ended war. They might not have a firm grasp on the various sects and takfiri groups or how to distinguish the GCC from Iran, but most know by now -- after Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya --  that bombing a country into submission does not create peace and prosperity; it just makes things incalculably worse.

Hillary will have to support the deal because to do otherwise within the Democratic Party with its ample peace wing would be extremely damaging to her standing in the polls.

As for Congress, we shall see the extent to which it is Israeli- and Saudi-occupied territory. Coming so soon after TPP and so close to a presidential election, I don't think it has the ability to override a veto. But it is still too early to say.

Thursday, July 2, 2015

Why a Yes Vote for Austerity in Greece's Sunday Referendum Will Necessitate Concessions from the Troika

Today in the United States will be the last day of the work week for many people. A lot of those who do not get tomorrow off because of the 4th of July holiday on Saturday will take Friday off anyway. Since tomorrow I'm posting on Hippies vs. Punks, and either Saturday or Sunday (or possibly both) my plan is to take care of some old business and finish "The Colt 45 Chronicle" posts, I want to get my two cents in before Sunday's referendum in Greece on austerity.

Yesterday I think Tsipras erred when he went on television and said he was willing to accept with some tweaks the last offer on the table from the troika. German Chancellor Angela Merkel promptly replied that there would be no more negotiations until after the Sunday referendum.

Two things on this: 1) Tsipras likely got some bad feedback from U.S. Treasury officials that eurozone leaders were open to a compromise, and 2) Germany obviously feels that a Yes vote for austerity is the most likely outcome.

Tsipras' public acceptance of the last offer from the troika at the same time Syriza is rallying Greeks to vote No is extremely confusing to say the least. Why vote No when the prime minister is saying in substance he would, with some marginal modifications, accept such an agreement?

But this morning I think Varoufakis went some distance towards correcting the Tsipras blunder by saying if the vote on Sunday is a Yes he will resign as finance minister.

Nonetheless if I had to choose, much as it nauseates me to acknowledge it, I would have to say that a Yes vote at this point seems more likely.

Neil Irwin published a piece yesterday arguing that "Greece Wanted to Reframe Europe’s Austerity Debate. It Failed." This is by and large the same point that Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism has been making since Syriza came out on top in January's parliamentary elections, and it is one she reiterates in a post yesterday, "Tsipras Accepts Most Creditor Terms as Merkel Insists on Referendum."

I think the first round of media that Varoufakis did in the winter following Syriza's win he made some headway. He was very cogent and convincing about the impossibility of Greece paying off its lenders; that austerity actually shrinks the economy, necessitating further loans from the troika; that the primary surplus achieved by the preceding government led by New Democracy was a fiction based on the shrinking of overall economic activity.

But once Syriza sat down with the troika in Brussels this message gradually over the months became lost, disappearing entirely when Varoufakis agreed to a primary budget surplus. As scholar Costas Panayotakis said in an interview on Democracy Now! on Tuesday, Syriza can't even be considered a Keynesian party. What was the norm in the 20th century in the post-War II period is completely verboten in Europe today.

All this augurs ill for a No vote come Sunday. Popular votes are not normally platforms for displays of personal courage and heroism, particularly with all the tacking back and forth leadership has been engaged in.

So we need to consider what a Yes vote entails. Varoufakis says he will resign. Tsipras says he will not implement austerity. And even if Tsipras decides to eat those words he would face a sizable rebellion from his party in parliament. This means new elections must be held, which means the financial crisis in Greece worsens. As Smith points out in her post from yesterday,
Consider how this might play out. An op-ed in Reuters by Hugo Dixon titled, Tsipras looks like he is crumbling, describes what happens if the referendum delivers an anti-Syriza “yes” vote:
Still, it would be wrong to think that a “Yes” vote would lead to a quick or straightforward solution, because of the complexities of Greek politics.
One might think that opposition parties and SYRIZA could form a national salvation government. Something similar happened in 2011. But creditors would have little confidence that any government relying on SYRIZA would do what it promised. As a result, it would struggle to reach a new deal with its lenders and get the banks open.
Knowing all this, the Greek political parties might conclude that it would be best to clear the air by calling new elections. But there’s no guarantee that the opposition would win such a vote because it is fragmented. It has not yet managed to rally behind a single figure and a common program.
Even if the opposition won such an election, it would not be ready to start talks with its creditors until August. By then, the banks would have long run out of cash unless the ECB supplied more emergency liquidity, and the economy would be in a terrible state.
Benoit Coeure, the ECB executive director responsible for negotiations with Athens, said this week that if Greeks vote “Yes” in the referendum, he had “no doubt” euro zone authorities would find ways to meet commitments towards the country. The snag is that it may struggle to find a legal route to provide more liquidity until a new agreement is reached.
So even if voters cry “uncle,” it will take time to sort out a new coalition or worse, have an election, and in the meantime, conditions in Greece will become more desperate. Bank holidays are a form of strangulation. As Nathan Tankus wrote last month:
Two years ago in Cyprus, an emergency bank holiday was declared and capital controls installed. The bank holiday only lasted for twelve days yet supply chains started drying up instantly. An ex-Cyprus central bank governor told the Guardian:
Supplies of food are being exhausted and there are cases of raw materials like iron and timber being held up in customs because importers don’t have the cash to pay for them … No one expected, myself included, that the EU, ECB md IMF, would behave like this. Cyprus has been treated very badly … Where is the solidarity principle that is supposed to underline Europe?
Even 6 months later after the banks had reopened and capital controls were loosened, businesses were still having trouble getting basic supplies.
And remember, Cyprus was in vastly better shape than Greece is now.
The goal of the neoliberal austerian power brokers has always been to crush Syriza. The question for Merkel now becomes, assuming a Yes to austerity on Sunday, is it better to have a gelded Syriza remain in power and carry out austerity by acceding to Tsipras' tweaks on pensions or is it better to throw Syriza out of power and topple the government?

Merkel no doubt would opt for the former. It is better to capture your opponent than have him run away to fight another day. But it might be beyond Merkel's ability, post-Yes, to grant any concessions to Tsipras. One thing seems clear. Assuming a Yes vote, and absent concessions from the troika, there will be new elections.

Monday, June 29, 2015

The Present Age: Freak Out of the 1%

It quickly got dark Sunday morning after the day dawned with bright sunshine.

Saturday evening as I reclined on my mattress on the floor reading Ed Sanders' The Family: The Story of Charles Manson's Dune Buggy Attack Battalion, the chapter where Tex Watson and Charlie's girls -- Linda Kasabian, Patricia Krenwinkel and Susan Atkins -- butcher the occupants of the Polanski household on 10050 Cielo Drive in Los Angeles' Benedict Canyon the early morning of August 9, 1969, sounds of Seattle's Capitol Hill Pride celebration wafted through my open windows.

The theme to this year's Pride was "Stonewall, Never Forget." The sounds were of Steppenwolf; a guy who sounded like John Kay led a band through all Steppenwolf's big hits, including the ones that appeared in Easy Rider (1969), "The Pusher" and "Born To Be Wild." Suddenly the past wasn't gone. I was in the present but 46-years back in 1969 with the Manson Family, Stonewall and Steppenwolf. Very strange.

The present world we live in is indeed very strange. Unlike the world of 1969, there is no drug-fueled freak out and rebellion of the masses, no massification of bohemia, no disruptive culture of protest. Instead, what we have is a "freak out" by those in power as they try to maintain their domination.

The efflorescence of takfiri jihadis, seemingly spontaneous, has more to do with the constituent countries of the GCC trying to beat back the spirit of the Arab Spring. When all is said and done, the rise of ISIS is the direct result of actions by states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and, yes, the United States. and the pathological desire to see an ally of Iran, Syria, toppled.

The blowback to this policy freak out is already being felt in Europe, as the European Union finds itself in stasis on how to deal with the refugees flocking to its shores from wars in Africa and the Middle East.

But no better example of the addledness of the current leadership is the attitude of the eurozone powers towards Greece. Paul Krugman has a tremendous column this morning, "Greece Over the Brink," in which he provides a pithy, succinct synopsis of the Greek debt crisis. Krugman properly places all the post-2010 blame on the troika:
Greece should vote “no,” and the Greek government should be ready, if necessary, to leave the euro. 
To understand why I say this, you need to realize that most — not all, but most — of what you’ve heard about Greek profligacy and irresponsibility is false. Yes, the Greek government was spending beyond its means in the late 2000s. But since then it has repeatedly slashed spending and raised taxes. Government employment has fallen more than 25 percent, and pensions (which were indeed much too generous) have been cut sharply. If you add up all the austerity measures, they have been more than enough to eliminate the original deficit and turn it into a large surplus. 
So why didn’t this happen? Because the Greek economy collapsed, largely as a result of those very austerity measures, dragging revenues down with it.
Krugman thinks Greece, by declaring a bank holiday and instituting capital controls, has already taken the most difficult step. He worries that a Yes vote will destroy the Syriza-led government and maintain the pestilential fiction of troika-dictated austerity. Interestingly, Krugman sees the current impasse as most radical leftists do -- a political attempt to destroy the not-sufficiently-neoliberal Syriza of Alexis Tsipras and Yanis Varoufakis:
So have I just made the case for “Grexit” — Greek exit from the euro? Not necessarily. The problem with Grexit has always been the risk of financial chaos, of a banking system disrupted by panicked withdrawals and of business hobbled both by banking troubles and by uncertainty over the legal status of debts. That’s why successive Greek governments have acceded to austerity demands, and why even Syriza, the ruling leftist coalition, was willing to accept the austerity that has already been imposed. All it asked for was, in effect, a standstill on further austerity.
But the troika was having none of it. It’s easy to get lost in the details, but the essential point now is that Greece has been presented with a take-it-or-leave-it offer that is effectively indistinguishable from the policies of the past five years. 
This is, and presumably was intended to be, an offer Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, can’t accept, because it would destroy his political reason for being. The purpose must therefore be to drive him from office, which will probably happen if Greek voters fear confrontation with the troika enough to vote yes next week. 
But they shouldn’t, for three reasons. First, we now know that ever-harsher austerity is a dead end: after five years Greece is in worse shape than ever. Second, much and perhaps most of the feared chaos from Grexit has already happened. With banks closed and capital controls imposed, there’s not that much more damage to be done. 
Finally, acceding to the troika’s ultimatum would represent the final abandonment of any pretense of Greek independence. Don’t be taken in by claims that troika officials are just technocrats explaining to the ignorant Greeks what must be done. These supposed technocrats are in fact fantasists who have disregarded everything we know about macroeconomics, and have been wrong every step of the way. This isn’t about analysis, it’s about power — the power of the creditors to pull the plug on the Greek economy, which persists as long as euro exit is considered unthinkable.
So it’s time to put an end to this unthinkability. Otherwise Greece will face endless austerity, and a depression with no hint of an end.
There is some reason to hope that the battle-hardened Greeks will vote No, even though elections are usually fear-based, lowest-common-denominator exercises. The fact that markets are down this morning but not enormously is another hopeful sign.

Wednesday, June 17, 2015

Default Does Not Equal a Grexit: Get Ready for Additional Acts in the Greek Debt Drama

It appears to me, and what I have said on this page in the past, is that there is no alternative to a Greek default on its debt obligation to the troika -- International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and the European Commission; either that or a complete about-face by the troika, capitulating on its demands to cut pensions and loosen labor laws. Germany's strict allegiance to austerity, as well as antipathy towards Greece shared by eurozone states Finland, Spain, et al makes a troika capitulation a long shot.

Several stories this morning (James Kanter and Niki Kitsantonis, "Tsipras Attacks Greece’s Creditors as Pressure Grows on Debts"; Peter Eavis, "Greek Exit Would Shake, but Most Likely Not Shatter, Eurozone") sound the alarm on the coming Greek default. The one story that caught my eye though was an AP piece ("Will Greece Leave the Euro? A Look at Its Options") that problematizes the notion of any clear resolution of the Greek debt drama once the country defaults at the end of this month:
Here are some questions and answers on Greece's future. They could come in handy during Thursday's meeting of eurozone finance ministers in Luxembourg.
___
HOW DOES A COUNTRY LEAVE THE EURO? 
Technically, it can't. These are uncharted waters. European Union treaties legally allow members to leave the 28-nation EU, but no mechanism was foreseen to let countries leave the euro. Theoretically, if all 19 nations agree that it's time for Greece to go then a "Grexit" could be negotiated. Some argue the country might have to leave the EU altogether to leave the single currency. 
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WHEN IS THE POINT OF NO RETURN? 
That would be when the European Central Bank decides to cut off emergency credit to Greece's banks, according to Zsolt Darvas, senior fellow at the Breugel think-tank in Brussels. 
That could happen if there is a run on Greek banks — in which case the ECB might not want to risk its money supporting them. Concerns over a run on banks could grow if it becomes clear that Greece will default on its next debt repayment, due June 30.
The ECB could also cut Greek banks loose if the country defaults on debt repayments due to the ECB in July and August. 
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WHAT WOULD HAPPEN THEN? 
Banks would probably have to close for a while and when they reopen, the government would likely put limits on how much money depositors can take out. "People would try to take their money out of the banks. The banks would not be able to pay," Darvas says. "People would try to store their euros at home, not pay taxes, and the whole financial system would come to a halt." 
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HOW CAN GREECE AVOID SUCH A DISASTER? 
Apart from pay its debts on time, some experts believe Greece could limit the damage by engineering its departure in secret. A small group of officials could make the exit preparations and then act on them almost immediately. They would inform their eurozone partners just hours before Greece walks out the door, according Roger Bootle, who heads the research analysis group Capital Economics. The public would be the last to know.
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WHAT MONEY WOULD GREECE USE? 
Greece could go back to using the drachma or introduce a new currency. Either way, volume is essential, and that implies serious challenges. Iraq faced similar issues when it introduced a new dinar in just three months following the U.S.-led invasion. "You would need a huge volume, very quickly. There's also the transportation that is a very big challenge. A lot of police, troops would be required to attend to the cash needs of a country the size of Greek. Logistically it would be a huge challenge," Darvas says. 
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WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO ITS DEBT? 
Greece's bills won't go away, and the jury is out on whether they could be converted to a new currency, although Greece would probably try to redenominate and renegotiate the debt. The one advantage in this for Athens is that all kinds of loans would probably be written down by its creditors. But Darvas says that "all of these technical issues can be resolved. The economic costs of a euro exit — GDP fall and the rise in unemployment — will be far higher."
If you are burnt out on following the debt-negotiating drama don't expect any relief come end of the month. I don't think Greece has any intention of exiting the eurozone; if it had, if preparations were being made to issue drachmas, there would be leaks by now. Once Greece defaults, that is when another round of negotiations will get going. The ECB could force Greek banks to collapse by freezing Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). But by making such a move, the troika would lose the political battle; Syriza would be vindicated.

Monday, April 15, 2013

Germany's Love-Hate of the Euro

The slow-motion collapse of the eurozone continues. A recent development is the formation of anti-euro party, Alternative for Germany, to challenge German Chancellor Angela Merkel from her Right in the September parliamentary elections. Nicholas Kulish and Melissa Eddy report today in their story, "German Elites Drawn to Anti-Euro Party, Spelling Trouble for Merkel," that 
The fragile solidarity between the 17 euro-zone members has been sorely tested by the years of crisis and the growing list of bailouts. The countries needing help complain about diktats from Brussels and Berlin, while Germany and its northern allies grumble about the costs. Here in the German capital, the images of demonstrators in Athens, Madrid and now Nicosia, Cyprus — some of them waving swastikas or pictures of Ms. Merkel dressed as Hitler — have begun to try people’s patience. 
Pollsters and political analysts doubt that the new party will attract more than 5 percent of the vote, the threshold for representation in the next Parliament. But it does not need that many votes to play the spoiler for Ms. Merkel. 
“They don’t need to get 5 percent to make things very tight for the chancellor,” said Wolfgang Nowak, a fellow at the North Rhine-Westphalia School of Governance in Duisburg. “And every swastika on the street in Athens helps this new party.”
A good naked capitalism post from this past Saturday, "Why Germany (Mistakenly) Thinks it Can Kill Its Export Markets Through Austerity and Still Prosper," shows that Germany runs a deficit with Russia and Asia but racks up a huge surplus with eurozone deficit nations. The quote comes from a cross post off Yanis Varoufakis' blog:
In 2012, mostly on account of energy imports, Germany had a net trade deficit of €27 billion with Russia, Libya, and Norway. In addition, it sported a €4.7 billion trade deficit vis-à-vis Japan and a sizeable €11.7 billion trade deficit with China. In total, Germany’s trade deficit with these net exporters summed to €43.4 billion. Meanwhile, Germany’s trade surplus with the Eurozone’s deficit nations (France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus and Ireland) came to a still staggering €54.6 billion – despite the sharp diminution of this number following the sharp decline in imports in these crisis-hit nations. 
Put differently, Germany’s net exports to the countries that the German press likes to lambast as ‘laggards’ that constitute a drain on German ‘progress’, sufficed to pay for Germany’s net trade deficit vis-à-vis China, Japan, Norway, Russia and Libya, with €11.2 billion to spare: enough to cover for the €3.4 billion transferred to German factories in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia and a large chunk of German companies’ transfer payments to their Dutch partners or subsidiaries (which are in a surplus of more than €15 billion with their German partners).
In short, despite all rumours to the contrary, German global trade surpluses are still being financed by the deficits of the imploding Eurozone ‘stragglers’. It is in this sense that Germany’s denial of the systemic nature of the Eurozone crisis, and its leaders’ commitment to the principle of ‘the greatest austerity for the weakest Eurozone member-states’, is perhaps our epoch’s most spectacular own-goal.
In the lead unsigned editorial on today's Opinion page, "Europe's Bitter Medicine," the New York Times points out, in the case of Portugal, the folly of austerity. The editorial, I think correctly, makes the case for euro bonds as a solution to the sovereign debt crisis:
In Portugal, the government of Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho cut spending and raised taxes so much that the fiscal deficit has fallen by about a third from 2010 to 2012. He also pushed through reforms to phase out rent control for tenants and legal changes that make it easier for companies to fire workers. The result is that the country’s unemployment rate has risen to close to 18 percent, from 12.7 percent in 2011. Economists say Portugal will likely have a bigger fiscal deficit this year than it agreed to in exchange for loans from other European countries and the International Monetary Fund, because national policies, not surprisingly, have made the recession deeper than anticipated. 
What would help is if leaders like Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany stopped insisting on austerity and helped bolster demand by, for instance, allowing weaker countries to issue bonds backed by the euro zone. That could put more into the economies and help lift them out of a downward spiral. Policy makers in Portugal and Italy would have a much easier time selling their people on the need for reforms if they weren’t also cutting popular government programs and benefits. Faster growth and lower unemployment would provide the resources that could later be used to pay down debts and reduce deficits.

Wednesday, April 3, 2013

Any Courage in Cyprus?

Cyprus, as it turns out, has the ability to block the bailout deal with the troika. This from a story today by Liz Alderman and James Kanter about the resignation of finance minister Michalis Sarris, "Cyprus Chief of Finance Quits Post":
But the Cypriot Parliament must still vote on a memorandum of understanding with the so-called troika of international organizations — the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund — that agreed to the bailout. 
That memorandum, still being drafted, will outline the budget cuts and other conditions Cyprus will have to meet to receive its allotments of money. A parliamentary vote is expected in coming weeks. The governments of Germany and Finland, under their national rules on bailout loans, are also expected to seek the approval of their Parliaments. 
The memorandum will probably be the subject of heated debate in Nicosia. Many lawmakers, already unhappy with the tough capital controls that have been slapped on bank accounts for the better part of a month, are dismayed by what they see as harsh terms that will tip Cyprus’s already enfeebled economy over the edge. 
But Mr. Sarris’s resignation should “help the Cypriot government win approval for the bailout program in the Cypriot Parliament,” said Mr. Rahman, the analyst.
The Cypriot Parliament has all the evidence it needs to scrap the deal. This is from today's story by David Jolly, "Unemployment in Euro Zone Reaches 12%":
The jobless crisis is hitting hardest in the south of Europe. Eurostat said Greece, with its economy in free fall, had the euro zone’s highest unemployment rate ,at 26.4 percent in December, the latest month for which data are available. Among Greek youth, the jobless rate has hit a staggering level, 58.4 percent. 
Spain, where the economy has contracted sharply after the collapse of the global credit bubble, posted the second-highest unemployment rate in the euro zone in February, at 26.3 percent. 
Cyprus’s jobless rate, at 14.0 percent, is almost certain to rise because the country’s recently negotiated bailout deal will crimp the economy for years to come, said Mr. Cliffe, of ING. “We’ve already seen how this story plays out in Greece,” he said. “We’re about to see it play out again in Cyprus.”
The question is do the elected leaders of Cyprus have the courage to leave the eurozone and go their own way. In the short term such a move would likely cause a drop in the markets, but in the long run Cyprus would be doing all of us an enormous favor by driving a stake through the zombie brain that can think only of bigger being better and that austerity somehow magically generates growth. Sadly, politicians, whether east or west or north or south, have a consistent track record of cowardice and plutocratic capture; so to expect emancipatory leadership is naive. But there is always hope. Hope is the anchor.

Ben Judah has an article on the Opinion page, "Did Putin Sink Cyprus?," that argues that Putin's failed promise to bring law and order to Russia along with the cultivation of his cult of personality has led to billions in capital flight. Judah concludes the piece by casting some blame the EU's way:
Whatever remains of the Russian fortunes in Nicosia seems sure to flee again — but not back to Russia. It may go to other European havens, like the Dutch Antilles and the British Virgin Islands. Malta and Luxembourg are possibilities, but analysts have both on bailout watch. 
Meanwhile, Brussels is not impotent. The European Union must clamp down on offshore havens, insist on transparent banking and toughen up on money laundering. This is austerity Europe — and bloated tax havens not only put Europe at risk but also make its financial system complicit with offshore corruption. 
But it cannot erase the truths exposed by the Nicosia bust. Europe, it turns out, is studded with vulnerable, contagious tax islands, and their availability only compounds Russia’s deeper problem: it is both too corrupt and too paranoid to keep its billions at home.

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

Cyprus Synopsis

The Cyprus bailout crisis is retold this morning by Liz Alderman in a story, "Cypriots Feel Betrayed by the European Union," that focuses on an average Joe, Charalambos Alexandrou, who owns a roofing business, and his wife, Aliki Perganti, who works for a ceramics company. The contours of a standard narrative are taking shape. Cyprus joins the EU in 2004; the eurozone, in 2008. In doing so, it moves away from agriculture and manufacturing and refashions itself along the lines of Switzerland and Luxembourg as a strategic money hub uniquely situated to serve Europe, Asia and the Middle East. And the money flows in, creating a real estate boom. Then in 2010 the chickens come home to roost. Risky loans begin to default. The coup de grace is the haircut on Greek government bonds the Cypriot banks are forced to take as part of the troika engineered bailout of Greece. When it was Cyprus' turn to go hat in hand to the troika Germany made sure, because of an intelligence assessment that Cypriot banks were flush with ill-gotten Russian wealth, that any bailout would have to include a bail-in, a.k.a., inflicting pain and suffering on depositors. As Alderman says,
And with losses of up to 60 percent being imposed on deposit accounts above 100,000 euros at the Bank of Cyprus, [Charalambos Alexandrou] said, even many of his friends — not just Russian oligarchs — were losing big portions of savings they so diligently tucked away during the good years.
An unsigned editorial in today's Opinion section of the New York Times, "Cyprus Is Not an Exception," points out that in the eurozone it's not just Cyprus that has a banking sector that is at a large multiple of GDP; both Malta and Luxembourg have banking sectors that are larger than Cyprus':
Luxembourg and Malta, which have established themselves as tax havens serving big global corporations and the superrich, have banking systems that are even larger. Luxembourg’s bank assets are a staggering 22 times its gross domestic product, and Maltese bank assets clock in at eight times the size of its economy. 
Leaders of both countries have insisted that they should not be compared with Cyprus and that they expected European leaders to stand behind their governments and banks come what may. Speaking of his banking system, the finance minister of Luxembourg, Luc Frieden, said: “We want to expand it further, not to downsize it.” 
Banks in Luxembourg and Malta, many owned by big European and American financial firms, are healthier than those in Cyprus, according to the International Monetary Fund. But the I.M.F. raised concerns about the ability of the countries to properly monitor their banks or support them in a crisis. In other words, the euro zone and the I.M.F. would have to step in to bail them out if they ran into trouble. 
In any case, the euro zone needs urgently to finish work on a banking union that would allow the European Central Bank to supervise large banks instead of leaving that task to national policy makers who may be too protective of their banks. Europe should also have a common process to restructure troubled banks, which should reduce the risk of Cyprus-like debacles. A banking union would also give savers more confidence that their insured deposits are truly guaranteed, an assurance that was deeply shaken by what happened in Cyprus. 
Thankfully, the crowds were not as big and chaotic as people had feared when banks in Cyprus reopened last week after for two weeks — but only after the country imposed tough capital controls to prevent depositors from fleeing. Europeans may not be as lucky next time.
There seems to be a lot of clucking satisfaction from those who championed the view that Cyprus was a little one-off that so far there is no evidence of a run on banks. I say it's early yet. People are still in shock. Events are still unfolding in Italy. Give it some time.

Saturday, March 30, 2013

Destruction of the Economy in Cyprus

One small Cyprus story this morning by Landon Thomas Jr., "Some Savers in Cyprus May Lose 60 Percent," buried on page B7 of the New York Times Busines section belies its importance. Deposits above 100,000 euros at the nation's largest bank, the Bank of Cyprus, will be confiscated to the tune of 60% to 77.5%. According to Thomas,
Over the past week, government officials have been saying that depositor losses would not exceed 40 percent — even though bankers and lawyers involved in the negotiations have been warning for some time that the final figure would need to be higher if the bank was to re emerge as a viable entity. 
Under the terms of the transaction, large depositors would have 77.5 percent of their savings turned into different forms of equity. 37.5 percent would be direct equity, in the bank with the rest coming in the form of securities that may convert into shares at a certain period. The remaining 22.5 percent would be a frozen, non-interest-bearing deposit that they would be able to access in the future. 
As a result of this arrangement, the bank’s largest depositors will initially become its major shareholders. 
If the bank does well, depositors would be able to sell their stock. But even in the best case, in which the bank thrives on the back of a quickly recovering economy — a long shot most economists believe — the loss is likely to exceed 60 percent and could well be much more than that. 
Lawyers and bankers who have analyzed the transaction believe the ultimate loss to the depositor could be anywhere between 60 and 77.5 percent.
To get a sense of the implications of this latest development check out today's must-read post by Yves Smith on naked capitalism, "Destruction of Cyprus Economy Proceeding Ahead of Schedule,"  which concludes as follows:

Now remember, Laiki and Bank of Cyprus were the core of the payments system in Cyprus. And it would be very difficult for a business of meaningful size not to have over €100,000 in deposits. If you freeze a significant majority of the commercial balances, how can you operate? How can these businesses even survive and pay each other? By e-mail, Antonis Polemitis of Ledra Capital teased out the implications:
If the Reuters story is correct, for the purposes of liquidity on Tuesday morning, that is a 100% haircut. 
If that is what they do, I am not sure how Cyprus can engage in economic activity on Tuesday without going to barter or scrips. 
I mean, that basically will mean 100% of the large deposits (all the business accounts) at Laiki and BoC are lost or not available as of next week. The Laiki wipe out may have been survivable. If you wipe (for liquidity purposes at least), both Laiki and BoC, then we are not talking about whether or not GDP drops X%, we are talking about ‘how do you actually engage in commerce?’ 
If they do this, there is little chance it can last more than a month — the economy will simply fail at even basic functions…
And if the plan has been accurately reported and plays out as Polemitis fears, it will undermine the “Cyprus is a special case” narrative. This Eurozone fiasco is making Geithner look good. The former Treasury secretary used the need to keep the confidence fairy alive as the excuse for any and every sop to the banks, from coddling miscreant executives to foaming the runway with mortgage borrowers to stealth bailouts. But the Eurocrats have completely ignored the impact of undermining confidence in the banking system. The fact that Cyprus has a decent-sized population of English retirees means that the British media will report on the Cyprus meltdown, which will be a stark contrast with Greece, where the economic devastation has not gotten the coverage it warrants. Grim accounts of the destruction wrought by the tender ministrations of the Troika should strengthen the position of the growing Euroskeptic sentiment in Italy, borne out by the success of Berlusconi and Grillo in the recent elections. Playing into the hands of Italian refuseniks should be the last thing Brussels and Berlin want. The cost of getting tough with Cyprus is likely to be far greater than they anticipate.
It's hard to find fault with this analysis, unless some sort of exception is made for business accounts, which is probably illegal (but capital controls in the eurozone were supposed to be illegal too). Bersani can't form a government in Italy. The next month should be a momentous one for Europe. Get those sell orders in.

Friday, March 29, 2013

Cyprus Temporary Capital Controls Likely To Last a Long Time

Cyprus' capital controls, only to last for one week, will now be in effect for at least a month. This from a story today by Andrew Higgins and Liz Alderman, "Long Lines as Banks Reopen in Cyprus After Freeze":
Not since the introduction of the euro in January 1999 has a European country blocked bank depositors from having full access to their own cash. Under European Union treaties, such restrictions are normally forbidden. But the European Commission, the union’s administrative arm, issued a statement Thursday morning that the Cyprus controls were legal — though urging that they be rescinded as soon as possible. Originally, the controls were to be in place for one week. But on Thursday, the Cypriot foreign minister, Ioannis Kasoulides, said that restrictions on financial transactions would not be lifted for a month.
A naked capitalism cross post from VoxEU today by Jon Danielsson, Director of the ESRC funded Systemic Risk Centre, London School of Economics, argues that the example of Iceland proves that temporary capital controls should, for all intents, be considered permanent:
Another European country was forced to implement `temporary’ capital controls in its crisis – Iceland, as discussed here on Vox (Danielsson and Arnason 2011). 
The Icelandic government, its central bank and the IMF considered the controls necessary because so many foreigners, and the occasional wealthy Icelander, had lost faith in the economy and only wanted to take their money out. While such individuals were considered misguided, their exit would have had disastrous consequences. Hence it was thought necessary to `temporarily’ prevent capital outflows. 
The authorities said at the time the controls would be temporary and limited in scope – lasting a few weeks or, at worst, a month or two. Half a decade later, the capital controls are still in place and getting more and more restrictive. 
This was the second time Iceland had implemented `temporary’ capital controls. The first time it did so, in the 1930s, led to the controls being in place until 1993. This is in line with the historical evidence; once capital controls are imposed, they are really hard to abolish, and a temporary arrangement usually ends up being permanent.
Reporting from Nicosia, Landon Thomas Jr. says the prevailing wisdom appears to be holding. Cyprus is a one-off and will not spread:
“People have lost all their money,” screamed a young financier Wednesday night, as he knocked back drink after drink at a local nightclub — which, despite the earsplitting din of Greek rap music, was half empty. “To me, that feels like war.” 
But on a global scale, investors have refused to panic, other than unloading the risky bonds of second-tier banks in Spain and Italy. 
And while the bond yields of Italian government debt have spiked in recent days, a signal of investor wariness, and the euro has traded down against the dollar, the view, for now, is that even though Europe’s handling of the crisis has been a mess, broader contagion has largely been avoided. 
“This does not worry us at all — Cyprus is just not systemic,” said a senior executive at a large sovereign wealth fund based in the Middle East, who was not authorized to speak publicly. 
Even Cypriot government bonds that are due to reach maturity this June are holding up fairly well, trading at 88 cents, not far from their recent high of 94 cents earlier this week, though a 12 percent discount from their face value.
But Floyd Norris in a High & Low Finance column that appears side by side with Thomas' piece sees signs of a spreading instability:
The fact the hot money stayed even after it became clear the Cypriot banks were in trouble — in large part because of all the Greek bonds they owned — is a testament to the false security the euro provided even after the Greek crisis erupted. That security has faded, at least a little. The cost of credit-default swaps on European banks has been rising since Cyprus got into trouble, suggesting the market thinks bank defaults have grown more likely. That cost continued to rise after the latest plan was announced. It does not help that European leaders seem unable to decide whether the Cypriot deal would set a precedent if banks in other countries get into trouble. It does, whatever they say, or at least it could. 
A few months ago, Europe was supposed to be on the way to a banking union, an arrangement that it was hoped would prevent what has now happened in Cyprus. What happens to those plans will be an indication of whether Europe can continue to hold the euro zone together. 
It may help that Cyprus is so insignificant. Its economy is about one-tenth the size of Ireland’s, which itself is among the smaller economies in the euro zone. It is even smaller than Vermont’s, which is smaller than that of any other state. We can only shudder at what might happen if banks in a big euro zone country got into a lot of trouble.
The next small eurozone country headed to the troika for a bailout, according to naked capitalism's Yves Smith, is Slovenia.

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Cyprus Augurs End of Euro

Why is Cyprus so important? Because it marks the end of the euro as we know it. This from today's excellent offering from Liz Alderman and Landon Thomas Jr., "With or Without Bailout, Cypriots Lose Trust in Banks":
“For the first time, we have capital controls in the euro zone,” said Nicolas Véron, a senior fellow at Bruegel, a policy research group in Brussels, and a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “The next time there is a crisis somewhere else in the world, people will think of what happened in Cyprus and will try to get their money out much faster. These are the new rules of the game.”
My interest in and concern with Cyprus is what happens to markets once the realization sinks in that the eurozone is starting to disintegrate. Yesterday, after Eurogroup head Jeroen Dijsselbloem said that Cyprus would be a model going forward, European markets dropped. This from Alderman and Thomas:
Stocks were down broadly in Europe on Monday, after the head of the Eurogroup, Jeroen Dijsselbloem, suggested that the idea of skimming savers’ accounts to bail out banks could be considered a “template” for other countries. The borrowing costs of the financially shaky Spain and Italy surged upward as the markets digested the Cyprus news — and the broader implications for the euro currency union.
Dijsselbloem later disavowed this statement, saying that Cyprus was a one-off, and in this he was supported by officials from the ECB (for more, check out the story this morning by Liz Alderman and David Jolly, "Head of Cyprus's Biggest Bank Resigns"). But even if it's not true, and bail-ins are not the new normal, the impression created by the Cyprus bailout negotiations is one of chaos. As the New York Times sums up in an editorial this morning:
Though it is better than the initial plan, the new agreement does not inspire much hope. It represents the latest in a series of slapdash and last-minute European efforts to prevent financial Armageddon in one country or another. Many analysts have noted that this deal leaves the government of Cyprus with an impossibly high debt burden, about 140 percent of its gross domestic product, and will impose many years of hardship and pain on its people and its economy.
For Spain, Italy and other troubled euro zone countries, Cyprus is an unnerving example. Individuals and businesses in those countries will probably split up their savings into smaller accounts or move some of their money to another country. If a lot of depositors withdraw cash from the weakest banks in those countries, Europe could have another crisis on its hands. 
The way to prevent financial catastrophes like this is to impose strong centralized regulations on all banks and recapitalize or restructure weakened ones. Most important, the policy makers need to scrap austerity programs that are making it nearly impossible for the European economy and financial system to recover.
Suffering is certainly ahead for Cypriots as they go the way of Greece and Portugal and Ireland and Spain. The question is whether that pain finds its way to our shores. A scenario that has to be contemplated is one where U.S. markets react negatively as the eurozone's disintegration accelerates. We are not flush with economic health in this country; we cannot sustain another significant market drop. Yesterday at work I saw a Reuter's headline online, "Student loan write-offs hit $3 billion in first two months of year" -- up 36% from the same period last year. More people are going back to school. Why? Because there is nothing else to do. There is not enough work.

Saturday, March 23, 2013

Damage to Cyprus Already Done

Once again the news coming out of Cyprus is not encouraging. Yesterday Cyprus' Parliament came up with a new bailout plan to present to the troika Sunday evening, though it still has to vote on one proposal to confiscate a quarter of all bank deposits above the insured amount of 100,000 euros for Laiki Bank account holders. Parts of the plan that passed, as Liz Alderman and James Kanter report today, include capital controls to prevent withdrawals and account closings as well as the shutting down of Laiki, creating a bad bank for the non-performing accounts and rolling its good accounts into the Bank of Cyprus. Parliament also voted to confiscate the pension funds of state-run companies.

I've seen reports that this might not satisfy the troika. The troika wants the legislation to apply to all Cypriot banks not just Laiki. Cypriot president Anastasiasdes jets to Brussels tomorrow to take his lumps.

The message from all of this -- banks have been closed for over a week now in Cyprus -- is that the damage has already been done. Even if the new bailout plan is accepted by the ECB, the IMF and the European Commission, Cyprus' days as a financial hub are over and capital flight from eurozone countries with vulnerable banks like Spain will likely commence posthaste. As naked capitalism opines in "Cyprus Capitulates to Eurozone (Updated)":
The imposition of capital controls has the potential to alarm depositors in periphery countries even more than deposit seizure. While the Eurocrats can try claiming that the deposit grab is a one-off, the result of Cyprus having a huge financial sector that was heavily deposit funded, it was already troubling that they didn’t go after equity or bondholders. But the imposition of capital controls effectively creates another currency without the benefit of allowing the currency to revalue.
As we’ve indicated, the big risk coming out of the cramdown of Cyprus is a resumption of the flow of deposits out of periphery countries, which had been underway last year but was arrested by the introduction of the OMT. You’d be nuts to keep your money in a Spanish bank after the brutal treatment of Cypriot depositors. Expect Swiss, German, American, and, as Dizard put it, “banco de Mattress” to be the beneficiaries.
So far U.S. markets have dismissed Cyprus as inconsequential. Let's see what the prevailing wisdom is next week. The 17-nation eurozone appears about to shrink.

Thursday, March 21, 2013

Troika Tough Love

The news out of Cyprus this morning is not encouraging. Proposals -- such as issuing new bonds based on the confiscation of state-run pension funds or using Church of Cyprus property as collateral to issue new bonds or selling offshore gas exploration rights to Gazprom -- cobbled together to satisfy troika (ECB, IMF and the European Commission) demands to raise 5.8 billions euros seemed to have fallen flat. The ECB, from a story this morning by Liz Alderman, proclaimed that if by Monday there is no deal it will cut off funding. According to a naked capitalism post this morning, "ECB to Push Cyprus over the Brink,"
This is tantamount to cutting off its central bank and pushing it out of Eurozone if it does not capitulate. 
During the day yesterday, Eurozone officials made it clear that they would not accept some other ideas that Cyprus had developed to try to shield depositors, such as accessing pensions fund assets, restructuring the two largest banks, and selling its gas rights to Russia. This was deemed unacceptable in that it would increase debt levels. The fallacy, of course, is that the Trokia is unduly obsessed with the numerator of this equation (the borrowings) and not the denominator (the impact on the economy). Cyprus.com estimates the impact of trashing the banking system to be a minimum 20% contraction of GDP in two years. And mind you, this is after Cyprus was a good Eurozone citizen and sent €3 billion to help the Greek government.
The ECB has given Cyprus virtually no runway. It’s a deal by end of Monday or off with their heads. Given the difficulty of cobbling anything else together, this would seem to force Cyprus into only being able to structure yet another variant of the “rape depositors” plan. They seem either to rely on a reaction like the US had to the TARP, to having Congress capitulate after the markets swooner, or perhaps they sincerely believe that even a worse case scenario, of dumping Cyprus out of the Eurozone, is acceptable because it will tell all those lazy Latins that they’d better not even think of crossing the Troika. (It’s inconceivable that a forced Cyprus exit would not lead to deposit flight from Portugal and Spain, which will pressure the Eurozone tremendously. They’ve really drunk their own “Cyprus is a special case” PR if so.)
According to Alderman people are already queuing up in front of ATMs this morning in Nicosia:
Meanwhile, the mood turned sour on the streets of Nicosia, the Cypriot capital, where people flocked to cash machines Thursday morning to withdraw as much money as possible after the government declared that banks would remain closed until next Tuesday to give officials time to renegotiate the bailout deal.
The tough love approach that the troika is taking with Cyprus only makes sense as homeopathic quakery. Take a tiny member of the eurozone and implement a bank levy. When the patient, the eurozone, survives the patient will be healthier. Then move on to the next country and repeat the cure. The gamble here is that bank runs can be contained.

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

Cypriot Parliament Rejects Bailout

Yesterday the Cypriot Parliament rejected the Euro Group bailout deal which called for raising 5.8 billion euros through a tax on all bank deposits even though deposits under 100,000 euros are guaranteed in Cyprus. Liz Alderman reports today that following the vote the European Central Bank put Cyprus on notice that time to arrive at a new agreement is limited:
After the parliamentary vote, the European Central Bank indicated that it would not immediately cut off emergency cash — without which Cypriot banks probably could not survive. In a terse statement, the central bank said it was consulting with the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission, its partners in the so-called troika of international lenders. 
But in a tacit warning that it would not provide assistance forever, the central bank said it would stick to rules that allow lending only to solvent banks. The Cyprus banks, while wobbly, are not yet insolvent.
Cyprus' finance minister, Michalis Sarris, is in Moscow today for talks with the Russians. Apparently, as reported today by Andrew Kramer, there is a Gazprom deal on the table to provide Cyprus bailout money in exchange for exploration rights to offshore gas deposits:
Though not widely publicized, the Russian proposal to prop up Cyprus with assets belonging to the Gazprom pension fund was apparently taken seriously enough by Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel. Her office issued a statement on Tuesday noting she had warned the president of Cyprus in a telephone call not to consider alternatives to the European bailout; Russia’s offer is the only known alternative. 
Michael Olympios, chairman of the Cypriot Investors Association, said one possibility under active consideration was for a Russian bank to buy Cyprus’s biggest troubled lender, the Cyprus Popular Bank, in a deal that could reduce the amount of the 10 billion euro bailout sought by Cyprus. Any such move would most likely be backed by the Kremlin, Mr. Olympios added, and could reduce the tax that Russian depositors might otherwise have to pay. 
Russian officials were preparing for talks in Moscow on Wednesday with the Cypriot finance minister, Michalis Sarris, who was expected to request that Russia postpone the maturity date on a 2.5 billion euro loan that it extended to Cyprus in 2011.
A detailed post this morning on naked capitalism, "Gaming the Cyprus Negotiations," argues that there is indeed a chance that a deal might not be reached:
My belief is that there are a lot of moving parts, and while it is perfectly rational for everyone to come to some sort of deal, the principals have a lousy negotiating dynamic at work. Russia has been excluded and is feeling angry and abused, and the Wall Street Journal description of the 10 hours negotiations that led to the original deal sound nightmarish: confused, chaotic, dysfunctional. It’s proof of the old notion that people (in this case finance ministers) should never negotiate their own deals unless they are super experienced negotiators (and pretty much everyone overestimates their negotiating skills). And these all-over-the-map negotiations took place when the principals were in the same location. It’s worse doing this sort of things by phone and e-mail.
So the odds are not trivial that a deal fails to come together, not because a pact is impossible (as in there is appears to be a bargaining space where everyone could find a solution they could swallow) but that the key actors will be unable to get to that agreement before time runs out. Stay tuned.
I think there's some merit to this point of view. But in the end we're talking about a tiny amount of money in the Great Power scheme of things. Certainly you would think someone -- Putin? Merkel? Draghi? -- would intervene.

Monday, March 18, 2013

Bank Run in Cyprus

A bank run has begun in Cyprus. This is important because Cyprus is a member of the eurozone. Cyprus is tiny; but if it goes down and scraps the euro, it could well be the beginning of the end. The issue is a decision by the Eurogroup to make a Cyprus bailout contingent on all depositors absorbing some losses. This is from today's Liz Alderman and Landon Thomas Jr. story, "Turmoil in Cyprus Over a Bailout Rattles Europe":
By size, Cyprus’s economy represents not even half a percent of the combined output of the 17 euro zone countries. Yet the impact of this weekend’s decision by European leaders to impose across-the-board losses on bank depositors — from the richest Russian oligarchs, who have increasingly deposited their money in Cyprus’s banks, to the poorest Cypriot pensioners — in return for 10 billion euros, or $13 billion, in bailout money could not be more far-reaching. 
After five years of bailouts financed largely by European taxpayers, wealthy European nations have decreed that when a bank or country goes broke, bond investors and perhaps even bank depositors will pay a significant portion of the bill.
This is how naked capitalism describes the situation today:
The cheery view that Europe had moves past its crisis now looks to have been a tad premature. The astonishing weekend revelation that Cyprus had struck a deal for a Eurozone rescue of the island nations banks that hinged on a deposit grab, um, tax, of 6.75% of deposits below €100,000 and 9.9% for those above €100,000, sends a message that anyone in a weak bank in a periphery country, particularly a large deposit holder, is at risk. The one thing that America learned in the Great Depression is that to prevent debilitating bank runs, depositors need to be sure their holdings are safe. And if you need to extend government guarantees to provide that reassurance, then government bloody well better keep the banks on a short leash to make sure you dont have to pay out on those guarantees all that often. The recklessness of letting financiers talk governments out of constraining bank activities is coming home to roost. 
But currently there aren't the votes in Cyprus' Parliament to accept the bailout terms. So Cypriot banks are closed until Friday and this morning markets are all down. The lengthy, detailed naked capitalism analysis concludes by saying that unless treated German schizophrenia -- wanting to maintain its huge trade surpluses without funding its eurozone partners -- will destroy the financial system:
Over the weekend, colleagues who are normally of the calm, cool and collected sort have been stunned by this development, although the Eurocrats had been muttering about a deposit haircut in Cyprus in recent months. And the message could not be clearer: you are at risk if you hold money in a shaky bank or country in the Eurozone. One reader’s reaction: “I thought I’d put a prediction on the record: starting tomorrow, the euro payment system really starts to unravel.” 
After the PR barrage that accompanied the launch of the OMT, which was a brilliant exercise in smoke and mirrors (all it did was repackage and rebrand existing ECB powers), the quiet deposit run out of periphery countries to banks in the core nations slowed and had even reversed in recent months. Expect it to pick up with renewed vigor. Even if we don’t see hot bank runs of people lined up trying to empty their accounts, anyone who has more than €100,000 on deposit in a periphery country, particularly Spain, has to recognize he is in danger. However, many of the people own businesses (a payroll of meaningful size means you’ll have large deposits at least when you are about to pay staff, and unless you manage cash very aggressively, much of the rest of the time too) will need some time to switch to safer (presumably German or maybe even Swiss) banks, since selecting a new bank and moving a large, multi-serivces account is a big undertaking. And this sort of hidden-to-the-public big deposit run has felled banks; it was the proximate cause of the resolution of WaMu. 
Now the EU officials could easily calm nervous depositors by announcing an ECB-backstopped deposit guarantee, instead of the current national system which depends on not-exactly-credible central banks. Germany and its fellow surplus countries have hesitated about proceeding with the necessary steps to further economic integration (notice how the plan to implement eurozone wide bank supervision, which Germany insisted was a precondition to Eurozone-level deposit guarantees, has languished?). Germany is trying to maintain policies that are contradictory: it wants to continue to have large trade surpluses, yet not fund its trade partners; its wants debtors to meet their obligations, yet refuses to allow either enough in the way of fiscal deficits or monetary easing to keep debtor countries from falling into deflationary spirals, which assure default. Germany’s failure to relent on any of these conditions means that what breaks will be the financial system.
Negotiations are underway no doubt to rejigger the tax formula for Cypriot depositors, reducing it for small fry. But, barring some authoritative pronouncement from Mario Draghi of the ECB that guarantees deposits at eurozone banks, the damage is done. Is this the beginning of the end for the euro?

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

A Good Time to Get Out of the Market

I started investing in the stock market in 2005. I didn't know anything. I thought of it as an experiment. Could I teach myself? When my ex-girlfriend sold (fortunately at the peak of the real estate boom) a condo she had purchased with money we had saved together during our 11-year relationship she paid me out my share of the principal, about $30,000. I took that money and opened a couple online brokerage accounts. At first I got bit by the irrational exuberance of the renewable energy stocks when oil was pushing towards $150 a barrel. For a moment I was looking like a genius. But in the end I made some hasty and poor purchases of penny stocks, and I lost thousands of dollars. Then came Lehman. Riding that out took some intestinal fortitude.

Now the stock market is back to where it was before the meltdown. And I'm getting out. Slowly I plan to unwind if not all most of my stocks before May. My reason? I don't think the eurozone is going to make it. This is from a naked capitalism post today, "Is the Eurozone Nearing a Make or Break Point?":
One of my colleagues studied in Germany, has extensive, high level political and economic contacts there, and reads the press daily. He also describes his sang froid as “somewhere between that of a Chinese sage and a dead animal.”
Needless to say, he not prone to overstatement or overreaction and also has a propensity to makes Delphic remarks.
He said the Eurozone is over. In pretty much those words, a simple sentence, no caveats or conditionals. I nearly fell out of my chair. This apparently reflects the German recognition as a result of the Italian elections that they will not be able to surmount domestic opposition in Italy and potentially other periphery countries and would rather pull the plug than continue funding their trade partners. He said there was a fair bit of discussion of Germany leaving the Eurozone after the election. I quizzed him on how they thought they could do that, since the new DM would presumably trade at a big premium to the Euro. We discussed that the likely outcome would be further labor “reforms”. Maybe I am naive, but I don’t see how this would not undercut an critical German strength, that of the good, if also sometimes combative, relationship between German workers and management. My source finally said widespread recognition of the existential impasse at most a couple of months away. He’s never this definitive.
There is an argument being made that the break up of the eurozone would be good for US markets; that it would lead to increased liquidity that would be pumped into infrastructure. Here's the naked capitalism response to this idea:
Anyone who can fathom how you get to that conclusion (beyond religious faith in the Fed), please explain it to me. Have they not considered what happens to all that debt the ECB bought if there is no Eurozone, or the Eurozone is very much shrunken? And Germany has so much nice shiny infrastructure already they had trouble in the crisis finding anything more to do on that front. This whole crisis is in large measure the result of the iron grip neoliberal thinking has on policy-making. That wasn’t dented one iota as a result of the global financial crisis. Why should a second eruption change that, absent a lot of further upheaval in terms of who is in the power seat?
For a good example of this "iron grip" of neoliberal thinking, take a look at today's lead unsigned editorial in the New York Times, Egypt Needs to Act. How should Egypt act? By embracing IMF-prescribed austerity:
Mr. Morsi’s job is to persuade the political opposition to join him in a suite of economic reforms that would raise taxes, trim energy subsidies and pave the way for a much larger $4.8 billion loan package from the International Monetary Fund. The I.M.F. loan, in turn, would open the door to even more aid and investment from financial institutions and other countries.
This is a perfect illustration of the mental illness afflicting elite institutions. The Times has been arguing vociferously against austerity on the home front (less so in the case of Europe). But overall the Old Gray Lady is still a megaphone for neoliberalism.