Showing posts with label Petro Poroshenko. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Petro Poroshenko. Show all posts

Monday, April 22, 2019

Good News: Ukrainians Reject U.S. Puppet Poroshenko

One can infer from the lack of coverage in "the newspaper of record" that yesterday's outcome of the presidential election in Ukraine (see "Ukraine Election: Volodymyr Zelensky, TV Comedian, Trounces President" by Andrew Higgins and Iuliia Mendel) is unwelcome in Washington, D.C.

Why? Lev Golinkin explains in The Nation (see "Ukraine’s Upcoming Election Pits a Deeply Unpopular President Against a TV Comedian"):
Thus far, Western media have focused on the “Isn’t this quirky?” aspect of an untested comedian about to become the leader of Ukraine. But there’s nothing quirky about it.
For millions of Ukrainian citizens mired in economic corruption, this election is anything but funny. Millions of rational people would rather take their chances with an untested comedian than the US-backed Poroshenko. That staggering decision behooves us to pay attention.
For the past five years, Ukraine played a central role in US foreign policy. Washington vigorously supported the 2013–14 Maidan uprising that ousted Viktor Yanukovych and brought Poroshenko to power. A bipartisan Who’s Who of Washington powerbrokers, including Senator John McCainand Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, hustled into Kiev to cheer on the uprising.
Five years later, the majority of Ukrainians are overwhelmingly rejecting that choice.
Indeed, it’s hard to consider this election as anything other than a referendum on not only Poroshenko’s presidency, but the entire US-backed Maidan project.
Higgins and Mendel report the extent of Poroshenko's overwhelming rejection:
KIEV, Ukraine — The comedian Volodymyr Zelensky won a landslide victory in Ukraine’s presidential election, according to official results with nearly all of the votes counted, making a comic actor with no experience in government or the military the commander in chief of a country that has been at war with Russian proxies for over five years.
With more than 95 percent of ballots cast on Sunday counted, Mr. Zelensky had won 73.17 percent of the vote, compared with just 24.5 percent for Petro O. Poroshenko, Ukraine’s incumbent president. Mr. Zelensky triumphed in every region, except for the area around the city of Lviv, a center of Ukrainian culture and nationalism in the west of the country.
Ukraine’s central election commission said that final official results might not be ready until April 30 because of the upcoming Orthodox Easter holidays.
Mr. Zelensky’s victory will give Ukraine its first Jewish leader and deliver a stinging rebuke to a political and business establishment represented by Mr. Poroshenko, a billionaire candy tycoon who campaigned on the nationalist slogan “Army, language, faith.”
Besides the issue of the systemic corruption of the oligarchy the presidential election was also a referendum on language. Zelensky speaks Russian not Ukrainian. A reader of The Times would be completely unaware of this because the few stories and opinion pieces devoted to the election made no mention of it.

A good story published by Politico at the end of March explains:
The usage of Ukrainian has boomed since the revolution, with a new law dictating that all schooling after the fifth grade onward must be in Ukrainian. Russian, meanwhile, has been demonized by some on the right as the “language of the enemy.”
Last year, overzealous city councilors from Ukraine’s western city of Lviv went as far as to ban Russian-language culture and media altogether — a move that occasioned a sharp rebuke from the country’s Western diplomatic community. “The Lviv [region] ban as formulated is narrow-minded, discriminatory and just plain dumb,” the Canadian ambassador to Ukraine, Roman Waschuk, tweeted at the time.
The ban was an outlier, but it struck the wrong tone in the country’s east and south, where Russian is still the predominant language. (The anti-government protests that preceded the war in the Donbas were set off by news that Ukraine’s parliament was considering repealing the status of Russian as a regional language).
A recent media law mandating Russian-language outlets to translate their content into Ukrainian has also ruffled feathers — and driven some sites out of business.
The coup in Kiev five years ago kicked off a great deal of turbulence in international affairs. Maybe the rejection of Poroshenko, Washington's man, is a favorable omen for our politics ahead.

Wednesday, November 28, 2018

Assange New-World Bound? + Poroshenko a Bust + a Month of Brexit Scaremongering

Plainly the government of Ecuador is releasing lies about Assange to curry favour with the security establishment of the USA and UK, and to damage Assange’s support prior to expelling him from the Embassy. He will then be extradited from London to the USA on charges of espionage.
Another must-read is Moon of Alabama's "Ukraine - Poroshenko Launched Clash With Russia To Gain Dictatorial Powers - He Failed":
Poroshenko could start a provocation elsewhere. He could attempt to reconquer the Donetzk airport. But while he might itch for losing more fights, a full blown war is out of question. Kiev's army is low on morale and would be defeated within days. 
Poroshenko's rule was catastrophic for the Ukraine. In several cities the central heating and warm water supply is broken. Ten-thousands will have to freeze during the winter, some of them to death. Since Poroshenko came to power millions of able Ukrainian workers have fled or work abroad, most of them to Russia. The most industrialized regions are in firmly in rebel hands. Most of the population is poor, the bureaucracy is utterly corrupt and the country is practically bankrupt. 
There will likely be dozens of corruption cases brought up against Poroshenko himself as soon as he loses power. If he is smart he will flee the Ukraine the very day his term ends.
With regards to Brexit, the campaign to frighten people over the consequences of not accepting May's withdrawal agreement has begun in earnest. There is no support for the withdrawal agreement in parliament. Nonetheless the next several weeks will be spent whipping up terror over a crash-out.

The scenario that Yves Smith outlines is a no vote in parliament followed by an adverse market reaction and then a re-vote which results in passage. It's fanciful.

The one bright spot that I can see is that after May fails to secure passage the second time around she will have to stand down. New elections will be called. Smith thinks that this is irrelevant in terms of the Brexit timeline; that a crash-out will commence. But I don't think so. I think the EU would have to grant the UK time to form a new government which could present its Brexit plan to parliament.

Monday, November 26, 2018

Kerch Strait Crisis: Poroshenko Requests Martial Law

What's bizarre about the reporting of the naval clash between Russia and Ukraine at the Kerch Strait is that The New York Times dispatch, written by Andrew Kramer, "Ukraine, After Naval Clash With Russia, Considers Martial Law," while hewing to the Western line that Russia is at fault, nonetheless manages to add flesh to a dark Ukrainian conspiracy, the likes of which you won't find on RT or Sputnik. According to Kramer,
At a midnight meeting, Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council said it would ask Parliament to declare a state of martial law. That raised alarms that President Petro O. Poroshenko could use the incident to delay a presidential election scheduled for March that polls suggest he is unlikely to win.
“This whole story grows more complicated by the fact that during martial law, it is forbidden to hold presidential, parliamentary or local elections, as well as strikes, protests, rallies and mass actions,” Mustafa Nayyem, a member of Parliament, posted on Facebook.
Poroshenko is polling in the single digits. Clara Weiss in "Russia fires on and captures Ukrainian Navy ships" adds some texture to the political mood in Kiev:
Poroshenko’s escalation of the military conflict with Russia is driven, to a large measure, by the growing domestic crisis of his regime. Almost five years after an imperialist-orchestrated, fascistic coup brought it to power, the Poroshenko regime is mired in crisis. Recent media reports suggested that some one million people in Ukraine live on the brink of starvation.
Hundreds of thousands have left the country since 2014, fleeing war and social devastation (see: “Ukraine’s depopulation crisis”). The past months saw several strikes by Ukrainian miners, railway workers and other sections of the working class. Polls show Poroshenko with the highest negative ranking of any candidate in the upcoming presidential elections.
Post-coup Ukraine is a failed state project of the West, different from but similar to Kosovo and Libya. The heat can be turned up or the flame reduced to a low burn depending on the whims of leaders in Europe and the United States; sending Ukrainian warships unannounced into the Sea of Azov is an effective way to goad the bear while at the same time bolstering their chosen lackey Petro Poroshenko.

I thought Iran would be the target for a martial crisis during the lame duck, but maybe it's Mother Russia.

Sunday, June 7, 2015

Putin Demolishes "Russian Aggression" Meme Being Spread by West

The G7 summit that kicks off today in Germany is being billed as a united "stand against Russian aggression." Any story about Russia recently in the Western press has referred to "Russian aggression" or the "Russian invasion." The first is meant to explain the popular uprising in the Donets Basin that split the country last year following the U.S.-backed coup of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych; the latter, the popular vote last spring in the Crimea to break away from the Kiev junta and join the Russian Federation. The Western press, despite never having formulated compelling narratives regarding "Russian aggression" and "Russian invasion," now merely assumes its readers accept the lies.

The reason we're being tattooed with references to "Russian aggression," and possibly why a flare up in fighting occurred late last week in Maryinka, a town outside of Donetsk, calling into question the already questionable integrity of Minsk II, is that European Union sanctions on Russia sunset at the end of the month. So Obama is in the land of "Edelweiss" to jawbone the big dogs -- Germany, France, Britain and Italy -- into shepherding the rest of the EU flock into another go-round of anti-Russian sanctions.

The problem for the United States -- and the United States has a lot of problems managing its global imperium right now -- is that the sanctions are not working. Even if one accepts the distorted Russophobia in the Western press of an empire-hungry Putin bent on subjugating simple, honest people yearning to be free, there is no evidence that the cocktail of trade and financial restrictions adopted last year would, if reauthorized, do a single thing to deliver Crimea to the Kiev junta or implement Minsk II.

Minsk II was a Russian-German initiative that the U.S. never supported because it basically guarantees the autonomy of Donetsk and Luhansk. So Poroshenko dug in his heels and refused to implement basic parts of the agreement like the payment of pensions to citizens living in the rebel LPR/DPR.

Kerry attempted to deal directly with Putin when the two met in Sochi in May. This meeting has been the topic of much speculation. I think it is pretty safe to say that Kerry was looking for some grand bargain or working understanding covering several fronts -- Syria, Iran, Ukraine. But the Sochi meeting highlighted once again Europe's status as subjects who are expected to do what they are told by their American lord. Obama will have to pretty that up today in Bavaria.

Given the EU's vassalage to the U.S., I think the safe bet is that the sanctions will be renewed. The "Russian aggression" meme provides the rationale for an indefensible policy. If Syriza is truly a different type of political formation from the neoliberal "radical center" that dominates the West, Greece will not support a sanctions renewal. The move this past Friday to delay an IMF repayment, bundling it together with others to be paid by the end of the month, gives Tsipras leverage in the high-stakes debt negotiations. Unless Tsipras gets a decent deal, Greece can and should block the sanctions.

Getting out front of the G7 Summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke with journalists from the Italian daily Corriere della Serra. Below is the interview, which can be found in its entirety on the President of Russia web site, with reporters Paolo Valentino and Luciano Fontana. I pick it up after the opening, which dealt with Italian-Russian relations. It's worth reading to remind oneself how much stronger a version of the truth Russia's interpretation of events is to the U.S.-manufactured lies meant to cloak its insatiable lust for unipolar hegemony.


Paolo Valentino: Thank you, Mr Putin.

When we were talking about the shadow cast on our relations, you said that it was not your choice, and there is an opinion that Russia feels betrayed, abandoned by Europe, like a lover abandoned by his mistress. What are the problems in our relations today? Do you think that Europe has been too dependent on the United States in the Ukrainian crisis? What do you expect from Europe in relation to the sanctions? I may have asked too many questions at once.

Vladimir Putin: You have certainly asked a lot of questions, with an Italian flair. (Laughs)

First, about the mistress. In this kind of a relationship with a woman, that is, if you assume no obligations, you have no right to claim any obligations from your partner.


We have never viewed Europe as a mistress. I am quite serious now. We have always proposed a serious relationship. But now I have the impression that Europe has actually been trying to establish material‑based relations with us, and solely for its own gain. There is the notorious Third Energy Package and the denial of access for our nuclear energy products to the European market despite all the existing agreements. There is reluctance to acknowledge the legitimacy of our actions and reluctance to cooperate with integration associations in the territory of the former Soviet Union. I am referring to the Customs Union, which we created and which has now grown into the Eurasian Economic Union.

Because it is all right when integration takes place in Europe, but if we do the same in the territory of the former Soviet Union, they try to explain it by Russia's desire to restore an empire. I don’t understand the reasons for such an approach.

You see, all of us, including me, have been talking for a long time about the need to establish a common economic space stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok. In fact, French President Charles de Gaulle said something similar a lot earlier than me. Today nobody objects to it, everybody says: yes, we should aspire to this.


But what is happening in practice? For example, the Baltic States have joined the European Union. Good, no problem. But today we are being told that these countries, which are part of the energy system of the former Soviet Union and Russia, they must join the European Union’s energy system. We ask: Are there any problems with energy supply or with something else? Why is it necessary? – No, there are no problems, but we have decided that it will be better this way.

What does this mean for us in practical terms? It means that we will be forced to build additional generating capacities in some western regions in Russia. Since electricity transmission lines went through the Baltic States to some Russian regions and vice versa, all of them will now be switched over to Europe, and we will have to build new transmission lines in our country to ensure electricity supply. This will cost us about 2‑2.5 billion euro.

Now let’s look at the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. It does not require that Ukraine becomes part of the European energy system, but it is considered possible. If this happens, we will have to spend not 2‑2.5 billion but, probably, about 8‑10 billion euro for the same purpose. The question is: why is this necessary if we believe in building a common economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok? What is the objective of the European Union’s Eastern Partnership? Is it to integrate the whole former Soviet Union into a single space with Europe, I repeat for the third time, from Lisbon to Vladivostok, or to cut something off and establish a new border between modern Russia and the western territories including, say, Ukraine and Moldova?

Let me tell you something else now, and you can decide for yourselves what to publish and what to leave out.

What are the roots of the Ukrainian crisis? Its cause seems to be completely disproportionate to what has become an utter tragedy today claiming many lives in southeast Ukraine. What sparked the crisis? Former President Viktor Yanukovych said that he needed to think about signing Ukraine’s Association Agreement with the EU, possibly make some changes and hold consultations with Russia, its major trade and economic partner. In this connection or under this pretext riots broke out in Kiev. They were actively supported both by our European and American partners. Then a coup d'état followed – a totally anti-constitutional act. The new authorities announced that they were going to sign the Association Agreement but would delay its implementation until January 1, 2016. The question is: what was the coup d'état for? Why did they need to escalate the situation to a civil war? The result is exactly the same.

What is more, at the end of 2013 we were ready to give Ukraine $15 billion as a state loan supported by a further $5 billion via commercial banks; plus we already gave it $3 billion during the year and promised to cut gas prices by half if they paid regularly. We were not at all against Ukraine signing an Association Agreement with the European Union. But, of course, we wanted to participate in the final decisions, meaning that Ukraine was then and is still now, today, a member of the CIS free trade area, and we have mutual obligations as its members.

How is it possible to completely ignore this, to treat it with utter disrespect? I simply cannot understand that. The result that we have – a coup d'état, a civil war, hundreds of lives lost, devastated economy and social sphere, a four-year $17.5 billion loan promised to Ukraine by the IMF and complete disintegration of economic ties with Russia. But Russian and Ukrainian economies are very deeply interconnected.

The European Union unilaterally removed its customs duties for Ukraine. However, the volume of Ukraine’s sales to the European market did not grow. Why not? Because there is nothing to sell. There is no demand in the European market for Ukrainian products, either in terms of quality or price, in addition to the products that were already sold before.

We have a market for Ukraine, but many ties have been severed unilaterally by the Ukrainian side. For example, all engines for our combat helicopters came from Ukraine. Now deliveries have stopped. We have already built one plant in St Petersburg and another plant will be completed this year, but the production of these engines in Ukraine will be shut down because Italy, France or Germany don’t need and will never need such engines. It is impossible for Ukraine to divert its production in any way; it will need billions in investment to do this.

I don’t understand why this was done. I have asked many of my colleagues, including in Europe and America, about it.


Paolo Valentino: And what do they answer?

Vladimir Putin: The situation got out of control.

You know, I would like to tell you and your readers one thing. Last year, on February 21, President Yanukovych and the Ukrainian opposition signed an agreement on how to proceed, how to organise political life in the country, and on the need to hold early elections. They should have worked to implement this agreement, especially since three European foreign ministers signed this agreement as guarantors of its implementation.

If those colleagues were used for the sake of appearances and they were not in control of the situation on the ground, which was in fact in the hands of the US ambassador or a CIA resident, they should have said: “You know, we did not agree to a coups d'etat, so we will not support you; you should go and hold elections instead.”

The same could be said about our American partners. Let’s assume that they also lost control of the situation. But if America and Europe had said to those who had taken these unconstitutional actions: ”If you come to power in such a way, we will not support you under any circumstances; you must hold elections and win them” – (by the way, they had a 100‑percent chance of a victory, everybody knows that), the situation would have developed in a completely different way.

So, I believe that this crisis was created deliberately and it is the result of our partner’s unprofessional actions. And the coverage of this process has been absolutely unacceptable. I would like to emphasise once more: this was not our choice, we did not seek it, we are simply forced to respond to what is happening.

In conclusion – forgive me for this protracted monologue – I would like to say that it is not that we feel deceived or treated unfairly. This is not the point. The point is that relationships should be built on a long‑term basis not in the atmosphere of confrontation, but in the spirit of cooperation.

Paolo Valentino: You say the situation got out of control. But is it not the right moment for Russia to seize the initiative, to find a way to engage its American and European partners in the search of solution to the situation, to show that it is ready to address this problem?

Vladimir Putin: That is exactly what we are doing. I think that today the document we agreed upon in Minsk, called Minsk‑II, is the best agreement and perhaps the only unequivocal solution to this problem. We would never have agreed upon it if we had not considered it to be right, just and feasible.

On our part, we take every effort, and will continue to do so, in order to influence the authorities of the unrecognised self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk republics. But not everything depends on us. Our European and US partners should exert influence on the current Kiev administration. We do not have the power, as Europe and the United States do, to convince Kiev to carry out everything that was agreed on in Minsk.

I can tell you what needs to be done; maybe I will anticipate your next question. The key aspect of the political settlement was to create conditions for this joint work, but it was essential to stop the hostilities, to pull back heavy weaponry. On the whole, this has been done. Unfortunately, there is still shooting occasionally and there are casualties, but there are no large‑scale hostilities, the sides have been separated. It is time to begin implementing the Minsk Agreements.

Specifically, there needs to be a constitutional reform to ensure the autonomous rights of the unrecognised republics. The Kiev authorities do not want to call it autonomy, they prefer different terms, such as decentralisation. Our European partners, those very partners who wrote the corresponding clause in the Minsk Agreements, explained what should be understood as decentralisation. It gives them the right to speak their language, to have their own cultural identity and engage in cross‑border trade – nothing special, nothing beyond the civilised understanding of ethnic minorities’ rights in any European country.

A law should be adopted on municipal elections in these territories and a law on amnesty. All this should be done, as the Minsk Agreements read, in coordination with Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic, with these territories.

The problem is that the current Kiev authorities don’t even want to sit down to talks with them. And there is nothing we can do about it. Only our European and American partners can influence this situation. There is no need to threaten us with sanctions. We have nothing to do with this, this is not our position. We seek to ensure the implementation of the Minsk Agreements.

It is essential to launch economic and social rehabilitation of these territories. What has happened there, exactly? The current Kiev authorities have simply cut them off from the rest of the country. They discontinued all social payments – pensions, benefits; they cut off the banking system, made regular energy supply impossible, and so on. So you see, there is a humanitarian disaster in those regions. And everybody is pretending that nothing is wrong.

Our European colleagues have taken on certain obligations, in particular they promised to help restore the banking system in these territories. Finally, since we are talking about what can or must be done, and by whom, I believe that the European Union could surely provide greater financial assistance to Ukraine. These are the main points.

I would like to stress that Russia is interested in and will strive to ensure the full and unconditional implementation of the Minsk Agreements, and I don’t believe there is any other way to settle this conflict today.

Incidentally, the leaders of the self-proclaimed republics have publicly stated that under certain conditions – meaning the implementation of the Minsk Agreements – they are ready to consider themselves part of the Ukrainian state. This is a fundamental issue. I think this position should be viewed as a sound precondition for the start of substantial negotiations.

Paolo Valentino: So you are saying that it is out of the question for the Crimean scenario to be repeated in eastern Ukraine?

Vladimir Putin: You know, the Crimean scenario does not reflect Russia’s position; it reflects the position of the people who live in Crimea.

All our actions, including those with the use of force, were aimed not at tearing away this territory from Ukraine but at giving the people living there an opportunity to express their opinion on how they want to live their lives.

I would like to stress this once again, as I have said many times before: if Kosovo Albanians were allowed this, why is it prohibited to Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars living in Crimea? And by the way, the decision on Kosovo’s independence was made exclusively by the Kosovo Parliament, whereas Crimea held a region-wide referendum. I think that a conscientious observer could not but see that people voted almost unanimously for reunification with Russia.

I would like to ask those who do not want to recognise it: if our opponents call themselves democrats, I would like to ask what exactly democracy means. As far as I know, democracy is the rule of the people, or the rule based on the will of the people. So, the solution of the Crimean issue is based on the will of the people of the Crimea.

In Donetsk and Lugansk people voted for independence, and the situation there is different. But the main thing, something we must always bear in mind, is that we should always respect the feelings and the choice of the people. And if somebody wants these territories to remain part of Ukraine, they should prove to those people that their lives would be better, more comfortable and safer within a unified state; that they would be able to provide for themselves and ensure their children’s future within this state. But it is impossible to convince these people by means of weapons. These issues, issues of this kind can only be resolved by peaceful means.


Paolo Valentino: Speaking of peace, the countries that used to be parties to the Warsaw Treaty and today are NATO countries, such as the Baltic states and Poland, feel threatened by Russia. NATO has decided to create special forces to address these concerns. My question is whether the West is right in its determination to restrain “the Russian bear”, and why does Russia continue to speak in such a contentious tone?

Vladimir Putin: Russia does not speak with anyone in a contentious tone, and in such matters, to quote a political figure from the past, Otto von Bismarck, it is not discussions but the potential that counts.

What does the actual potential show? US military spending is higher than that of all countries in the world taken together. The aggregate military spending of NATO countries is 10 times, note – 10 times higher than that of the Russian Federation. Russia has virtually no bases abroad. We have the remnants of our armed forces (since Soviet times) in Tajikistan, on the border with Afghanistan, which is an area where the terrorist threat is particularly high. The same role is played by our airbase in Kyrgyzstan; it is also aimed at addressing the terrorist threat and was set up at the request of the Kyrgyz authorities after a terrorist attack perpetrated by terrorists from Afghanistan on Kyrgyzstan.

We have kept since Soviet times a military unit at a base in Armenia. It plays a certain stabilising role in the region, but it is not targeted against anyone. We have dismantled our bases in various regions of the world, including Cuba, Vietnam, and so on. This means that our policy in this respect is not global, offensive or aggressive.

I invite you to publish the world map in your newspaper and to mark all the US military bases on it. You will see the difference.

Sometimes I am asked about our airplanes flying somewhere far, over the Atlantic Ocean. Patrolling by strategic airplanes in remote regions was carried out only by the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. In the early 1990s, we, the new, modern Russia, stopped these flights, but our American friends continued to fly along our borders. Why? Some years ago, we resumed these flights. And you want to say that we have been aggressive?

American submarines are on permanent alert off the Norwegian coast; they are equipped with missiles that can reach Moscow in 17 minutes. But we dismantled all of our bases in Cuba a long time ago, even the non-strategic ones. And you would call us aggressive?

You yourself have mentioned NATO’s expansion to the east. As for us, we are not expanding anywhere; it is NATO infrastructure, including military infrastructure, that is moving towards our borders. Is this a manifestation of our aggression?

Finally, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was to a large extent the cornerstone of the entire international security system. Anti-missile systems, bases and radars are located in the European territory or in the sea, e.g. in the Mediterranean Sea, and in Alaska. We have said many times that this undermines international security. Do you think this is a display of our aggression as well?

Everything we do is just a response to the threats emerging against us. Besides, what we do is limited in scope and scale, which are, however, sufficient to ensure Russia's security. Or did someone expect Russia to disarm unilaterally?

I have proposed to our American partners not to withdraw from the treaty unilaterally, but to create an ABM system together, the three of us: Russia, the United States and Europe. But this proposal was declined. We said at the time: ”Well, this is an expensive system, its efficiency is not proven, but to ensure the strategic balance we will develop our strategic offensive potential, we will develop systems of overpowering anti-ballistic defence. And I have to say that we have made significant strides in this area.

As for some countries’ concerns about Russia's possible aggressive actions, I think that only an insane person and only in a dream can imagine that Russia would suddenly attack NATO. I think some countries are simply taking advantage of people’s fears with regard to Russia. They just want to play the role of front-line countries that should receive some supplementary military, economic, financial or some other aid. Therefore, it is pointless to support this idea; it is absolutely groundless. But some may be interested in fostering such fears. I can only make a conjecture.

For example, the Americans do not want Russia's rapprochement with Europe. I am not asserting this, it is just a hypothesis. Let’s suppose that the United States would like to maintain its leadership in the Atlantic community. It needs an external threat, an external enemy to ensure this leadership. Iran is clearly not enough – this threat is not very scary or big enough. Who can be frightening? And then suddenly this crisis unfolds in Ukraine. Russia is forced to respond. Perhaps, it was engineered on purpose, I don’t know. But it was not our doing.

Let me tell you something – there is no need to fear Russia. The world has changed so drastically that people with some common sense cannot even imagine such a large-scale military conflict today. We have other things to think about, I assure you.

Paolo Valentino: But you cooperate with the United States on Iran, and John Kerry's visit sent yet another message in this regard. Or am I wrong?

Vladimir Putin: You are right – it did. We are cooperating not only on the Iranian nuclear programme, but on other serious issues as well. Despite America's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, our arms control dialogue continues.

We are not just partners; I would say we are allies in addressing the issues related to non‑proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We are undoubtedly allies in the fight against terrorism. There are some other areas of collaboration as well. The central theme of Expo Milano, which you mentioned earlier, is yet another example of our joint work. Indeed, there are plenty of issues that we continue to tackle jointly.

Paolo Valentino: Mr Putin, on May 9, Russia marked the 70th anniversary of the Great Victory, which liberated both your country and the entire Europe from Nazism. No other country paid as bloody a price for this victory as Russia. However, there were no Western leaders standing next to you on Red Square. Il Corriere della Sera published Silvio Berlusconi's letter criticising those leaders for their absence. I have two related questions.

Do you think that by their absence they showed disrespect for the Russian people? What does the memory of the Great Patriotic War mean to the Russian identity today?

Vladimir Putin: It is not a matter of identity. Identity is built on culture, language and history. This war is a tragic page in our history. When we mark such days, festive but also sad given the number of lives lost in that war, we think about the generation that made our freedom and independence possible, about those who triumphed over Nazism. We also think about the fact that no one has the right to forget this tragedy, first of all, because we must think about how to avoid the repetition of anything like that in the future. These are not just words; it is not an unfounded fear.

Today, we hear some people say that there was no such thing as the holocaust, for instance. We are witnessing attempts to glorify the Nazis and their collaborators. This is part of our life today. Today's terrorism in all its various manifestations is very much like Nazism; in fact, there is hardly any difference between the two.

As for the colleagues you have mentioned, it is their personal choice, of course, whether to come to Moscow to join in the celebrations or not. I think that they failed to see past the current complexity in international relations to something far more important that is linked not only to the past, but also to the need to fight for our common future.

They made their choice, but this day is, first and foremost, our holiday. You see, there were veterans from quite a number of countries in Moscow: from the United States, Great Britain, Poland and other European countries. In fact, it is these people who are the true heroes of this day, and this was very important to us. During those celebrations, we did not honour only those who fought Nazism in the Soviet Union; we also remembered the Resistance fighters in Germany itself, in France and in Italy. We remember all of them and pay tribute to all the people who did not spare themselves in the fight against Nazism.

Certainly, we understand only too well that it was the Soviet Union that made the decisive contribution into the Victory and suffered the most severe losses in the fight against Nazism. It is more than just a military victory to us, it is a moral victory. You see, virtually every family lost someone in the war. How can we forget this? It is impossible.

Paolo Valentino: There are a few more quick questions left.

Vladimir Putin: I hope they are quick indeed.

Luciano Fontana: You are a very popular leader in Russia, but in other countries and even in your own country you are often called authoritarian. Why is it so difficult to be part of the opposition in Russia?

Vladimir Putin: What is so difficult about it? If the opposition proves that it can tackle the challenges faced by a district, a region or the whole country, then, I think, people will always notice it.

The number of parties in our country has multiplied, in recent years we liberalised the process of establishing a political party and taking it to a regional and national level. It is all about their competence and ability to work with the electorate, to work with people.

Paolo Valentino: Then why are members of the opposition so rarely interviewed by the main Russian TV channels?

Vladimir Putin: I think if they have something interesting to say, they will be interviewed more often.

As for political competition, we know that various means are used against political rivals. Just take a look at the most recent history of Italy.

Paolo Valentino: Mr President, Greece is facing huge difficulties in its relations with Europe. If Greece leaves the eurozone, will Russia be ready to offer it political and economical assistance?

Vladimir Putin: We are building our relations with Greece irrespective of whether it is an EU, eurozone or NATO member. We have very close historical and good partnership relations with Greece, which is why it is up to the Greek people to make a sovereign decision as to which union and zone to be part of. But we don’t know what will happen in the future, so it would be wrong or even harmful for both Greek and European economies if we, as the saying goes, try to read the tea leaves.

For an economy like Greece there are certain difficulties brought about by the common European rules. They cannot devalue the drachma because they don't have it, they are strictly pegged to the euro currency. Their boundaries are fully open for European goods, which gives a distinct advantage to the export-oriented economies. Common decisions are made concerning such sectors as agriculture and fishery, where Greece could have certain competitive advantages but there are limits as well.

Another sector where it has an advantage is tourism, of course, but it applies to the Schengen area and there are also some limits. We have a visa-free arrangement with Turkey and 5 million Russian tourists visited this country last year, while less than one million tourists visited Greece, around 300,000, as far as I know. However, Greece receives concessional loans, financial support from the European treasury, and it has access to the European labour market. There are also other benefits of being part of the European family.

It is not up to us here in Russia to decide what is more beneficial and preferable for Greece. Once again, it is up to the Greek people to make a sovereign decision in dialogue with their main European partners.

Paolo Valentino: I would like to ask the last two small questions.

Vladimir Putin: Are we going to stay here until morning?

Paolo Valentino: We can see four Russian emperors here, in this room. Which historical figure inspires you the most?

Vladimir Putin: You know, people ask me this question a lot. I prefer to dodge it since the answer can give rise to various interpretations. (Laughs)

So I will put it like this: I try not to idolise anybody. I try, or rather, I am guided by the interests of the Russian people in my work, taking into account everything that has been previously accumulated and the conditions we are living in today, and I try to get a glimpse of the way we should build our life, economy and policy – first and foremost, our domestic policy – as well as our foreign policy in the medium and long-term strategic perspective.

There are many good examples in both Russian and European history, as well as in world history. But all those people lived and worked in certain conditions. The most important thing is to be honest with yourself and with the people who have entrusted you with this work.

Luciano Fontana: One last question. What is your biggest regret in life? What do you consider a mistake that you would never want to make again?

Vladimir Putin: I will be quite frank with you. I cannot recollect anything of the kind. By the grace of God, I have nothing to regret in my life.

Question: You are a happy person.

Vladimir Putin: I am, thank God.

Tuesday, April 7, 2015

Russia Moves to Quickly Win New Cold War

To get a sense of what Greece is up against in trying to resist the troika's austerity diktats read the Reuters piece by Hugo Dixon, "Greece Must Walk the Talk, and Soon." Saying that finance minister Yanis Varoufakis has come up with the 458 million euros to meet an April 9 IMF deadline, Dixon opines:
Athens has scraped together enough cash to meet the I.M.F. payment, in part by extracting liquidity from quasi state entities. However, the left-wing government has pretty much exhausted its techniques for squeezing blood from a stone. Meanwhile, it has largely wasted two and a half months in office by lecturing its creditors, sending out mixed messages about its willingness to default and coming up with amateurish overhaul plans.

Now the government needs to get serious and — unless Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is really willing to default — impose vicious capital controls and exit the euro. 
Athens’s eurozone creditors are still hanging tough. Although they do not want Greece to enter a spiral of self-destruction and are worried about the fallout it if does, they do not trust what the government says. As a result, the creditors rightly want to see some meaningful actions before they lend Greece more money. 
Mr. Tsipras needs to show he means business, by suffering some political cost at home as a result of implementing unpopular measures. Otherwise, there is a risk that the government will take the cash, continue to speak with a forked tongue and still default in June if it can’t get a new long-term deal to its liking.
This is the dominant thinking within the troika: Syriza-led Greece is a mendacious, troublesome political upstart that needs to be made an example of, that needs to be broken publicly on the wheel so every Spanish voter looking to support Podemos or Mick pining for Sinn Féin will think twice before questioning the status quo.

The troika's version of the domino theory for the New Cold War that Washington D.C. explicitly launched last year in Kiev with the coup of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich actually got its start a year earlier with eurogroup chief Jeroen Dijsselbloem's bail-in scheme for Cyprus. At the time Russia did not take kindly to the bail in, interpreting it as a direct attack on her large depositors in Cyprus.

But as Andrew Higgins reports in "Waving Cash, Putin Sows E.U. Divisions in an Effort to Break Sanctions" all is now forgiven:
NICOSIA, Cyprus — When Cyprus seized hundreds of millions of dollars from bank depositors, many of them Russians, as part of an internationally brokered deal two years ago to rescue its collapsing financial system, the Russian leader, Vladimir V. Putin, denounced the move as “dangerous” and “unfair,” warning of a sharp chill in relations. 
But Mr. Putin was all smiles recently when he received Cyprus’s president, Nicos Anastasiades, in Moscow. He hailed relations with the Mediterranean nation as “always being truly friendly and mutually beneficial” and agreed to extend — on greatly improved terms for Cyprus — a $2.5 billion Russian loan.
The shift from fury to declarations of eternal friendship displayed Mr. Putin’s well-known flair for tactical back flips. But it also showed his unbending determination to break out of sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States and the European Union for Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and support for armed rebels in eastern Ukraine.
Mr. Putin has methodically targeted, through charm, cash, and the fanning of historical and ideological embers, the European Union’s weakest links in a campaign to assert influence in some of Europe’s most troubled corners. One clear goal is to break fragile Western unity over the conflict in Ukraine.
On Wednesday, Greece’s new left-wing prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, will be the next to visit Moscow. Ahead of the trip, Mr. Tsipras declared himself opposed to sanctions on Russia, describing them as a “dead-end policy.”
On Sunday, Mr. Putin’s efforts to peel away supporters from the European Union opened a new rift, after the United States ambassador in Prague criticized a decision by the president of the Czech Republic, Milos Zeman, to attend a military parade in Moscow on May 9. And in February, Mr. Putin visited Hungary, the European Union’s autocratic backslider, peddling economic deals.
Russia has so far been unable to turn such hand-holding into something more concrete against sanctions that require the approval of all 28 European Union members. But pressure for a rupture is building.
The rupture might be supplied by Poroshenko's obvious backsliding on the Mink 2.0 ceasefire. As David Herszenhorn reports in "Ukrainian Leader Is Open to a Vote on Regional Power":
MOSCOW — President Petro O. Poroshenko of Ukraine on Monday denounced calls for “federalization” of the country, which Russia has endorsed as a way of granting political autonomy to the areas of eastern Ukraine controlled by pro-Russian separatists.
Establishing greater local autonomy and governmental authority is widely viewed as crucial to settling the nearly yearlong war in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, and it was a central plank in a cease-fire accord signed in February. But there are fierce disagreements over how to shape those powers, and how far they would extend.
Speaking at the first meeting of a commission charged with developing amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution, Mr. Poroshenko described federalization as tantamount to breaking apart the country, and said he was so certain Ukrainians would reject the idea that he was willing to put it to a national referendum.
“Why do I dwell in great detail on the idea of federalization?” Mr. Poroshenko said. “Because it is like an infection, a biological weapon, which is being imposed on Ukraine from abroad. Its bacteria are trying to infect Ukraine and destroy our unity.”
Leaders of the self-declared people’s republics in Donetsk and Luhansk have complained bitterly in recent weeks that Mr. Poroshenko and other officials in Kiev, including members of Parliament, were refusing to take the necessary steps to carry out the political provisions in the cease-fire agreement, which was signed in Minsk, Belarus.
***
. . . Separatist leaders noted that they had not been invited to join the commission on constitutional changes, and they took issue with Mr. Poroshenko’s remarks, including his insistence that Ukraine would remain a “unitary state” and his declaration that Ukrainian would remain the country’s only official language.
“These things are absolutely unacceptable,” Andrei Purgin, head of the Donetsk People’s Republic, told the Interfax news agency. “Everything they now say and do contradicts the Minsk agreements that took so much work to achieve.”
As for the commission and the constitutional amendment process, Mr. Purgin told Interfax: “We did not receive any invitations. We don’t have any representatives there.”
I have learned not to underestimate the obedience of the French and Germans when it comes to complying with U.S. orders, but this abrogation of Minsk 2.0 by the junta in Kiev seems impossible to defend. France, Germany, Poland, etc., might fall into the neocon line but it will be hard to secure the unanimity of all 28 EU members for increased Russian sanctions when fighting resumes in Donbass.

That is why it seems like a slam dunk that Putin will extend an offer of financial assistance to Alexis Tsipras when he visits Moscow tomorrow. If favorable terms can be found to extend a $2.5 billion loan to Cyprus, why not the bigger, politically far more important Greece?

Higgins ends his story on Russian rapprochement with Cyprus explaining the result of Dijsselbloem's bail-in. It backfired:
Vasilis Zertalis, the head of Prospectacy, a financial service company, described Cyprus as a “small piece on a big chessboard.” Europe, he said, tried to advance its own position during the 2013 banking crisis by seeking to end Cyprus’s role as a haven for Russian money. 
“They wanted to scare the Russians away,” he said. “But the money that left was from Britain, from other European countries and from America.” 
Ordinary Cypriots and politicians, he said, “all gave up on the European Union” because of the harsh bailout terms in 2013 and “know that the United States will never take a stand against Turkey.” 
“So,” he said, “the only allies Cyprus really has are Russia and maybe China.”
Putin has an opportunity to reach back into the slipstream of time and make a move that Stalin should have made. Stalin should have aided Greece instead of letting the British Empire re-install the monarchy there, setting the stage for the decades-long Cold War.

The choice should be clear now for Tsipras. The heads of the EU want to crush Syriza. I say he has no other choice at this point. He must accept Russia's offer of financial aid.

Thursday, February 19, 2015

Grexit + Serious Trouble in Kiev

Greece has asked for a six-month extension of its loan agreement with the troika (Niki Kitsantonis and James Kanter, "Greece Requests Extension of Loan Agreement and Meets Resistance From Germany"). A meeting will be held tomorrow afternoon in Brussels between eurogroup chief Jeroen Dijsselbloem and Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis. They will attempt for the third time to arrive at an understanding.

The question, as explored in depth this morning by Yves Smith, "Obama Administration Throws Greece Under the Bus; ECB Leak Recommends Capital Controls; Greece Weighing Capitulation," is whether Greece's six-month extension request is a capitulation to the troika's austerity demands. Smith sees it as such:
Things are not going well for Greece. It appears Syriza has largely capitulated to the demands of the Troika. Greece has submitted a request for a loan extension that the Eurogroup will consider Friday. From ekathimerini:
Government officials on Wednesday worked until late finalizing a proposal…
Specifically the government is expected to seek an extension to the so-called Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement, the official name for the European Financial Stability Facility’s loan contract. That contract stipulates, however, that the dispensation of financial assistance is dependant on Greece honoring the terms of the so-called memorandum, which contains the economic reforms that the previous government committed to and which the current SYRIZA-led coalition has contested. Indeed, former Prime Minister Antonis Samaras had made the same request in December last year when he sought to extend the European part of Greece’s bailout program, from the end of the year to February 28. Kathimerini understands that Samaras’s request had then used the words “technical extension to the existing Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement,” the same phrase that the new government was said to be considering last night.
The compromise is expected to satisfy both sides as it would mean Athens can avoid using the phrase “extension of the existing program” and the creditors can avoid using the term “loan agreement.” In substance, however, there would be little difference from the extension sought by Samaras as the terms of the memorandum would have to be respected in order for rescue loans to be disbursed.
This means that Greece is effectively asking for an extension of the bailout, which is what it had refused to do. And that means keeping the “conditionality” as in privatizations and labor-crushing structural reforms, intact. Greece is still fighting to keep some flexibility there but it is not clear they will obtain much. Again from ekathimerini:
The European Commission’s vice president for eurozone affairs, Valdis Dombrovskis, said efforts were under way to reach a compromise by finding “common ground for an extension of the current program.”
He insisted that “the best way forward is to extend the existing program with its conditionality.” Dombrovskis noted, however, that if Greece wants to substitute some of the existing measures in the memorandum with alternatives, it could do so.
In other words, this is a “peace with honor” solution.
Smith then goes on to list what led to the presumed capitulation: 1) the Syriza-led government was abandoned by the United States (no surprise there); 2) Greece is going to run out of a cash February 24, much earlier than originally anticipated; and, most importantly, 3) the European Central Bank (ECB) is fanning a bank run and then restricting the amount of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) that Greece could tap (basically, the ECB has been working to crater the Greek banking system to force Tsipras and Varoufakis to kneel).

The problem for the troika is that clearly Greek's Syriza-led government has no intention of implementing the austerity diktats contained in the loan memo. Can you imagine a situation in Athens (approval for Syriza is sky high) where Tsipras starts taking bids on publics assets and issuing pink slips to government workers? It is not going to happen.

If there is any wiggle room in the six-month extension document, Dijsselbloem will try to eliminate it. For one, Greece insists that the troika's auditors will not be welcomed back to Athens to oversee implementation of the diktats. According to Yves Smith,
[I]t may be that even the concessions that they are apparently prepared to offer will not be deemed sufficient. For instance, it does not appear that Syriza has agreed to let the Troika monitors back in, one of the five demand seen as critical by the Germans. And even though the European Commission spokesperson Valdis Dombrovskis said there might be some negotiating room on specific conditions, that is also inconsistent with the FAZ description of the German stance. Recall that it was a European Commission trial document that Varoufakis said Greece was willing to sign but was firmly nixed by the Eurogroup. 
So it may be that this last round of concessions is meant not as a capitulation but to demonstrate how much Greece was willing to give in the face of implacable Eurogroup demands and was still rebuffed. We’ll know the outcome either way shortly.
This has been my feeling all along about the underlying strategy of Syriza. Syriza is a pro-EU party. Varoufakis spoke eloquently and sincerely -- and in an impromptu manner -- about European unity during his Monday press conference. But if Syriza can prove that the status quo is irrational, which Varoufakis has made some headway communicating over the last several weeks, then a Grexit and the resulting turmoil will not be blamed on Syriza but on the troika.

Kitsantonis and Kanter are reporting that Germany is opposed to Greece's six-month extension request:
Germany is probably the central eurozone member in [Friday's] proceedings, and a German Finance Ministry spokesman, Martin Jäger, said in a statement on Thursday that the letter from Athens was “not a substantial proposal to resolve matters.” He added: “The written document does not meet the criteria agreed in the Eurogroup on Monday.”
Germany's intention is to break Syriza, de-legitimize it. Smith said the German ambassador to Greece requested that Varoufakis be replaced as finance minister. Germany sees Greece as a serf in bondage, and Germany will not accept an outcome that places the nations on equal footing.

The temptation in the West to interpret every relationship as one of lordship and bondage is on display in Ukraine. The junta's loss in Debaltseve is clearly a turning point. The Ukrainian Army which was cracking prior to Debaltseve (to the point that the Gray Lady was reporting plans floated in Kiev to create a brand new army) will probably not be able to recover from the rout it suffered this week. The Saker outlines the Debaltsve turning point as follows:
The real problem for Kiev is that more or less all of the current line of contact can become a potential counter-offensive point for the Novorussians who, by the way, have never concealed their desire to get back all of the historical Novorussian lands. So while the current (relative) cease-fire is all nice and dandy, I think that by this spring, when the Novorussians will have reinforced their infantry with up to 100'00 more men the situation for the Kiev regime will become absolutely horrific and no amount of US weapon deliveries will change that. This might well be the beginning of the end for the Nazi experiment in Kiev. 
The implications for the AngloZionist empire are rather clear: if the 1%ers have any kind of sense of reality left, they should toss out Poroshenko and the rest of the crazies and foster some kind of government of technocrats in charge of drafting a new constitution and organizing a referendum on federalization simply because the folks in Kiev better negotiate while there still is something left to negotiate then to way to be hiding in a surrounded bunker like their hero Hitler did. Alas, I don't think Uncle Sam or the Eurocretins have any common sense left in them. 
Whatever may be the case, by the ballot or by the bullet, but we *are* winning.
With the Ukrainian Army mortally wounded, Poroshenko is trying to get UN peacekeepers introduced to Donbass. Russia has nixed the move.

Would the U.S. try to piece together a "coalition of the willing"? I don't think so; such a move would invite an enormous Russian response.

No, Kiev's days are numbered, and so too apparently the eurzone's.

Wednesday, February 18, 2015

Germany's Reaction to NAF's Victory in Debaltseve Bad Sign for Greece

Debaltseve has fallen to the Novorossiya Armed Forces (NAF). What is interesting about David Herszenhorn's story, "Ukraine Forces Withdraw From Debaltseve, a Strategic Town," is he doesn't let on to where the Ukrainian Army is planning to retreat. 
Andriy Lysenko, a spokesman for the Ukrainian national security and defense council, confirmed the retreat at a briefing in Kiev, the capital, on Wednesday afternoon, and said that the pullout was nearly completed. 
“Today, the armed forces of Ukraine are conducting the organized, planned retreat of units of forces of the antiterrorist operation from the city of Debaltseve,” Mr. Lysenko said. “At the moment, almost 80 percent of the Ukrainian units have retreated from this sector, and this operation is to be completed soon.”
Herszenhorn doesn't mention in his story that Debaltseve is encircled by the NAF. There is nowhere for the Ukrainian Army to flee. But in a story yesterday by Andrew Kramer, "Despite Ukraine Truce, a Battle That Continues," it is clear Poroshenko's troops are surrounded and in deep trouble:
As many as 8,000 Ukrainian soldiers are holed up in the city, a rail hub connecting the capitals of the two rebel regions, Donetsk and Luhansk. Rebels have reportedly sent text messages to phones in the town, telling the soldiers that they have been abandoned and should surrender.
The Ukrainian government maintains that the town was not surrounded before the cease-fire took effect, and that European monitors of the truce should insist that the separatist forces halt their offensive and open a corridor to evacuate the wounded.
The main rebel group, the Donetsk People’s Republic, has said it will not observe the agreement in Debaltseve, saying that it was encircled before the cease-fire began and that it is therefore now an internal region in its enclave, not a section of the front.
The only resupply road into Debaltseve is mined, in range of rebel artillery and at times held by pro-Russian infantry. On Friday, eight Ukrainian soldiers reportedly escaped on foot through the fields, and on Sunday, a dozen or so made it out in a truck [one of the soldiers on the truck said it was dumb luck that they made it out alive]. 
On Tuesday, however, Ukrainian rocket-launching trucks and tanks were barreling down the resupply road toward the fighting, though the cease-fire required both sides to withdraw heavy weaponry starting at midnight Monday.
The Saker explains in a post yesterday, "Yet another monumental failure for the junta," that worse is yet to come for Kiev:
All my sources confirm that Debaltsevo is mostly in Novorussian hands and that the junta forces are in full retreat to the south of the pocket. All the top Novorussian brass was on hand today, including Kononov, Motorola, Givi, Mozgovoi and Zakharchenko as were many tens of Ukrainian prisoners. It appears that the junta forces were unable to provide the kind of resistance they showed in Peski, and that make sense because in Peski they were not surrounded and they had the fire support of Ukrainian forces just north and west of them. This time the cauldron is too deep and the "lid" too strong.
You can see that the cauldron "lid" has now closed on Debaltsevo from the north and that the junta forces are either surrendering of fleeing south where there is quite literally nothing for them to do then to wait until they run out of food and ammo. Bottom line: it's over for the Ukie forces in the Debaltsevo cauldron.
Amazingly, the freaks in Kiev as still insisting that there is no cauldron but only a "bridgehead". The good news is that apparently nobody buys that nonsense any more and the mothers and wifes of the men caught in the cauldron are trying everything they can to force the Ukie high command to accept the Novorussian offer of an evacuation corridor. The try to protest in front of the General Staff building in Kiev, then the blocked traffic. In a particularly poignant moment one of these women put a megaphone next to a cellphone to amplify the voice of her son/husband calling from the cauldron and announcing that they had for about 3 hours of supplies left.
All this is truly catastrophic news for the junta in Kiev. First, their policy of denying the issue made it impossible for their forces to get out while it was still possible. According to Russian military experts, about half of all the (comparatively) combat capable units of the Ukrainian military have been surrounded in this cauldron and that means that 50% of the Ukrainian army is now gone. Second, while Poroshenko and the junta freaks tried as hard as they could to completely deny the very existence of the cauldron, thanks to the Internet and the Russian TV channels most folks in junta-controlled Ukraine know that they are being lied to. That, in turns, means that the regime is loosing the very little credibility it might have had with the general public. Last and not least, now there will be a lot of very ugly recriminations from all sides of the political spectrum about who is guilty for that latest disaster. I would not be surprised one bit if the Ukrainian death-squads (aka Azov battalion & Co.) decided to storm Kiev for two reasons: a) to take out their rage on the regime and b) because it is safer to storm Kiev than Donetsk. Poroshenko better watch his back now. By the way, rumor (unconfirmed!) has it that he already evacuated his family to Germany.
Novorussian intel is reporting that the junta is trying to assemble three battalion tactical groups and numerous MLRS north of the cauldron to try to rescue the surrounded forces, but this will be too little too late. The Novorussians are used to Ukie artillery and they don't fear their armor or, even less so, infantry. Besides, I bet you that now that they are inside Debaltsevo, the Novorussians will deeply dig in. When is the last time that the junta forces succeeded in an urban assault operation? Exactly.
Bottom line: yet another brilliant victory for the Novorussian forces and yet another humiliating defeat for the junta in Kiev.
Judging from the reaction to Debaltseve by various participants at Minsk last week, The Saker is on the money: This is another titanic blunder by the junta which bodes ill not just for Kiev but for the West and Russia as well.

First, Herszenhorn reports Putin's reaction as follows:
[Poroshenko's] comments [asserting bizarrely that Ukrainian troops had accomplished their mission in Debaltseve], however, came after the separatists boasted of controlling the town, and after President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia suggested on Tuesday in Hungary that Ukraine should accept its defeat at Debaltseve by separatist forces he described as “underdogs.”

“Life is life; it just goes on,” Mr. Putin said. “No need to dwell on it.”
Germany's reaction is troubling: more sanctions, more blame for Russia. According to Herszenhorn:
Ms. Merkel’s office condemned the separatist offensive, calling it a clear violation of a cease-fire. 
At a regular government news conference, Steffen Seibert, Chancellor Merkel’s spokesman, said Europe was prepared to support a new round of sanctions against Russia if the situation in Ukraine continued to deteriorate. 
“There has been a massive violation of the cease-fire which took effect on Sunday,” Mr. Seibert said, according to Reuters. He said it was too early to say whether the Minsk peace deal had collapsed. 
“The hopes linked to the Minsk agreement have been seriously damaged,” he said. “We must push for the implementation of the package of measures.” 
“We see the U.N. resolution as an impulse in this direction, and in the coming days, we will work with the possibilities that we have,” he said.
To blame the NAF solely for a violation of the Minsk 2.0 ceasefire is not credible. Even the extremely biased Gray Lady reports that the Ukrainian Army violated the ceasefire. All indications are that the West is going to continue to back the junta. Hopefully, The Saker is right and Kiev will collapse from within either due to a new Maidan uprising or another Right Sector putsch. Because of the lifeline the West keeps extending to Poroshenko, change will have to come from within, and that appears to me to be a longshot.

Germany's insane behavior -- doing the same thing (sanctions) and expecting a different result (surrender of the NAF) -- does not bode well for the outcome of loan negotiations between Greece and the troika. Germany's institutional obtuseness has to be factored in.

On the other hand, one might argue that what determines German behavior is what Washington wants. Germany did not want a civil war in Ukraine, but Merkel has gone along with the disastrous U.S.-backed ATO in the Donbass. Washington supports some flexibility for Greece (see today's NYT unsigned editorial, "Give Greece Room to Maneuver"); Obama has voiced support, albeit meekly, for the Syriza-led government being allowed to implement some of its pro-growth policies. The idea here, as expressed in an "Upshot" today by Neil Irwin, "A Possible Day of Reckoning, Again, for Greece and Europe," is that eventually Germany will capitulate in favor of European unity:
If Greece ends up dropping out of the euro currency zone entirely, with unpredictable ripple effects across the Continent and the world financial system, the events of the last few days will look like a turning point that led to that moment. As of Tuesday, to be clear, markets were predicting nothing of the sort. European stock markets were down only slightly, and the value of the euro was actually up a bit. In effect, markets have seen this show before: the sturm und drang of threats and counterthreats that end in a last-minute deal.
The hedge fund manager Mark Dow offered on Twitter a way to think about the tense negotiations: “EZ bears underestimate the short-term resolve of EZ policy makers. EZ bulls overestimate the long-term viability of the exchange rate system.” 
Here’s what Mr. Dow is saying. We have seen again and again that this generation of European leaders, who built their careers on the altar of European unity, will eventually do what it takes to prevent the common currency from ripping apart. If this recent history is a guide, then the drama of the last few days is merely the theatrics required to get these finance ministers to arrive at a deal. 
On the other hand, Mr. Dow also points out, Europe really does have a big and plausibly unsolvable macroeconomic problem.
One more way to look at it is if Germany goes against her interests in Ukraine by supporting the Washington war drive then she earns the right to lead in negotiations with Greece. This means that the Moscovici document that Varoufakis was willing to sign but that was withdrawn at that last moment by Jeroen Dijsselbloem at Germany's behest will not be recycled. There are reports in the media that this is what is in the works.

Right now, given Germany's reaction to the fall of Debaltseve, it looks like continued impasse between the troika and Greece.

Tuesday, February 17, 2015

Ukraine's Economic Predicament

As the Minsk 2.0 ceasefire dies aborning because Poroshenko refused to admit that 8,000 troops of the Ukrainian Army were surrounded in Debaltseve, Michael Hudson has a tremendous article, "Ukraine Denouement – The Russian Loan and the IMF’s One-Two Punch," that reminds us that at the root of the civil war is a U.S.-backed neoliberal orthodoxy. It is always a fruitful exercise to remind oneself that the Maidan sprang to life when Yanukovych balked at signing an association agreement with Europe because, after crunching the numbers, it was apparent to him that the cost was not sustainable politically.

So Yanukovych took the Russian lifeline instead, and not too long thereafter the Ukrainian president was fleeing for his life.

Hudson begins his piece by outlining Ukraine's current dire economic straits:
The fate of Ukraine is now shifting from the military battlefield back to the arena that counts most: that of international finance. Kiev is broke, having depleted its foreign reserves on waging war that has destroyed its industrial export and coal mining capacity in the Donbass (especially vis-à-vis Russia, which normally has bought 38 percent of Ukraine’s exports). Deeply in debt (with €3 billion falling due on December 20 to Russia), Ukraine faces insolvency if the IMF and Europe do not release new loans next month to pay for new imports as well as Russian and foreign bondholders.
Finance Minister Natalia Yaresko announced on Friday that she hopes to see the money begin to flow in by early March. But Ukraine must meet conditions that seem almost impossible: It must implement an honest budget and start reforming its corrupt oligarchs (who dominate in the Rada and control the bureaucracy), implement more austerity, abolish its environmental protection, and make its industry “attractive” to foreign investors to buy Ukraine’s land, natural resources, monopolies and other assets, presumably at distress prices in view of the country’s recent devastation.
Looming over the IMF loan is the military situation. On January 28, Christine Lagarde said that the IMF would not release more money as long as Ukraine remains at war. Cessation of fighting was to begin Sunday morning. But Right Sector leader Dmytro Yarosh announced that his private army and that of the Azov Battalion will ignore the Minsk agreement and fight against Russian-speakers. He remains a major force within the Rada.
Poroshenko is on record -- not that this means anything for a junta predicated on one fiction peddled after the next -- saying that he will declare martial law if the situation in the Debaltseve is not resolved to Kiev's satisfaction. Given that the junta needs the IMF funds to remain afloat, this provides a powerful incentive for the Novorossiyan Armed Forces (NAF) to keep the 8,000 Ukrainian soldiers bottled up in the Debaltseve cauldron.

Hudson's piece does a good job explaining how the IMF might give short shrift to the €3 billion loan Russia extended to Ukraine:
The IMF has been drawn into U.S. confrontation with Russia in its role as coordinating Kiev foreign debt refinancing. It has stated that private-sector creditors must take a haircut, given that Kiev can’t pay the money its oligarchs have either stolen or spent on war. But what of the €3 billion that Russia’s sovereign wealth fund loaned Ukraine, under London rules that prevent such haircuts? Russia has complained that Ukraine’s budget makes no provision for payment. Will the IMF accept this budget as qualifying for a bailout, treating Russia as an odious creditor? If so, what kind of legal precedent would this set for sovereign debt negotiations in years to come?
International debt settlement rules were thrown into a turmoil last year when U.S. Judge Griesa gave a highly idiosyncratic interpretation of the pari passu clause with regard to Argentina’s sovereign debts. The clause states that all creditors must be treated equally. According to Griesa (uniquely), this means that if any creditor or vulture fund refuses to participate in a debt writedown, no such agreement can be reached and the sovereign government cannot pay any bondholders anywhere in the world, regardless of what foreign jurisdiction the bonds were issued under.
This bizarre interpretation of the “equal treatment” principle has never been strictly applied. Inter-governmental debts owed to the IMF, ECB and other international agencies have not been written down in keeping with private-sector debts. Russia’s loan was carefully framed in keeping with London rules. But U.S. diplomats have been openly – indeed, noisily and publicly – discussing how to “stiff” Russia. They even have thought about claiming that Russia’s Ukraine loans (to help it pay for gas to operate its factories and heat its homes) are an odious debt, or a form of foreign aid, or subject to anti-Russian sanctions. The aim is to make Russia “less equal,” transforming the concept of pari passu as it applies to sovereign debt.
Further, Hudson limns the rent-seeking logic that -- from Ireland and Greece to Ukraine -- lies behind the IMF's austerity diktats:
IMF loans are made mainly to enable governments to pay foreign bondholders and bankers, not spend on social programs or domestic economic recovery. Sovereign debtors must agree to IMF “conditionalities” in order to get enough credit to enable bondholders to take their money and run, avoiding haircuts and leaving “taxpayers” to bear the cost of capital flight and corruption.
The first conditionality is the guiding principle of neoliberal economics: that foreign debts can be paid by squeezing out a domestic budget surplus. The myth is that austerity programs and cuts in public spending will enable governments to pay foreign-currency debts – as if there is no “transfer problem.” 
The reality is that austerity causes deeper economic shrinkage and widens the budget deficit. And no matter how much domestic revenue the government squeezes out of the economy, it can pay foreign debts only in two ways: by exporting more, or by selling its public domain to foreign investors. The latter option leads to privatizing public infrastructure, replacing subsidized basic services with rent-extraction and future capital flight. So the IMF’s “solution” to the deb problem has the effect of making it worse – requiring yet further privatization sell-offs.
This is why the IMF has been wrong in its economic forecasts for Ukraine year after year, just as its prescriptions have devastated Ireland and Greece, and Third World economies from the 1970s onward. Its destructive financial policy must be seen as deliberate, not an innocent forecasting error. But the penalty for following this junk economics must be paid by the indebted victim.
In the wake of austerity, the IMF throws its Number Two punch. The debtor economy must pay by selling off whatever assets the government can find that foreign investors want. For Ukraine, investors want its rich farmland. Monsanto has been leasing its land and would like to buy. But Ukraine has a law against alienating its farmland and agricultural land to foreigners. The IMF no doubt will insist on repeal of this law, along with Ukraine’s dismantling of public regulations against foreign investment.
This is what Greece is fighting to free herself of. Since it is the very logic of Western capitalist hegemony, Yanis Varoufakis has repeatedly arrived at impasse with his interlocutors in Brussels. All he is asking for is a bridge loan of six months to discuss the technicalities of the troika's bailout. Not allowed.

And this is why war must continue in Ukraine. The IMF prescriptions Kiev must implement can only be carried out if the public is distracted by war. But herein lies the rub. The IMF cannot loan to a nation at war. Finally then after a year it seems that the Kiev junta has arrived at a day of reckoning.

Hudson holds out the possibility that Europe will come to its senses suddenly and break with the United States and align with Russia:
We can now see why the EU/IMF austerity plan that Yanukovich rejected made it clear why the United States sponsored last February’s coup in Kiev. The austerity that was called for, the removal of consumer subsidies and dismantling of public services would have led to an anti-West reaction turning Ukraine strongly back toward Russia. The Maidan coup sought to prevent this by making a war scar separating Western Ukraine from the East, leaving the country seemingly no choice but to turn West and lose its infrastructure to the privatizers and neo-rentiers. 
But the U.S. plan may lead Europe to seek an economic bridge to Russia and the BRICS, away from the U.S. orbit. That is the diplomatic risk when a great power forces other nations to choose one side or the other.
Sadly, I don't see this happening. The hive mind in Brussels, Berlin and other European capitals is still too melded with Washington D.C. If the junta can't get money from the IMF because Poroshenko has declared martial law, Kiev will widen the war and likely receive billions in direct military aid from the West. The war will go on until Kiev collapses.