Showing posts with label Patrick Cockburn. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Patrick Cockburn. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 20, 2018

The Crime of the Century

I read Patrick Cockburn's The Rise of Islamic State (2015) over the weekend. I've had a copy of the book for several months, but what motivated me to pick it up on Saturday and dig in -- it's a quick read -- was a story in The New York Times by Catherine Porter, "Canada Struggles as It Opens Its Arms to Victims of ISIS," about how refugee agencies in Canada have been overwhelmed by 1,200 Yazidis who were victims of ISIS.

This seems to me to be the crime of the century, the whole Timber Sycamore fiasco of the Obama administration -- the covert war against Syria which uses Al-Qaeda-type groups, as Cockburn prefers to call them, of which ISIS was one, which is to say, Salafi jihadists financed by the Gulf monarchies, as proxies.

As Glen Ford noted last week in "Going Down With the Bad Ship U.S.A.":
“Do you realize now what you’ve done?” Vladimir Putin demanded of the Americans, at the United Nations, in 2015. “It is hypocritical and irresponsible to make loud declarations about the threat of international terrorism while turning a blind eye to the channels of financing and supporting terrorists, including the process of trafficking and illicit trade in oil and arms. It would be equally irresponsible to try to manipulate extremist groups and place them at one's service in order to achieve one's own political goals in the hope of later dealing with them or, in other words, liquidating them.”
“The U.S. and its junior partners could only project power in the region through an alliance with Islamic jihadist terror.”
Washington’s jihadist strategy has rapidly unraveled ever since. The empire was unmasked in the world’s most public forum, revealing the utter depravity of U.S. policy and, more importantly, the weakness of Washington’s position in the region. The mighty fortress of global capital, the self-appointed defender of the world economic “order,” was revealed as, not just in collusion with head-chopping, women-enslaving, sectarian mass-murdering terrorists, but militarily dependent on the very forces it claims to wage a twilight, “generational” battle to destroy. The U.S. has been spouting The Mother of All Lies, and most of humanity knows it. Deep down, most Americans suspect as much, too.
I read Cockburn's book on ISIS hoping that he would document the links between foreign intelligence agencies and the Salafists. He does, but not in an exhaustive or explicit fashion. He simply asserts that foreign intelligence agencies play an outsize role in Al-Qaeda-type organizations. He mentions the "moderate rebels" canard, which is where pro-Western opposition militias were dummied up to act as pass-throughs for sophisticated weapons, like anti-tank missiles, to the jihadists.

It is all appalling, and the devastated, traumatized Yazidis that Canada is dealing with are just one example. How about the European refugee crisis? The devastated cities of Iraq and Syria? The hundreds of thousands of dead?

What is the appropriate punishment for this covert war? With the Vietnam War at least there was the spectacular humiliation of a super power defeated militarily by a people's army; that acted as a check on U.S. hubris for a decade. So far there has been nothing of the sort in Syria.

The U.S. cannot risk another such defeat in a global environment where the Washington Consensus is shattering and the Dragon and the Bear are on the rise.

So jihadist proxies are what it is going to have to be for the foreseeable future: contrived chemical weapons attacks, punitive U.S. cruise missile strikes, and Salafi foot soldiers.

The defeat of the YPG/YPJ Kurdish militia at the hands of the Turkish Army and its FSA re-branded remnants of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra is both a blessing and a curse for the United States. A blessing because the Syrian Kurds have been exposed as critically dependent on U.S. air power. The battle for Kobani that  the YPG/YPJ won against ISIS, handing the caliphate its first significant battlefield defeat the fall of 2014, and which marks the end of Cockburn's book, appears in retrospect to have been singularly dependent on the U.S. Air Force. And a curse because the retreat from Afrin deflates the myth of the Syrian PKK's martial prowess, much as ISIS's attack on Iraqi Kurdistan dealt a blow to the peshmerga, a blow which I don't think it ever recovered.

The U.S. is stymied. It is in this environment that a major blunder could be made. (See Bill van Auken's "Threat of US attack on Syria grows amid fall of 'rebel' stronghold." The best thing I've read on the war in Syria in a while.)

The one hope I harbor is that though U.S. elites are out of touch, they are not so out of touch to think they can embark on another major military escalation in the Middle East without there being a punishing political correction.

The problem here though is that the Democrats are just as hawkish as the GOP now.

Tuesday, February 7, 2017

Two Must-Reads by Patrick Cockburn and Gareth Porter

A couple must-reads from the weekend are Patrick Cockburn's "Misreporting Iraq and Syria" and an interview of Gareth Porter by Dennis Bernstein, "The Double Standard on Yemen’s Suffering."

Cockburn drives home the complete breakdown of journalistic standards in the Western media when it came to reporting on East Aleppo. Qaeda-spread rumors of atrocities perpetrated by Syrian government forces were immediately and uncritically whisked to the front page.

The big takeaway from Cockburn's piece is that Western reporting on Syria in general and East Aleppo in particular has been outsourced to jihadis. No independent, secular journalists remain in "opposition" territory. So for every Anne Barnard story you read where she communicates with an "anti-government activist" via Skype, that's likely a Nusra fighter being featured in the "newspaper of record." As Cockburn reminds us,
Since at least 2013 it has been too dangerous for journalists to visit rebel-held areas because of well-founded fears that they will be kidnapped and held to ransom or murdered, usually by decapitation. Journalists who took the risk paid a heavy price: James Foley was kidnapped in November 2012 and executed by Islamic State in August 2014. Steven Sotloff was kidnapped in Aleppo in August 2013 and beheaded soon after Foley. But there is tremendous public demand to know what is happening in such places, and news providers, almost without exception, have responded by delegating their reporting to local media and political activists, who now appear regularly on television screens across the world. In areas controlled by people so dangerous no foreign journalist dare set foot among them, it has never been plausible that unaffiliated local citizens would be allowed to report freely.
In East Aleppo any reporting had to be done under licence from one of the Salafi-jihadi groups which dominated the armed opposition and controlled the area – including Jabhat al-Nusra, formerly known as the Syrian branch of al-Qaida. What happens to people who criticise, oppose or even act independently of these extremist groups was made clear in an Amnesty International report published last year and entitled ‘Torture Was My Punishment’: Abduction, Torture and Summary Killings under Armed Group Rule in Aleppo and Idlib. Ibrahim, whom al-Nusra fighters hung from the ceiling by his wrists while they beat him for holding a meeting to commemorate the 2011 uprising without their permission, is quoted as saying: ‘I heard and read about the government security forces’ torture techniques. I thought I would be safe from that now that I am living in an opposition-held area. I was wrong. I was subjected to the same torture techniques but at the hands of Jabhat al-Nusra.’
The fact that groups linked to al-Qaida had a monopoly on the supply of news from East Aleppo doesn’t necessarily mean that the reports in the press about the devastating effects of shelling and bombing were untrue. Pictures of flattened buildings and civilians covered in cement dust weren’t fabricated. But they were selective. It’s worth recalling that – according to UN figures – there were between 8000 and 10,000 rebel fighters in East Aleppo, yet almost none of the videos on TV ever showed any armed men. Western broadcasters commonly referred to the groups defending East Aleppo as ‘the opposition’ with no mention of al-Qaida or its associated groups. There was an implicit assumption that all the inhabitants of East Aleppo were firmly opposed to Assad and supported the insurgents, yet it’s striking that when offered a choice in mid-December only a third of evacuees– 36,000 – asked to be taken to rebel-held Idlib. The majority – 80,000 – elected to go to government-held territory in West Aleppo. This isn’t necessarily because they expected to be treated well by the government authorities – it’s just that they believed life under the rebels would be even more dangerous. In the Syrian civil war, the choice is often between bad and worse.
The second half of Cockburn's article is devoted to the media blackout of the U.S.-led siege of Mosul, what Cockburn calls the largest urban combat theater post-WWII.

Media blackout is one of the points Gareth Porter makes in his interview. The Saudi's are starving Yemen with critical assistance of the United States. Thirty-one percent of children under five are suffering from acute malnutrition, a.k.a., starvation. Without U.S. logistical support the Saudi coalition could not maintain its blockade. Do news consumers in the U.S. get treated to that fact? Hardly ever.

Porter concludes the interview by mentioning how Iran is especially impacted by Trump's immigration ban and how deeply intertwined Saudi Arabia is with the U.S. deep state, which is in turn largely privatized:
DB: Now, I notice that the Saudis didn’t make the Trump [immigration] ban list. Although there would be a lot of good reasons why they might be on it. Can you put that in context?
GP: Yeah. If there was a ban that reflected the degree of risk, relative degree of risk, let’s not call it the absolute degree, but the relative degree of risk from people trying to gain entry into the United States from the Middle East, you would certainly have to say that Saudi Arabia was the top risk because of the number of jihadists who have come from Saudi Arabia, and have gone to, of course, Syria, as well as Iraq, to participate in those jihadist campaigns.
And, of course, as you say, Saudi Arabia is not included. The fact is, of course, that that list of countries whose people are banned from coming into the United States is entirely political, yet includes Iran which is, of course, not a risk at all. There’s simply no basis for saying that there’s the slightest risk from Iran because it has not, in fact, been at war with the United States. Because it has been an ally of the United States against the jihadists in those countries where the United States faces the greatest risks… the countries from which the Unites States faces the greatest risks.
DB: But that hasn’t stopped the Trump administration from going and sort of implementing its policies particularly focused on… there are a number of Iranians now really directly impacted, right?
GP: That’s right. I mean, Iranians have been severely impacted by this. Students, of course, the largest number of graduate students in American universities from the rest of the world, as I understand it, are Iranians, at this point, certainly higher education, the higher levels of education. 
And so, many, many Iranians now have been caught in trying to get back to the United States, or who needed to visit home, from American universities, and this was a very serious problem for them. But I would just add that, you know, clearly this administration is not basing its first major foreign policy decision on the situation in the Middle East, or the degree of risk. But it’s basing it on the appeal to the constituency that elected Donald Trump.
DB: Alright, and just, again, to step back a little bit, the situation on the ground in Yemen at this moment is dire. And, is there any attempt at a truce, a treaty? There’s a lot of focus on Syria.
GP: Right. There have been negotiations going on now for many months, between the Houthis on one side, and the Yemeni government that was put into power, put back into power, by the Saudis and their coalition, after the war began.
Well, after the war began, these negotiations have been stalled because the Saudi supported officials in those negotiations have essentially refused to allow the Houthis to basically hold onto their weapons, until the process is completed. I mean, they have been demanding a prior giving up of weapons before the settlement is reached, in terms of the political part of it. So, we’re still not close to, as I understand it, to actually having a peace agreement, and a durable ceasefire.
And the United States, you know, the Obama administration, was at least trying to push the Saudis to be a bit more reasonable. But, I’m sorry to say that the problem we face here is that the U.S. government, (and I’m quite sure that the Trump administration will not be very different, if at all, from the Obama administration in this regard) the permanent government, the national security government or the “permanent war government,” as I call it, of the United States is so dependent, or shall we say so cozy with the Saudis, particularly, that they have basically screwed up Syria, they have destabilized and caused a terrible humanitarian crisis in Syria, then they went and did the same thing in Yemen, by supporting the Saudis.
Why did they do it? Because the Pentagon, the CIA and the NSA all have sweetheart deals with the Saudis which are worth a great deal of money. Both sale of arms and basically selling of intelligence services to the Saudis are at the heart of this. And also, of course, there’s access to bases that… at least the base in Bahrain, the naval base in Bahrain, which the United States covets, the U.S. Navy covets. And, therefore, the Saudis control that base, and that’s another thing that the permanent war state isn’t unwilling to give up.
DB: And this is big business in the context of the Pentagon.
GP: It is.
DB: By the way, what are the corporations… who are we talking about now… who are happy about this?
GP: Well, you’re talking about all of the major arms suppliers. The big four, the big five of aircraft, aerospace companies who have been able to sell more weapon systems to the Saudis because of the political relationship that exists between the United States and the Saudi government. Those people are obviously very concerned, and very happy about the situation. But when you talk about big business it’s not just the private companies.
What I have found, just to summarize… the conclusion that I’ve come to in my study of the permanent war state, is that what we used to think of as a state bureaucracy has morphed into a combination of state bureaucracy and private contractors. They have merged so totally that there’s no distinction anymore. The lines have been blurred. And the Pentagon and the CIA and the NSA are all now, basically, more like corporations than they are public services, or state services, to the American people.

Monday, March 23, 2015

Islamic State a Spook-Run Operation

One of the principal canards about Islamic State peddled in the Western press is that the caliphate is an indigenous formation growing out of grievances that Sunnis have with the Shiite-majority government of Iraq and the Alawites of Syria. But besides the high profile of the Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, where is there any evidence that ISIS is a homegrown movement? In fact, the overwhelming preponderance of evidence is that ISIS is exogenous to Iraq and Syria, attracting foreign fighters, thanks to a sophisticated online presence, to enter the caliphate through Turkey.

Patrick Cockburn has recently published a number of stories for The Independent describing life inside Islamic State. (The stories have been re-posted on the CounterPunch website.) Cockburn
interviews members of the growing Sunni diaspora in Iraqi Kurdistan, people, mostly from Anbar Province, who have fled the ISIS occupation of their towns and cities.

Cockburn's "The One-Day Siege: ISIS’s Conquest of Hit" is a good example:
It was on 4 October last year that Isis captured the small city of Hit, seizing complete control in the space of just a few hours. For the city’s 100,000 mostly Sunni residents the takeover by the self-proclaimed Islamic State has brought changes that some support, but others deeply resent. 
Among those living in Hit when Isis rolled in was Faisal, a 35-year-old government employee who is married with two children, and a keen observer of all that has befallen the agricultural centre and former transport hub over the past five months. 
He recently fled to the Kurdish capital, Erbil, where he described to me the rule of Isis and its impact on Hit, starting with the day the city was captured.
Faisal goes on to describe a religious police state where there is little money to pay for food, little communication with the outside world, and no work except for the jihadis -- all overseen by foreign fighters and imams:
The internet has not worked in Anbar Province for the last eight months, compelling people to use satellite internet connections that are monitored by Isis. More recently the group offered a limited internet service, though this is only available in internet offices and other locations monitored by the jihadist group. There is no internet access from private homes, while in the public locations, Faisal says, “Isis can spy on computers so they can see what you are surfing and to whom you are talking”.
Predictably, Isis focuses on religion and spreading its variant of Islam. Faisal says: “Many preachers (imams) were replaced by foreign preachers from the Arab world, mostly Saudis, Tunisians and Libyans, as well as Afghans. Some new imams are appointed temporarily just for Friday speech and prayer, while others are permanent appointments. Isis removed some of the old preachers who have left for Baghdad or KRG (the Kurdish-controlled region). These are often Sufis, whose beliefs are rejected by Isis.”
There are many other signs of Isis imposing its cultural agenda in Hit. Faisal says that “at the entrance to every main street and bazaar, there are Isis groups holding black dresses that cover the whole body including the face and head. If a woman does not have one, she must buy one [for about £8] and the money goes to the Isis treasury.”
Are people joining Isis in Hit? Faisal says they do, often for economic reasons. “I know many people in my neighbourhood in Hit who joined Isis,” he says. “They are paid little money, about 175,000 dinars (£80), but they say that the salary is enough because they also enjoy many privileges, including free fuel, cooking gas, sugar, tea, bread, and many other foodstuffs and services.
“Isis still has a strong financial basis. It confiscates the houses of the people who were previously employed in the police, courts, and security forces. These houses, and any furniture in them, are confiscated by the Sharia (legal or religious) court, where the judges are Libyan and Tunisian, though the other staff are locals. The ruling authority in Hit is headed by the military governor, the religious (legal) governor, the security governor and finally the administrative governor.”
Faisal’s account of life in Hit is confirmed by eyewitnesses from other parts of the Islamic State. Isis at first benefited from widespread popular relief that the Iraqi Army was gone, but there is deepening resentment against the enforcement of outlandish rules on personal behaviour that is contrary to local religious and social traditions. These include women being forced to wear the niqab (covering their faces), obligatory attendance at prayers and the destruction of mosques, such as the Younis mosque in Mosul, deemed by Isis to be un-Islamic shrines.
There is also the fear of conscription of young men to fight for the Islamic State, an obligation that is increasingly difficult to avoid and is leading many families to try to leave Isis-controlled territory, which is not easy to do.
But despite resentment by many at its takeover of mosques and schools, Isis is able to use these to propagate its views and to make converts – something that may strengthen the forces of the Islamic State. Conscription does not seem to have diluted the fanaticism of Isis fighters, or their willingness to take heavy casualties, according to Kurdish commanders who have come under attack by Isis units in recent months.
Local eyewitnesses confirm that the unpopularity of Isis is not universal. Sameer, a Kurdish shopkeeper in Mosul, told The Independent last November that “in spite of the coalition air strikes every night and every morning, Isis increases in terms of the number of its men and the territory they occupy”.
Since then, Isis has retreated from much of the Sinjar area west of Mosul, but Ali Hussein Mustafa, a 21-year-old university student who left Mosul last month, says that “many Isis men were much better than the fighters of the Iraqi Army in dealing with people and helping them”.
He says this better behaviour was not invariable and criticised Isis fighters at some checkpoints who harassed or swore at women whose face was not hidden. He added, however, that many people had now concluded that “Isis rule is no better, and maybe worse, than what they endured before [when the US or Iraqi government was in charge of Mosul from 2003 to 2014]”.
It should be said that Patrick Cockburn has always stuck to the "ISIS is an indigenous response to Shiite misrule of al-Maliki" argument, putting the leftist journalist in line with the U.S. State Department. But recently he published a story, "Is the Defeat of ISIS in Iraq Inevitable?," that sort of softened his pro-Sunni "It's all Maliki's fault" slant:
As Isis’s columns advanced last year, its fighters carried out massacres to spread fear just as Saddam Hussein had done against the Kurds and Shia a quarter of a century earlier. When the government’s Badush prison, near Mosul, was captured by Isis, its fighters slaughtered 670 Shia prisoners. At Camp Speicher, outside Tikrit, 800 Shia cadets were lined up in front of trenches and machine-gunned. Pictures of the scene resemble those of atrocities carried out by the German army in Russia in 1941. In August, when Isis fighters stormed into Kurdish-held regions, they targeted the Yazidis as “pagans” to be murdered, raped and enslaved.
To me it seems obvious that ISIS is a spook-run operation, meaning a government intelligence bureau is either at the control board or actively assisting a small leadership group in directing the caliphate. Popular movements are messy and enthusiastic, always either falling short or spilling over stated objectives in a public way. ISIS is nothing of the sort. It is opaque and mercenary; its messaging strictly controlled. No, this is definitely a top-down production.

When ISIS suffered a defeat recently in Tikrit at the hands of the Iraqi Army and Shiite militias working in concert with Kurdish pesh merga there was a prompt asymmetrical response: the terror attack targeting tourists at a museum in Tunisia and the suicide bombings at two Zaydi Shiite mosques in Sana. This reminded me of the old Rumsfeld neocon logic of "When you have a problem one way to solve it is to make it bigger."

Scott Shane had a story, a good one, that was featured prominently on The New York Times website for most of the weekend. In "From Minneapolis to ISIS: An American’s Path to Jihad," it is clear that the young Somali men from Minneapolis were able to hook up with ISIS recruiters at a mosque in Bloomington. Answer the question of who paid for their plane tickets and we'll be a little clearer how the ISIS network operates and who funds it.

And it will turn out that ISIS is no different than Al Qaeda, an organization funded and supported by the Gulf Sheikhdoms.

Thursday, October 2, 2014

Coups and Assassinations Coming Shortly to Kabul

I'm sure the Gray Lady ran a biographical perspective piece on Ashraf Ghani at some point when he emerged out of the pack of presidential contenders to replace the increasingly recalcitrant U.S. quisling Hamid Karzai. I must have missed it. But I didn't miss the ringing endorsement of the newly -- one doesn't want to say "elected" because that doesn't really capture the process that led to Ghani assuming the title of president -- seated leader of Afghanistan by Ralph Nader.

I am familiar with Ralph Nader. I changed my life because of his Green Party candidacy for president in 2000. He doesn't give out pro forma recommendations; he does't play the usual kind of quid pro quo, "I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine"-type of politics. He's an iconoclast with a lot of pride who does things his own way.

I remember being at a campaign event early on in the 2000 election, a fundraiser. Nader was speaking at a coffee house; he was talking about the legacy of legislature-backed stadium giveaways to professional sports teams. He mentioned the amount of money Seahawks owner Paul Allen had spent to win the initiative campaign to build what is currently named CenturyLink Field. I called from out of the small crowd surrounding him the correct figure, "Five million dollars in five weeks." Nader shot me the steely look -- even though I wrote a check (I can't remember how much) to be in attendance -- of a man who didn't like to be interrupted but one who appreciated another armed with the facts willing to raise his voice.

So Nader's recommendation of Ghani means something. And that is supported in a story today by Azam Ahmed and Declan Walsh, "New Afghan Leader, Putting Focus on Graft, Revives Bank Fraud Inquiry":
KABUL, Afghanistan — Signaling his intent to improve the Afghan government’s poor reputation on corruption, President Ashraf Ghani on Wednesday ordered a new examination of the stagnant Kabul Bank fraud prosecutions. 
The bank, likened to a roughly $800 million Ponzi scheme after powerful insiders pillaged it through fraudulent loans, has come to symbolize the legal impunity enjoyed by Afghanistan’s elite. And the case has become a major sticking point for donor nations and the International Monetary Fund, which at one point made prosecution of those responsible for the bank’s collapse a condition of any new loans to the government.
Just three days into Mr. Ghani’s presidency, his decree about the bank was clearly meant to reassure Western partners that aid to the country would not be a bad investment. The day before, as Afghanistan signed long-term security deals with the United States and NATO, Mr. Ghani had emphasized the importance of international aid in tackling “shared challenges.”
The Gray Lady, at times able to comport herself in stunning fashion, has an excellent unsigned editorial today, "Paying Afghanistan’s Bills," that I will quote in its entirety because it does such a fine job defining those "shared challenges":
By the end of the year, Congress will have appropriated more money for Afghanistan’s reconstruction, when adjusted for inflation, than the United States spent rebuilding 16 European nations after World War II under the Marshall Plan. 
A staggering portion of that money — $104 billion — has been mismanaged and stolen. Much of what was built is crumbling or will be unsustainable. Well-connected Afghans smuggled millions of stolen aid money in suitcases that were checked onto Dubai-bound flights. The Afghan government largely turned a blind eye to widespread malfeasance. Even as revelations of fraud and abuse stacked up, the United States continued shoveling money year after year because cutting off the financial spigot was seen as a sure way to doom the war effort. 
As the Pentagon winds down its combat mission there at the end of the year, it’s tempting to think of the Afghan war as a chapter that is coming to an end — at least for American taxpayers. But, as things stand, the United States and its allies will continue paying Afghanistan’s bills for the foreseeable future. That commitment was solidified Tuesday as the American ambassador in Kabul and Afghanistan’s security adviser signed a bilateral security agreement that will keep a small contingent of NATO troops there for at least two years. 
The United States and NATO partners recently agreed to spend $5.1 billion a year to pay for the army and police, until at least 2017. Western donors are expected to continue to give billions more for reconstruction and other initiatives, recognizing that Afghanistan won’t be weaned off international aid anytime soon. In fact, the government appears to be broke.
A few weeks ago, Afghanistan’s Finance Ministry made an urgent plea to the United States for a $537 million bailout, warning that it would otherwise not be able to make payroll. That’s part of a broader, worrisome trend. The International Monetary Fund estimates that Afghanistan will face a financial gap of roughly $7.7 billion annually between now and 2018. 
If the flow of money is to keep going, the Afghan government has to prove that it can be trusted. And, for its part, Congress should not hesitate to cut off the aid if corruption remains unabated. 
Afghanistan’s new president, Ashraf Ghani, who took office on Monday, has pledged to stamp out graft. “I am not corrupt, and I am not going to encourage corruption, tolerate it or become the instrument,” the president, a former World Bank executive, told the BBC in an interview. 
That will be easier said than done in a country where back-room deals are the norm. Mr. Ghani can show he is serious by appointing and empowering a new attorney general willing to take on unscrupulous officials. His proposal to lead a new procurement board is commendable because it would make him personally accountable. 
Of the $104 billion that American lawmakers have appropriated for Afghan reconstruction, nearly $16 billion remains unspent, according to John Sopko, the inspector general who is overseeing the reconstruction effort. As one of the poorest nations on earth, Afghanistan clearly has plenty of needs. But the American agencies tasked with spending the money must do a better job identifying priorities, setting realistic goals and adopting stronger safeguards. 
Delivering a speech at Georgetown University recently, Mr. Sopko marveled at the Marshall Plan comparison. “What have we gotten for the investment?” he asked.
My only problem with the editorial is the impression it casts that USG has somehow been a duped victim of all this fiscal mismanagement rather than its chief architect. The American way of doing things is just as corrupt as the Afghan way of doing things. What went on with the fleecing of Kabul Bank had a precedent in the American savings and loan scandals of the 1980s.

With the Taliban ascendant -- this year was the deadliest for the Afghan police since the U.S.-led occupation began 13-years ago -- the U.S. experience in Iraq is noteworthy. Once the U.S. military exited, the Iraqi Army became little more than an elaborate system of graft, a Ponzi scheme, where officers purchase their commissions to receive kickbacks from recruits, who may or may not actually be reporting for duty. This is not to say that this doesn't occur when the U.S. is in country maintaining a supervisory role; it is just that the corruption doesn't run so rampant the the entire system implodes as it did in Iraq. The ability of American military supervisors to call in airstrikes probably has something to do with it too.

A singular description of the corruption-fueled collapse of the Iraqi military can be found in an interview of Patrick Cockburn by Tariq Ali, "The Rise of ISIS and the Origins of the New Middle East War," that appeared earlier in the week on the Counterpunch web site:
Tariq Ali: And so, if we come down to the speed with which this particular organisation swept through parts of Iraq, which you yourself talk about in the book, how do you explain the total collapse of the Iraqi army, Patrick? Is it in that sense not too much different from the army created by the West in Afghanistan, the fact that they are not prepared to fight and die for the United States? At that time it was, al-Qaeda and Iraq was only one of a number of serious resistance movements to the occupation but it was very evident in Baghdad at the time when I went to American briefings that anything that happened was attributed by the spokesman, the military spokesman, to al-Qaeda. Of course this played well back in the US, but in Iraq it had quite the contrary effect which people who were against the occupation think, oh it’s al-Qaeda who’s doing all this resisting, let’s go an get a black flag and join them…

Patrick Cockburn: Yeah, and even more so. I mean I think this is, it’s difficult to think of another example in history, where there are 300 or 350 thousand men in the Iraqi army, they’d spent 41.6 billion dollars on this army over the last three years. But it disintegrated because of an attack by maybe a couple of thousand people in Mosul. Why did it happen? Well, the army was rather extraordinary. I mean one Iraqi general I was talking to who’d been forcibly retired said at the beginning of the disaster was the Americans, [who] when they set it up, insisted that supplies and things like that should be outsourced, privatised. 
So immediately a colonel of a battalion nominally of 600 men would get money for 600 men, [but] in fact there were only 200 men in it, and would pocket the difference, which was spread out among the officers. And this applied to fuel, it applied to ammunition… At the time of the fall of Mosul there are meant to be 30,000 troops there. In fact, it’s estimated that only one in three was there. Because what you did was: you joined the army, you got your full salary and then you kicked back half that salary to your officer, who spread it among the officers. So I remember about a year ago talking to a senior Iraqi politician, and who said look: the army’s going to collapse if it’s attacked. I said surely some will fight, he said: no no no, you don’t understand. These officers are not soldiers, they’re investors! 
They have no interest in fighting anybody; they have interest in making money out of their investment. Of course you had to buy your position. So in 2009, you want to be a colonel in the Iraqi army, it’ll cost you about 20,000 dollars, more recently it cost you about $200,000. You want to be divisional commander, and there are 15 divisions, it will cost you about 2 million. Of course, there are other ways of making money. Checkpoints on the roads act as sort of customs barriers and a tariff on each truck going through would be paid. So that’s why they ran away, led by their commanding officer, the three commanding generals got into a helicopter in civilian clothes and fled to Erbil, the Kurdish capital. And that led to the final dissolution of the army. 
Tariq Ali: It is one of the most astonishing events in recent history, Patrick. I mean can you think of any other equivalent, even in the last century?
Patrick Cockburn: I can’t think of any of such a large well-equipped army disintegrating. You could say that Saddam’s army disintegrated in ’91 when attacked by the Americans, and again in 2003. But then it was attacked by the largest military force in the world and was being bombed. So it’s not a parallel. It of course shows that ISIS was quite effective in spreading terror through social media, by films of it decapitating Shia captives. So the soldiers were terrified of ISIS.
Nader's ringing endorsement of Ghani makes me thinks that he is different. If he is, we'll know soon enough. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Working Group on Bribery "will release its report, 'Unfinished Business,' which names every beneficiary of the Kabul Bank scandal" today according to Ahmed and Walsh. If Ghani goes after those named, even if they are the elite, the palace intrigue will grow thick. Coups and assassinations can't be far off.

Tuesday, September 23, 2014

The Far Enemy Attacks ISIS Bases in Northern Syria: Don't Expect Anything to Change Much

With the U.S. bombing Islamic State's stronghold in northern Syria, it is important to read the story by David Kirkpatrick and Omar al-Jawoshy that accompanies it on the front page. 

"Weeks of U.S. Strikes Fail to Dislodge ISIS in Iraq" confirms the pessimistic assessment provided yesterday on Counterpunch by veteran Middle East reporter Patrick Cockburn, "The Absurdity of U.S. Policy in Syria":
Likewise in Iraq, air strikes can only do so much. The government in Baghdad and the Iraqi army are still Shia-dominated and, however much the Sunni in Iraq dislike IS, they are even more frightened of its opponents. The US will try to split Sunni tribes and neighbourhoods away from the fundamentalists as it did in 2007, but there were then 150,000 US troops in the country and al-Qa’ida in Iraq was much weaker than IS. At the same time, it will find it difficult to advance further because, aside from Baghdad, it has already seized the areas where live the 20 per cent of Iraqis who are Sunni Arab. In Syria at least 60 per cent of the population are Sunni Arabs, meaning that IS’s natural constituency is much bigger.
Kirkpatrick and Jawoshy outline the problems the U.S. is having in kick-starting the Sunni Awakening:
The Sunni tribes of Anbar and other areas drove Qaeda-linked militants out of the area seven years ago with American military help, in what became known as the Sunni Awakening. But the tribes’ alienation from the subsequent authoritarian and Shiite-led government in Baghdad opened the door for the extremists of the Islamic State to return this year.
The foundation of the Obama administration’s plan to defeat the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, is the installation of a new prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, who has pledged to build a more responsive government and rebuild Sunni support. But, though at least some Sunni Arabs are fighting alongside the army in places like Haditha, influential Sunni sheikhs who helped lead the Awakening say they remain unconvinced.
Myriad local Sunni sheikhs are reading from the playbook written in Riyadh (or Langley -- who can tell anymore?):
“The Sunnis in Anbar and other provinces are facing oppression and discrimination by the government,” said Mohamed el-Bajjari, a sheikh in Anbar who is a spokesman for a coalition of tribes. “This government must be changed to form a technocratic government of nonsectarian secular people, or the battles and the anger of the Sunni people will continue.” 
Sunni tribal leaders said they were already disappointed by Mr. Abadi, whom Mr. Obama has hailed as the face of a more inclusive government. They said the military had not lived up to a pledge by the prime minister to discontinue shelling civilian areas in the battle against the Islamic State. (An American official involved in the effort, speaking on the condition of anonymity according to diplomatic protocol, said some governors had asked for renewed airstrikes to stop new Islamic State advances.)
Bear in mind this is the same line used by USG to pressure Malaki to step down. The Sunni sheikhs are now using it against Abadi. Kirkpatrick and Jawoshy leave the reader with the impression that ISIS still has a tremendous amount of support among Iraq's Sunni sheikhs:
In Dhuluiya, a town famous here as where the mostly Sunni Jabouri tribe has held out during a three-month siege by the Islamic State’s forces, local fighters said their Sunni neighbors had abandoned them. 
“The Sunni tribes’ role here is almost nonexistent,” said Ali al-Jabouri, a local fighter. “There are many tribes in the villages near here, but they were not serious about joining us to combat the Islamic State, and until now none of them have joined us.” 
In some places, the Iraqi Army has turned over captured territory to the police, who quickly lose control back to the Islamic State. Other Sunni leaders, however, insisted that things would improve. 
Wasfi al-Aasi, a Sunni Arab tribal leader who leads a pro-government council of sheikhs in Baghdad, said the biggest tribes had signaled their support against the Islamic State and were establishing “national guard” units in six provinces. “The next few days will bring good news,” he said. 
He said the tribal leaders who expressed disappointment in the government were “all with the Islamic State.”
The story ends with ISIS tallying a significant victory in Anbar by overrunning Camp Saqlawiya north of Falluja and slaughtering the Iraqi troops inside:
A week ago, for example, a force of about 800 soldiers found themselves stranded at Camp Saqlawiya in Anbar, cut off from the rest of the army behind Islamic State lines without food, water, fuel or, eventually, ammunition, according to soldiers who escaped. Finally, on Sunday, an army tank unit based in Ramadi, outside Anbar, made its way through a road mined with explosives to within 500 yards of the base, said a soldier in the group who gave his name as Abu Moussa. 
Seeing the rescuers, the soldiers inside opened the gates and ran out, he said. But groups of Islamic State fighters suddenly poured out of neighboring buildings and surged forward in armored vehicles with heavy-weapon mounts. At least two armed vehicles rigged with bombs made it into the base and exploded. 
The tanks retreated, Abu Moussa said, crushing bodies of dead soldiers underneath them. “I have not seen such fire and blood for 10 years” in the military, he said. “It is a disaster.”
So yesterday when I said that the caliphate had been successfully stymied by American air power, I was not being accurate. ISIS always reaches for the long-hanging fruit; it is a fighting force that is always on the offensive. In addition to the victory at Camp Saqlawiya, ISIS also sent over one-hundred thousand Syrian Kurds across the border into Turkey when it attacked the Kurdish enclave of Kobani. Ben Hubbard, Alan Cowell and Helene Cooper report in "U.S. and Allies Strike ISIS Targets in Syria" that:
On Syria’s northern border, meanwhile, more than 130,000 Syrian Kurds have fled into Turkey to escape an advance by Islamic State fighters. The humanitarian catastrophe could worsen within days. the United Nations relief agency in Geneva said on Tuesday that it was making contingency plans for all 400,000 inhabitants of a Syrian Kurdish border town to try to flee into Turkey.
The story's celebration of the power of the U.S.-led airstrikes against ISIS camps in northern Syria (". . . a fierce opening blow against the jihadists of the Islamic State, scattering their forces and damaging the network of facilities . . . .") gives way to a more pessimistic evaluation:
Some of Syria’s allies have suggested that the government in Damascus would benefit from strikes, although analysts question whether the Syrian military has the forces it would need to do so. 
Syria also has hundreds of rebels groups, many of which hate the Islamic State, and the United States has been working with allies to build up a small number groups deemed moderate. But these forces remain relatively small and are far from the Islamic State’s locations, so there is little chance that they will soon be able to seize control of any areas vacated by the Islamic State.
Now comes the part where Islamic State will pivot to the "Far Enemy." threatening attacks on the Western coalition of nations that is attacking it:
Reuters quoted an unidentified ISIS fighter as saying “these attacks will be answered.” The militants have already released videos showing the beheadings of two American hostages and of one British captive, and have threatened a fourth hostage, a Briton, with the same fate. 
Additionally, an Algerian group linked to Islamic State has claimed to have kidnapped a French citizen. Prime Minister Manuel Valls told French radio that there would be “no discussion, no negotiation and we will never give in to blackmail” about the hostage’s fate.
We'll see if ISIS sticks to its strategy of plucking the low-hanging fruit. Jordan was part of the coalition of Sunni sheikhs (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain were the others) that participated in the airstrikes on northern Syria. If I were al-Baghdadi I would think Jordan is the juiciest piece of fruit hanging lowest off the branch. But if the caliphate is centrally controlled from the House of Saud, no such attacks will be in the offing. There will be more decapitations of Western aid workers and journalists and maybe some subway bombs in Europe.

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

"ISIS Consolidates" But an Independent Kurdistan is Here to Stay

It appears that Maliki has a legitimate beef. Iraqi president, Fuad Masum, a Kurd, should have nominated Maliki, as head of the largest parliamentary bloc, prime minister and given him a shot at forming a new government. Instead, with the United States working diligently behind the scene to make sure Maliki was afforded no such opportunity, president Masum designated Haider al-Abadi, a member of Maliki's Dawa Party, prime minister. (There was a good OpEd yesterday by Zaid al-Ali, "Iraq’s Rot Starts at the Top," singling out Abadi as the best of a group of potential Maliki replacements because he is open to outside influence. Coincidence? Probably not.)

Maliki responded to his ouster by mustering troops in the Green Zone in Baghdad and promising legal action in the courts. But as noted in "Iraqis Nominate Maliki Successor, Causing Standoff," by Tim Arango, Alissa Rubin and Michael Gordon,
The question is whether Mr. Abadi, who like many of Iraq’s Shiite leaders led a life of exile until the American invasion in 2003 ousted Saddam Hussein, can forge a grand political bargain with meaningful roles for the two significant minority factions, Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Under the Constitution, he has a 30-day window to conclude the sort of back-room deals — promises of positions and ministries, which sustain Iraq’s system of patronage — that would be the backbone of a new government.
With 30 days to form a government Maliki can make a lot of mischief. He has an extensive security force at his disposal. But the reality is that he has all the big players lined up against him: Iran, the U.S. and the religious authority of Grand Ayatollah Sistani; plus, if things got hot in the Green Zone, it would be forces loyal to Maliki against Muqtada al-Sadr's militias and the Badr Corps of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Baghdad would be weakened by such fighting and rendered easy prey for Islamic State.

No, Maliki is gone. The writing on the wall is clear. The U.S. is dangling more support upon formation of a new government by Abadi. It seems as if the Obama administration will get its wish, which is for a federalized Iraq, a nation composed of three states: Kurdistan, Sunnistan and Shiastan.

Already the U.S. is greasing the skids on arms shipments -- weapons of all kinds, both light and heavy -- to the Kurds. The CIA has taken the lead, but the Pentagon is not far behind. Kurdistan is here to stay. That appears to be fact now. Allow me to quote at length a good story, "Pentagon Says Airstrikes Have Slowed but Not Stopped Sunni Militants," by Helene Cooper and Alissa Rubin:
The Central Intelligence Agency has begun directly supplying weapons to pesh merga fighters, administration officials said, after weeks of pleas and demands from leaders in the country’s semiautonomous Kurdish region for help in fighting ISIS. But it remains unclear just how much weaponry the United States has funneled through to the Kurds so far; military officials said they would probably begin sending small-arms munitions soon, too.
A C.I.A. spokesman declined to comment.
“The pesh merga are composed of capable, disciplined forces who deserve their reputation as fierce mountain-war fighters,” a United States official said. “However, it’s been almost a decade since their mostly light infantry brigades have been tested in battle, so it’s not surprising that they’ve taken some knocks from ISIL.”
The Kurds, who say they need armor-piercing munitions to help penetrate heavily fortified tanks captured by ISIS fighters from both the Syrian and Iraqi militaries, will soon be getting long-range weapons as well. 
“Some of the ISIL forces have a longer-range weapons system, so we need to make sure that the government of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces are providing longer-range weapons themselves to the Kurdish forces,” General Mayville said. 
The Kurds have asked the United States to provide — or in some way help them obtain — sniper rifles, mortars, heavy machine guns, wire-guided antitank weapons and antitank guns, rocket-propelled grenades, Humvees and tanks, among other weapons, Kurdish officials said. They have also asked for body armor and helicopters for evacuations.
A senior military official said Monday that the Pentagon was concentrating on rifles and machine guns. He declined to say what kinds of weapons the C.I.A. had begun supplying the Kurds. 
A second Pentagon official, also speaking on the condition of anonymity as a matter of policy, said that the Defense Department had yet to decide whether it would supply the pesh merga with antitank guns, but that “whatever they are getting will be in line with meeting the proper requirements for the kind of defenses that they’re conducting.” 
In the past, American officials have been hesitant about directly supplying weapons to the Kurds, who differ with Iraq’s current prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, over the division of oil resources and how much territory should fall within the Kurdistan region’s borders. In addition, the Kurds initially took advantage of the conflict with ISIS to expand their own territory in northern Iraq. Many Obama administration officials say privately that they do not expect Kurdistan to remain part of Iraq once the fighting is over.
So even though the pesh merga were routed by Islamic State in Jalawla, a town in Diyala Province that borders Kurdistan, forcing the vaunted Kurdish fighters to stage another "tactical retreat," it is clear that with robust support from the United States the Kurds will hold on. What these means in terms of oil revenue and the status of Kirkuk is unclear; it also unclear at this point the extent to which the Obama administration is willing to roll back IS's gains in northern Iraq. Patrick Cockburn's article, "Isis Consolidates" in the London Review of Books, recommended Sunday by the Moon of Alabama blog, paints a picture of a caliphate that is going to be around for some time.

Cockburn is of the opinion that an attack on Baghdad is inevitable and that Iraq's Shia are in a state of denial, having drunk the Kool-Aid handed out by the U.S. that the problem is Maliki and that once Maliki goes all will right itself.

In the near term, Cockburn thinks that IS will turn its attention again to toppling Assad, starting with Aleppo. And that once the Syrian Arab Army crumbles the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East, the Israelis and the Gulf monarchies, not to mention Iran and Hezbollah, will have a real crisis to contend with.

Cockburn is of the school of thought that IS is a Frankenstein monster, a creation of the Saudis that has proven too powerful to control. Now it is pursuing its own agenda. I am skeptical of this.

Monday, August 4, 2014

The Caliphate Grows, as Does the Case Against Kiev in the Downing of MH17

Islamic State was on the march over the weekend. The jihadis routed the vaunted pesh merga in three Iraqi cities north of Mosul: Zumar, Wana and Sinjar. Tim Arango reports from Baghdad in "Sunni Extremists in Iraq Seize 3 Towns From Kurds and Threaten Major Dam" that
In a statement, ISIS boasted of conquering “more important areas which were controlled by the pesh merga and the secular militias.” With the new territory, which the group described as “the border triangle of Iraq, Syria and Turkey,” ISIS strengthened its hold on territory that traverses the frontiers of Iraq and Syria, giving it an even greater ability to move fighters and weapons between the front lines of the civil wars in both countries. 
According to security officials and residents in the area, the Kurdish forces were routed from Zumar, a town on the road from the Syrian border that also sits on oil fields, and then Sinjar. Sinjar, an isolated city in northwestern Iraq, has been home to a sizable community of Yazidis, Kurdish speakers who ascribe to a religion that combines elements of Islam and ancient Persian religions and who are considered apostates by Muslim extremists. 
Later on Sunday, the militants captured Wana, a strategic town near the Tigris River — putting them within striking distance of the Mosul Dam, the country’s largest and an important supplier of electricity and water. The dam is on the Tigris River about 30 miles northwest of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, which fell to ISIS on June 10. 
Yazidi residents of Sinjar, who were reached by phone, were terrified. They told of kidnappings and executions of members of their sect. One resident, Sami Hassan, said he was at work at a hospital on Sunday when an injured ISIS fighter arrived and demanded to know the sect to which Mr. Hassan belonged.
Mr. Hassan said he had escaped from a window while being shot at. 
Another local, Khudhur Rasho, said he had seen two Yazidi men executed and the members of 10 families, their hands bound behind their back, being led away by militants. 
A State Department spokeswoman, Jen Psaki, said Sunday that ISIS posed “a dire threat to all Iraqis, the entire region and the international community” and that the United States would continue to seek ways to support the Iraqi security forces and the Kurdish pesh merga. 
The seizing of the three towns in a triangle that stretches north and west from Mosul to the borders of Syria and Turkey allowed the extremists to expand their territory, but the capture of the Mosul Dam would be a bigger prize, and could give the militants the ability to unleash a deadly flood on large populations.
Also over the weekend, Islamic State, operating with Nusra and Free Syrian Army fighters, took the Lebanese border town of Arsal. Hwaida Saad reports in "Fighters From Syria Kill 10 Lebanese Soldiers in Battle Over Border Town" that
Islamist fighters from Syria killed 10 Lebanese soldiers and appeared to have captured more than a dozen others in an armed offensive that left them in a tense battle for control of a Lebanese border town, Lebanon’s army chief said Sunday. 
The new toll was reported one day after fighters from Syria — who included members of rebel brigades, an affiliate of Al Qaeda and the extremist Islamic State in Iraq and Syria — carried out a series of attacks on army checkpoints that left them largely in control of the town of Arsal. 
The two-day clash was the most recent spillover into Lebanon from the civil war in neighboring Syria. The two countries share a complex web of political and sectarian ties that have made the violence in Syria resonate in its smaller neighbor, where street clashes, car bombs and political deadlock related to the war in Syria have been common.
Residents, aid workers and Syrian rebels reached in Arsal on Sunday said that insurgents had seized the town but that it was surrounded by the Lebanese Army, which was shelling it.
The weekend gains by Islamic State represent acute problems for U.S. policy in the region. First, while publicly opposed to IS, as the Jan Psaki quote in the Arango story makes clear, the United States has actual done nothing to stem the caliphate's growth. In fact, overwhelming, the Obama administration's reaction to the Salafis military advance on June 10, which led to the capture of Mosul, has been to blame Iraq's Shiite prime minister Nuri al-Maliki. Now that IS has turned its aggression on the Kurds, trusted American allies, and the Kurds are crying out for military assistance, it is going to be interesting to see how the U.S. manages its allegiance to both the House of Saud, the main benefactor of Islamic State, and Kurdistan, where the United States is expanding a drone facility at Erbil.

Patrick Cockburn, who has a new book out on Islamic State, had a piece over the weekend on the Counterpunch web site that is quite bullish on the prospects of continued success for the caliphate. He sees IS as shrewd and disciplined, consolidating its territorial gains while always on the look-out to pluck low-hanging fruit. Cockburn does not have many good things to say about the Shia leadership of Iraq. He predicts a jihadi encirclement and prolonged siege of Baghdad. Things are going to go from bad to worse.

The attack on Lebanon, no favorite of the U.S. because of Hezbollah, represents trouble for Obama due to the presence of Free Syrian Army fighters among the jihadis. The FSA, presumably, remains the United States principal Syrian ally in the battle against the Assad government. Getting the FSA weapons, training and hundreds of millions of dollars is going to be difficult if it is operating in open alliance with, as State Department spokeswoman Psaki says, “a dire threat to all Iraqis, the entire region and the international community.”

So the difficulties mount for Team Obama. The presidential recount that Kerry negotiated in Afghanistan is tottering. Carlotta Gall reports in "Disputes Threaten to Derail Audit of Afghanistan Vote" that an argument between the Adbullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani camps as to what counts as an invalidated ballot brought the recount to a halt over the weekend, necessitating direct intervention by the U.S. State Departmant. The Abdullah camp revealed tape of a telephone conversation which seems to show that there was a criminal conspiracy by the Karzai government and international community to swing the runoff to Ghani:
Also on Sunday, Mr. Abdullah’s campaign manager released an audiotape on which he said Vice President Karim Khalili could be heard directing his followers to support Mr. Ghani in the runoff. An aide to Mr. Khalili has denounced the tape as fake, according to the independent television news channel Tolo TV. 
In the tape the speaker, who sounded like Mr. Khalili but had not been independently verified as such, said that the international community, the election commission and the president all supported Mr. Ghani for president. He even suggested that Afghanistan’s allies would tolerate the use of any means to achieve such a result. 
“Our international friends have promised us that by using any means and using any opportunity, the election outcome must turn in favor of this team, even if these opportunities, even if these means are against electoral mechanisms,” the voice said.
Mr. Abdullah’s campaign manager, Baryalai Arsalai, said the tape proved that the election fraud had been planned to return a victory for Mr. Ghani. 
“This evidence was released today to inform our countrymen that our president, other government elders and the so-called election commission are instruments,” Mr. Arsalai said. The election was a public process, he said, calling it the right of the Afghan people, not the president or the commission chief. “We have a responsibility to let people know that their rights are being violated,” he said.  
Mr. Arsalai vouched for the tape’s authenticity and said details proving that would be released later.
Afghanistan is not going to make it. Thus, with Lebanese territory now under jihadi control and the Taliban soon to be back in power, the caliphate rises, from the Mediterranean to the Durand Line.

Before signing off for the day, it is worth mentioning that the U.S. control of the MH17 narrative is slipping fast. Two good articles over the weekend -- Mike Whitney's "The Unanswered Questions of MH17" and Robert Parry's "Flight 17 Shoot-Down Scenario Shifts" -- marshal the evidence and clarify the events since July 17, and everything points to the Kiev junta. The arguments that Whitney and Parry present are compelling. There is even a possibility that their line of thinking will find its way to the mainstream.

Wednesday, July 16, 2014

Gaza, the Center of a Global Meltdown

In the many years I have been a news consumer, principally of the New York Times, at no point has it been like it is today. The planet is convulsed by organized violence. Everywhere one turns there appears to be war.

The Middle East is being restructured. Islamic State, a Salafist construct of the Gulf Sheikhdoms, is raising a caliphate in northen Iraq and northern Syria (see Patrick Cockburn's excellent article, posted on Niqnaq's blog, for the latest there); Kurdistan is also rising out of the ashes of Iraq, while Iraqi Shiite parties are trying to figure out what to do next. Iran is spread thin, trying to negotiate with Great Satan on the future of its nuclear program while playing a central role in two hot wars.

In old Europe, conflict rages in Hitler's Lebensraum, as a U.S.-directed fascist junta in Kiev wages war on its civilian population in an attempt to draw the Russian Bear into a quagmire that isolates it from the rest of world capitalism. On the other side of Asia, Uncle Sam is attempting the same thing with the Chinese Dragon, drawing it into open hostilities with its smaller-nation neighbors over resource-rich and strategically-important island chains in the China Sea.

The spot on the map, AfPak, that led to the currently fraying U.S. Weltanschauung -- the post-9/11 reorganization of the state to facilitate a Global War On Terror (GWOT) -- is about to blow sky high. Much as Afghanistan descended into bloody warlord anarchy following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 (the year of Tiananmen and the fall of the Berlin Wall), the tribes are preparing for battle royale once again as Great Satan readies for the exit.

But potentially the biggest burst of flame is the ongoing Israeli assault on Gaza. I say potentially the biggest because we appear to be at a moment when the occupation, which began not too long after I was born fifty years ago, is going to crack. Most, except for the hard right Israelis like foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman, realize that the occupation cannot continue, that the every-two-year Israeli attacks have to stop, and that border crossings have to be opened. Palestinians are willing to weather, at least for now, the slaughter dished up by Israel because they are unwilling to accept the Gaza status quo. As Anne Barnard reports in "Gazans, Desiring Deep Change, Are Ambivalent on Egypt Cease-Fire Plan":
[H]is grandmother Wedad al-Jarba might have been angry that Hamas, the militant group that dominates the Gaza Strip, did not embrace the cease-fire proposed by Egypt, and kept firing rockets as Israel briefly held its fire. Instead, she shrugged. Like many Gazans interviewed, she said she longed for a deal — one that would change life in Gaza. But she doubted Egypt’s proposal would do that. 
“Every time, they have a cease-fire, but then everything comes back: the siege, the closures,” she said. “Then they bomb again.” 
That ambivalence is widespread in the strip, a narrow, 25-mile-long Palestinian enclave sandwiched between Israel, Egypt and the sea. It may help explain why a beleaguered Hamas kept firing even after Israeli officials declared that such a decision would justify further escalation. 
Israel occupied Gaza during the 1967 Six-Day War and controls its borders, airspace and seas even now, nearly nine years after pulling out its settlers and troops. Since then, tough restrictions have effectively amounted to a blockade, reducing imports and exports to a trickle and preventing all but a few Gazans from leaving. Short but devastating wars deepen the misery.
In a story yesterday, "Gaza Families Near Israeli Border Struggle to Build a Life in the Heart of a Conflict," Barnard limned a helpful sketch of the occupation of Gaza as seen through the eyes of the Marouf family:
Ms. Marouf’s son-in-law, a father of four, lost part of a leg and suffered internal injuries in a strike on Saturday as he headed to his work at a chicken shop. That was only the latest blow to a family whose experience traces every stage of Gaza’s disappointments since 2005, when Israel unilaterally pulled out its settlements and troops, and residents briefly hoped for a new order of increased autonomy and opportunity.
Ms. Marouf grew up in the shadow of an Israeli settlement, subject, she said, to frequent security clampdowns. Her husband waited hours each day to get through security to work on Israeli farms. Then, Israel billed the pullout as the end of its occupation of the Gaza Strip, a narrow, 25-mile-long coastal territory that it seized in the 1967 war.
“We built good hopes,” Ms. Marouf said. “We want Gaza to be like any other nation, with a state, a seaport, a future for our children.”
But things only got worse. Israel never relinquished control of Gaza’s borders, airspace and waters; Palestinians consider it still occupied. Israel imposed even harsher restrictions on the movement of people and goods as militants periodically fired rockets and Hamas, which had killed hundreds of Israelis in suicide bombings, won Palestinian elections in 2006. Ms. Marouf’s husband could no longer reach Israel for work, so they invested their savings in renting land to grow strawberries.
Gaza kept sinking. Facing a boycott from Israel and the West, Hamas failed to form a government; it captured an Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, in 2006, prompting more Israeli bombardment as Palestinian rocket attacks continued. In 2007, Hamas took over Gaza from its rival party, Fatah, by force, dividing the Palestinian Authority.
An agreement with Israel to ease its near blockade grew even more remote, making it hard for farmers like the Maroufs to export their harvests.
Then, in late 2008, came what Israel called Operation Cast Lead, involving airstrikes and an incursion into northern Gaza to destroy rocket launchers. The Maroufs fled to a United Nations school, where an Israeli airstrike killed several people; Israeli officials called it a mistake.
Ms. Marouf gave birth to her seventh child, Saja, days later. Her daughter Hadeel, then 11, and a teenage brother went home to get baby clothes, and found their house a smoking ruin, the fields burned. As they walked away, Hadeel said Monday, several neighborhood children tagged along. An Israeli tank shell killed six of them.
“One person’s insides were spilling out,” Hadeel said, reaching for her mother’s hand. Also destroyed was the house of Ms. Marouf’s married daughter, Sabeen.
“We all have childhood memories there,” Sabeen said of her mother’s house. “But the occupation killed our memories as well.”
The family lived in tents for a year, shivering at night as the wind blew under the flaps. Their only income was about $6 a month Ms. Marouf earned making cheese at a women’s factory run under a European Union aid project; even that has disappeared, the project discontinued.
They received United Nations compensation for their house, enough to build a home only half its size, Ms. Marouf said. Construction was slow because of Israeli restrictions on importing building materials. Money ran out before the house was done, but the family moved in, without furniture, which they could not afford. The children went to school in tattered uniforms.
In an Israeli assault in Gaza in 2012, the family stayed put, but last week, they cowered under the most intense bombardments they had ever heard, knowing that if wounded, they would be too frightened to go to a hospital. Ms. Marouf said that each morning, “We thank God that the day has come and we are all right.”
In the shelter, where the family sleeps on bare floors, her daughter Saja, now 5, stared gravely from her mother’s arms and played with a shekel coin. “She won’t eat,” Ms. Marouf said.
Around the corner, a building was flattened by an airstrike on Sunday, and the family is not sure whether they are safe.
Ms. Marouf blamed Israel, Hamas and Fatah for failing to achieve peace.
“We don’t hate the mujahedeen; they defend our people, ourselves, our land,” she said, using the Arabic word for holy warriors to refer to militants. “But we are the victims,” she added, “caught between the three sides.”
Let's keep an eye on the Palestinian resistance. Their continuing steadfastness in the face of terror will offer insight as to how this global conflagration that we are in will spread. The old warpigs will not give up without a great deal of savagery.

Monday, December 16, 2013

Prince Turki's Mendacity and the Coming Blowback

Yesterday Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal speaking at the World Policy Conference taking place on the French Riviera in the sovereign city-state monarchy of Monaco once again blamed the United States for "almost a criminal negligence" in not removing Bashar al-Assad from power in Syria. Obama's failure to enforce his "red line" on the use of chemical weapons in the August 21 Ghouta attack (which Seymour Hersh says is proof not of Obama abiding by American anti-war sentiment but of knowledge linking Al Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front to the use of sarin) sent the Saudis into a rage, prompting them to decline a seat on the United Nations Security Council for which they had worked long and hard.

Prince Turki al-Faisal, who learned foreign policy at Georgetown University with Bill Clinton, will go down in history as the Director of Saudi Arabia General Intelligence Directorate from the Grand Mosque Seizure in 1979 to ten days prior the 9/11 attacks, a time that corresponds to the rise of global jihad as a replacement of communism as an organizing principle for U.S. Hyperpower. While Turki no longer holds an official position in government, he is acknowledged as speaking for the Kingdom.

Prince Turki was also critical of the secret talks the U.S. held with Iran prior to the announcement of a breakthrough deal on the Iranian nuclear program. Almost as an afterthought, as proof of Pan-Arabist bonafides, Turki mentioned the plight of the Palastinians and their search for statehood.

All of this is dutifully reported in Steven Erlanger's story this morning, "Saudi Prince Criticizes Obama Administration, Citing Indecision in Mideast," with nary a word of what is common knowledge -- and regularly reported in the Gray Lady herself -- that Saudi Arabia is the prime funder and advocate of the Sunni jihadis in their quest for a caliphate in the Levant.

The daily suicide bombings wreaking havoc in Iraq against the Shia? The constant kidnappings of secular anti-Assad activists in Syria? Blame the Saudis. So when Erlanger ends his piece with Turki crying crocodile tears for the failed Free Syrian Army without the slightest mention of the Wahhabi and Salafi groups that led to the FSA's demise, the New York Times is doing a grave disservice to her readers:
In separate remarks here to the Reuters news agency, Prince Turki said that the United States and Britain had done too little to help the more moderate, more secular Syrian rebels, leaving them to fend for themselves against both “Al Assad’s killing machine” and the better-armed radical Islamist rebel groups. 
“Why should he stop the killing?” he said of Mr. Assad. 
“That to me is why the F.S.A. is not in as prominent position as it should be today,” he said, referring to the Free Syrian Army, “because of the lack of international support for it. The fighting is going to continue, and the killing is going to continue.”
Maybe Erlanger had it in there but it was edited out; he is a decent reporter but one who always grants a great deal of deference to established powers. I remember back in the days of the war in Kosovo; he faithfully carried water for the NATO air campaign.

A more illuminating story, "The Deadly Pawns of Saudi Arabia," is one that appeared last Monday on the Counterpunch web site. Written by the longtime Middle East reporter Patrick Cockburn it has a different take on who is responsible for unrest in the region:
Saudi Arabia as a government for a long time took a back seat to Qatar in funding rebels in Syria, and it is only since this summer that they have taken over the file. . . 
The directors of Saudi policy in Syria – the Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, the head of the Saudi intelligence agency Prince Bandar bin Sultan and the Deputy Defence Minister Prince Salman bin Sultan – plan to spend billions raising a militant Sunni army some 40,000 to 50,000 strong. Already local warlords are uniting to share in Saudi largesse for which their enthusiasm is probably greater than their willingness to fight. 
The Saudi initiative is partly fuelled by rage in Riyadh at President Obama’s decision not to go to war with Syria after Assad used chemical weapons on 21 August. Nothing but an all-out air attack by the US similar to that of Nato in Libya in 2011 would overthrow Assad, so the US has essentially decided he will stay for the moment. Saudi anger has been further exacerbated by the successful US-led negotiations on an interim deal with Iran over its nuclear programme.
Cockburn says that United States is looking the other way because the Saudi Sunni jihadi army is aimed at the Shia. But Cockburn doesn't think that it is going to end well, that any unity prevailing now among jihadi groups due to Saudi largesse will not last. Then, like in post-Soviet Afghanistan, it will be the United States and Saudi Arabia itself that will be the target.

Tuesday, August 6, 2013

Gray Lady's Anne Barnard Savors Ambiguous Rebel Victory

Anne Barnard, back in Beirut after her stay in Damascus, celebrates the rebel capture of Minakh air base (spelled as "Minnigh" and "Minnegh" in other accounts) in northern Syria's Aleppo Province. Writing with Hwaida Saad, Barnard, in "Rebels Gain Control of Government Air Base in Syria," is even more accepting of rebel claims than the reliably pro-opposition Al Jazeera, which in its story, "Syrian rebels claim control of Aleppo airbase," is careful to frame the government's loss of the air base as hearsay. SANA issued a pro forma denial.

According to Barnard and Saad,
Warplanes from the base had struck at villages across northern Syria, and the base, in flat fields with little cover, had presented its own challenge. But as rebels began to acquire antiaircraft weapons from Qatar and other donors, shooting down helicopters and warplanes, it became harder for the army to restock the base by air, stranding the soldiers with dwindling supplies.
Chechen jihadis were apparently instrumental in the attack:
The base was first besieged by a Free Syrian Army brigade called North Storm, and joined by fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham and a group calling itself Jaish al-Muhajireen wal Ansar. Muhajireen means emigrants, and the group, which carried out several suicide attacks at the base, is led by Russian speakers from Chechnya and other parts of the Caucasus. 
Mr. Farzat said Chechen Islamist fighters near the airport had refused to let the defecting government soldiers flee, so he helped them escape by another route. “I give the Islamic fighters credit for the liberation,” he said.The seizure of the base could have an impact on the stalemated fight for Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, by freeing up rebel fighters and antiaircraft weapons to put pressure on Aleppo’s airport, which rebels have been unable to take despite months of trying. It could also dampen the morale of government troops in other remote outposts. 
Abu al-Haytham, a rebel fighter who fought for months to seize Minakh and is now in Turkey, called the capture of the base a morale booster and “a strike against the regime.” But, he added, “it won’t change anything on the ground — we just got some vehicles and ammunition.”
Licking her lips in anticipation of those freed-up antiaircraft guns being trained on Aleppo, Barnard also heralds an ISIS surge into the Alawite coastal stronghold of Latakia:
In Latakia, the rebel offensive, involving more than 1,500 fighters led by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, accelerated what had been a gradual rebel push into a province whose government-held central city has been a relatively secure haven for displaced Syrians from war-torn areas. 
Government forces withdrew Monday from a number of villages in the coastal mountains, said Ammar Hassan, an opposition activist in close touch with rebels. 
He said rebels had seized four mountaintop military posts that had been shelling villages below, and were trying to advance farther toward the coast and toward Qardaha, the ancestral mountain village of President Bashar al-Assad’s family.
Regardless of the veracity of rebel gains in these two particular instances, it does seem that Patrick Cockburn's assessment of the conflict after the government victory at Qusayr is on target: there are going to be no outright winners here. The government can continue to rack up victories, but the opposition -- with its myriad Islamist groups; its CIA-supported Free Syrian Army; its Kurdish separatists -- controls significant amounts of territory and appears ever ready to mount fresh offensives.

A piece that appeared in The Guardian at the beginning of last month, "Syria's al-Nusra Front – ruthless, organised and taking control," written by Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, provides excellent insight into the antagonistic relationship between Al Nusra Front and Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, as well as why the United States seems blithely unconcerned about the spread of Islamist fighters into Syria:
If the jihadis are in the ascendant in the east, they are not without challenges. The first of these is a strategy that bore fruit for the Americans in Iraq: the threat of an Arab "awakening", or sahwa, in which the US pays tribes to fight the jihadists on their behalf. In Iraq, this delivered a disastrous defeat for al-Qaida and other jihadis, but it has since achieved mixed results in Yemen, Somalia and Afghanistan. 
But while it took the Americans months of intricate negotiations and huge sums of money to convince a few tribal elders in Iraq, in Syria almost every other marginal tribal elder and his many cousins flirt with the the idea of sahwa, and the money that it could bring. 
"They used to tell us that the FSA will turn to sahwa and fight us, which I thought was an exaggeration," said the emir of gas before we departed. "Now I know that will happen for sure."
Abdul-Ahad's piece gives one a non-partisan perspective of the breadth of opposition within Syrian.

Monday, July 1, 2013

**CORRECTED**Conflicting Reports on Beheading of Franciscan Father. The Gray Lady Mum.

Catholic Online has a piece about the Al Nusra Front beheading Franciscan Father Francois Murad. This is being denied. No word as of yet in the prestige press.

No Syria news appeared in this morning's New York Times. Reuters is reporting that Chinese Communist leadership blames unrest in the western region of Xinjiang on the Syrian opposition. This wasn't mentioned in the story by Christopher Buckley that appeared in the New York Times.

Yesterday Mark Mazzetti, C.J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt reported on Qatari shipments of shoulder-fired Chinese FN-6 missiles to the rebels in Syria. Add this to reports of the Saudis supplying antitank guns to the rebels in Aleppo, and already it's plain to see that the heart of the Middle East is going the way of Afghanistan in the 1980s. This means constant warfare and the suffering that results -- death, dislocation, poverty.

It was a big disappointment to read Steve Coll's take on Syria in The New Yorker. It's pure sophistry. He basically comes out and calls for a no-fly zone. Coll makes his pitch based on appeals to our humanitarian better angels. Al-Assad is targeting civilians lining up to buy bread. Proof? No proof needed. And he's using poison gas on his own people. Proof? Well, our spot-on intelligence apparatus, of course. After reading Coll's "spooky" piece, from now on I'll be skeptical about anything he writes.

The best reporting -- the most consistent and trustworthy -- comes from The Independent's Patrick Cockburn. He had an excellent piece on Homs that appeared on Counterpunch's web site over the weekend; in it he directly addresses humanitarian warriors like Coll and the canard that the body count -- 90,000 to 100,000 -- constantly headlined in the Western press is entirely attributable to al-Assad:
The Syrian conflict is a civil war with all the horrors traditionally inflicted in such struggles wherever they are fought, be it Syria today or Russia, Spain, Greece, Lebanon or Iraq in the past. For the newly appointed American National Security Adviser Susan Rice, David Cameron or William Hague to pretend that this is a simple battle between a dictatorial government and an oppressed people is to misrepresent or misunderstand what is happening on the ground.
Evidence that both sides have committed supporters prepared to fight to the death is borne out by the estimate of some 100,000 dead published this week by the pro-rebel Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. It concludes that fatal casualties come almost equally from the two sides in the civil war: broadly 25,000 of them government soldiers, 17,000 pro-government militia, 36,000 civilians and 14,000 rebel fighters, though the last two figures in particular are probably understated.
The massive anti-Morsi protests yesterday in Egypt are heartening. The Saudis and Qataris actively seeking to Talibanize the entire Middle East no doubt took note. There is a huge majority that wants peace, employment and tolerance. Not sharia. Not perpetual war.