Showing posts with label Hamid Karzai. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hamid Karzai. Show all posts

Friday, August 5, 2016

Afghanistan at the End of the Line

News of Afghanistan that reaches the pages of the Western press is usually bad. Terror bombings in Kabul. The northern province of Kunduz, whose capital city was overrun briefly by the Taliban last autumn, remains largely under Taliban control. The same can be said for Helmand and Uruzgan provinces in the south. Obama reversed himself on U.S. troop levels and rules of engagement exposing the lie of his 2014 end of combat operations ceremony.

Another big 2014 Obama administration lie is about to be exposed. The Kerry-created unity government of Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, cobbled together extra-legally to avoid a potential civil war due to questionable vote returns from the Afghan presidential election, is supposed to have passed certain mile markers by this October. Mujib Mashal explains this morning in "Hamid Karzai Is Still Running, but Where’s the Finish Line?"
The end of September is the deadline for the government to meet the commitments of a political deal brokered by Secretary of State John Kerry after the catastrophic 2014 election dispute. By then, Afghanistan is supposed to hold a parliamentary election, enact sweeping electoral reform, and amend the Constitution to create the position of prime minister for Mr. Ghani’s election rival and current governing partner, Abdullah Abdullah. But staying on schedule was already impossible many months ago, and Mr. Kerry has publicly insisted that Mr. Ghani’s government will remain through the end of its five-year term, regardless.
That is just the beginning. The country’s security situation is worsening, despite the American military’s increased involvement in the fighting. The Taliban have seized many districts, and they threaten to take many more.
Mr. Ghani, the constant technocrat, has been forced to focus on security, and his economic initiatives have stalled. And suddenly he has also been challenged by a street protest movement in which ethnic Hazaras are accusing his government of systematic discrimination.
The most recent of the demonstrations was struck by a suicide bombing, claimed by the Islamic State, that left at least 80 people dead. Now the demonstrators accuse the government of purposefully leaving them vulnerable to attack, and they have given Mr. Ghani an ultimatum to meet their demands — another September deadline, as it turns out.
On top of all that, a new protest movement, potentially more dangerous, is growing just north of Kabul, the capital, calling for the government to rebury with dignity a bandit northern king who has been dead for nearly a century, shot by a firing squad. Among the people calling for the reburial, and threatening protests, are northern militia commanders who have long been skeptical of Mr. Ghani, and they have also given him a September ultimatum.
Government officials accuse Mr. Karzai and his allies of having a hand in the recent protests. But he says he is after neither the collapse of the government nor a return to power. “I have absolutely no doubt about that,” he said.
He just wants the government’s legitimacy affirmed after the September deadline, he said, and the only way left is to call a traditional loya jirga — a grand assembly of tribal elders from across the country.

Mr. Karzai’s push for a loya jirga is the move most widely seen as a game plan for returning to power, or at least for negotiating more leverage. His strength is with the tribes and the power brokers he has maintained at his side, while Mr. Ghani has alienated many of them.

It helps to understand that Mr. Karzai represents an entire network of power — national as well as local — accumulated over 13 years and beyond. That network feels that it is slowly being uprooted under Mr. Ghani’s presidency, and that it could be vastly weakened if the current government survives the September deadline intact.
Kerry is on record saying that the U.S. plans on ignoring its own agreement, an agreement that was supposed to bestow legitimacy on the Afghan unity government. Ghani will rule absent parliamentary elections, election reform or a loya jirga. Clearly this is an occupation government, nothing more. How the United Nations and international donors will manage to maintain the fiction that Afghanistan is a democratic state is another matter. Mashal wrote back in April that
Western and Afghan officials say certain advisers to Mr. Ghani are envisioning a different outcome: using the deadline to force out Mr. Abdullah. They argue that while the position of chief executive expires, the president will still have a mandate, from an election that they say was cleansed by a United Nations audit.
Part of the price Abdullah Abdullah paid for his chief executive slot in the current government was to drop his challenge to the legitimacy of the 2014 election. Now, potentially, those scrubbed election results will be used to oust him.

And that is just the internal government feud between the Ghani and Abdullah factions. Then there is Karzai positioning himself as the leader of a post-U.S. Afghanistan:
Mr. Karzai reserves his sharpest criticism of the government for what he considers its biggest sin: cozying up, “immensely, sadly,” to the United States and relying on it for its survival. 
Mr. Karzai, who sent flowers to the American ambassador for the Fourth of July holiday and then signed a thank-you note to the ambassador for thanking him, said in an interview with The New York Times last week that “the Americans, whose primary slogan is democracy, are making a sham of democracy in Afghanistan.” 
He is not fundamentally against the American presence, he says: He just wants them to stop bombing his country and interfering in the political process, which he accused Mr. Kerry of doing in the spring when he insisted on a full-term Ghani government.
“This is a blatant interference to undermine the sovereignty of Afghanistan,” Mr. Karzai said in the interview. “Look at this country: What do we have other than our pride and sovereignty? Then someone comes — from a good place, America — stands here in our country to determine the duration of our government as he sees fit? That is an insult.”

Meanwhile, the streams of visitors continue, and Mr. Karzai regales them with parables that at times seem like bids for redemption, and at others like foresight.

During one lunch, he told a story of a group of tired travelers in a desert who see a fire in the distance and hear drums. Men are dancing the circle-dance called Attan. The travelers decide to spend the night there, and to make their hosts feel comfortable, they join in the dance.
But the dance stretches on and on. 
“One of the travelers is wise, he realizes it is the devil’s dance and it will go on all night,” Mr. Karzai told the guests. “When the morning comes, there would be no sign of a dance or the devils.”

He paused, then drove the point home: “We are stuck in the dance of the devil,” he said, to chuckles. “When the sun rises, the devils will be gone, but we will be left in this dry land.”
The U.S. and Afghanistan are linked. Afghanistan's destruction played a key role in the counterrevolution launched against social democracy in the United States. First, the big military buildup begun by Jimmy Carter and expanded by Reagan after the Soviet invasion; then, post-9/11, the U.S. invasion.

This fall both the U.S. and Afghanistan are coming to the end of the line of their counterrevolutions against social democracy.

Tuesday, December 22, 2015

Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan: The Promise of Elections Will Not Bring Peace

There is little reason to hope that anything will come of the UN-approved peace plan for Syria announced last Friday. Just look at how poorly peace talks on Yemen have gone; and with Yemen you don't have nearly the number of large-state actors with their fingers in the mix as is the case with Syria. In Yemen, like in Syria, a significant problem is how to contain the efflorescence of Salafi jihadists who are supported by Saudi Arabia. Kareem Fahim and Saleed al-Batati report in "Yemen Peace Talks End With No End to Conflict" that
In recent days, anti-Houthi fighters have mounted a broad offensive across several northern provinces, and captured new territory, including a provincial capital. [What about the ceasefire?] The anti-Houthi forces are backed by a Saudi-led military coalition that has been conducting an aerial campaign against the rebels since March. Human rights groups say that bombing by the coalition is responsible for the majority of civilian deaths during the war. 
The Saudi-led coalition carried out airstrikes in Sana and other areas on Saturday and Sunday. And the Houthis, who have been making increasingly bold military incursions across the border into Saudi Arabia, have fired ballistic missiles at the Saudi-backed forces in the past few days, according to Yemeni military officials.
It appears that the Houthis are flying the white flag, but to no avail:
Nasser Bagazgooz, who was part of the Houthi delegation, asserted that his side had made “big” concessions, including agreeing to withdraw Houthi forces from cities and from government institutions, and to hand over weapons.

The Houthis had asked for the formation of a new government “from across the political spectrum,” and elections within a year, he added.
The Houthis are basically mirroring the UN-outlined peace process for Syria. But the Saudis don't seem to find this acceptable, which should tell us how smoothly things will go in January.

Interestingly, elections are also on the mind of a nascent opposition movement within the quisling Afghan government. But first a few words on the dire military predicament in Afghanistan from this morning's "Situation Report" by Foreign Policy's Paul McLeary:
Taliban keeps pushing. NATO’s combat mission in Afghanistan may have ended last December, but the deaths of six U.S. soldiers near Bagram airbase on Monday, and the rushed deployments of U.S. and British forces to Helmand province to hold back a resurgent Taliban, tell a very different story. 
The loss of six soldiers in one strike is the largest battlefield loss for the U.S. in Afghanistan in well over a year, and more than doubles American combat fatalities there in 2015, which stood at four before Monday.
Renewed Taliban offensives across the country call into question the effectiveness of the Afghan army, which continues to struggle despite years of training and billions spent on equipping the force. And now, American commandos are back in the fight in the southern province of Helmand to backstop Afghan forces, who are in danger of losing control of the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah and the key town of Sangin, FP’s Paul McLeary reports.
British troops have also been sent to Helmand, though London insists they are only acting in an advisory role. It’s worth remembering that Sangin resonates deeply with the British public, “as more than 100 of their 456 fatalities in Afghanistan since the start of the war in 2001 took place in the district,” the AP notes.
Mujib Mashal reported in yesterday's paper, "Afghan Government Faces New Set of Rivals," that allies of former president Hamid Karzai are demanding that the Ghani-Abdullah government honor pledges to hold elections within nine months. There is a hardcore segment of this opposition who want a loya jirga convened immediately and a caretaker government put in place:
It was unlikely that the members of the opposition council would have much popular support, because many of them had controversial pasts, Mr. Safi said. [Wadir Safi, a lecturer of political science at Kabul University.] But the government’s abysmal record has given many of them hope that they can exercise some power anyway, he added.
“The problem is also that the government hasn’t delivered at all — the two men came together in an illegal agreement, they have talked a lot and delivered nothing, and they are trying to extend that,” Mr. Safi said.
Mr. Ghani’s government came to power through a power-sharing agreement brokered by Secretary of State John Kerry after an election stalemate last year threatened to throw the country into a civil war. The agreement’s two-year deadline expires next September, and it calls for a thorough overhaul of the election process, the holding of parliamentary and district elections, and a national assembly of elders to amend the Constitution and formalize Mr. Abdullah’s position as a prime minister.
But 15 months after coming to power, the government has struggled with even the most basic steps needed for holding the elections, including an agreement on the makeup of the commission to oversee the vote. A harsh winter, and a Taliban offensive that is expected to intensify in the spring, makes their task of holding the elections as scheduled even more difficult.
In all three battle zones -- Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan -- elections will not bring peace. In not one of the three countries does the U.S. and its Saudi ally want truly free and fair elections. The U.S. doesn't have free and fair elections in the homeland, and neither do the Saudis. So the wars will continue.

Tuesday, May 5, 2015

Taliban-Afghan Pugwash Conference a Success

Call me naive, but I think the Pugwash Conference held at a beach resort in Doha, Qatar the last couple of days featuring informal talks between representatives of the Afghan Taliban and the government of Ashraf Ghani was a big success. Tentative, non-binding "common points" were reached on several topics that have proved to be stumbling blocks in the past. Both sides agreed that 1) the current Afghan constitution is not sacrosanct; 2) the Taliban can open and operate a political office in Qatar, something which sent Hamid Karzai through the roof in 2013; and 3) interference by neighboring foreign states and Daesh (ISIS) is not welcome.

Here is the complete list of "common points" as published by the Pugwash Conference:
1. There was a general appreciation of the positive value of the meeting, and a widely shared sense of gratitude towards the State of Qatar for the hospitality and the assistance given to the participants in the meeting. 
2. The idea of bringing about peace in Afghanistan and ending the conflict was wholeheartedly supported by all the participants. 
3. The civilian casualties of the Afghan conflict have been lamented by everybody, even though differences may exist on who bears the main responsibility of these casualties. Protection of civilians is, as it should be, a priority for everybody. 
4. The role of foreign forces that are or have been present in Afghanistan were evaluated in different ways (also in relation to the civilian casualties mentioned above). Everybody agreed that foreign forces have to leave Afghanistan soon. Some expressed concern that there should be an agreement among Afghan political forces before the departure of the foreign forces. 
5. Any political discrimination against any Afghan political party or group would be an obstacle to the peace process. In particular, the delisting of black-listed Taliban would facilitate the peace process. Political prisoners should be released. 
6. Corruption and the production/selling of drugs are among the most serious problems of Afghanistan. 
7. The value of education for both men and women was underlined by everybody. Economic development in Afghanistan will heavily depend on peace. 
8. The structure of the political system (and the constitution of Afghanistan) should be discussed in detail, and, while different opinions may arise in this respect, there is a general agreement that no party should have a monopoly on power. 
9.  In any case, the government of Afghanistan will be an Islamic one. This does not mean that minorities of any sort should be discriminated against. [Pamela Geller will love this one.]
10. The model of the so-called Islamic State (Daesh) is alien to the tradition and the desires of the Afghan people. This point was agreed upon by everybody. 
11.The relation with neighboring countries should be kept amicable, and cooperation with such countries should be strengthened. This does not mean that neighboring countries are welcome to interfere with Afghan internal affairs. 
12. The meeting of 2-3 May 2015 should be followed up by other meetings in order that the peace process be sustained. It is vital that communication among different Afghan parties and groups be kept alive, even at an unofficial level. In general, the peace process should be speeded up! Some would welcome the possibility of talks between the Taliban and the Government. 
13. The Taliban in Doha played an important role in the organization of this meeting. The Taliban’s office should be opened to facilitate meetings and talks. 
14. Qatar, UN and non-governmental international organizations such as Pugwash should hopefully continue to support the Afghan peace process. 
15. The public interest and the well-being of the Afghan people will be at the center of the attention of the participants in this meeting and in the forthcoming ones.
Interestingly, Rod Nordland, back in Kabul after assignment in Iraq, chooses to accentuate point #4 in "Some Progress Is Reported in Informal Afghan-Taliban Talks" as a tentative retraction of the Taliban demand that formal peace negotiations cannot begin until all occupying military forces withdraw from Afghanistan: "The Taliban signaled that they might be willing to drop their demand that all foreign troops, such as the residual American and NATO force of 13,000 trainers and counterterrorism troops, would have to be withdrawn before peace talks could take place."

Nordland cited the Taliban's post-conference statement as proof for his interpretation of point #4: "In a separate statement, the Taliban denounced the American role in the country and demanded a withdrawal, but did not appear to make that a precondition for peace talks, as they often have in the past."

But point #4, as is, says nothing about the Taliban dropping their demand on the removal of all foreign troops as a condition for the start of a formal peace process.

What Nordland's story makes clear, and one that he wrote which appeared in yesterday's paper ("Afghan and Taliban Representatives Meet in Qatar"), is that the Pugwash Conference in Doha was successful to the extent that it cut out Pakistan. This from today's story:
“Peace cannot be achieved just in talks and slogans,” the Taliban statement, posted on the group’s website, read. “There is a need for determination and good intentions.” They also appeared to dismiss a role for Pakistan in future talks, criticizing “peace talk offers that are usually made to neighboring countries.” 
Pakistan has long allowed the Taliban’s senior leadership to take refuge on its side of the border and has been wary of peace overtures that its government does not control.
And from the story yesterday:
Pakistan has long been seen as an important potential broker of any peace process between the Afghan government and the Taliban, given that many insurgent leaders have found continued shelter there. But the Qatari conference represented an effort by the Taliban to strike out independently of the Pakistanis, Mr. Mutmaeen ["an Afghan writer and journalist who previously served as an official in the Taliban government"] said. “The important point is that there are no Chinese, no Saudis or no one from Pakistan, only from Europe and the United Nations” other than the Afghans, he said. “This is a good development.” 
“This is an opportunity,” Mr. Qasimyar ["foreign policy committee chief at the Afghan government’s High Peace Council"] said. “They get together, they may have a chance to have tea or dinner or lunch at the same table, and that’s all right.”
Much has been made recently about China's sizable investment in Pakistan and its plans to build a land bridge to the Arabian Sea, as well as its own efforts to host peace talks. The Pugwash Conference highlights the obvious (something that easily gets lost): the Taliban is not a monolith. There are many different factions and players; some are agents of Pakistan, and some opposed to Pakistan. How this all plays out as the spring offensive in Afghanistan continues to get underway is hard to say. But the results of the Pugwash Conference are better news than we have had for some time.

Monday, March 16, 2015

Fourth Anniversary of War in Syria + CIA Funds Al Qaeda

A number of interesting stories appeared over the weekend that reaffirm the idea that the future is one of perpetual war.

First, there was Ben Hubbard's marking of the four-year anniversary of the war in Syria, "An Ever-Bleaker Syria, From All Vantage Points":
. . . [O]ne of the starkest indications of what four years of conflict have done to Syria came from space, with new satellite images showing that mass destruction and displacement have extinguished more than four-fifths of the country’s lights, according to an analysis by Xi Li of Wuhan University in China and the University of Maryland at College Park. 
The Syria conflict began four years ago this week with protests calling for political reforms inspired by the Arab Spring uprisings elsewhere in the Middle East.
Since then, it has repeatedly metastasized: President Bashar al-Assad unleashed soldiers and thugs to quell the unrest; the opposition spawned armed rebel groups; foreign powers poured in military aid; and the resulting violence spread chaos in increasingly large expanses of territory, allowing extremist groups to establish footholds and increase their power.
Syria enters its fifth year of conflict with few signs that the war will end soon. International efforts to bring the warring parties together for peace talks have fallen dormant, and the United Nations envoy, Staffan de Mistura, has made little progress on even his modest goal of a short-term cease-fire in only one of Syria’s many battleground cities. 
Instead, international attention has shifted to military action against the extremists of the Islamic State, who control parts of Syria and Iraq and have shocked the world by beheading their foes and demolishing historical sites.
You'll notice that Hubbard never directly mentions the United States as a "foreign power" that fanned the conflict in Syria (which used to be uniformly referred to as a "civil war," but an undeniable influx of jihadis from abroad, an influx aided by the Gulf monarchies, Turkey, the U.S. and U.K., made that designation impossible even for the purveyors of crass propaganda).

The U.S. role has not gone unmentioned in the "newspaper of record." The CIA runs covert operations in both Jordan and Turkey to rid Syria of its Baathist government. This has been reported by the Gray Lady in the past, as has the U.S. high-tech weapons transfers to the "good" Syrian rebels which always manage to find their way to the "bad" jihadis (for a helpful roundup of evidence of an Islamic State-U.S. linkage, see Tim Anderson's "The Relationship between Washington and ISIS: The Evidence.")

Now that we are at the fourth anniversary of the cracking of Syria, to get a sense of the U.S. role in that cracking, we should all again read Seymour Hersh's "The Red Line and the Rat Line," something to keep in mind as Hubbard ticks off the toll of Syria's destruction:
Aid organizations say that the rise of the Islamic State, also known as ISISor ISIL, has not only inflicted deprivation and violence on the communities it conquers, but has also siphoned international attention from a growing humanitarian crisis that is echoing increasingly far from Syria’s borders. Last year, for example, brought a record high for illegal migration across the Mediterranean to Europe. Many of those taking the often-lethal trips were Syrian.
Humanitarian organizations issued a barrage of reports for the anniversary of the war’s beginning that quantify how hard life has become for Syrians.
About half of the country’s prewar population has fled from home, according to the United Nations, and nearly four million people have become refugees abroad, putting large burdens on neighboring countries like Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon.
A report by the Syrian Center for Policy Research said that education was in a “state of collapse”; that 6 percent of Syrians had been killed or wounded; and that life expectancy had dropped by 20 years since 2010.
“The numbers are staggering,” said Valerie Amos, the departing emergency relief coordinator for the United Nations. “They are so staggering that they have become almost meaningless to people.” 
For Syrian civilians in the country, the war has meant a downward spiral of death, uncertainty, poverty and displacement.
***
Hopes that the situation would improve rose briefly a year ago when the United Nations Security Council passed its first resolution on Syria, calling for free access to humanitarian aid. Another resolution authorized aid shipments across borders not controlled by the Syrian government.
But last week, a coalition of 21 aid groups released a harsh report saying that the resolutions had failed to make much difference.
“There is more death, more displacement, an increase in restrictions by neighboring countries and a more desperate situation for the refugees and for those displaced inside Syria,” said Daniel Gorevan, who handles Syria policy for Oxfam, one of the groups that participated in the report.
In countries bordering Syria, the flood of refugees has put a heavy burden on economies and budgets. In Lebanon, where about one in five residents is a refugee, some communities have been transformed by the human tide.
There you have it. Another Palestinian-like diaspora in the Middle East, with all misery and conflict that entails for the future.

One wonders why if the U.S. accepted the rehabilitation in Egypt of the old guard Mubarak forces in a bloody display of despotic force, peace can't made with Assad. But judging from the State Department's quick walk back of Kerry's statement that peace can be negotiated with Assad, "Kerry Suggests There Is a Place for Assad in Syria Talks," the war in Syria will grind on until there is some sort of region-wide collapse. Why? Because U.S. policy answers to the Saudis and Israelis, and this is the way they want it.

The Obama administration is slowing its troop withdrawal schedule in Afghanistan. This story appeared the same day as The New York Times spotlighted Matthew Rosenberg's bombshell, "C.I.A. Cash Ended Up in Coffers of Al Qaeda," which is actually a follow up to a story he wrote nearly two-years ago about the slush fund the Central Intelligence Agency set up for then president Hamid Karzai. That was the fund tapped to pay Al Qaeda ransom money for a Afghan diplomat, Abdul Khaliq Farahi, son-in-law to a powerful advisor of Karzai.

As Rosenberg reports, the CIA's slush fund practices continue under current president Ashraf Ghani:
The cash flow has slowed since a new president, Ashraf Ghani, assumed office in September, Afghan officials said, refusing to elaborate. But they added that cash was still coming in, and that it was not clear how robust any current American constraints on it are. 
“It’s cash,” said a former Afghan security official. “Once it’s at the palace, they can’t do a thing about how it gets spent.”
This how the "Great Game" works. It is money for war, and it is war all the time.

Thursday, October 2, 2014

Coups and Assassinations Coming Shortly to Kabul

I'm sure the Gray Lady ran a biographical perspective piece on Ashraf Ghani at some point when he emerged out of the pack of presidential contenders to replace the increasingly recalcitrant U.S. quisling Hamid Karzai. I must have missed it. But I didn't miss the ringing endorsement of the newly -- one doesn't want to say "elected" because that doesn't really capture the process that led to Ghani assuming the title of president -- seated leader of Afghanistan by Ralph Nader.

I am familiar with Ralph Nader. I changed my life because of his Green Party candidacy for president in 2000. He doesn't give out pro forma recommendations; he does't play the usual kind of quid pro quo, "I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine"-type of politics. He's an iconoclast with a lot of pride who does things his own way.

I remember being at a campaign event early on in the 2000 election, a fundraiser. Nader was speaking at a coffee house; he was talking about the legacy of legislature-backed stadium giveaways to professional sports teams. He mentioned the amount of money Seahawks owner Paul Allen had spent to win the initiative campaign to build what is currently named CenturyLink Field. I called from out of the small crowd surrounding him the correct figure, "Five million dollars in five weeks." Nader shot me the steely look -- even though I wrote a check (I can't remember how much) to be in attendance -- of a man who didn't like to be interrupted but one who appreciated another armed with the facts willing to raise his voice.

So Nader's recommendation of Ghani means something. And that is supported in a story today by Azam Ahmed and Declan Walsh, "New Afghan Leader, Putting Focus on Graft, Revives Bank Fraud Inquiry":
KABUL, Afghanistan — Signaling his intent to improve the Afghan government’s poor reputation on corruption, President Ashraf Ghani on Wednesday ordered a new examination of the stagnant Kabul Bank fraud prosecutions. 
The bank, likened to a roughly $800 million Ponzi scheme after powerful insiders pillaged it through fraudulent loans, has come to symbolize the legal impunity enjoyed by Afghanistan’s elite. And the case has become a major sticking point for donor nations and the International Monetary Fund, which at one point made prosecution of those responsible for the bank’s collapse a condition of any new loans to the government.
Just three days into Mr. Ghani’s presidency, his decree about the bank was clearly meant to reassure Western partners that aid to the country would not be a bad investment. The day before, as Afghanistan signed long-term security deals with the United States and NATO, Mr. Ghani had emphasized the importance of international aid in tackling “shared challenges.”
The Gray Lady, at times able to comport herself in stunning fashion, has an excellent unsigned editorial today, "Paying Afghanistan’s Bills," that I will quote in its entirety because it does such a fine job defining those "shared challenges":
By the end of the year, Congress will have appropriated more money for Afghanistan’s reconstruction, when adjusted for inflation, than the United States spent rebuilding 16 European nations after World War II under the Marshall Plan. 
A staggering portion of that money — $104 billion — has been mismanaged and stolen. Much of what was built is crumbling or will be unsustainable. Well-connected Afghans smuggled millions of stolen aid money in suitcases that were checked onto Dubai-bound flights. The Afghan government largely turned a blind eye to widespread malfeasance. Even as revelations of fraud and abuse stacked up, the United States continued shoveling money year after year because cutting off the financial spigot was seen as a sure way to doom the war effort. 
As the Pentagon winds down its combat mission there at the end of the year, it’s tempting to think of the Afghan war as a chapter that is coming to an end — at least for American taxpayers. But, as things stand, the United States and its allies will continue paying Afghanistan’s bills for the foreseeable future. That commitment was solidified Tuesday as the American ambassador in Kabul and Afghanistan’s security adviser signed a bilateral security agreement that will keep a small contingent of NATO troops there for at least two years. 
The United States and NATO partners recently agreed to spend $5.1 billion a year to pay for the army and police, until at least 2017. Western donors are expected to continue to give billions more for reconstruction and other initiatives, recognizing that Afghanistan won’t be weaned off international aid anytime soon. In fact, the government appears to be broke.
A few weeks ago, Afghanistan’s Finance Ministry made an urgent plea to the United States for a $537 million bailout, warning that it would otherwise not be able to make payroll. That’s part of a broader, worrisome trend. The International Monetary Fund estimates that Afghanistan will face a financial gap of roughly $7.7 billion annually between now and 2018. 
If the flow of money is to keep going, the Afghan government has to prove that it can be trusted. And, for its part, Congress should not hesitate to cut off the aid if corruption remains unabated. 
Afghanistan’s new president, Ashraf Ghani, who took office on Monday, has pledged to stamp out graft. “I am not corrupt, and I am not going to encourage corruption, tolerate it or become the instrument,” the president, a former World Bank executive, told the BBC in an interview. 
That will be easier said than done in a country where back-room deals are the norm. Mr. Ghani can show he is serious by appointing and empowering a new attorney general willing to take on unscrupulous officials. His proposal to lead a new procurement board is commendable because it would make him personally accountable. 
Of the $104 billion that American lawmakers have appropriated for Afghan reconstruction, nearly $16 billion remains unspent, according to John Sopko, the inspector general who is overseeing the reconstruction effort. As one of the poorest nations on earth, Afghanistan clearly has plenty of needs. But the American agencies tasked with spending the money must do a better job identifying priorities, setting realistic goals and adopting stronger safeguards. 
Delivering a speech at Georgetown University recently, Mr. Sopko marveled at the Marshall Plan comparison. “What have we gotten for the investment?” he asked.
My only problem with the editorial is the impression it casts that USG has somehow been a duped victim of all this fiscal mismanagement rather than its chief architect. The American way of doing things is just as corrupt as the Afghan way of doing things. What went on with the fleecing of Kabul Bank had a precedent in the American savings and loan scandals of the 1980s.

With the Taliban ascendant -- this year was the deadliest for the Afghan police since the U.S.-led occupation began 13-years ago -- the U.S. experience in Iraq is noteworthy. Once the U.S. military exited, the Iraqi Army became little more than an elaborate system of graft, a Ponzi scheme, where officers purchase their commissions to receive kickbacks from recruits, who may or may not actually be reporting for duty. This is not to say that this doesn't occur when the U.S. is in country maintaining a supervisory role; it is just that the corruption doesn't run so rampant the the entire system implodes as it did in Iraq. The ability of American military supervisors to call in airstrikes probably has something to do with it too.

A singular description of the corruption-fueled collapse of the Iraqi military can be found in an interview of Patrick Cockburn by Tariq Ali, "The Rise of ISIS and the Origins of the New Middle East War," that appeared earlier in the week on the Counterpunch web site:
Tariq Ali: And so, if we come down to the speed with which this particular organisation swept through parts of Iraq, which you yourself talk about in the book, how do you explain the total collapse of the Iraqi army, Patrick? Is it in that sense not too much different from the army created by the West in Afghanistan, the fact that they are not prepared to fight and die for the United States? At that time it was, al-Qaeda and Iraq was only one of a number of serious resistance movements to the occupation but it was very evident in Baghdad at the time when I went to American briefings that anything that happened was attributed by the spokesman, the military spokesman, to al-Qaeda. Of course this played well back in the US, but in Iraq it had quite the contrary effect which people who were against the occupation think, oh it’s al-Qaeda who’s doing all this resisting, let’s go an get a black flag and join them…

Patrick Cockburn: Yeah, and even more so. I mean I think this is, it’s difficult to think of another example in history, where there are 300 or 350 thousand men in the Iraqi army, they’d spent 41.6 billion dollars on this army over the last three years. But it disintegrated because of an attack by maybe a couple of thousand people in Mosul. Why did it happen? Well, the army was rather extraordinary. I mean one Iraqi general I was talking to who’d been forcibly retired said at the beginning of the disaster was the Americans, [who] when they set it up, insisted that supplies and things like that should be outsourced, privatised. 
So immediately a colonel of a battalion nominally of 600 men would get money for 600 men, [but] in fact there were only 200 men in it, and would pocket the difference, which was spread out among the officers. And this applied to fuel, it applied to ammunition… At the time of the fall of Mosul there are meant to be 30,000 troops there. In fact, it’s estimated that only one in three was there. Because what you did was: you joined the army, you got your full salary and then you kicked back half that salary to your officer, who spread it among the officers. So I remember about a year ago talking to a senior Iraqi politician, and who said look: the army’s going to collapse if it’s attacked. I said surely some will fight, he said: no no no, you don’t understand. These officers are not soldiers, they’re investors! 
They have no interest in fighting anybody; they have interest in making money out of their investment. Of course you had to buy your position. So in 2009, you want to be a colonel in the Iraqi army, it’ll cost you about 20,000 dollars, more recently it cost you about $200,000. You want to be divisional commander, and there are 15 divisions, it will cost you about 2 million. Of course, there are other ways of making money. Checkpoints on the roads act as sort of customs barriers and a tariff on each truck going through would be paid. So that’s why they ran away, led by their commanding officer, the three commanding generals got into a helicopter in civilian clothes and fled to Erbil, the Kurdish capital. And that led to the final dissolution of the army. 
Tariq Ali: It is one of the most astonishing events in recent history, Patrick. I mean can you think of any other equivalent, even in the last century?
Patrick Cockburn: I can’t think of any of such a large well-equipped army disintegrating. You could say that Saddam’s army disintegrated in ’91 when attacked by the Americans, and again in 2003. But then it was attacked by the largest military force in the world and was being bombed. So it’s not a parallel. It of course shows that ISIS was quite effective in spreading terror through social media, by films of it decapitating Shia captives. So the soldiers were terrified of ISIS.
Nader's ringing endorsement of Ghani makes me thinks that he is different. If he is, we'll know soon enough. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Working Group on Bribery "will release its report, 'Unfinished Business,' which names every beneficiary of the Kabul Bank scandal" today according to Ahmed and Walsh. If Ghani goes after those named, even if they are the elite, the palace intrigue will grow thick. Coups and assassinations can't be far off.

Wednesday, September 24, 2014

U.S. Hits Nusra + Crocker Remembers Karzai

An interesting, and I would say unexpectedly positive, report of the U.S.-led airstrikes on Islamic State is the inclusion of Al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, Al Nusra Front, in the target list. Whether the bombing of Nusra positions was due to the group's connection to the shadowy Khorasan Group (an organization that appears to be a spook confection, breathed into life last week when Director of National Intelligence James Clapper mentioned that "in terms of threat to the homeland, Khorasan may pose as much of a danger as the Islamic State") or payback for the false flag Ghouta poison gas attack (that Seymour Hersh argued last spring was a Nusra operation) is not clear.

Ben Hubbard has the story, "Startling Sight Where Blasts Are the Norm":
While Mr. Obama had announced that the Islamic State would be targeted, the United States also hit at least two bases belonging to the Nusra Front, Al Qaeda’s Syria affiliate, exposing the gap between how the United States and many of Syria’s rebels see the group, as well as the hazards of attacking it. 
The United States considers the Nusra Front a terrorist organization, and American officials said the strikes disrupted an imminent plot to attack the West by an offshoot of Qaeda veterans known as Khorasan. 
One strike hit an area of abandoned villas on the western edge of Aleppo Province, killing at least 50 Nusra Front members, most of them foreigners and including at least a dozen leaders, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. 
A second strike in a village farther west, Kafr Dariyan, killed 15 people, including seven Nusra fighters and eight civilians, among them four children, the observatory said. An American military official said this was the strike against Khorasan. 
A video posted online showed residents removing a body from the rubble of a collapsed building.
The Nusra strikes immediately highlighted the shortcoming of Obama's announced strategy of combating IS by supporting "moderate" Syrian rebels. As Hubbard reports, the "moderates" like Al Qaeda and consider Nusra an ally in the fight against the Syrian government:
Even rebels who supported the strikes on the Islamic State criticized the targeting of the Nusra Front, which they consider a loyal partner in the battle against Mr. Assad. 
“It is not the right time to target the Nusra Front,” said Lt. Col. Fares al-Bayyoush, whose rebel group has received support from the United States and its allies. 
Colonel Bayyoush was also angry that the American strike had killed civilians and that the United States was not attacking Mr. Assad and his allies, like the Lebanese group Hezbollah, which the United States also classifies as a terrorist organization. 
“Isn’t Hezbollah a terrorist organization and the coalition wants to target all terrorist organizations in Syria?” he asked.
Hubbard concludes his story with a sensible quote from Shiite villager in northern Syria who worries that the U.S. coalition -- which includes well-known jihad sponsors al-Saud and Qatar -- against Islamic State is inherently unstable and will lead nowhere except to more war:
One activist who had fled Raqqa when the Islamic State took over said he hoped the strikes would weaken the jihadists but worried that Mr. Assad would benefit. 
“Maybe the regime will take over ISIS’ locations if the weak rebels aren’t able to after the strikes,” said the activists, who gave only his nickname, Abu Bakr. 
Many government supporters were worried about where events might lead because some of the countries in the coalition, like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have called for Mr. Assad to step down or actively supported his enemies with money and arms. 
“I don’t trust the coalition,” said a man who gave only his first name, Jamal, from a Shiite village in northern Syria that is besieged by Sunni rebels. “They might take advantage of the situation and hit important locations, like the airport where the regime is, and I am afraid of errors.”
A coalition designed to wage war against a Sunni fundamentalist state, but the reality is that the coalition is secretly at war with itself -- does that sound familiar? It should because it describes the coalition that has fought the Taliban and occupied Afghanistan for the last 13 years.

Which brings us to Hamid Karzai's farewell address yesterday. There is a good interview with Shamil Sultanov on Pravda's web site. In describing the rise of Islamic State, he mentions that Karzai, like Nouri al-Malaki, is an American creation who grew alienated from his parent: "Al-Maliki is a protege, a puppet of the United States. Sometimes, though, a puppet may start wagging its master. We know this by the example of Hamid Karzai."

The Afghan president could not resist telling it like it is when it comes to the wiles and the ways of the U.S. overlord. Rod Nordland has the story -- an excellent report -- "In Farewell Speech, Karzai Calls American Mission in Afghanistan a Betrayal":
KABUL, Afghanistan — In his nearly 13 years as the leader of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai’s most memorable public stances always seemed driven by some deep emotion, and an almost compulsive need to express it. There was heartbreak for families killed by errant airstrikes, outrage at the scheming of hostile neighbors, palpable longing to preside over a peaceful end to the Taliban insurgency. 
On Tuesday, though he delivered a farewell speech in a loose and sometimes jocular way, there was, again, no doubt of the emotion that inspired his words: bitterness at what he saw as an American betrayal of Afghanistan. 
“America did not want peace for Afghanistan, because it had its own agendas and goals here,” he told an audience of hundreds of cabinet and staff members at the presidential palace in Kabul, warning them not to trust the Americans. “I have always said this: that if America and Pakistan want peace, it is possible to bring peace to Afghanistan.” 
Mr. Karzai’s denunciation of the United States came in terms that had become wearily familiar to the diplomats watching the televised speech from the heavily fortified American Embassy just a few blocks and many blast walls from the palace. But what the president did not say, omitting any recognition of the more than 2,000 American lives and hundreds of billions of dollars the United States expended in fighting the Taliban, may have grated more.
*** 
In his speech, he offered his first piece of advice to Mr. Ghani and to Abdullah Abdullah, the presidential rival who is to join a unity government after months of political crises and wrangling over widespread electoral fraud. It was more a warning than a reflection on the recent political peril: “Both wise brothers should be very careful in maintaining their relationship with Western countries and the United States,” Mr. Karzai said. 
He sought to explain to the government officials his dogged refusal to sign a bilateral security agreement with the United States, which would allow American troops to remain in Afghanistan after this year. Mr. Ghani has promised to sign it as soon as he is inaugurated, and many inside Mr. Karzai’s own government were critical of his stance. 
“I believe the stability of Afghanistan is directly related to the United States and Pakistan,” Mr. Karzai said. “This war is for the personal interest of the foreign policies of others, and this is a fight of outsiders in which Afghans are sacrificed.”
The remainder of Nordland's piece is composed of an interview with foreign-policy guru Ryan Crocker. Of all the Establishment figures I find Crocker one of the most sensible. He has called for peace with Iran and caution regarding regime change in Syria. It's worth to quote Nordland at length:
Ryan C. Crocker, dean of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M, was the first American ambassador to the post-Taliban government, and he was among those American officials who supported Mr. Karzai’s initial appointment as Afghanistan’s leader. Mr. Crocker also returned as ambassador in 2011, as Afghan relations were souring under the Obama administration, which Mr. Karzai saw as less attentive than the Bush administration had been. 
“I saw over the years an increasing bitterness on his part particularly vis-à-vis Pakistan and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship,” Mr. Crocker said. 
Mr. Karzai’s view was that the United States should have been able to force Pakistan to stop giving sanctuary to the Taliban’s leaders. The American view has been that the expectation was unrealistic, given the deeply troubled relationship between Washington and Islamabad. 
During Mr. Crocker’s second tour here as ambassador, and throughout Mr. Cunningham’s time since then, Mr. Karzai adopted an increasingly strident tone toward the Americans, particularly on the issue of civilian casualties in American airstrikes, and on two occasions actually threatened to join the Taliban, whom he often referred to as “my brothers.” 
He blamed the Americans, too, for his inability to start any sort of meaningful peace talks with the Taliban. The insurgents have consistently refused to talk to him, denouncing him as an American puppet. 
For all of that, Mr. Crocker still believes Hamid Karzai was the right man for the job Americans effectively chose him for at a conference in Bonn in December 2001. “I don’t think there was a better choice than Karzai,” he said. “I didn’t think so then; I don’t think so now.”
*** 
Mr. Crocker remembered Mr. Karzai saying in 2011 that he was counting the days until he could leave office: “I think I remember his words verbatim: ‘The worst thing that could happen to Afghanistan would be for me to continue in office.’ Then he said: ‘No, that would be the second-worst thing. The worst thing would be if one of my brothers was elected.’ ”

Tuesday, August 19, 2014

Coup Coming Shortly to Afghanistan + Europe Grows Tired of Kiev + Intifada in St. Louis County Continues

A particularly good story today from Matthew Rosenberg, "Amid Election Impasse, Calls in Afghanistan for an Interim Government," reminding us once again what poor prospects there are for peace and stability. Currently a whispering campaign is underway for an interim government, a.k.a., a putsch, to rule the country in absence of any hope that the Abdullah-Ghani recount will ever be concluded or unity government of the two candidates agreed upon:
That official and others interviewed in recent days spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were discussing plans that could be considered seditious. The fact that they discussed the plans in advance suggests that they are using the threat of a coup to achieve political ends, not simply plotting in secret to execute one. 
The officials said they believed they would have the backing of Afghanistan’s army, police and intelligence corps. Though no concrete plans are in place, several officials said a committee would most likely be formed to run Afghanistan and that representatives of Mr. Abdullah and Mr. Ghani would be asked to join. Both candidates have dismissed the idea of an interim government. 
Many Afghans are liable to view any step to an interim government as a power grab by the men who surrounded Mr. Karzai for the last 12 years who may be seeking an excuse to preserve their power.
The United States and European countries are loath to see Afghan officials make an end-run around Afghanistan’s Constitution, which would call into question the lives lost and billions spent by the West in Afghanistan. Yet, in the two months since the runoff, the Abdullah and Ghani campaigns have proved unable or unwilling to compromise.
At the same time, talks on creating a national unity government, which the candidates agreed to as part of an American-brokered deal to end the crisis, have made limited progress. A special audit of all 8.1 million votes under the supervision of the United Nations agreed to as part of the same deal has been mired by arguments over what constitutes a fraudulent vote.
Along with the threat of violence, the political fight has brought Afghanistan’s ethnic divides back to the surface, pitting the smaller Tajik and Hazara communities against the dominant Pashtuns. The economy is suffering as well. Two Afghan officials warned that the government would soon be unable to pay its civil servants because revenue from taxes and customs were down by nearly a third this year.
The primary motivation for a coup/interim government appears to be the signing of the stalled bilateral security agreement (BSA) with the United States. The Taliban is gaining ground, and the U.S. needs an agreement in place by the middle of next month in order to keep troops in country; otherwise, like the Russians did in 1989, the superpower promises to exit completely by the end of the year:
Signs of fraying within the Karzai government have already begun to emerge. With Taliban military advances threatening entire districts, for instance, some Afghan officials are now deploying army and police units and seeking help from the American-led military coalition in defiance of Mr. Karzai, who has tried to limit when and where foreign and Afghan forces can operate. 
A new government is needed soon if there is to be any chance of securing deals to keep American and European troops here after the end of the year, some Afghan officials said. They said it would be better to start laying the groundwork to justify an interim government now in case Mr. Abdullah and Mr. Ghani cannot not find a solution.
Talk about plans for an interim government intensified after some of Mr. Abdullah’s most powerful backers — men who command well-armed militias — came within days of trying to seize power and declare their candidate the president after the release of preliminary results that gave Mr. Ghani a wide lead.
Three senior Afghan officials said they needed a government in place by mid-September to ensure security agreements needed to keep some United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan beyond the end of the year. They said a new presidential election could most likely be held next year, probably at the same time Afghanistan will elect a new parliament, which would help keep costs under control.
Karzai's refusal to sign a BSA, along with his wariness to engage Taliban advances, leads one to believe he is probably operating according to an understanding with the Taliban's sponsors in the Gulf, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The caliphate, though suffering some setbacks recently, could one day span Asia from the Mediterranean to the Pacific.

Turning to Eurasia, Angela Merkel has announced her first visit to Kiev since the February coup. Billed as a peace mission -- maybe, though I can point to no evidence, Merkel now realizes that left to its own proclivities the junta will indeed create a failed state (is there any doubt at this point?) on the eastern edge of Europe, a Kosovo on steroids that just happens to be where a significant amount of the fuel that powers Germany's economy transits -- anyhow, billed as a peace mission, possibly that is the reason the junta is blaming the rebels for the atrocity of blowing up a caravan of refugees.

Something is happening here -- what with the Russian aid convoy stilled stalled at the border, foreign ministers negotiating in Berlin, the Western prestige press going over the top with its front-loading of specious junta claims -- the destruction of Russian APCs that crossed the border into the Ukraine, the Ukie military capturing downtown Luhansk, and now the rebels, conjuring up images of MH17, knowingly slaughtered refugees -- but what it is ain't exactly clear. The junta appears to be throwing up as much dust, generating as much noise as possible.

It could be this: Europe has grown tired. The show cannot go on. A deal must be secured that grants the Donbass substantial autonomy within a federalized Ukraine. In other words, the deal Russia originally proposed last winter.

Quickly, a few words on the uprising in St. Louis County. Missouri Governor Jay Nixon's mustering of the National Guard did not the cow the protesters who took to the streets again last night. Monica Davey, John Eligon and Alan Blinder report in "National Guard Troops Fail to Quell Unrest in Ferguson":
As darkness set in along West Florissant Avenue, one of the city’s main thoroughfares and a center of the weeklong protests, demonstrators were required to keep moving. 
After more than an hour of peaceful protests, some in the crowd began to throw bottles at the police, who brought out armored vehicles and tactical units. But many peacekeepers in the crowd formed a human chain and got the agitators to back down.
At another point, as protesters gathered near a convenience store, some of them threw objects; the police responded with tear gas. 
And near midnight, the police began announcing over loudspeakers that people needed to leave the area or risk arrest after what the police said were repeated gunshots and a deteriorating situation. 
A few blocks away, at the police command post, National Guard members in Army fatigues, some with military police patches on their uniforms, stood ready but never entered the area where protesters were marching. State and local law enforcement authorities oversaw operations there. 
Residents seemed puzzled and frustrated by the continually changing approaches, suggesting that the moving set of rules only worsened longstanding tensions over policing and race in this town of 21,000. 
“It almost seems like they can’t decide what to do, and like law enforcement is fighting over who’s got the power,” said Antione Watson, 37, who stood near a middle-of-the-street memorial of candles and flowers for Mr. Brown, the 18-year-old killed on a winding block here. 
“First they do this, then there’s that, and now who can even tell what their plan is?” Mr. Watson said. “They can try all of this, but I don’t see an end to this until there are charges against the cop.”

Wednesday, February 5, 2014

Despite Scare Headlines, Expect U.S. Troops in Afghanistan Post-2014

It is not easy to interpret what is going on in Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai, the post-9/11 quisling of the West, has been engaged in a prolonged, nasty squabble with his paymasters. Just yesterday the New York Times published a frontpage blockbuster, "Karzai Arranged Secret Contacts With the Taliban," that was really more smoke than fire. All reporters Azam Ahmed and Matthew Rosenberg came up with is that Karzai had tentative, unproductive talks at the end of last year with the Taliban, and that no deal is currently on the table:
But other Afghan and Western officials said that the contacts had fizzled, and that whatever the Taliban may have intended at the outset, they no longer had any intention of negotiating with the Afghan government. They said that top Afghan officials had met with influential Taliban leaders in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in recent weeks, and were told that any prospects of a peace deal were now gone.
But reading Ahmed and Rosenberg is fruitful in that it reminded me of something that I had already forgotten -- the United States itself was negotiating with the Taliban:
The only known genuine negotiating channel to those leaders [with connections to Mullah Omar] was developed by American and German diplomats, who spent roughly two years trying to open peace talks in Qatar. The diplomats repeatedly found themselves incurring the wrath of Mr. Karzai, who saw the effort as an attempt to circumvent him; he tried behind the scenes to undercut it. 
Then, when an American diplomatic push led to the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar, Mr. Karzai lashed out publicly at the United States. Afghan officials said that to them, the office looked far too much like the embassy of a government-in-exile, with its own flag and a nameplate reading “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” Within days, the Qatar initiative stalled, and Mr. Karzai was fuming at what he saw as a plot by the United States to cut its own deal with Pakistan and the Taliban without him. 
In the wake of the failure in Qatar, Afghan officials redoubled their efforts to open their own channel to Mullah Omar, and by late autumn, Mr. Karzai apparently believed those efforts were succeeding. Some senior Afghan officials say they did not share his confidence, and their doubts were shared by American officials in Kabul and Washington.
Something is happening here and what it is ain't exactly clear. As good a place as any to start, just in terms of the basics, is today's story by Peter Baker and Matthew Rosenberg, "Old Tensions Resurface in Debate Over U.S. Role in Post-2014 Afghanistan." Yesterday Obama met in the White House for a powwow on Afghanistan with his top military brass:
As part of his review, Mr. Obama met Tuesday with Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the general’s vice chairman, Adm. James A. Winnefeld Jr.; Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., commander of American and allied forces in Afghanistan; Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III, the head of the United States Central Command; and Adm. William H. McRaven, head of the United States Special Operations Command.
Afghanistan will have a presidential election in April. What I don't understand about all the jockeying of Karzai by the Obama administration is why not wait to cut a deal with his successor? Probably because any successor to Karzai will be as tough or tougher when it comes to negotiating a bilateral security agreement (BSA) with the United States.

Right now there are some 55,500 Western troops in Afghanistan, 36,500 of which are American.

Post-2014, NATO is planning for a force of 8,000 to 12,000, made up of two-thirds Americans; the U.S. wants to keep a force of 10,000, with an additional 5,000 troops made up of foreign forces.

The United States wants a BSA that includes the usual status of forces agreement (SOFA) immunity guarantee as well as the right to continue its terror-inducing practice of raiding private residences. Karzai has flip-flopped on signing the BSA and threatened to bargain a deal solely with NATO. The U.S. military is allegedly pressuring Obama into an all or nothing posture, "Give us want we want, Karzai, or we will pull all our troops out of country."

As a sign that Uncle Sam is serious, Congress has already cut development aid to Afghanistan in half to $1.2 billion, with the remaining money threatened if Karzai goes ahead with the release of 37 suspected Taliban detainees.

We know that Karzai has plenty of leverage. Pakistan is a huge national security issue for the U.S. The CIA drone bases in Afghanistan are prized for their ability to project power into and eavesdrop on a nuclear-armed Pakistan that also harbors Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership.

Regardless of the U.S. tough talk of a "zero option," Obama is not about to give up those drone bases. Karzai knows this. He knows he can't lose, no matter how much he angers his bosses in Congress and the White House. He is playing with house money.

Despite all the distracting scare headlines, expect a deal to be brokered that keeps U.S. troops in Afghanistan post-2014. Those drones will continue to fly east to Pakistan.

Friday, May 3, 2013

When the Money Disappears So Does Karzai

The work week began Monday with Matthew Rosenberg's frontpage story detailing the CIA's plying of Afghan quisling Hamid Karzai with countless bags of cash (at one point we were in competition with Iran) -- a practice stretching back to the foundation of the current state of Afghanistan. Warlords were paid to fight the Taliban. Rosenberg's story is not merely a revelation of corrupt practices; it provides insight into the very nature of our mission in Afghanistan, which now stands revealed as a sham. As soon as the money dries up Karzai's government will disappear (either that or become the proxy of another foreign power willing to foot the bill).

It's been interesting to gauge the reaction to this story, which as far as I can tell has been pretty close to zero. The New York Times followed up Rosenberg's frontpage story Monday with a reaction piece -- Karzai in Finland thanking the U.S. for the money -- the next day also written by Rosenberg. Wednesday the Times published an unsigned editorial asking Congress to demand an explanation from the CIA. Mark Steel had a story, "Look on the bright side: There’s a roaring heroin trade in Afghanistan, and it's all thanks to us," in yesterday's Independent. And that's about it. (Kevin Mahken has a short piece in the New Republic pointing out that this is the way things have been done throughout history.)

Today the New York Times under a "Cash for Karzai: A C.I.A. Caper" header publishes several good letters, one of which is from a former Foreign Service officer:
Your report is old news, albeit dramatic and in flagrante delicto. 
As a Foreign Service officer for three decades, I observed up close the contradiction between C.I.A. officers, usually under embassy cover, paying cash for access and secrets while the rest of us did it by charm alone. 
It was particularly disheartening in post-independence Africa of the 1960s, when idealism still prevailed and the Agency for International Development was charged with building democracy while the Central Intelligence Agency rushed to outbid the French, the Russians and others to corrupt new and vulnerable African leaders. 
Today, we have the demeaning spectacle of agency bag men vying with the Iranians to bestow briefcases bulging with cash on the notably corrupt Afghan president, Hamid Karzai. 
This is occurring while American servicemen and women are still fighting and dying in Afghanistan, and while we still have the temerity to talk about bringing democracy to that benighted land. 
RICHARD L. JACKSON
Wellington, Fla., April 29, 2013
Our imperial project in Afghanistan is irredeemable. Let's hope that this is so widely acknowledged that the scheduled troop withdrawal proceeds according to plan.

Wednesday, May 1, 2013

We're in a Dismal Place

The old stars of the New York Times Op-Ed page have decent columns today. Maureen Dowd accurately assesses the current state of our national politics in "Bottoms Up, Lame Duck":
During the 2012 campaign, the president and his top advisers liked to make the argument that if he was re-elected, the “fever” would break. Washington would no longer be the graveyard of progress, the crypt of consensus. Once dystopian Republicans accepted that Obama was not running again, they would start cooperating with him. 
But it’s beginning to sink in that the opposite may be true.
We're in a dismal place. I began this blog at the end of last November with the question, Do elections matter? The answer by now, five months later, is they obviously do not.

Thomas Friedman, that tireless booster of technology and capitalism, describes in "It's a 401(k) World" the Hell Realm we occupy today thanks to technology and capitalism. It's a brutal, super-fast, hyperconnected, survival-of-the-fittest, technologically-sophisticated world:
When I say that “everyone has to pass the bar now,” I mean that, as the world got hyperconnected, all these things happened at once: Jobs started changing much faster, requiring more skill with each iteration. Schools could not keep up with the competencies needed for these jobs, so employers got frustrated because, in a hyperconnected world, they did not have the time or money to spend on extensive training. So more employers are demanding that students prove their competencies for a specific job by obtaining not only college degrees but by passing “certification” exams that measure specific skills — the way lawyers have to pass the bar. Last week, The Economist quoted one labor expert, Peter Cappelli of the Wharton business school, as saying that companies now regard filling a job as being “like buying a spare part: you expect it to fit.”
This is the world that Friedman has been championing for over a decade. But I don't think he anticipated the extent of its destructiveness. He of course always celebrated capitalism's "creative destruction" in theory. But now that we're living through it, I think it's dawning on him that it's not going to end well. Whether we hear this from Friedman in one of his columns is doubtful.

There is an unsigned editorial today, "'Ghost Money,' and Lots of It," in which the New York Times asks Congress to "publicly call the C.I.A. to account" for delivering bags of cash to Afghan President Hamid Karzai:
There are many reasons to be outraged. Not the least of these is that the payments helped fuel corruption just when other agencies, including the White House and State Department, were pressing the Afghans to crack down on corruption and prosecute those responsible. American leaders have argued again and again that Afghanistan’s success, and America’s success in Afghanistan, including its ability to withdraw troops by the end of 2014, depended on a government in Kabul that could win the hearts and minds of its people and competently deliver services. A government riddled with corruption had little if any chance of achieving these objectives. 
Meanwhile, there are signs that Mr. Karzai will use state machinery to ensure the election next year of a handpicked successor, which would further discourage Afghans who had hoped that years of war would yield not just stability but some semblance of participatory democracy. Yet, as Mr. Karzai has shown many times, neither the C.I.A.’s millions nor the Pentagon’s billions, devoted to building his army and trying to keep his country safe, can buy more than minimal and erratic cooperation. 
The United States and other donors have warned the Afghans that continued international assistance — which the country is expected to need for years to come — will be conditioned on concrete steps to curb corruption. Now that the C.I.A. payments have been exposed, it will be harder to make that argument.

Tuesday, April 30, 2013

CIA Attempts Old-Fashioned Party Building in Afghanistan

Matthew Rosenberg follows up his story from yesterday about the CIA leaving bags of cash at the Afghan presidential palace with a confirmation today by Hamid Karzai, "Afghan Leader Confirms Cash Deliveries by C.I.A.":
The C.I.A. money continues to flow, Mr. Karzai said Monday. “Yes, the office of national security has been receiving support from the United States for the past 10 years,” he told reporters in response to a question. “Not a big amount. A small amount, which has been used for various purposes.” He said the money was paid monthly. 
Afghan officials who described the payments before Monday’s comments from Mr. Karzai said the cash from the C.I.A. was basically used as a slush fund, similarly to the way the Iranian money was. Some went to pay supporters; some went to cover other expenses that officials would prefer to keep off the books, like secret diplomatic trips, officials have said. 
After Mr. Karzai’s statement on Monday, the presidential palace in Kabul said in a statement that the C.I.A. cash “has been used for different purposes, such as in operations, assisting wounded Afghan soldiers and paying rent.” The statement continued, “The assistance has been very useful, and we are thankful to them for it.” 
The C.I.A. payments open a window to an element of the war that has often gone unnoticed: the agency’s use of cash to clandestinely buy the loyalty of Afghans. The agency paid powerful warlords to fight against the Taliban during the 2001 invasion. It then continued paying Afghans to keep battling the Taliban and help track down the remnants of Al Qaeda. Mr. Karzai’s brother Ahmed Wali, who was assassinated in 2011, was among those paid by the agency, for instance. 
But the cash deliveries to Mr. Karzai’s office are of a different magnitude with a far wider impact, helping the palace finance the vast patronage networks that Mr. Karzai has used to build his power base. The payments appear to run directly counter to American efforts to clean up endemic corruption and encourage the Afghan government to be more responsive to the needs of its constituents.
It's clear what the CIA was/is trying to do. Politics is the art of the quid pro quo. And the ultimate quid pro quo medium is cash. As Jesse Unruh, the Speaker of the California State Assembly in the Golden State's heyday, famously said, "Money is the mother's milk of politics." The CIA was/is engaged in political formation, and the script it's following is fundamental; in this country we associate it with Tammany Hall.  And while "Tammany" might be a pejorative term, it is at root what politics is all about. It explains why 1% of the population controls politics in a democratic system of hundreds of millions of citizens. The 1% has most of the money.

Rosenberg can't resist taking a poke, in the story's final paragraph, at the claim that the CIA money was used to provide care for wounded soldiers:
Outside official circles, some Afghans offered a lighter take. “They make it sound as if it was a charity money dashed by a spy agency,” wrote Sayed Salahuddin, an Afghan journalist, on Twitter, referring to the palace statement that money had been used to help wounded soldiers. “They must have ‘treated’ many people.”

Monday, April 29, 2013

Austerity + Syria + Bags of Cash for Karzai

There is a lot going on in today's newspaper. Krugman has a solid column, "The Story of Our Time," summing up where we are at with austerity orthodoxy:
O.K., I’ve just given you a story, but why should you believe it? There are, after all, people who insist that the real problem is on the economy’s supply side: that workers lack the skills they need, or that unemployment insurance has destroyed the incentive to work, or that the looming menace of universal health care is preventing hiring, or whatever. How do we know that they’re wrong? 
Well, I could go on at length on this topic, but just look at the predictions the two sides in this debate have made. People like me predicted right from the start that large budget deficits would have little effect on interest rates, that large-scale “money printing” by the Fed (not a good description of actual Fed policy, but never mind) wouldn’t be inflationary, that austerity policies would lead to terrible economic downturns. The other side jeered, insisting that interest rates would skyrocket and that austerity would actually lead to economic expansion. Ask bond traders, or the suffering populations of Spain, Portugal and so on, how it actually turned out. 
Is the story really that simple, and would it really be that easy to end the scourge of unemployment? Yes — but powerful people don’t want to believe it. Some of them have a visceral sense that suffering is good, that we must pay a price for past sins (even if the sinners then and the sufferers now are very different groups of people). Some of them see the crisis as an opportunity to dismantle the social safety net. And just about everyone in the policy elite takes cues from a wealthy minority that isn’t actually feeling much pain. 
What has happened now, however, is that the drive for austerity has lost its intellectual fig leaf, and stands exposed as the expression of prejudice, opportunism and class interest it always was. And maybe, just maybe, that sudden exposure will give us a chance to start doing something about the depression we’re in.
Republicans were on the Sunday morning talk shows calling for direct intervention in the Syrian civil war. Lindsey Graham wants the U.S. to arm the rebels and establish a no-fly zone. The problem there, based on a reading of yesterday's story by Ben Hubbard, "Islamist Rebels Create Dilemma on Syria Policy," is that we would be aiding and abetting al-Qaeda-affiliated groups like the Al-Nusra Front, a terrorist organization according to U.S. declaration. The gist of Hubbard's piece is that the only rebel fighting forces left in Syria are Islamist.

The must-read story today though, and one that illuminates the kind of kleptocracy to look forward to in a post-Assad Syria, is Matthew Rosenberg's frontpage story, "With Bags of Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in Afghanistan," detailing the CIA-supplied payoffs that have been the heart and soul of the Karzai government from the very beginning. There are many incredible quotes in this piece, such as
“The biggest source of corruption in Afghanistan,” one American official said, “was the United States.”
Handing out cash has been standard procedure for the C.I.A. in Afghanistan since the start of the war. During the 2001 invasion, agency cash bought the services of numerous warlords, including Muhammad Qasim Fahim, the current first vice president. 
“We paid them to overthrow the Taliban,” the American official said.
At the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003 Karzai successfully lobbied the U.S. to have the CIA payments routed through his National Security Council. At this point Iranians were also dropping off bags of cash at the presidential palace:
By late 2002, Mr. Karzai and his aides were pressing for the payments to be routed through the president’s office, allowing him to buy the warlords’ loyalty, a former adviser to Mr. Karzai said. 
Then, in December 2002, Iranians showed up at the palace in a sport utility vehicle packed with cash, the former adviser said. 
The C.I.A. began dropping off cash at the palace the following month, and the sums grew from there, Afghan officials said. 
Payments ordinarily range from hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars, the officials said, though none could provide exact figures. The money is used to cover a slew of off-the-books expenses, like paying off lawmakers or underwriting delicate diplomatic trips or informal negotiations. 
Much of it also still goes to keeping old warlords in line. One is Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek whose militia served as a C.I.A. proxy force in 2001. He receives nearly $100,000 a month from the palace, two Afghan officials said. Other officials said the amount was significantly lower.
Karzai's Afghanistan is one big racket. Home many Republicans do you think will be on the Sunday morning talk shows clamoring for a policy shift? Zero. Right. What does this say about how we govern? War is good business.