Showing posts with label Nicos Anastasiades. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nicos Anastasiades. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 7, 2015

Russia Moves to Quickly Win New Cold War

To get a sense of what Greece is up against in trying to resist the troika's austerity diktats read the Reuters piece by Hugo Dixon, "Greece Must Walk the Talk, and Soon." Saying that finance minister Yanis Varoufakis has come up with the 458 million euros to meet an April 9 IMF deadline, Dixon opines:
Athens has scraped together enough cash to meet the I.M.F. payment, in part by extracting liquidity from quasi state entities. However, the left-wing government has pretty much exhausted its techniques for squeezing blood from a stone. Meanwhile, it has largely wasted two and a half months in office by lecturing its creditors, sending out mixed messages about its willingness to default and coming up with amateurish overhaul plans.

Now the government needs to get serious and — unless Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is really willing to default — impose vicious capital controls and exit the euro. 
Athens’s eurozone creditors are still hanging tough. Although they do not want Greece to enter a spiral of self-destruction and are worried about the fallout it if does, they do not trust what the government says. As a result, the creditors rightly want to see some meaningful actions before they lend Greece more money. 
Mr. Tsipras needs to show he means business, by suffering some political cost at home as a result of implementing unpopular measures. Otherwise, there is a risk that the government will take the cash, continue to speak with a forked tongue and still default in June if it can’t get a new long-term deal to its liking.
This is the dominant thinking within the troika: Syriza-led Greece is a mendacious, troublesome political upstart that needs to be made an example of, that needs to be broken publicly on the wheel so every Spanish voter looking to support Podemos or Mick pining for Sinn Féin will think twice before questioning the status quo.

The troika's version of the domino theory for the New Cold War that Washington D.C. explicitly launched last year in Kiev with the coup of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich actually got its start a year earlier with eurogroup chief Jeroen Dijsselbloem's bail-in scheme for Cyprus. At the time Russia did not take kindly to the bail in, interpreting it as a direct attack on her large depositors in Cyprus.

But as Andrew Higgins reports in "Waving Cash, Putin Sows E.U. Divisions in an Effort to Break Sanctions" all is now forgiven:
NICOSIA, Cyprus — When Cyprus seized hundreds of millions of dollars from bank depositors, many of them Russians, as part of an internationally brokered deal two years ago to rescue its collapsing financial system, the Russian leader, Vladimir V. Putin, denounced the move as “dangerous” and “unfair,” warning of a sharp chill in relations. 
But Mr. Putin was all smiles recently when he received Cyprus’s president, Nicos Anastasiades, in Moscow. He hailed relations with the Mediterranean nation as “always being truly friendly and mutually beneficial” and agreed to extend — on greatly improved terms for Cyprus — a $2.5 billion Russian loan.
The shift from fury to declarations of eternal friendship displayed Mr. Putin’s well-known flair for tactical back flips. But it also showed his unbending determination to break out of sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and the European Union for Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and support for armed rebels in eastern Ukraine.
Mr. Putin has methodically targeted, through charm, cash, and the fanning of historical and ideological embers, the European Union’s weakest links in a campaign to assert influence in some of Europe’s most troubled corners. One clear goal is to break fragile Western unity over the conflict in Ukraine.
On Wednesday, Greece’s new left-wing prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, will be the next to visit Moscow. Ahead of the trip, Mr. Tsipras declared himself opposed to sanctions on Russia, describing them as a “dead-end policy.”
On Sunday, Mr. Putin’s efforts to peel away supporters from the European Union opened a new rift, after the United States ambassador in Prague criticized a decision by the president of the Czech Republic, Milos Zeman, to attend a military parade in Moscow on May 9. And in February, Mr. Putin visited Hungary, the European Union’s autocratic backslider, peddling economic deals.
Russia has so far been unable to turn such hand-holding into something more concrete against sanctions that require the approval of all 28 European Union members. But pressure for a rupture is building.
The rupture might be supplied by Poroshenko's obvious backsliding on the Mink 2.0 ceasefire. As David Herszenhorn reports in "Ukrainian Leader Is Open to a Vote on Regional Power":
MOSCOW — President Petro O. Poroshenko of Ukraine on Monday denounced calls for “federalization” of the country, which Russia has endorsed as a way of granting political autonomy to the areas of eastern Ukraine controlled by pro-Russian separatists.
Establishing greater local autonomy and governmental authority is widely viewed as crucial to settling the nearly yearlong war in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, and it was a central plank in a cease-fire accord signed in February. But there are fierce disagreements over how to shape those powers, and how far they would extend.
Speaking at the first meeting of a commission charged with developing amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution, Mr. Poroshenko described federalization as tantamount to breaking apart the country, and said he was so certain Ukrainians would reject the idea that he was willing to put it to a national referendum.
“Why do I dwell in great detail on the idea of federalization?” Mr. Poroshenko said. “Because it is like an infection, a biological weapon, which is being imposed on Ukraine from abroad. Its bacteria are trying to infect Ukraine and destroy our unity.”
Leaders of the self-declared people’s republics in Donetsk and Luhansk have complained bitterly in recent weeks that Mr. Poroshenko and other officials in Kiev, including members of Parliament, were refusing to take the necessary steps to carry out the political provisions in the cease-fire agreement, which was signed in Minsk, Belarus.
***
. . . Separatist leaders noted that they had not been invited to join the commission on constitutional changes, and they took issue with Mr. Poroshenko’s remarks, including his insistence that Ukraine would remain a “unitary state” and his declaration that Ukrainian would remain the country’s only official language.
“These things are absolutely unacceptable,” Andrei Purgin, head of the Donetsk People’s Republic, told the Interfax news agency. “Everything they now say and do contradicts the Minsk agreements that took so much work to achieve.”
As for the commission and the constitutional amendment process, Mr. Purgin told Interfax: “We did not receive any invitations. We don’t have any representatives there.”
I have learned not to underestimate the obedience of the French and Germans when it comes to complying with U.S. orders, but this abrogation of Minsk 2.0 by the junta in Kiev seems impossible to defend. France, Germany, Poland, etc., might fall into the neocon line but it will be hard to secure the unanimity of all 28 EU members for increased Russian sanctions when fighting resumes in Donbass.

That is why it seems like a slam dunk that Putin will extend an offer of financial assistance to Alexis Tsipras when he visits Moscow tomorrow. If favorable terms can be found to extend a $2.5 billion loan to Cyprus, why not the bigger, politically far more important Greece?

Higgins ends his story on Russian rapprochement with Cyprus explaining the result of Dijsselbloem's bail-in. It backfired:
Vasilis Zertalis, the head of Prospectacy, a financial service company, described Cyprus as a “small piece on a big chessboard.” Europe, he said, tried to advance its own position during the 2013 banking crisis by seeking to end Cyprus’s role as a haven for Russian money. 
“They wanted to scare the Russians away,” he said. “But the money that left was from Britain, from other European countries and from America.” 
Ordinary Cypriots and politicians, he said, “all gave up on the European Union” because of the harsh bailout terms in 2013 and “know that the United States will never take a stand against Turkey.” 
“So,” he said, “the only allies Cyprus really has are Russia and maybe China.”
Putin has an opportunity to reach back into the slipstream of time and make a move that Stalin should have made. Stalin should have aided Greece instead of letting the British Empire re-install the monarchy there, setting the stage for the decades-long Cold War.

The choice should be clear now for Tsipras. The heads of the EU want to crush Syriza. I say he has no other choice at this point. He must accept Russia's offer of financial aid.

Monday, March 25, 2013

Dijsselbloem's Deal with Anastasiades

A deal is reported to have been struck between the Eurogroup, led by Jeroen Dijsselbloem of the Netherlands, and Cyprus President Nicos Anastasiades. Here's how it breaks down, according to a cross post by Cyprus.com this morning on naked capitalism:
  1. Laiki is resolved via good bank / bad bank, with uninsured depositors (4.2B) most likely losing everything (along with shareholders and bond holders). 
  2. Bank of Cyprus will have a bail-in of uninsured depositors, with them losing between 30-40% most likely. Shareholders and bond holders will be wiped out. 
  3. Troika will lend 10B to the Cyprus government, solely for fiscal purposes and based on a memorandum to be determined. None of the troika funds will be used for the bank bailout.
  4. Insured depositors will be protected (sub 100K euros). 
  5. The 9B of ELA [Emergency Liquidity Assistance] at Laiki will be transferred to Bank of Cyprus. This is the single most bizarre and unfair part of the agreement. It has not been discussed why the Bank of Cyprus creditors should be paying for the ELA of Laiki and no reporter pressed with a follow-up question. 
  6. Note that for the most part the bailout is NOT hitting the Russian depositors that hard but will hit local Cyprus depositors hard. Russian depositors were not largely at Bank of Cyprus.
Gone is the specific demand that Cyprus raise 5.8 billion euros since none of the 10 billion euros the Troika is lending is going to a bank bailout. There is some question whether the deal needs to be approved by Cyprus' Parliament. Dijsselbloem is quoted in today's New York Times saying that it can implemented immediately. But naked capitalism raises the possibility that this is not the case:
I have been operating on the assumption ... that the deal negotiated in the early AM in Brussels was set because it relied on the bailout provisions already passed by the Cypriot parliament and did not require additional approvals. And of course, one of the biggest tricks in deal land is to act like something is done even if the remaining “technical” details aren’t technical but are actually substantive and could be used to stymie consummation of the transaction. 
However, Richard Smith has found a tweet that suggests otherwise:

If this source is right, it’s still possible for the Parliament to reject the deal. Consistent with that being possible, I noticed how the recent rounds of messaging about the pact considerably downplayed how bad the hits to Cypriot borrower would be (as in it seemed to be more in sales mode than I would have expected). The early estimates (not official, just based on a look at the balance sheet and knowledge of what was on it) was that the Laiki depositors >€100,000 would be very lucky to get anything back, and the Bank of Cyprus losses for the over €100,000 depositors had been 22% to 25%, and that may not include the ELA transfer, which would presumably increase the losses considerably. 
Admittedly, at this point, the inertial course would be to approve the agreement. However, the influential Archbishop of Cyprus advocated leaving the Eurozone over the weekend. That plus a show of outrage from the population could undo what seems to be a settled deal. And that would have more immediate, unexpected ramifications.
Krugman in his column this morning welcomes the imposition of capital controls in Cyprus and provides a little historical perspective:
I am, of course, not the first person to notice the correlation between the freeing up of global capital and the proliferation of financial crises; Harvard’s Dani Rodrik began banging this drum back in the 1990s. Until recently, however, it was possible to argue that the crisis problem was restricted to poorer nations, that wealthy economies were somehow immune to being whipsawed by love-’em-and-leave-’em global investors. That was a comforting thought — but Europe’s travails demonstrate that it was wishful thinking. 
And it’s not just Europe. In the last decade America, too, experienced a huge housing bubble fed by foreign money, followed by a nasty hangover after the bubble burst. The damage was mitigated by the fact that we borrowed in our own currency, but it’s still our worst crisis since the 1930s. 
Now what? I don’t expect to see a wholesale, sudden rejection of the idea that money should be free to go wherever it wants, whenever it wants. There may well, however, be a process of erosion, as governments intervene to limit both the pace at which money comes in and the rate at which it goes out. Global capitalism is, arguably, on track to become substantially less global. 
And that’s O.K. Right now, the bad old days when it wasn’t that easy to move lots of money across borders are looking pretty good.
Predictions are that Cyprus' economy, 45% of which is in financial services, will shrink 20% to 30% in the next two years.

Saturday, March 23, 2013

Damage to Cyprus Already Done

Once again the news coming out of Cyprus is not encouraging. Yesterday Cyprus' Parliament came up with a new bailout plan to present to the troika Sunday evening, though it still has to vote on one proposal to confiscate a quarter of all bank deposits above the insured amount of 100,000 euros for Laiki Bank account holders. Parts of the plan that passed, as Liz Alderman and James Kanter report today, include capital controls to prevent withdrawals and account closings as well as the shutting down of Laiki, creating a bad bank for the non-performing accounts and rolling its good accounts into the Bank of Cyprus. Parliament also voted to confiscate the pension funds of state-run companies.

I've seen reports that this might not satisfy the troika. The troika wants the legislation to apply to all Cypriot banks not just Laiki. Cypriot president Anastasiasdes jets to Brussels tomorrow to take his lumps.

The message from all of this -- banks have been closed for over a week now in Cyprus -- is that the damage has already been done. Even if the new bailout plan is accepted by the ECB, the IMF and the European Commission, Cyprus' days as a financial hub are over and capital flight from eurozone countries with vulnerable banks like Spain will likely commence posthaste. As naked capitalism opines in "Cyprus Capitulates to Eurozone (Updated)":
The imposition of capital controls has the potential to alarm depositors in periphery countries even more than deposit seizure. While the Eurocrats can try claiming that the deposit grab is a one-off, the result of Cyprus having a huge financial sector that was heavily deposit funded, it was already troubling that they didn’t go after equity or bondholders. But the imposition of capital controls effectively creates another currency without the benefit of allowing the currency to revalue.
As we’ve indicated, the big risk coming out of the cramdown of Cyprus is a resumption of the flow of deposits out of periphery countries, which had been underway last year but was arrested by the introduction of the OMT. You’d be nuts to keep your money in a Spanish bank after the brutal treatment of Cypriot depositors. Expect Swiss, German, American, and, as Dizard put it, “banco de Mattress” to be the beneficiaries.
So far U.S. markets have dismissed Cyprus as inconsequential. Let's see what the prevailing wisdom is next week. The 17-nation eurozone appears about to shrink.