Showing posts with label Muqtada al-Sadr. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Muqtada al-Sadr. Show all posts

Friday, January 24, 2020

U.S. Engineering Caliphate 2.0

Today in Baghdad Muqtada al-Sadr's promise of a "million-strong march" protesting U.S. military presence in Iraq materialized. Al Jazeera reports that
Al-Sadr, whose party won the most number of seats in the May 2018 parliament elections, seized on the public anger over the drone attack to call "a million-strong, peaceful, unified demonstration to condemn the American presence and its violations".
Iraq's top Shia Muslim leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, later called in his weekly sermon for political groups to form a new government as soon as possible to bring stability to the country and enact reforms to improve Iraqis' lives.
He also reiterated his opposition to foreign interference in Iraq, having previously condemned the US killing of Soleimani.
"Iraq's sovereignty must be respected ... and citizens should have the right to peaceful protest," he said.
Friday's rally is supported by mainstream Shia parties, including al-Sadr's political rival Hadi al-Ameri, who heads the Fatah bloc in parliament, as well as the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF, or Hashd al-Shaabi), an umbrella group comprised of an array of militias, including Iran-backed groups.
Al Jazeera's Imran Khan, reporting from the protest, said the turnout was a "real show of strength".
"It almost doesn't matter if this is a million people or less. The size and the vocalness of the crowd has made sure that the message has been sent now."
The New York Times (see "Protesters Mass in Baghdad, Demanding U.S. Leave Iraq") laughably attempts to dismiss the protest by saying it was organized:
This demonstration — unlike those in Tahrir Square in central Baghdad, which have gone on for months and involve a ragtag group of antigovernment protesters with homemade signs and a range of backgrounds — is heavily orchestrated rather than a spontaneous outpouring of feeling.
Participants were recruited, transported by buses provided by the organizers and given signs, flags and sometimes food. The vast majority of the participants are Shiite Muslims, the main constituency of the cleric Mr. al-Sadr and the armed groups close to Iran.
“The organizers of the demonstration in the southern city of Najaf called the Sadr followers, including me, and told us that there are buses and cars to transport the demonstrators from Najaf to Baghdad on Thursday at 1 p.m. and 9 p.m. and 11 p.m.,” said Mohammed Ali, 33, a taxi driver.
I suppose the same argument was used by the White Citizens' Council to dismiss Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" March on Washington.

Reuters gets into the act (see "'No, No America': Iraq protesters demand U.S. military pullout") by belittling the protest for "largely dissipating after several hours." Yes, that's what protest marches do.

There is intense antipathy in the corporate mainstream media for Muqtada al-Sadr and any Iraqi leader who stands up for Iraq sovereignty.

Reuters reminds us in the last paragraph of its story that
For the first time in nearly two years, parliament voted along sectarian lines to press the government to kick out U.S. forces. Shi’ite parties voted in favor, while Sunni Muslim and Kurdish lawmakers boycotted the session.
There is a bombshell story in the Middle East Eye by Suadad al-Salhy (see "US seeking to carve out Sunni state as its influence in Iraq wanes") which exposes where those Sunni and Kurdish lawmakers where when parliament was voting to kick out U.S. troops from Iraq:
The absence of Sunni and Kurdish MPs in parliament highlighted the fragile relationship between Sunni leaders and their Iran-backed Shia allies. Most abstaining MPs left Baghdad toward either Erbil in northern Iraq or Jordan’s Amman for fear of retaliation.
The latest developments in Iraq have prompted them to search for other options, foremost among which was an autonomous Sunni region, Sunni lawmakers told MEE.
As soon as some Sunni politicians arrived in Erbil and Amman, they met US officials there to "discuss options for both sides,” sources said.
In the early hours of 8 January, Iran targeted two Iraqi military bases hosting US forces, one in western Iraq and the other in the north, with ballistic missiles that left no casualties.
Less than 24 hours later, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Schenker flew to Erbil, without going through Baghdad, to meet key US ally and former president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Masoud Barzani, in addition to a number of other Kurdish officials.
Although statements later issued by the US did not mention any meetings that took place with Sunni leaders in Erbil, many sources confirmed that both the assistant secretary of state and Stephen Fagin, the US consul in Erbil, met a number of Sunni politicians “to discuss the implications of the parliament’s decision, the threats that Sunnis face and options for facing the two issues”.
On the same day, Schenker flew to the UAE. There, he later said, he met "by chance" with the speaker of the Iraqi parliament, Muhammad al-Halbousi, “who happened to be there”.
After meeting with Schenker, Halbousi held a series of meetings in the UAE on 9 and 10 January with several prominent Sunni leaders.
The plan is to create a Sunnistan with Anbar Province as its anchor:
None of the Sunni and Shia leaders and officials spoken to by MEE have any clear idea of the project’s details.
They all say that it is still just ideas and no clear information has been provided regarding the region’s prospective borders, the number of provinces it would contain and mechanisms to solve the problems that it will face.
It is perfectly clear, however, that the project will be launched from Anbar province, to later include the provinces of Nineveh and Salah al-Din, and part of Diyala.
The proposed Sunni region will be created first in accordance with the articles of the Iraqi constitution, which allows for administrative regions to be established alongside Kurdistan.
Later, the region will be temporarily annexed to Kurdistan in a federal or confederal form, "to avoid the conflict between Sunnis and Kurds over Kirkuk and the disputed areas", according to a prominent Sunni leader.
The last step, MEE understands, will be to have this region recognised internationally.
The Arab Gulf states allied to US, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, support and finance this project, Sunni and Shia leaders and officials told MEE.
“Funding is in place, international pressure is in place, and the necessary military strength is in place to create this region,” a prominent Sunni leader familiar with the talks said.
“Neither Iran nor the Shia forces will be able to stand against the project because the US and Gulf states back it,” the leader added.
“A huge amount of money and investment offered by the Sunni states is at stake, and these will turn the Anbar desert into green oases and rebuild the destroyed areas in Mosul and Salah al-Din. Who will care about oil?”
It is important to remember that immediately following the ISIS capture of Mosul and the collapse of the Iraqi Army this was Brett McGurk's demand of Iraq's government -- an autonomous Sunni region in Iraq with its own armed forces. ISIS was always a means to the end of an internationally recognized partition of Iraq.

Friday, November 22, 2019

The Rebellion in Iraq Continues

The Western mainstream media has been so captive of the anti-Iranian narrative regarding the month-plus protests in Iraq that it is hard to find any news about the protesters' formidable Iraqi advocates, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr. Reuters reports today in "Iraqi forces kill three protesters, cleric warns of crisis" that 
Iraq’s top Shi’ite Muslim cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, called on Friday for politicians to hurry up in reforming electoral laws because the changes would be the only way to resolve weeks of deadly unrest.
“We affirm the importance of speeding up the passing of the electoral law and the electoral commission law because this represents the country moving past the big crisis,” his representative said during a sermon in the holy city of Kerbala.
Sistani, who rarely weighs in on politics except in times of crisis, holds massive influence over public opinion in Shi’ite-majority Iraq. He also repeated his view that the protesters had legitimate demands and should not be met with violence.
Alissa Rubin had an excellent story the other day (see "‘Our Patience Is Over’: Why Iraqis Are Protesting") about Sadr City's important role in the Baghdad protests. She mentions that
Most Sadr City residents, like many people in southern Iraq, are followers of Muqtada al-Sadr, a nationalist and populist Shiite cleric and leader whose family long resisted the authority of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party.
[snip] 
Sadr City today remains armed and ready to defend its own.
The Sadr Organization, of which Abu Tiba is a member, and which has ties to Mr. al-Sadr’s militia, is helping to coordinate the protests from the neighborhood. Its members are thick on the ground at the protests, controlling strategic positions.
 At the outset of the protests, in the beginning of October, al-Sadr and al-Sistani were regularly mentioned as being on the side of the protesters. Then this fact largely disappeared from the coverage. If you were pro-Iranian, the protests were dismissed as another Western plot; if you were pro-American, an anti-Iranian rebellion. But in reality it is a real people-power uprising, a promising reemergence of the Arab Spring.

Tuesday, October 29, 2019

Muqtada

It's not looking good for Iraq's prime minister Adel Abdul Mahdi. Despite a large number of fatalities, the protests appear to be growing larger. According to Alissa Rubin, Baghdad bureau chief of The New York Times, in "Iraqi Antigovernment Protests Grow, Part Battle Lines and Carnival":
On Monday, the street running into Tahrir Square, Baghdad’s main gathering place and the entryway to a bridge leading to the Green Zone, was packed with people, food carts and trucks blasting music, as well as protesters beating a traditional drum.
Much of the protest had a festive air: People danced, some men took their shirts off, others wore hats made of the Iraqi flag, and at tea carts vendors handed out cups of sweet tea and sandwiches. Closer to the Green Zone, the demonstration was more of a battle, as security forces fired tear gas and clashed with protesters.
[snip] 
The government’s response in recent days has been more moderate than when the protests began in the first week of October. At that time, the security forces used live fire to drive back those who tried to enter Baghdad’s heavily guarded Green Zone. Nationwide, over the first five days, 157 people were killed, including eight members of the security forces, according to a government report.
A two-week hiatus in protests followed those clashes, and the demonstrators appeared to organize in the calm. The protests resumed on Oct. 25.
Meanwhile, Moktada al-Sadr, a nationalist Shiite cleric, has been stoking the antigovernment sentiment of the protesters, calling for new elections and for Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi to step down.
Mr. al-Sadr is the only leader of a Shiite political party urging his followers to protest; most of the others, some of whom have ties to Iran, are firmly in the government camp. But Mr. al-Sadr, who has pushed to rid Iraq of both American and Iranian influence, has repeatedly spoken out against corruption, garnering him greater credibility with the demonstrators than some of his peers.
It's when an uprising becomes Mardi Gras that authorities need to worry. A Mardi Gras draws in the broad public, unlike a purely political march or police street fight.  The government is obviously scared, agreeing to toss a few gumdrops in the form of dissolving provincial councils and reducing salaries of top officials.

Neither the United States nor Iran want to see this uprising continue. One doesn't want to see more bloodshed, but at the same time it would be wonderful to see a reboot of the Arab Spring. That Muqtada al-Sadr is playing a leadership role is encouraging. It means that there is a formidable combatant in the arena; a champion, not a cutout.

Friday, June 8, 2018

Iraq Recount: Muqtada Should Remain on Top

It's hard to limn the politics of Iraq's simmering constitutional crisis. On Wednesday parliament amended Iraq's election law, clearing the way for a total manual recount of the May 12 vote and sidelining the High Electoral Commission of Iraq.

It appears, based on "Iraqi Council to Oversee Manual Recount Amid Post-Election Chaos" by Falih Hassan and Margaret Coker, that the fraud is centered in Kurdistan and parts of the former caliphate:
Controversy increased again this week, when the electoral body announced that it had voided votes from 1,021 ballot boxes around the country, as well as ballots cast by Iraqi citizens overseas. It did not say which electoral districts the boxes came from, why the ballots were voided or what criteria it used in taking that action. 
The majority of fraud complaints have come from Kurdish regions in northern Iraq, and from some of the areas still struggling with security after the defeat of the Islamic State.
The story doesn't say which party ended up on top in that turf, but it wasn't Muqtada al-Sadr's Sairoon alliance. So Sairoon should remain on top after the national recount. Unless the recount is completely hijacked by corrupt forces seeking to maintain their sinecures. But that seems unlikely to me.

Monday, May 14, 2018

Election Upset in Iraq

It's probably more a statement of the poor quality of Western reporting on Iraq -- this morning the only story I could locate about Saturday's parliamentary elections was from from Reuters, "Cleric Sadr, in surprise comeback, seems set to win Iraq election" -- than an actual upset by Muqtada al-Sadr's Alliance of Revolutionaries for Reform coalition:
In the first election since Islamic State was defeated in the country, Shi’ite militia chief Hadi al-Amiri’s bloc, which is backed by Iran, was in second place, while Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, once seen as the front-runner, trailed in third position.
The preliminary results were based on a count of more than 95 percent of the votes cast in 10 of Iraq’s 18 provinces.
Unlike Abadi, a rare ally of both the United States and Iran, Sadr is an opponent of both of the countries which have wielded influence in Iraq since a U.S.-led invasion toppled Sunni dictator Saddam Hussein and ushered the Shi’ite majority to power.
[snip]
Turnout was 44.52 percent with 92 percent of votes counted, the Independent High Electoral Commission said - that was significantly lower than in previous elections. Full results are due to be officially announced later on Monday.
Sadr and Amiri both came in first in four of the 10 provinces where votes were counted, but the cleric’s bloc won significantly more votes in the capital, Baghdad, which has the highest number of seats.
A document provided to Reuters by a candidate in Baghdad that was also circulating among journalists and analysts showed results from all 18 provinces.
Reuters could not independently verify the document’s authenticity but the results in it showed Sadr had won the nationwide popular vote with more than 1.3 million votes and gained 54 of parliament’s 329 seats.
He was followed by Amiri with more than 1.2 million votes, translating into 47 seats, and Abadi with more than 1 million votes and 42 seats, according to calculations made by Reuters based on the document. Ex-Prime Miniser Nuri al-Maliki, a close ally of Iran like Amiri, came in fourth with 25 seats.
Winning the largest number of seats does not automatically guarantee that Sadr will be able to hand-pick a prime minister. The other winning blocs would have to agree on the nomination.
In a 2010 election, Vice President Ayad Allawi’s group won the largest number of seats, albeit with a narrow margin, but he was blocked from becoming prime minister for which he blamed Tehran.
And a similar fate could befall Sadr. Iran has publicly stated it would not allow his bloc to govern and may try to form a governing coalition between its allies, Amiri and Maliki.
“We will not allow liberals and communists to govern in Iraq,” Ali Akbar Velayati, top adviser to the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in February.
His statement, which sparked criticism by Iraqi figures, was referring to the electoral alliance between Sadr, the Iraqi Communist Party and other secular groups who joined protests organized by Sadr in 2016 to press the government to see through a move to stem endemic corruption.
Iraqi Communist Party Secretary General Raed Fahmy told Reuters the vote in favor of the Sadrist list, backed by his group, ‘’is is a clear message that we must have balanced relations with all (foreign countries) based non-interference in Iraq’s internal affairs.’’
‘’Everybody is welcome to provide support to Iraq, but not at the expense of its sovereignty and independence,’’ he added.
During the campaign, frustrated Iraqis of all shades complained about their political elite’s systematic patronage, bad governance and corruption, saying they didn’t receive any benefits of their country’s oil wealth.
‘’The importance of this vote is that it is a clear message that the people wants to change the system of governance which has produced corruption and weakened state institutions,’’ said Fahmy. ‘’It is a message to provide services to the people, health and education, and to reduce social disparities.’’
These parliamentary elections must be seen as a solid defeat of the U.S.-Saudi-Israeli goal of Balkanizing Iraq. Clearly the Islamic State was a GCC-supported project to create a Sunnistan out of Iraq and Syria. It partially succeeded in Syria with U.S. troops and air power controlling one-third of the country and a hefty chunk of turf along the Iraq border.

But the citizens of Iraq are more committed to their sovereignty and national independence than at any time since the U.S. invasion. The defeat of the Salafist mercenaries played a key role in this renewal of national purpose. The same thing can be said of neighboring Syria.

The U.S.-Israeli-Saudi idea to scrap the Sykes-Picot Middle East is proving difficult to implement. It's actually reinvigorating allegiance to these old nationalist constructs.

The problem for the United States and its clients is that it has force but it can't actually hold territory, absent U.S. troops. The Salafis have proven incapable. The Israelis are too busy slaughtering Palestinians in Gaza.

The United States remains the only option for GCC states and Israel. And right now there is not enough of an anti-war movement in the U.S. to block another war from kicking off.

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

"ISIS Consolidates" But an Independent Kurdistan is Here to Stay

It appears that Maliki has a legitimate beef. Iraqi president, Fuad Masum, a Kurd, should have nominated Maliki, as head of the largest parliamentary bloc, prime minister and given him a shot at forming a new government. Instead, with the United States working diligently behind the scene to make sure Maliki was afforded no such opportunity, president Masum designated Haider al-Abadi, a member of Maliki's Dawa Party, prime minister. (There was a good OpEd yesterday by Zaid al-Ali, "Iraq’s Rot Starts at the Top," singling out Abadi as the best of a group of potential Maliki replacements because he is open to outside influence. Coincidence? Probably not.)

Maliki responded to his ouster by mustering troops in the Green Zone in Baghdad and promising legal action in the courts. But as noted in "Iraqis Nominate Maliki Successor, Causing Standoff," by Tim Arango, Alissa Rubin and Michael Gordon,
The question is whether Mr. Abadi, who like many of Iraq’s Shiite leaders led a life of exile until the American invasion in 2003 ousted Saddam Hussein, can forge a grand political bargain with meaningful roles for the two significant minority factions, Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Under the Constitution, he has a 30-day window to conclude the sort of back-room deals — promises of positions and ministries, which sustain Iraq’s system of patronage — that would be the backbone of a new government.
With 30 days to form a government Maliki can make a lot of mischief. He has an extensive security force at his disposal. But the reality is that he has all the big players lined up against him: Iran, the U.S. and the religious authority of Grand Ayatollah Sistani; plus, if things got hot in the Green Zone, it would be forces loyal to Maliki against Muqtada al-Sadr's militias and the Badr Corps of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Baghdad would be weakened by such fighting and rendered easy prey for Islamic State.

No, Maliki is gone. The writing on the wall is clear. The U.S. is dangling more support upon formation of a new government by Abadi. It seems as if the Obama administration will get its wish, which is for a federalized Iraq, a nation composed of three states: Kurdistan, Sunnistan and Shiastan.

Already the U.S. is greasing the skids on arms shipments -- weapons of all kinds, both light and heavy -- to the Kurds. The CIA has taken the lead, but the Pentagon is not far behind. Kurdistan is here to stay. That appears to be fact now. Allow me to quote at length a good story, "Pentagon Says Airstrikes Have Slowed but Not Stopped Sunni Militants," by Helene Cooper and Alissa Rubin:
The Central Intelligence Agency has begun directly supplying weapons to pesh merga fighters, administration officials said, after weeks of pleas and demands from leaders in the country’s semiautonomous Kurdish region for help in fighting ISIS. But it remains unclear just how much weaponry the United States has funneled through to the Kurds so far; military officials said they would probably begin sending small-arms munitions soon, too.
A C.I.A. spokesman declined to comment.
“The pesh merga are composed of capable, disciplined forces who deserve their reputation as fierce mountain-war fighters,” a United States official said. “However, it’s been almost a decade since their mostly light infantry brigades have been tested in battle, so it’s not surprising that they’ve taken some knocks from ISIL.”
The Kurds, who say they need armor-piercing munitions to help penetrate heavily fortified tanks captured by ISIS fighters from both the Syrian and Iraqi militaries, will soon be getting long-range weapons as well. 
“Some of the ISIL forces have a longer-range weapons system, so we need to make sure that the government of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces are providing longer-range weapons themselves to the Kurdish forces,” General Mayville said. 
The Kurds have asked the United States to provide — or in some way help them obtain — sniper rifles, mortars, heavy machine guns, wire-guided antitank weapons and antitank guns, rocket-propelled grenades, Humvees and tanks, among other weapons, Kurdish officials said. They have also asked for body armor and helicopters for evacuations.
A senior military official said Monday that the Pentagon was concentrating on rifles and machine guns. He declined to say what kinds of weapons the C.I.A. had begun supplying the Kurds. 
A second Pentagon official, also speaking on the condition of anonymity as a matter of policy, said that the Defense Department had yet to decide whether it would supply the pesh merga with antitank guns, but that “whatever they are getting will be in line with meeting the proper requirements for the kind of defenses that they’re conducting.” 
In the past, American officials have been hesitant about directly supplying weapons to the Kurds, who differ with Iraq’s current prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, over the division of oil resources and how much territory should fall within the Kurdistan region’s borders. In addition, the Kurds initially took advantage of the conflict with ISIS to expand their own territory in northern Iraq. Many Obama administration officials say privately that they do not expect Kurdistan to remain part of Iraq once the fighting is over.
So even though the pesh merga were routed by Islamic State in Jalawla, a town in Diyala Province that borders Kurdistan, forcing the vaunted Kurdish fighters to stage another "tactical retreat," it is clear that with robust support from the United States the Kurds will hold on. What these means in terms of oil revenue and the status of Kirkuk is unclear; it also unclear at this point the extent to which the Obama administration is willing to roll back IS's gains in northern Iraq. Patrick Cockburn's article, "Isis Consolidates" in the London Review of Books, recommended Sunday by the Moon of Alabama blog, paints a picture of a caliphate that is going to be around for some time.

Cockburn is of the opinion that an attack on Baghdad is inevitable and that Iraq's Shia are in a state of denial, having drunk the Kool-Aid handed out by the U.S. that the problem is Maliki and that once Maliki goes all will right itself.

In the near term, Cockburn thinks that IS will turn its attention again to toppling Assad, starting with Aleppo. And that once the Syrian Arab Army crumbles the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East, the Israelis and the Gulf monarchies, not to mention Iran and Hezbollah, will have a real crisis to contend with.

Cockburn is of the school of thought that IS is a Frankenstein monster, a creation of the Saudis that has proven too powerful to control. Now it is pursuing its own agenda. I am skeptical of this.

Sunday, March 10, 2013

Patrick Cockburn on Iraq Ten Years After

For a good rundown on current politics in Iraq check out Patrick Cockburn's article, "Death and Dollars in the New Iraq: The Shia and the Kurds 10 Years After the Invasion," posted on the Counterpunch website this weekend. Some highlights: Iran is ready to wash its hands of Maliki (at least by the 2014 parliamentary elections); Muqtada al-Sadr is still a power, shrewdly positioning the Sadrists and defending a unified Iraq; and Kurdistan is booming but might overplay its hand if it chooses to piss off Baghdad by going ahead with an oil pipeline to Turkey that is already under construction.

I recently sold all the stock I had in the Turkish Investment Fund (TKF). I held onto it for over five years. I bought in originally because I thought eventually Turkey, a great nation, the seat of the old Ottoman Empire, would be admitted to the eurozone; also, I thought that Turkey would absorb most of the trade with Iraq as it went through de-Baathification. I sold because I don't think the eurozone is going to survive; plus, I think Iran and Iraq are headed for some tough times as Syria continues to unravel. Syria's collapse is something that goes unmentioned in Cockburn's piece.