Showing posts with label Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Show all posts

Monday, October 28, 2019

Trump on the Theft of Syria's Oil

I happened to be up early and online when Trump made his announcement that the U.S. had terminated a “whimpering and crying and screaming" ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Watching it, what struck me was how much of the question-and-answer period that followed Trump's statement dealt with Syria's oil. (Below are the key passages from the NPR readout.) One could be forgiven if you were to draw the conclusion that al-Baghdadi's death and control of Syria's oil were connected.

Which, of course, they are. The U.S. goal, from the days of the Arab Spring up until now, is regime change in Syria. Control of Syria's oil allows the U.S. to maintain its fantasy that it can force Assad to negotiate away his presidency.

What struck me even more than Trump's lubricious display over Syria's oil was that there was not one peep from the assembled press corp regarding the legality of such a move. It is as if the law of jungle and mafia don behavior have become totally normalized for a head of state in the age of peak neoliberalism.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I think it's great. Look, we don't want to keep soldiers between Syria and Turkey for the next 200 years. They've been fighting for hundreds of years. We're out. But we are leaving soldiers to secure the oil. And we may have to fight for the oil. It's okay. Maybe somebody else wants the oil, in which case they have a hell of a fight. But there's massive amounts of oil.
And we're securing it for a couple of reasons. Number one, it stops ISIS, because ISIS got tremendous wealth from that oil. We have taken it. It's secured.
Number two — and again, somebody else may claim it, but either we'll negotiate a deal with whoever is claiming it, if we think it's fair, or we will militarily stop them very quickly. We have tremendous power in that part of the world. We have — you know, the airport is right nearby. A very big, very monstrous, very powerful airport, and very expensive airport that was built years ago. We were in there — we're in that Middle East now for $8 trillion.
So we don't want to be keeping Syria and Turkey. They're going to have to make their own decision. The Kurds have worked along incredibly with us, but in all fairness, it was much easier dealing with the Kurds after they went through three days of fighting, because that was a brutal three days. And if I — we would have said to the Kurds, "Hey, do you mind moving over seven miles?" Because, you know, they were in the middle, mostly. So you have seven or eight miles. "Could you mind moving over?"
Because, I have to say, Turkey has taken tremendous deaths from that part of the world. You know, we call it a safe zone. But it was anything but a safe zone. Turkey has lost thousands and thousands people from that safe zone. So they've always wanted that safe zone, for many years. I'm glad I was able to help them get it. But we don't want to be there; we want to be home. I want our soldiers home or fighting something that's meaningful.
I'll tell you who loves us being there: Russia and China. Because while they build their military, we're depleting our military there. So, Russia loves us being there. Now, Russia likes us being there for two reasons: because we kill ISIS, we kill terrorists, and they're very close to Russia. We're 8,000 miles away. Now, maybe they can get here, but we've done very well with Homeland Security and the ban, which, by the way, is approved by the United States Supreme Court, as you know. You know, there was a reporter that said we lost the case. And he was right, in the early court. He refu- — he didn't want to say; just refused to say that we won the case in the Supreme Court. So, you know.
But we have a very effective ban, and it's very hard for people to come to our country. But it's many thousands of miles away, whereas Russia is right there, Turkey is right there. Syria is there. They're all right there. Excuse me, Iran is right there. Iraq is right there. They all hate ISIS. So, we don't — you know, in theory, they should do something.
And I'll give you something else: The European nations have been a tremendous disappointment because I personally called, but my people called a lot. "Take your ISIS fighters." And they didn't want them. They said, "We don't want them." They came from France, they came from Germany, they came from the UK. They came from a lot of countries. And I actually said to them, "If you don't take them, I'm going to drop them right on your border. And you can have fun capturing them again."
But the United States taxpayer is not going to pay for the next 50 years. You see what Guantanamo costs. We're not going to pay tens of billions of dollars because we were good enough to capture people that want to go back to Germany, France, UK, and other parts of Europe. And they can walk back. They can't walk to our country. We have lots of water in between our country and them.
So, yeah. Go.
[snip] 
I spoke with Lindsey Graham just a little while ago. In fact, Lindsey Graham is right over here. And he's been very much involved in this subject. And he's — he's a very strong hawk. But I think Lindsey agrees with what we're doing now.
And, again, there are plenty of other countries that can help them patrol. I don't want to leave 1,000 or 2,000 or 3,000 soldiers on the border.
But where Lindsey and I totally agree is the oil. The oil is, you know, so valuable for many reasons. It fueled ISIS, number one. Number two, it helps the Kurds, because it's basically been taken away from the Kurds. They were able to live with that oil. And number three, it can help us because we should be able to take some also. And what I intend to do, perhaps, is make a deal with an Exxon Mobil or one of our great companies to go in there and do it properly. Right now, it's not big. It's big oil underground, but it's not big oil up top, and much of the machinery has been shot and dead. It's been through wars. But — and — and spread out the wealth.
But, no, we're protecting the oil. We're securing the oil. Now, that doesn't mean we don't make a deal at some point. But I don't want to be — they're fighting for 1,000 years, they're fighting for centuries. I want to bring our soldiers back home. But I do want to secure the oil.
If you read about the history of Donald Trump — I was a civilian. I had absolutely nothing to do with going into Iraq, and I was totally against it. But I always used to say, "If they're going to go in..." — nobody cared that much, but it got written about. "If they're going to go in..." — I'm sure you've heard the statement, because I made it more than any human being alive. "If they're going into Iraq, keep the oil." They never did. They never did. I know Lindsey Graham had a bill where basically we would have been paid back for all of the billions of dollars that we've spent — many, many billions of dollars. I mean, I hate to say it, it's actually trillions of dollars, but many, many billions of dollars. And, by one vote, they were unable to get that approved in the Senate. They had some pretty big opposition from people that shouldn't have opposed, like a president. And they weren't able. If you did that, Iraq would be a much different story today because they would be owing us a lot of money. They would be treating us much differently.
[snip]
Now, I will secure the oil that happens to be in a certain part. But that's tremendous money involved. I would love to — you know, the oil in — I mean, I'll tell you a story. In Iraq — so they spent — President Bush went in. I strongly disagreed with it, even though it wasn't my expertise at the time, but I had a — I have a very good instinct about things. They went in and I said, "That's a tremendous mistake." And there were no weapons of mass destruction. It turned out I was right. I was right for other reasons, but it turned out, on top of everything else, they had no weapons of mass destruction, because that would be a reason to go in. But they had none.
But I heard recently that Iraq, over the last number of years, actually discriminates against America in oil leases. In other words, some oil companies from other countries, after all we've done, have an advantage Iraq for the oil. I said, "Keep the oil. Give them what they need. Keep the oil." Why should we — we go in, we lose thousands of lives, spend trillions of dollars, and our companies don't even have an advantage in getting the oil leases. So I just tell you that story. That's what I heard.

Friday, June 16, 2017

Russia Appears to Have Blown Up Caliph Baghdadi

The reporting (see Andrew Kramer's "Russian Military Says It Might Have Killed ISIS Leader") of the demise of ISIS potentate Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has the ring of truth to it. At the end of May Baghdadi was powwowing with other Islamic State honchos and hundreds of fighters in the desert outside Raqqa when two Russian Sukhoi fighter jets blew them all to kingdom come.

Whether Russia knew ahead of time that Baghdadi would be present or whether a regular patrol combing the desert for concentrations of jihadists got lucky is unclear. I suspect the latter, and that over the last two weeks intelligence agencies of the major players have picked up chatter from the collapsing caliphate that its emir is no longer among the living.

Lavrov has been reticent to claim the public relations windfall, though there is an acknowledgement in the Western prestige press that Russia bagging Baghdadi pulls down the major rhetorical pillar erected by the Obama administration that the Russians weren't fighting ISIS but merely enabling a ruthless dictator. As Kramer explains,
Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war in 2015; it said at first that cargo planes flying to a Syrian air base carried only humanitarian aid, but later openly announced a military operation. The Kremlin’s stated goal was fighting the Islamic State, lest it gain a stronghold in Syria not far from restive, predominantly Muslim regions in southern Russia.
But the Obama administration said that the pattern of airstrikes showed that Russia’s real intention was to prop up the government of President Bashar al-Assad, a Russian ally battling a range of opposition groups, including moderate rebels. The killing of the Islamic State’s leader, if confirmed, would help bolster Russia’s initial justification for its intervention — that its goal all along was to fight terrorism.
My feeling all along is that Baghdadi is merely a figurehead, that the operations and strategy of the Islamic State are determined by foreign intelligence agencies aligned with the United States. His death is nonetheless a significant event, another portent that the diabolical perversion of the Arab Spring by the United States and its allies is running out of steam.

Tuesday, July 21, 2015

NYT on ISIS: "How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Caliphate"

Daily newspapers love deadlines. Deadlines provide an organizing principle, a dividing line, for coverage. There is the build up to the deadline, the result, and then the post-mortem. Elections provide good deadlines, as do high-stakes negotiations.

There has been a bounty of non-election deadlines of late what with the P5+1 countries signing a deal with Iran on its nuclear program (approved yesterday by the United Nations Security Council) and Greece's Syriza-led government capitulating to the Eurogroup demands for even greater austerity.

For the time being no red-flashing deadlines offer themselves up to provide the backbone, the central nervous system, of the daily news. There are the shootings and the rapes, as always, and, in the United States, the perpetual presidential campaign; and then on the distant horizon in September, a juicy deadline convergence is taking shape when Pope Francis brings his anti-capitalist message to the belly of the beast, the U.S. Capitol, where he will address Congress around the same time that its 60-day review of the Iran nuclear deal is up and yet another government shutdown looms over the federal budget.

In days like these when there are no deadlines flashing it is interesting to take note of what stories are being pushed to the top. The top story on the New York Times homepage this morning is Tim Arango's "ISIS Transforming Into Functioning State That Uses Terror as Tool."

Since ISIS took Ramadi and Palmyra in May, the takfiri jihadi group has not dominated daily news coverage. There are stories about Lone Wolf attacks that are ISIS inspired or a piece about an ISIS commander being blown up in a drone strike, but nothing of the sort that fills the front pages day in and day out.

Today though there is Arango's story, sculpted principally out of quotes from liberal realpolitik academic Stephen Walt and former high-ranking CIA official John McLaughlin, which joins a report by Ben Hubbard and Eric Schmitt, "ISIS Leader Takes Steps to Ensure Group’s Survival," about the command structure of ISIS.

The shortcoming of both stories, the 900-lb. gorilla in the room that the reporters attempt to ignore, is the extent to which ISIS is a foreign-led proxy force in the sectarian war against Iranian influence in the Greater Middle East.

In the Arango report, the reader is provided, this time from a neorealist perspective, with another explanation of why we might be able to live with ISIS after all. Like the Taliban, the takfiri jihadis are providing honest government. If it is built on a foundation of savage terror -- decapitations, sexual slavery, lashings, dismemberment -- at least the boys from Islamic State don't ask for bribes. Bashar al-Assad created the mess to begin with by fighting a civil war. Here is a sample:
Sunnis in Iraq remain broadly hostile to the Shiite-controlled central government. As for Syria, President Bashar al-Assad has presided over a civil war that has killed more than 200,000 people and basically dislocated half the population.
“Honestly, both are dirty, the regime and Daesh,” said Ahmed, the owner of an antiques shop who recently fled to Raqqa to avoid airstrikes in outlying areas. But the Islamic State, he said, “is more acceptable here in Raqqa.”
Ahmed, who gave only his first name for fear of reprisals, has also lived under rule by the Free Syrian Army, or F.S.A., the rebel group that rose up in 2011 to fight the Syrian government. The F.S.A., he said, is “like the regime. They are thieves.”
Under the Islamic State, he said, life can be brutal, but at least it seems more stable for those who can avoid crossing the group’s leaders. “Here they are implementing God’s regulations,” he said. “The killer is killed. The adulterer is stoned. The thief’s hands are cut.”
A similar sentiment helped the Taliban consolidate power two decades ago in Afghanistan: While the Taliban were feared, and their justice was often brutal, they were also respected by many Afghans for standing against corruption and chaos — and they remained firmly in control until the American invasion in 2001.
John E. McLaughlin, who was deputy director of the C.I.A. from 2000 to 2004, said he was recently at a dinner party in Washington at the home of an Australian diplomat when the discussion turned to the threat of the Islamic State.
“It suddenly just occurred to me, if you add everything up, that these guys could win,” he said. It was a controversial notion, he explained, because the group’s graphic brutality, which it showcases to the world in gory videos released through social media, has fed a sense that its demise is inevitable because it is so evil.
“Evil isn’t always defeated,” he said.
What goes unmentioned in this ludicrous retelling is that foreign jihadis funneling into Syria via Turkey (with U.S. knowledge) turned the Arab Spring uprising quickly into a war of occupation. It is similar to Obama's roll out of the P5+1 deal on Iran's nuclear program where, based on his telling, one would think that all terrorism in the region had an Iranian origin. It is an upside down picture of the world.

In the Hubbard and Schmitt story on the command and control structure of ISIS under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi it is clear that, though the reporters seek to emphasize the indigenous nature of ISIS, it is in fact run by foreign fighters. Al-Baghdadi is a religious figurehead:
WASHINGTON — The Islamic State’s reclusive leader has empowered his inner circle of deputies as well as regional commanders in Syria and Iraq with wide-ranging authority, a plan to ensure that if he or other top figures are killed, the organization will quickly adapt and continue fighting, American and Iraqi intelligence officials say.
The officials say the leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, delegates authority to his cabinet, or shura council, which includes ministers of war, finance, religious affairs and others. 
The Islamic State’s leadership under Mr. Baghdadi has drawn mainly from two pools: veterans of Al Qaeda in Iraq who survived the insurgency against American forces with battle-tested militant skills, and former Baathist officers under Saddam Hussein with expertise in organization, intelligence and internal security. It is the merger of these two skill sets that has made the organization such a potent force, the officials say.

But equally important to the group’s flexibility has been the power given to Islamic State military commanders, who receive general operating guidelines but have significant autonomy to run their own operations in Iraq and Syria, according to American and Kurdish officials. This means that fighters have limited information about the inner workings of the Islamic State to give up if captured, and that local commanders can be killed and replaced without disrupting the wider organization. Within this hierarchy, Iraqis still hold the top positions, while Tunisians and Saudis hold many religious posts. 
*** 
A senior Kurdish security official in northern Iraq and several American officials said that Mr. Baghdadi was very much the top leader and that he was involved in issuing orders across the group’s territories. “While many other group leaders also oversee and manage operations, Baghdadi asserts his role through providing guidance and holding meetings with leadership,” said a senior United States military official with access to classified briefings on the Islamic State. 
But other analysts said Mr. Baghdadi’s religious credibility was more significant than any operational prowess. 
“Baghdadi is to a certain extent a religious figurehead designed to grant an aura of religious legitimacy and respectability to the group’s operations, while the real power brokers are a core of former military and intelligence officials,” said Matthew Henman, managing editor of IHS Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center.
*** 
Kurdish commanders fighting the Islamic State on the ground say certain groups of foreign fighters appear to move like shock troops around territory controlled by the group. 
Before a major Islamic State offensive on the city of Kirkuk early this year, the Kurds began getting reports that a Russian commander had gone there with his own group of fighters, said Polad Talabani, the head of the counterterrorism unit of the Kurdistan regional government.
We could be getting daily coverage of the ongoing Iraqi campaign to retake Anbar Province from ISIS; instead we get more brand-building for ISIS which simultaneously elides the most salient feature of ISIS -- that it depends for its survival on a network of foreign aid and management from Saudi Arabia and other conservative Gulf monarchies.

Monday, March 23, 2015

Islamic State a Spook-Run Operation

One of the principal canards about Islamic State peddled in the Western press is that the caliphate is an indigenous formation growing out of grievances that Sunnis have with the Shiite-majority government of Iraq and the Alawites of Syria. But besides the high profile of the Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, where is there any evidence that ISIS is a homegrown movement? In fact, the overwhelming preponderance of evidence is that ISIS is exogenous to Iraq and Syria, attracting foreign fighters, thanks to a sophisticated online presence, to enter the caliphate through Turkey.

Patrick Cockburn has recently published a number of stories for The Independent describing life inside Islamic State. (The stories have been re-posted on the CounterPunch website.) Cockburn
interviews members of the growing Sunni diaspora in Iraqi Kurdistan, people, mostly from Anbar Province, who have fled the ISIS occupation of their towns and cities.

Cockburn's "The One-Day Siege: ISIS’s Conquest of Hit" is a good example:
It was on 4 October last year that Isis captured the small city of Hit, seizing complete control in the space of just a few hours. For the city’s 100,000 mostly Sunni residents the takeover by the self-proclaimed Islamic State has brought changes that some support, but others deeply resent. 
Among those living in Hit when Isis rolled in was Faisal, a 35-year-old government employee who is married with two children, and a keen observer of all that has befallen the agricultural centre and former transport hub over the past five months. 
He recently fled to the Kurdish capital, Erbil, where he described to me the rule of Isis and its impact on Hit, starting with the day the city was captured.
Faisal goes on to describe a religious police state where there is little money to pay for food, little communication with the outside world, and no work except for the jihadis -- all overseen by foreign fighters and imams:
The internet has not worked in Anbar Province for the last eight months, compelling people to use satellite internet connections that are monitored by Isis. More recently the group offered a limited internet service, though this is only available in internet offices and other locations monitored by the jihadist group. There is no internet access from private homes, while in the public locations, Faisal says, “Isis can spy on computers so they can see what you are surfing and to whom you are talking”.
Predictably, Isis focuses on religion and spreading its variant of Islam. Faisal says: “Many preachers (imams) were replaced by foreign preachers from the Arab world, mostly Saudis, Tunisians and Libyans, as well as Afghans. Some new imams are appointed temporarily just for Friday speech and prayer, while others are permanent appointments. Isis removed some of the old preachers who have left for Baghdad or KRG (the Kurdish-controlled region). These are often Sufis, whose beliefs are rejected by Isis.”
There are many other signs of Isis imposing its cultural agenda in Hit. Faisal says that “at the entrance to every main street and bazaar, there are Isis groups holding black dresses that cover the whole body including the face and head. If a woman does not have one, she must buy one [for about £8] and the money goes to the Isis treasury.”
Are people joining Isis in Hit? Faisal says they do, often for economic reasons. “I know many people in my neighbourhood in Hit who joined Isis,” he says. “They are paid little money, about 175,000 dinars (£80), but they say that the salary is enough because they also enjoy many privileges, including free fuel, cooking gas, sugar, tea, bread, and many other foodstuffs and services.
“Isis still has a strong financial basis. It confiscates the houses of the people who were previously employed in the police, courts, and security forces. These houses, and any furniture in them, are confiscated by the Sharia (legal or religious) court, where the judges are Libyan and Tunisian, though the other staff are locals. The ruling authority in Hit is headed by the military governor, the religious (legal) governor, the security governor and finally the administrative governor.”
Faisal’s account of life in Hit is confirmed by eyewitnesses from other parts of the Islamic State. Isis at first benefited from widespread popular relief that the Iraqi Army was gone, but there is deepening resentment against the enforcement of outlandish rules on personal behaviour that is contrary to local religious and social traditions. These include women being forced to wear the niqab (covering their faces), obligatory attendance at prayers and the destruction of mosques, such as the Younis mosque in Mosul, deemed by Isis to be un-Islamic shrines.
There is also the fear of conscription of young men to fight for the Islamic State, an obligation that is increasingly difficult to avoid and is leading many families to try to leave Isis-controlled territory, which is not easy to do.
But despite resentment by many at its takeover of mosques and schools, Isis is able to use these to propagate its views and to make converts – something that may strengthen the forces of the Islamic State. Conscription does not seem to have diluted the fanaticism of Isis fighters, or their willingness to take heavy casualties, according to Kurdish commanders who have come under attack by Isis units in recent months.
Local eyewitnesses confirm that the unpopularity of Isis is not universal. Sameer, a Kurdish shopkeeper in Mosul, told The Independent last November that “in spite of the coalition air strikes every night and every morning, Isis increases in terms of the number of its men and the territory they occupy”.
Since then, Isis has retreated from much of the Sinjar area west of Mosul, but Ali Hussein Mustafa, a 21-year-old university student who left Mosul last month, says that “many Isis men were much better than the fighters of the Iraqi Army in dealing with people and helping them”.
He says this better behaviour was not invariable and criticised Isis fighters at some checkpoints who harassed or swore at women whose face was not hidden. He added, however, that many people had now concluded that “Isis rule is no better, and maybe worse, than what they endured before [when the US or Iraqi government was in charge of Mosul from 2003 to 2014]”.
It should be said that Patrick Cockburn has always stuck to the "ISIS is an indigenous response to Shiite misrule of al-Maliki" argument, putting the leftist journalist in line with the U.S. State Department. But recently he published a story, "Is the Defeat of ISIS in Iraq Inevitable?," that sort of softened his pro-Sunni "It's all Maliki's fault" slant:
As Isis’s columns advanced last year, its fighters carried out massacres to spread fear just as Saddam Hussein had done against the Kurds and Shia a quarter of a century earlier. When the government’s Badush prison, near Mosul, was captured by Isis, its fighters slaughtered 670 Shia prisoners. At Camp Speicher, outside Tikrit, 800 Shia cadets were lined up in front of trenches and machine-gunned. Pictures of the scene resemble those of atrocities carried out by the German army in Russia in 1941. In August, when Isis fighters stormed into Kurdish-held regions, they targeted the Yazidis as “pagans” to be murdered, raped and enslaved.
To me it seems obvious that ISIS is a spook-run operation, meaning a government intelligence bureau is either at the control board or actively assisting a small leadership group in directing the caliphate. Popular movements are messy and enthusiastic, always either falling short or spilling over stated objectives in a public way. ISIS is nothing of the sort. It is opaque and mercenary; its messaging strictly controlled. No, this is definitely a top-down production.

When ISIS suffered a defeat recently in Tikrit at the hands of the Iraqi Army and Shiite militias working in concert with Kurdish pesh merga there was a prompt asymmetrical response: the terror attack targeting tourists at a museum in Tunisia and the suicide bombings at two Zaydi Shiite mosques in Sana. This reminded me of the old Rumsfeld neocon logic of "When you have a problem one way to solve it is to make it bigger."

Scott Shane had a story, a good one, that was featured prominently on The New York Times website for most of the weekend. In "From Minneapolis to ISIS: An American’s Path to Jihad," it is clear that the young Somali men from Minneapolis were able to hook up with ISIS recruiters at a mosque in Bloomington. Answer the question of who paid for their plane tickets and we'll be a little clearer how the ISIS network operates and who funds it.

And it will turn out that ISIS is no different than Al Qaeda, an organization funded and supported by the Gulf Sheikhdoms.

Thursday, September 25, 2014

Kirkpatrick Shines a Light on House of Saud

Regularly on this page I have praised the reporting of David Kirkpatrick, the Gray Lady's Cairo bureau chief who covered the Tahrir Square revolution in 2011 as well as the military-led counterrevolution in 2013 and everything that went on in between. He is a rare journalist in the mainstream press in that he does not not first adhere to whatever the company line is at the time and then sculpt his writing to suit that purpose; rather, he propounds a thesis and then sets to proving it. The thesis Kirkpatrick chooses to articulate seems to be of his own making and not yoked to the State Department talking points in circulation.

Of course there is always the possibility that Kirkpatrick is an intelligence agency asset -- just a very good one -- an example of how the CIA, though much maligned, is one step ahead of the competition. I prefer to think of him as a very shrewd operator, a reporter who knows the ropes and who can press right up to the censor's red line. He is -- and this for a salaried worker of the Gray Lady is incredible -- reliable.

Kirkpatrick's offering in today's paper, "ISIS’ Harsh Brand of Islam Is Rooted in Austere Saudi Creed," is a must read. The House of Saud is finally getting some of the mainstream attention that it deserves:
For their guiding principles, the leaders of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, are open and clear about their almost exclusive commitment to the Wahhabi movement of Sunni Islam. The group circulates images of Wahhabi religious textbooks from Saudi Arabia in the schools it controls. Videos from the group’s territory have shown Wahhabi texts plastered on the sides of an official missionary van. 
Kirkpatrick goes on to outline the divergence between Al Qaeda and Islamic State, which is grounded in Saudi Wahhabism; ISIS is the more faithful scion of al-Saud:
This approach is at odds with the more mainstream Islamist and jihadist thinking that forms the genealogy of Al Qaeda, and it has led to a fundamentally different view of violence. Al Qaeda grew out of a radical tradition that viewed Muslim states and societies as having fallen into sinful unbelief, and embraced violence as a tool to redeem them. But the Wahhabi tradition embraced the killing of those deemed unbelievers as essential to purifying the community of the faithful. 
“Violence is part of their ideology,” Professor Haykel said. “For Al Qaeda, violence is a means to an ends; for ISIS, it is an end in itself.” 
The distinction is playing out in a battle of fatwas. All of the most influential jihadist theorists are criticizing the Islamic State as deviant, calling its self-proclaimed caliphate null and void and, increasingly, slamming its leaders as bloodthirsty heretics for beheading journalists and aid workers. 
The upstart polemicists of the Islamic State, however, counter that its critics and even the leaders of Al Qaeda are all bad Muslims who have gone soft on the West. Even the officials and fighters of the Palestinian militant group Hamas are deemed to be “unbelievers” who might deserve punishment with beheading for agreeing to a cease-fire with Israel, one Islamic State ideologue recently declared.
“The duty of a Muslim is to carry out all of God’s orders and rulings immediately on the spot, not softly and gradually,” the scholar, Al Turki Ben-Ali, 30, said in an online forum.
***
The Islamic State’s founder, Mr. Baghdadi, grafted two elements onto his Wahhabi foundations borrowed from the broader, 20th-century Islamist movements that began with the Muslim Brotherhood and ultimately produced Al Qaeda. Where Wahhabi scholars preach obedience to earthly rulers, Mr. Baghdadi adopted the call to political action against foreign domination of the Arab world that has animated the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda and other 20th-century Islamist movements. 
Mr. Baghdadi also borrowed the idea of a restored caliphate. Where Wahhabism first flourished alongside the Ottoman Caliphate, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded shortly after that caliphate’s dissolution, in 1924 — an event seen across the world as a marker of Western ascent and Eastern decline. The movement’s founders took up the call for a revived caliphate as a goal of its broader anti-Western project. 
These days, though, even Brotherhood members appear almost embarrassed by the term’s anachronism, emphasizing that they use caliphate as a kind of spiritual idea irrelevant to the modern world of nation-states. 
“Even for Al Qaeda, the caliphate was something that was going to happen in the far distant future, before the end times,” said William McCants, a researcher on militant Islam at the Brookings Institution. The Islamic State “really moved up the timetable,” he said — to June 2014, in fact. 
Adhering to Wahhabi literalism, the Islamic State disdains other Islamists who reason by analogy to adapt to changing context — including the Muslim Brotherhood; its controversial midcentury thinker Sayed Qutb; and the contemporary militants his writing later inspired, like Ayman al-Zawahri of Al Qaeda. Islamic State ideologues often deem anyone, even an Islamist, who supports an elected or secular government to be an unbeliever and subject to beheading. 
“This is ‘you join us, or you are against us and we finish you,’ ” said Prof. Emad Shahin, who teaches Islam and politics at Georgetown University. “It is not Al Qaeda, but far to its right.”
The story concludes by Kirkpatrick bringing it back to Saudi Arabia and the dilatory response of the clerics there in criticizing ISIS:
Some experts note that Saudi clerics lagged long after other Muslim scholars in formally denouncing the Islamic State, and at one point even the king publicly urged them to speak out more clearly. “There is a certain mutedness in the Saudi religious establishment, which indicates it is not a slam dunk to condemn ISIS,” Professor Haykel said. 
Finally, on Aug. 19, Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Sheikh, the Saudi grand mufti, declared that “the ideas of extremism, radicalism and terrorism do not belong to Islam in any way, but are the first enemy of Islam, and Muslims are their first victims, as seen in the crimes of the so-called Islamic State and Al Qaeda.”
To paraphrase a writer Thomas Friedman quoted in his column yesterday, "How can we expect the Saudi royal family to condemn ISIS when they believe the exact same thing?"

The shortcoming of Kirkpatrick's piece is that it fails to mention the longstanding relationship between Wahhabism, the Muslim Brothers, Al Qaeda and the United States. But the fact that more stories are appearing in the press tracking Islamic State back to its sponsors within the House of Saud I take to be a positive development.

Monday, August 11, 2014

"Maliki Must Go"

I have always thought that Obama is a poor liar. I think it has to do with his deeply held belief that he is a good man, which happens to be one of his strongest political assets. Obama has the ability to convince people -- now, after six years of prevarication, a diminishing percentage of the American electorate -- that he is sincere, that he cares about the common folk, that he is a good man.

Thomas Friedman's POTUS interview is worth sitting through (I made it through about 50 of its 59 minutes) if only to witness Obama lying poorly. The topic of course is foreign policy. Thomas Friedman is the Gray Lady's longtime foreign affairs columnist and a chief propagandist of a facile "Gee whiz, isn't American techno-capitalism the best!" school of thought that underlies a lot of elite liberal thinking.

The interview ranges over all the hot spots: Iraq, Syria, Israel and Palestine, Russia and the Ukraine, China (I didn't make it to the part on China). Friedman begins asking about the situation in Iraq with ISIS. In response, Obama sticks to his administration's well-worn explanation, which can be summarized as "It's all Maliki's fault." The argument goes like this: Maliki, the elected parliamentary leader of Iraq and once the U.S. favorite, has ruled in a "maximalist" quasi-authoritarian manner which has alienated the country's main minority groups, the Kurds and Sunnis, driving the latter into the arms of the bloodthirsty, worse-than-Al-Qaeda jihadi organization, Islamic State. Therefore, in order for the United States, with its unsurpassed military power, to assist Iraqis in defending the territorial integrity of their nation against a horde of Wahhabis, Maliki must go.

While Obama was birthing this line of thought to his helpful midwife Friedman, he got tangled in his own nonsense. And, since he sees himself as a good and honest man, he took a little stumble. The snag in the recitation of the same stale talking points for Obama was when he admitted that the ideology of Islamic State does not appeal broadly to the Sunni masses, that it is a violent fringe group with no solution to the basic problems of jobs and growth. Once he proffered this, you could tell that he immediately realized that he had exposed the false nature of his position regarding Maliki and the spread of IS -- because if IS is a fringe group with no appeal, then having more Sunni politicians heading up government ministries is not going to make a difference one way or another as to why the Salafis are running rampant across two sovereign states, decapitating, crucifying, taking hostages, blowing up religious shrines. So the good man president stumbled on his own bullshit.

The good news is that Islamic State has been pushed back somewhat on its heels. Yesterday the Kurds recaptured towns outside of Erbil, Gwer and Mahmour, thanks to American air support. But apparently, there is a power struggle underway in the Green Zone. Alissa Rubin and Michael Gordon report in "Political Crisis in Iraq Deepens as Leadership Deadline Nears" that
The political crisis deepened in Baghdad on Monday as a deadline approached for naming a new prime minister and the current prime minister appeared on the verge of using military force to guarantee his survival. 
As intensive discussions were underway with Fouad Massoum, the Iraqi president charged with naming a new prime minister, the current premier, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, continued to insist he had the right to form the government because he commanded the largest bloc in the Iraqi Parliament. On Sunday, a defiant Mr. Maliki mustered Iraqi forces in Baghdad’s government center, known as the Green Zone, in a show of force meant to intimidate Mr. Massoum and other leading political figures.
***

The most likely outcome in the current crisis, according to a number of Iraqi political leaders, is that Mr. Massoum will appoint someone else in Mr. Maliki’s bloc who could win support from most of the other Shiites in Parliament as well as from Kurds and Sunnis. 
Even many who are opposed to Mr. Maliki’s coalition appeared ready to accept someone else from inside it. “Really at this point, I think it’s anybody but Maliki,” said a Kurdish politician who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the situation. 
Whether Mr. Maliki will accept someone else from his bloc in the top spot remains unclear. 
“The risk is, if he clings to power, he will control the country by force,” said another senior Iraqi politician. “This would be a military coup.”
Two questions that I have are 1) why doesn't Massoum let Maliki go ahead and try to form a government (my understanding is that there enough Shiites from the Sadrist bloc to prevent that from happening, assuming the Kurds and Sunnis cannot be bought off to support the great demon they are supposedly dead set against)? and 2) why trumpet the threat of the coup when there is obviously no chance of that? Iran is opposed to Maliki staying on and the real battle-hardened Shiite militias could be expected to line up against any fraction of the Iraqi Army that stayed loyal to Maliki.

As Rubin and Gordon go on to explain:
If Mr. Maliki were to call on the Iraqi Army to back his effort to stay in power, he could face resistance from one or several of the many militia groups that have close ties to political parties. 
“We’re all worried about a coup d'état,” said Gen. Halgurd Hikmet, the chief spokesman for the Kurdish pesh merga. “Maliki has to know that we have two major units of our troops guarding the Parliament and the Defense Ministry,” he said referring to the Kurdish division of the Iraqi Army. 
There are also the forces loyal to the influential Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, who oppose Mr. Maliki and are numerous in Baghdad. And there are the fighters of the Badr Corps, who are technically part of the Iraqi Army but remain closely tied to Hadi al-Ameri, a powerful Shiite member of the Iraqi Parliament with links to Iran. Whether Badr fighters will back Mr. Maliki or will move against him could help determine whether he survives. 
Whether any of these militias would be deployed is not clear, but the potential for fighting among different factions is real, several people said.
Briefly, before signing off, the Gray Lady takes her first lengthy look at the man of the hour, Islamic State's caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Written by Tim Arango and Eric Scmitt, "U.S. Actions in Iraq Fueled Rise of a Rebel" cover no new ground, but it is a useful review of what passes for wisdom about ISIS and al-Baghdadi. Eric Schmitt's presence on the byline should give us pause. He is a reliable government gatekeeper. Nothing is said about the role of the Gulf Sheihkdoms other than that below:
In June 2010, Stratfor published a report on the group that considered its prospects in the wake of the killings of the top leadership. The report stated, “the militant organization’s future for success looks bleak.” 
Still, the report said, referring to the Islamic State of Iraq, then an alternative name for Al Qaeda in Iraq, “I.S.I.’s intent to establish an Islamic caliphate in Iraq has not diminished.” 
The Sunni tribes of eastern Syria and Iraq’s Anbar and Nineveh Provinces have long had ties that run deeper than national boundaries, and ISIS was built on those relationships. Accordingly, as the group’s fortunes waned in Iraq, it found a new opportunity in the fight against Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria. 
As more moderate Syrian rebel groups were beaten down by the Syrian security forces and their allies, ISIS increasingly took control of the fight, in part on the strength of weapons and funding from its operations in Iraq and from jihadist supporters in the Arab world.
That's it. Sort of begs the question how you go from the Stratfor assessment in 2010 to the caliphate rising in 2014, all almost entirely under the radar.