Showing posts with label Taliban. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Taliban. Show all posts

Thursday, January 31, 2019

U.S. Busts Out ISIS from a Taliban Prison

I saw this Tim Anderson tweet in a Niqnaq post: a story from the Tehran Times, "U.S. Caught Helping ISIS Commanders Escape from Taliban Prison in Afghanistan," about U.S. special forces busting "40 Daesh ringleaders" out of a Taliban prison in Badghis Province, Afghanistan, and helicoptering them away to safety.

It makes you wonder if Islamic State's presence in Afghanistan has been orchestrated by the United States from the very beginning. I'm watching the Netflix series Narcos. I knew next to nothing about Pablo Escobar and the Medellín Cartel. The Medellín Cartel is eventually superseded by the Cali Cartel thanks to the intercession of the CIA and the ultra-right anticommunist paramilitary organization of the Castaño Brothers.

Afghanistan is no different from the Narco wars in Colombia. Fight terror with terror; it's a preferred method of the CIA.

Monday, June 11, 2018

Is Peace Breaking Out in Afghanistan?

Thursday Afghan president Ashraf Ghani announced a unilateral ceasefire. Saturday the Taliban reciprocated. According to The Long War Journal, "Whereas the government announced that its unilateral ceasefire will last until June 20, the Taliban’s order covers just 'the first, second and third day of Eid' — meaning a shorter timeframe."

Reading Mujib Mashal's "Afghan Leader Declares Brief, Unilateral Cease-Fire in Taliban Fight," published Thursday, one can't help but come away with the opinion that what Ghani is doing is calling a timeout to give his winded team a breather and prevent the opposition from running up the score:
Some analysts feared that not enough thought had gone into how a cease-fire might play out at a time when the war has spread to nearly half of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. The presence of many militant groups makes the task much harder for a force stretched by daily fighting.
“Fighting is ongoing in 15 provinces, and the Afghan president announces the cease-fire,” said Atiqullah Amarkhel, a retired Afghan general and military analyst.
“Unilateral cease-fires are not helpful,” Mr. Amarkhel said. “Don’t forget that already the Afghan Army isn’t attacking — it is defending. It will confuse the Afghan forces, the Taliban will attack and gain more, and it will affect the morale of the Afghan forces.”
But Borhan Osman, a senior analyst for the International Crisis Group in Afghanistan, said a cease-fire might be an effective countermove at a time when “more than 90 percent of the attacks in Afghanistan are initiated by the insurgency.”
With the government already on the defensive, Mr. Osman said, it might as well use a cease-fire to build trust with the Taliban and test their seriousness about negotiating peace. The Taliban have yet to offer a clear response to the peace plan that Mr. Ghani offered months ago.
“The Taliban have always expressed concern that the government is not serious about peace, and not coherent enough to be a reliable partner for talks,” Mr. Osman said. “Today’s announcement could be a step toward addressing those worries, showing that Mr. Ghani as commander in chief has the power to halt offensives by all pro-government forces.”
Mushal's story from Saturday, "Taliban Announce Brief Cease-Fire, Offering Afghans Hope for Lull in War," convincingly places the Trump administration firmly behind the peace process:
Increasingly, senior Afghan officials and Western diplomats in Kabul believe the United States is willing to take a direct role in peace talks with the Taliban. Pakistan remains a key component of that.
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo spoke by phone with Pakistan’s powerful army chief, Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, a day before the cease-fire was announced. Gen. Bajwa is set to visit Kabul soon.
“We have asked for Pakistan’s assistance in facilitating a peace process, and we have sought to understand Pakistan’s own core security concerns and ensure that its interests are taken into account in any peace process,” said Lisa Curtis, who is in charge of Afghanistan and South Asia policy at the National Security Council. “The United States is ready to participate in the discussion, but we cannot serve as a substitute for the Afghan government and the Afghan people.”
Many saw the strong American role in the Afghan government’s cease-fire announcement as an indication of a more hands-on approach. Senior members of the Afghan government did not know of plans for a cease-fire until a couple days before they were announced.
Mr. Blanc, the former diplomat, said the urgency to show Mr. Trump some progress is palpable.
“There is a deep concern amongst the Americans who want to see the American commitment to Afghanistan remain, that Trump is going to pull the plug,” Mr. Blanc said. “The idea that potentially someone is working to do something dramatic — no question about it. I would be shocked if that wasn’t somebody’s calculation, whoever is in the driver’s seat here.”
It could be that the reason Afghan commanders had no clue about Ghani's ceasefire is that it was a last second diktat from Washington. It makes sense and is consistent with Trump's focus on 2020. If he can broker an end to the frozen conflict on the Korean Peninsula, as well as bring an end to the 17-year war in Afghanistan, it will be a potent argument for his reelection.

What is the Ghani peace plan on the table? It was something that came out of the Kabul Process in February. An opinion piece written by Hekmat Khalil Karzai vaguely describes some of its features:
The Afghan government is firmly committed to addressing the core concerns and demands of the Taliban, including the future presence of the international military forces, amendments to our constitution and the release of Taliban prisoners.
The initiative also offers removal of the names of Taliban commanders from the sanctions lists maintained by the United Nations and others, which limit their movements and hinder their inclusion into mainstream Afghan society and polity.
Throughout the peace process and after the end of hostilities, the Afghan government will ensure the security of the Taliban and their families and help resettle former combatants as part of an agreement.
The Taliban won't accept the presence of any foreign troops stationed on Afghan soil. A complete withdrawal is not something the U.S. military will abide. So the war will likely continue.

Monday, July 24, 2017

Afghanistan is Past Its Tipping Point

UPDATE: This morning's Situation Report is chock full of bad news regarding Afghanistan:
Afghan grind fragmenting Trump’s cabinet. There’s little good news coming out of Afghanistan these days, and in Washington, the wheels keep turning on the long-awaited Trump strategy. But two national security officials told Politico’s Susan Glasser that a recent National Security Council Principals Committee meeting about Afghanistan descended into a “shitshow” of disagreements and complaints.
According to Glasser,
[T]he session of the National Security Council Principals Committee, described by two sources briefed on it as a “s*** show” that featured what a third source, a senior White House official, confirmed was a heated debate where “words were exchanged,” proved no more successful than months’ worth of previous Afghan policy debates.
Trump refused to sign off on the plan they approved, the sources said, instead sending it back to his national security team demanding more work. And on Tuesday, the president made clear just how dissatisfied he was. In what were pretty much his first public comments on Afghanistan during his six months in office, he told reporters before a White House lunch, “I want to find out why we’ve been there for 17 years.” On Thursday, headed into a Pentagon meeting, he was similarly cagey. Asked about more troops for Afghanistan, he replied only, “We’ll see.”
Trump’s equivocation reflects the difficulty of figuring out what to do about an unceasing war that is once again at an impasse without an influx of new troops. “We are not winning in Afghanistan,” Defense Secretary James Mattis testified last month.
But the president’s hesitation is also, according to multiple current and former senior U.S. officials I’ve spoken with in recent days, a striking vote of no-confidence in his national security adviser, H.R. McMaster, who has been trying and failing for months to sell the president on a new plan for Afghanistan.
McMaster has made a major policy review of America’s long, failed war there his personal mission, according to the sources, and he pushed hard to get a new strategy that would include the relatively modest troop increases and a commitment to at least another four-year timeline approved in advance of Trump’s May summit with NATO allies.
****

With ceasefires in effect in much of Syria and Mosul conquered, the most active war theater is likely Afghanistan. Mujib Mashal and Jawad Sukhanyar write in "Taliban Seize Two More Afghan Districts in Sustained Fighting" of ongoing battles in the country's south, north, east and west.
With the Taliban’s annual offensive in full swing, after the opium harvest and the fasting for the holy month of Ramadan, Afghan forces have been engaged with the Taliban in 21 of the country’s 34 provinces, according to the country’s minister of defense, Gen. Tariq Shah Bahrami. The frequency of attacks across several provinces in recent days and the casualty rate among the security forces, particularly the police and government militiamen, have raised alarms.
The uptick in violence comes as the Trump administration is considering sending a few thousand more troops, adding to the force of about 8,700 Americans already in the country to bolster the Afghan security forces.
In the meantime, the United States military has intensified airstrikes in support of the Afghan forces. In the first six months of 2017, American aircraft released more than 1,600 weapons, according to the United States Central Command, nearly 20 percent more than the number for all of 2016. In Helmand Province alone last week, American forces carried out an average of 10 strikes a day.
[snip]
Even before the fall of the two recent districts, the insurgents controlled 11 districts from the country’s roughly 400 districts, and influenced another 34, according to United States military data released by the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction. In comparison, the Afghan government controlled 97 districts and influenced 146. More than 100 districts were contested by both sides.
My guess is that the above U.S. assessment is rose-colored. When was the last time you read about the Afghan government clearing districts of Taliban? If anything, the Taliban abandon territory because they have to attend to other matters. This doesn't mean that Afghan security forces, particularly the police, can hold turf, calling into question the "More than 100 districts were contested by both sides" sentence above. If these 100 districts are placed in the Taliban column, you have a country that's past the tipping point.

Kabul is not going to fall soon. But the terror bombings like the one Mujib Mashal reports this morning, "Taliban Claim Kabul Explosion That Killed Dozens," will continue to create chaos.

Mattis has been reticent about his plans for a troop deployment, a taciturnity that coincided with stories about Bannon and Kushner wanting to outsource the Taliban fight to mercenaries.

The U.S. mission in Afghanistan is at an end. The question is how long before an administration can muster the political courage to acknowledge reality. With a bellicose Congress like the one we have, it is going to be a while.

Wednesday, February 24, 2016

The European Union is Finished + The Battle for Mosul Set to Begin

Mark this winter as the end of the European Union. In "Clashes Erupt in Greece as Macedonia Bars Afghan Asylum Seekers," Liz Alderman lists the large number of states that now have border restrictions. Macedonian, following a decision over the weekend by Austria, Serbia and Croatia to restrict migrant entries, ruled that Afghans are economic immigrants and not refugees fleeing a war zone like their Iraqi and Syrian brothers and sisters. This comes at the same time that U.S. air power had to assist in restoring electricity to Kabul following Taliban attacks on transmission lines in Baghlan Province. Civilian casualties are up, peace talks led by Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the United states are going nowhere and the Taliban continues to gobble up territory. It is a wonder that there aren't more Afghans fleeing to Europe.

The effect of Macedonia's decision is to push the refugees back into Greece. One could see this coming once Merkel's fantasy of having Turkey warehouse the flotsam from the West's wars repeatedly failed to launch. Now, barring a D-Day-type naval flotilla in the Aegean to block the refugees, Greece will be under great pressure to remain a viable, functioning state. As Alderman reports,
The backup of migrants was increasing the strain on Greece, which has become a focal point in the crisis. European Union officials have demanded that Athens take steps to tighten screening and slow the flow of refugees, many of whom are hoping to reach Germany, or risk suspension from the Schengen zone. 
Greece, which is reeling from a prolonged economic crisis, has protested that it lacks the funds to carry out the task adequately and was overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of people crossing the Aegean Sea from Turkey, despite a pledge from Ankara to curb migrant flows in exchange for 3 billion euros, or about $3.3 billion, in aid from the European Union. 
Only in the past two weeks has Greece opened several so-called hot spot facilities on the islands where migrants are most likely to arrive. But Athens has faced a sharp outcry from locals on some of those islands, such as Kos and Leros, who say they fear that the new centers, which are used to register and hold migrants until their applications are sorted out, will turn into permanent holding camps. 
Greece is the most popular entry point into Europe for hundreds of thousands of migrants from Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. More than 56,000 migrants arrived in Greece by sea in January alone, 10 times the number in the same period last year. In the first three weeks of this year, at least 113 people died trying to make the sea crossing to Europe, the International Organization for Migration said, compared with 94 a year earlier. 
Underlining the risks of the influx for Greece, the president of the European Parliament warned this week that the country risked becoming a “parking lot” for migrants unless the European Union moved to put in effect a plan to resettle thousands of migrants stuck there and in Italy.
There has been no let-up despite the winter. With the partial truce declared for Syria a likely dud, a U.S. invasion of Libya in the works and, according to this morning's "Situation Report" by Paul McLeary and Adam Rawnsley, the battle to reconquer Mosul set to begin, the number of refugees later this spring and summer will be overwhelmingly:
The road to Mosul. The Iraqi army will likely need to deploy between eight and 12 army brigades to liberate Mosul from the grip of the Islamic State, according to a U.S. general in charge of training Iraqi forces.
“We are making plans for Mosul,” U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Richard Clarke, commander of Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command in Iraq, told reporters at the Pentagon via teleconference from Baghdad Tuesday. “We’re doing that each and every day.” The exact number of troops is still in flux, as Iraqi brigades can range in size from about 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers.
U.S. troops deployed near ISIS territory. A handful of American troops are already in place near Mosul, and have been setting up a forward operating base from which Iraqi troops will launch any future assault on the city. The Nineveh Operations Center in the small village of Makhmour will eventually house about 4,500 Iraqi soldiers who will be in the lead of the fight for Mosul. The base also houses a new command center for the Iraqi army’s 15th Division, which ran through an American-led training program last year.
And Iraqi officials look ready to go. Defense Minister Khaled al-Obaidi said earlier this month that Iraqi forces expect to start the Mosul operation “no later than the first half of this year,” while Prime Minister Haider al Abadi has predicted that 2016 would see a “final victory” against the group.
Schengen, already dead de facto, will be officially suspended. Without passport-free travel you can't claim there is a European Union. A Brexit is coming. Trump is on the rise. Can Le Pen be far behind?

Wednesday, February 3, 2016

Afghanistan at a Turning Point

Here is the Afghanistan blurb from this morning's "Situation Report" by Foreign Policy's Paul McLeary and Adam Rawnsley:
Echoing American generals who have run the war in Afghanistan for the past decade, leader of U.S. and NATO troops there, Gen. John Campbell, told a congressional panel Tuesday that the country “is at an inflection point.” If Washington pulls out too many troops by the end of this year, 2016 “is at risk of being no better, and possibly worse, than 2015,” which was the bloodiest year yet for Afghan security forces. The general -- expected to retire in the coming months once Lt. Gen. John "Mick" Nicholson comes to Kabul to take over -- praised the White House’s decision to keep U.S. troop strength at around 9,800 troops for much of this year, eventually falling to about 5,500 by 2017. "Ultimately, Afghanistan has not achieved an enduring level of security and stability that justifies a reduction in our support in 2016," Campbell said.
Last year the casualty rate sustained by the Afghan security forces was deemed unsustainable. According to Mujib Mashal's "Taliban Bombing Kills at Least 20 at Kabul Police Station":
. . . [C]asualties among Afghan soldiers and police officers had risen by almost a third in 2015, compared with a record casualty rate in 2014 that some officials then considered unsustainable.
***
Intense Taliban offensives this winter, including the string of bombings in Kabul, have Afghan and Western officials increasingly worried about the pressure on the Afghan security forces. 
Col. Michael T. Lawhorn, a spokesman for NATO and United States forces in Afghanistan, said the casualties of Afghan forces through 2015 were 28 percent higher than in the previous year. Colonel Lawhorn, who would not go into details about the new casualty report, said a difficult year for Afghan forces had long been expected because they were carrying responsibility for a “significantly increased operational tempo” last year, after the end of the NATO combat mission. 
An Afghan official briefed on the matter put the number of casualties last year at close to 16,000 soldiers and police officers, with more than 5,000 killed. Even those numbers seemed low, considering that 4,100 were killed in the first six months of 2015, and the fighting greatly intensified in the last six months of the year.
Oruzgan Province north of Kandahar is in trouble, as Mashal goes on to relate:
In the district of Deh Rawood in southern Oruzgan Province, where the police have long complained of a lack of equipment and ammunition while practically under siege, four security checkpoints were abandoned by the police and later burned down by the Taliban, according to Mohammad Karim Khadimzai, head of the Oruzgan provincial council. Around 30 police officers deserted their posts in Deh Rawood and arrived in Tirin Kot, the provincial capital.
In today's paper Mashal and Taimoor Shah report that a hero boy soldier was assassinated by the Taliban in front of his home in Tirin Kot ("Taliban Gun Down 10-Year-Old Militia Hero in Afghanistan").

Gen. Campbell appears to have told Congress the truth when he announced that 2016 is an "inflection point" for Afghanistan. If the Chinese can't put enough pressure on Pakistan to get substantive peace negotiations moving, it is hard to see how the U.S./NATO project in Afghanistan survives.

Wednesday, October 7, 2015

Taliban Northern Offensive Mortally Wounds Ghani Government

All the happy talk emanating from the U.S. military and the Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani that the Taliban have given up on Kunduz City and are drifting into the bush is debunked by an excellent story, "Taliban Gain Advantage in Tug of War in Kunduz," written by Rod Nordland and Najim Rahim. The entire piece should be read, but the last three paragraphs speak directly to the dire situation the Afghan government finds itself in Kunduz:
A senior Afghan military officer blamed a lack of American airstrikes over the past two days for the Taliban advance on Tuesday, in the wake of the American airstrike that destroyed the Doctors Without Borders hospital in Kunduz on Saturday and killed 22 people, mostly hospital staff and patients. 
“The U.S. airstrikes are halted since yesterday evening,” said the officer, who confirmed that the city remains divided between the insurgents and government forces, with some fighting on Tuesday even in the Sare Dawra neighborhood, close to the airport, where the Afghan Army and American Special Operations troops have headquarters. “Until the airstrikes resume, it will be hard to have any progress in the fighting against the Taliban,” he said. 
The senior officer also blamed a lack of coordination among Afghan units. “There are 10 generals from different organs, and they aren’t under the command of one person who should lead the fighting,” the officer said. “This way, it is unlikely for the Afghan security forces to achieve anything so quickly. The fighting might last for months and Kunduz city may not be retaken.”
Residents are streaming out the city, voting with their feet in a display of distrust for the Afghan military and its NATO allies. What makes this all very Tet like is that it is not just Kunduz under siege; it several northern provinces. According to Alissa Rubin reporting yesterday in "Afghan Forces Report Progress in Kunduz as Taliban Press Other Fronts":
With much of the attention still on Kunduz, where fighting continued Monday and where a devastating American airstrike on Saturday deprived the city’s residents of its most important hospital, new fighting was reported near the provincial capital in Faryab, in northwestern Afghanistan. It was the third northern hub to come under Taliban attack in recent days.
The onslaught on the Faryab provincial capital, Maimana, was barely repelled by the Afghan security forces, said the acting governor, Abdul Sattar Barez. He estimated that some 2,000 Taliban fighters had been involved, but that number seemed high, given that the Taliban managed to take Kunduz City last week with an estimated 300 to 400 fighters.
Regardless, the attacking force was said to include insurgent fighters from four nearby provinces as well as from Faryab: Sari Pul, Jawzjan, Badghis and Ghor. The fighting went on for nearly 10 hours as Taliban attacked the city from three directions, Mr. Barez said. He credited the combination of a united Afghan force backed up by Maimana locals as well as air support from the American-led coalition for repelling the attack.
“The reason we managed to push them back was thanks to the Afghan National Security Forces and the people of Faryab who stood against them and stopped them from achieving their ominous goal,” he said. 
“Thanks, too, to NATO for their air support,” he said, referring to the international coalition, adding: “Their jets flew all night in the skies, which demoralized the enemy. If it wasn’t for the NATO air support, we would not have made it.”
Without U.S. air power the Ghani government's days would be significantly limited, as the reported recapture of Kunduz City by the Taliban proves.

The United States Forces in Afghanistan must be trying to work out the protocols for future airstrikes since General John F. Campbell is granting that the rules were broken in the obliteration of the Doctors Without Borders hospital. How an AC-130 gunship can loiter for over 30 minutes blasting to smithereens the only hospital in the region defies understanding, particularly when Doctors Without Borders says it provided GPS coordinates to both the Taliban and the Afghan/U.S. forces, and then alerted the military of its mistake while the attack was in progress.This is a snafu in the same category of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO air war against Yugoslavia. Doctors Without Borders is not going to let this drop quietly; it is calling for an independent investigation under the Geneva Conventions. This is a big, powerful multinational NGO that usually works within the Western imperial system. The attack on the hospital is a war crime if ever there was one.

Before signing off, it is worth one's time to read the lengthy story on Mullah Mansour (Joseph Golstein, "Taliban’s New Leader Strengthens His Hold With Intrigue and Battlefield Victory"), the newly minted leader of the Afghan Taliban riding high now with the success of his northern offensive. What Goldstein's piece brings home, even though it is too reliant on anonymous sources from Afghan intelligence, is the extent to which Mullah Mansour, and hence the Afghan Taliban, is a creature of Pakistan's national security apparatus:
As acting leader of the Taliban over the past few years, he closely kept the secret that Mullah Omar had been dead since 2013. And he wielded that edge powerfully, issuing orders in Mullah Omar’s name, moving against rival Taliban commanders and steadily consolidating power, according to Afghan and Taliban officials. 
He has also benefited from a powerful alliance with the Pakistani military spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, the original sponsor of the Afghan Taliban insurgency. That relationship, along with a hefty dose of cash payouts to fellow commanders, was a crucial factor in his ability to manage the succession crisis this summer after news of Mullah Omar’s death finally got out, Taliban and Afghan officials said. 
Pakistan’s role in Mullah Mansour’s rise and rule has offered a bit of hope to Afghan and Western officials that Pakistani officials might be persuaded to force the Taliban to accept a peace deal. 
But it has also sometimes been a political liability for Mullah Mansour, embittering some Taliban figures who resent Pakistan’s influence on the leadership and who are not likely to forgive his deception about Mullah Omar’s death. Some alienated commanders have sought a new direction with the Islamic State offshoot that is growing in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Mullah Mansour’s biggest mystery to Western and Afghan officials is wrapped up in the question of how he will try to shape Afghanistan’s future now that he has consolidated power: Will he attempt to return the Taliban to power as conquerors, or will he try to turn military victories into a strong hand in peace talks? 
His own words and actions would seem to support either path.
Right now there is no mystery at all. War is working for the Taliban. The Ghani government, already inherently weak, is now mortally wounded.

Wednesday, September 30, 2015

Carter Doctrine, Polestar of U.S. Hegemony, is Disintegrating

The reverse side of the neoliberal coin is neoconservatism. Both neoliberalism and neoconservatism got their start in the early 1970s, and by the time of the Carter presidency they had locked in as an essential part of the U.S. body politic.

A neoconservative hallmark is the Carter Doctrine. The Carter Doctrine states that the U.S. will unilaterally use military force to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf.

Though written by Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinki, a famous practitioner of realpolitik, it has been the true north of every Democratic and Republican administration for the last 35 years.

The Carter Doctrine was formulated in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, purportedly to counter Soviet hegemony in the region.

Well, we've come full circle (Neil MacFarquhar, "Russian Pilots Launch First Airstrikes in Syria, Officials Say").

The United States failed experiment in Afghanistan is approaching a flatline. Kunduz, the city, finally fell to the Taliban on Monday (Joseph Goldstein and Mujib Mashal, "Taliban Fighters Capture Kunduz City as Afghan Forces Retreat"). But the surrounding province of Kunduz has been under the control of the Taliban for most of the year. So the city falling should come as no surprise.

The story developing is that the Taliban victory in Kunduz seems to have been well plotted. The Afghan government, guided by it U.S. minders, have not been able to retake the city because of Taliban offensives in adjoining provinces. This is from Joseph Goldstein and Mujib Mashal, "Afghan Crisis Grows as Push to Retake Kunduz From Taliban Fails":
After more than a day of relative silence as the situation worsened around Kunduz, the American military showed the first signs of increased involvement in what the Pentagon called “a setback,” conducting at least two airstrikes, and reportedly more as attacks continued at the airport late Tuesday.

Beyond the Taliban’s gains in Kunduz, there was evidence that the insurgents were also pushing a broader offensive in northern Afghanistan, officials said. One particular point of concern was Takhar Province, just east of Kunduz, where the insurgents were said to be heavily assaulting military checkpoints and government facilities in several districts over the past two days.
And this from a breaking story this morning (Joseph Goldstein, "U.S. Strikes Taliban-Held Land Near Kunduz Airport as Afghan Crisis Deepens"):
KABUL, Afghanistan — American warplanes bombarded Taliban-held territory around the Kunduz airport overnight, and Afghan officials said American Special Forces were rushed toward the fighting. But by Wednesday morning, the crisis in northern Afghanistan had deepened, as the Taliban continued to surge outward from Kunduz, the major city that the militants captured on Monday. 
The militants claimed critical stretches of highway and continued to threaten the area around the airport, where hundreds of Afghan soldiers and civilians have been holed up since the city fell. 
Over the past three days, the Taliban have achieved what appears to be their largest military victory in a war that has gone on for more than a decade. Not only have insurgent forces captured a city of about 300,000 people — the first urban center the Taliban has held since 2001 — but as the reeling Afghan government struggles to respond, it has become clear that not only Kunduz but a large chunk of Afghanistan’s north is at stake.
In Baghlan Province south of Kunduz, Afghan reinforcements on their way to the city have been delayed or stopped altogether amid Taliban ambushes along the main highway. It appeared on Wednesday that before the Afghan government could launch a significant counteroffensive in Kunduz, it would first need to reclaim some of Baghlan.
Reinforcements in large numbers “will not be able to reach Kunduz without a big fight,” said Ted Callahan, a Western security adviser based in northeastern Afghanistan.
Abdul Shaker Urfani, a member of a community council in a northern part of Baghlan, said that more than 1,000 Afghan soldiers and police officers were stuck in the province. They were trying to reach Kunduz, “but they can’t break the Taliban resistance,” Mr. Urfani said.
So much for Obama's ballyhooed "end of U.S. combat operations" in Afghanistan. With superior Taliban planning -- quite a feather in the embattled Mullah Akhtar Mansour's turban -- it appears the north has been lost to the government of Ashraf Ghani, which today marks its one-year anniversary.

Obama has been a profound failure. Back in the heady days following his first landslide election, when I still believed in the illusion that he was a politician who was going to transform the system, in the back of my mind was the shadow that what we had here was another Jimmy Carter.

As it turns out that doubt was indeed prescient. Obama is a two-term Jimmy Carter who will usher in a Trump instead of a Reagan, at the same time as the temple of U.S. unipolar hegemony (i.e., the Carter Doctrine) comes crashing down.

Thursday, April 30, 2015

This is the End for Both the Democrats and the Long U.S. War in Afghanistan

Democrats' hopes of holding onto the White House seem remote. Obama is in free fall. Anti-police #Black Lives Matter protests continue, now in their second year. When I got off the train last night and scooted up the escalator, a couple of officers from the King County Sheriff's Department stood at the entrance to the transit station. A sure sign that a protest was underway. Last year, beginning with Thanksgiving and the riots in Ferguson, the police stayed on the streets for a month, a massive display of force for the holiday shoppers.

The cities are protesting and Obama is trying to have it both ways, poo-pooing rioters while explaining the conditions -- drug abuse, broken homes, underdevelopment of black communities in the inner-city -- that make riot necessary. But Obama does not call out the system by name --institutional racism. The Kerner Commission Report identified the problems 50 years ago in the wake of the riots of 1967 and articulated solutions, principally economic investment. Half-a-century later solutions remain unimplemented, a huge failure.

Obama is paying out what little political currency he has left to get the Trans-Pacific Partnership  through Congress. In order to do so he is going to have to rely on Republican votes. In many ways the last year of Obama's presidency is shaping up to look like Bill Clinton's, and we know how that turned out for Democrats.

The difference between Obama and Clinton is that Clinton was waging war in a relatively modest manner, bombing Yugoslavia into submission and terrorizing Iraq. Obama has more wars on his hands than we can count.

The one that kicked it all off for Clinton's successor, George W. Bush, is promising to provide a spectacular failure for Obama as he exits the White House. U.S. forces in Afghanistan, despite the administration's declaration of the end of combat operations there at the end of last year, are actively engaging the Taliban in attempt to keep the government of Ashraf Ghani from losing large chunks of territory.

Two stories over the last two days -- Mujib Mashal and Jawad Sukhanyar, "Afghan Troops Rush to Kunduz Amid Taliban Assault"; Azam Ahmed and Joseph Goldstein, "Taliban Gains Pull U.S. Units Back Into Fight in Afghanistan" -- depict a dire situation. The coalition government of Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Adbullah is not fully functional after more than half a year. There is still no defense minister even though the Taliban spring offensive has jumped off to an earlier than expected start with the provincial capital of Kunduz threatened.

As Ahmed and Goldstein explain, commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan Gen. John Campbell is basically acting as Ghani's defense minister, and this despite the declared end of a U.S. combat role:
As early as January, when officials in Washington were hailing the end of the combat mission, about 40 American Special Operations troops were deployed to Kunar Province to advise Afghan forces that were engaged with the Taliban over a handful of villages along the border with Pakistan.
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With the troops on the ground, the command for the American-led coalition called in airstrikes under the authority of force protection, according to two Western military officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the details of the operation were not public.
“They are putting guys on the ground in places to justify the airstrikes,” one of the officials said. “It’s not force protection when they are going on the offensive.”
Commenting on the continuing military operations against the Taliban, the top American commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John F. Campbell, vehemently denied accusations that he was putting troops into harm’s way just to enable more airstrikes.
He has insisted that it is within his purview to target Taliban insurgents who pose a threat not just to American or NATO troops but to any Afghan security forces. And his options on the ground were clear, he said in an interview, even if Washington’s public description of them was not.
“Washington is going to have to say what they say politically for many different audiences, and I have no issue with that,” General Campbell said. “I understand my authorities and what I have to do with Afghanistan’s forces and my forces. And if that doesn’t sell good for a media piece then, again, I can’t worry about it.”
He added: “Combat and war and transition, as you know, it’s a very complex thing. For me, it’s not black and white.”
The operations are continuing during a troubling stretch for the Afghan security forces, as the Taliban are continuing to make gains. Members of the nation’s military and police forces were killed by the insurgents at a high rate last year. And in the first three months of this year, things already appeared worse: The casualty rate rose 54 percent over the same period last year, according to one Western and one Afghan official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the figures were not public.
The danger was highlighted in recent days in the northern province of Kunduz, where the Afghan Army has been forced to send thousands of reinforcements to beat back a major Taliban offensive. In addition to threatening to claim at least one district, the insurgents have come within a few miles of the provincial capital, officials in Kunduz said. Coalition forces deployed jets to the area in a show of force but no munitions were dropped, officials said.
In that environment, American military officials have been reluctant to let go of the war, arguing that their involvement remains necessary given the Taliban threat and changing regional factors.
But in March, when Mr. Obama and President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan publicly announced that they had agreed to slow the withdrawal of American troops, administration officials emphasized that counterterrorism and training were still the focus, not everyday combat missions against the Taliban. The idea of the extended timeline was to bolster the ability of Afghans to fight, officials said, not to directly fight on their behalf.
Now, though, the distance seems to be widening between the administration’s public statements and what the military appears to be doing, whether at the behest of the White House or on its own, officials here said.
“What I’m thankful for is that I have the authority and flexibility to make those very tough decisions,” General Campbell said. “They could have said, ‘Every time you hit a target, you have to get approval.’ ”
***
Still, General Campbell has found strong support from Mr. Ghani, who became the president in September. Many officials characterize their relationship as a strikingly close partnership: General Campbell visits the president nearly every day — more than any other Western official in the country — and the commander’s staff has been tasked with not only helping to write policy for the Afghan forces but also helping direct overall strategy, at a time when the war is meant to be entirely in the hands of the Afghans.
Some Western officials have privately expressed discomfort with the American role and questioned how prolonging the American strategy in Afghanistan would be more effective this year than it was in the past 13.
“I’m not surprised they are continuing in this way,” said one Western diplomat living in Kabul. “What’s surprising is how much of it they’re doing.”
For an idea of the "thumb in the dike" nature of expanded U.S. airstrikes, read the Mashal and Sukhanyar story about the Taliban offensive in Kunduz. One thing that is apparent from their report is that there is a deep fissure in the Afghan force structure. The Afghan Local Police, militias set up and funded by the U.S., are often at odds with the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army. (There is an excellent short film produced by The New York Times that documents this.) According to Mashal and Sukhanyar,
The intensity of the violence around Kunduz sent the government scrambling to respond, with three high-level visits to Kunduz on Monday alone, and with confusion and dissension reported among some of the forces fighting back against the insurgents.
The provincial head of the Afghan Local Police, militia forces that have often been on the front lines of fighting against the Taliban, was scornful. “The army and the police don’t coordinate the operations with the A.L.P.,” said the forces’ leader, Sayed Dawood Hashemi. “We are used as firewood in the fighting.”
Despite requests for assistance from the security forces, one A.L.P. unit with dozens of men was forced to retreat from the neighborhood of Talawka, on the outskirts of Kunduz, allowing Taliban fighters to flood in, according to a member of the provincial council. Elsewhere, 26 A.L.P. fighters have been captured by the Taliban and two killed, Mr. Hashemi said.
Intense fighting started relatively early this year. Two weeks before the official start of their spring offensive, the Taliban attacked Afghan Army positions in remote Badakhshan Province, with hundreds of fighters overrunning Jurm District, abducting and killing dozens of soldiers, some of whom were reportedly beheaded. The government says it has begun a counteroffensive in Badakhshan, even as heavy fighting has been reported in several other northern provinces, including Sar-i-Pul, Jowzjan and Faryab.
With so many battles raging across the country, visiting army officials have told provincial council members in Kunduz that the best they can do is push back the enemy a bit, and that they cannot afford to sustain a longer operation, according to Mr. Ayoubi, the council chief in Kunduz.
In the meantime, irregular militias that were once funded by the United States as bastions against the Taliban have largely been on their own.
In Qala-i-Zal District, the 300 men under a commander named Nabi Gechi have been trying to fend off the Taliban advance. After five days of sustained small-arms and mortar fire from the insurgents, Mr. Gechi said, his militia was forced to retreat from one of its posts, with three men killed and a dozen wounded.
“The people of Qala-i-Zal are paying for the ammunition and food to supply us enough so we can stand up to the Taliban attacks,” he said.
Not only is there a war with the Taliban, but there is a war within the U.S.-created Afghan state between local and national armed forces. This cannot end well. The question is when will it collapse not if it will collapse.

Monday, March 9, 2015

Women's Place in Afghan Society After 14 Years of Western Occupation

Yesterday was International Women's Day. I celebrated it by going back and reading two long articles by Alissa Rubin that appeared early last week.

In the first story, "Afghan Policewomen Struggle Against Culture," which I found the more informative of the two, Rubin describes what can only be called a failed effort by occupying Western powers to establish a toehold for women in the tribal, misogynist Afghan criminal justice system. Remember, besides the hunt for the planners of 9/11, it was restoring the lost rights of Afghan women under the Taliban that was the main justification used by the Bush administration for its lengthy occupation of the country.

In one telling passage Rubin describes how Western-dictated quotas for police women have been turned into a system of prostitution:
. . . Nooria Sediqi, a second lieutenant who is about 50, displayed considerable knowledge of prostitution arrangements within the police. “The salaries are low,” she said of police pay. For a session of sex, a woman could earn $100 or even $200, she said. That is half a month’s salary for a junior policewoman, and a great deal even for a more senior one. 
Occasionally older policewomen have acted as madams, procuring younger ones either for men within the police force or outside it, according to two of the policewomen interviewed for this article as well as Western officials who work with the police. 
Interviews suggest that many policewomen, aware they have few useful skills and untrained in how to behave professionally, are vulnerable to sexual pressure. They are easy targets for more senior males who can withhold their pay or assign them to jobs far from home, and so policewomen are fearful of complaining.
One has to get to nearly the end of the story before Rubin provides a glimpse of success in the form of Zarif Shaan Naibi: "The first female warden of Kabul’s women’s prison, she stands out among the overwhelmingly male command structure of the Interior Ministry."

It is at this point, near the end, that Rubin finally allows for a little historical context to enter her piece:
Her success appears to be rooted partly in her training in the late 1970s and the 1980s, when Afghanistan’s government was imbued with Communist ideology. The period offered exceptional opportunity for women, especially in urban areas.
As ethnic Hazaras, a group that was persecuted by the Taliban and has now embraced education and the modern world, Ms. Naibi’s mother and brothers allowed her to join the police, and when she married, her husband allowed her to continue. He is now in the Defense Ministry.
Ms. Naibi recalls that in her day all her teachers at the police training center were women. Now they are almost all men.
Under the Communists, women’s education was valued and candidates for the police were vetted, she said. “If she wasn’t educated, they wouldn’t take her. If she had graduated from high school, they would send her to the police academy.”
But these Communist ideals encountered resistance from much of Afghan society. Then under the Taliban, most policewomen were banished, and Ms. Naibi’s family, as Hazaras, had to flee. When the police were reconstituted after the Taliban’s ouster in 2001, the Afghan leadership was desperate for women to serve, calling former policewomen back to work as well as recruiting new ones.
What Rubin leaves unmentioned is the U.S. role in bringing to end the period of Communist rule that "offered exceptional opportunity for women"; that role led to the blowback attacks of 9/11 and is currently responsible for reign of terror in the Middle East. (For a brilliant recapitulation of how the U.S. is presently both fighting and assisting Islamic State in Iraq and Syria read Tim Anderson's "The Relationship between Washington and ISIS: The Evidence.")

In other words, what the U.S. was responsible for destroying it is now halfheartedly and superficially trying to reconstruct, and so far with little success to show for its effort.

In the second of her two articles, "A Thin Line of Defense Against ‘Honor Killings’," Rubin describes Women for Afghan Women, "a fragile network of safe houses and the women who staff them" in 13 Afghan provinces. It is here that Rubin goes into the brutal nuts and bolts of Afghan patriarchy. This is ground that has been covered elsewhere earlier, such as in Ann Jones superb Kabul in Winter (2007), but it is good to see the Gray Lady devoting not insignificant column inches to it.

One wonders how long this network of women's shelters will last when the U.S. pulls out by the end of next year. There is currently a bipartisan movement underway ("No Cause to Delay the Afghan Pullout") to maintain U.S. military presence beyond 2016. Based on recent reports, it is clear that in the Afghan National Army we have another Iraq Army -- a paper army, a ghost army. The U.S. military is required to have a presence in country to obscure this.

Monday, December 1, 2014

Ferguson Protests + Afghan Government in Trouble + Oil Price War

Obama holds a PR event today (Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "Obama Plans Meetings on Ferguson Unrest at the White House") the goal of which is to put a lid on the public outrage over the police killing last August of unarmed black teenager Michael Brown in the St. Louis suburb of Ferguson.
[Obama] will gather his cabinet on Monday to discuss the results of a review of federal programs that provide military-style equipment to state and local law enforcement agencies. The initiatives were called into question in August, after the Ferguson police responded with riot gear and assault-style weapons to protests in the aftermath of the shooting of Michael Brown, the teenager, by Officer Darren Wilson.

“As the country has witnessed, disintegration of trust between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect and serve can destabilize communities, undermine the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, undermine public safety, create resentment in local communities, and make the job of delivering police services less safe and more difficult,” a White House official said Sunday night, speaking on condition of anonymity to describe the meetings.
Don't count on any significant changes in the federal policy of offloading surplus military hardware to local constabularies.

The faux-macho, Fortune 500 thinking prevalent in our "Land of the Free/Home of the Brave" encapsulated in spouted lines like "Money talks; bullshit walks" is actually a helpful guide here. As long as the protesters stay mobilized in significant numbers the state will have to take special measures to fund the deployment of the highway patrol and national guard. According to Jack Healy and Monica Davey, "Darren Wilson, Officer in Ferguson Shooting, Resigns From Police Dept.":
The peaceful daytime demonstrations came as Gov. Jay Nixon of Missouri sent state lawmakers a letter outlining what he called an urgent need to cover the ballooning costs of maintaining hundreds of National Guard troops and state police officers who are deployed here on the streets, day and night. The governor has called a special legislative session.
One Ferguson resident interviewed last month prior to the grand jury decision thought some sort of indictment had to be forthcoming because a spike in protests that would follow an acquittal would bankrupt the community. Unfortunately, St. Louis County prosecuting attorney Robert McCulloch was not so prescient.

At this point I think the protests have legs. There was encouraging evidence of crossover between anti-racist and economic justice activists in the form of coordinated Black Friday protests.

Many significant shifts are currently underway. In Afghanistan the unconstitutional power-sharing agreement between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah is near collapse. A helpful summary of recent events is found in this morning's Foreign Policy Situation Report by David Francis and Sabine Muscat:
Kabul is the focus of Taliban insurgents seeking to undermine the fledgling government of new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani. The Afghan capital has been under siege in recent days with a dozen attacks in the last two weeks. Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid claimed the attacks were intended to scare foreigners out of the capital as well as to undermine Ghani. They follow the ratification of a bilateral security agreement between Kabul and Washington that will allow for 10,000 American troops to stay in the country in 2015. 
The Wall Street Journal's Nathan Hodge and Habib Khan Totakhil: "The past two weeks have seen a string of attacks on diplomatic and international targets in Kabul, including a deadly assault Saturday on a guest house belonging to a nongovernmental organization, Partnership in Academics and Development. This past Thursday a suicide attack hit Wazir Akbar Khan, the heart of the diplomatic quarter, and a car bombing struck a British diplomatic convoy." More here. 
The attacks, which targeted both Afghan officials and foreigners, have already forced the resignation of Kabul's Chief of Police Gen. Zahir Zahir. Ghani is scheduled to travel to London and Brussels this week to rally global support for his country. But political fallout in Kabul has already begun. 
Ghani has been unable to form a new government amid escalating violence and has dismissed most of the existing ministers in Afghanistan's government. The New York Times' Joseph Goldstein: "The underlying problem, which various factions in the government point to, is the power-sharing agreement that followed this year's disputed presidential election. It makes Mr. Ghani president and his election rival, Abdullah Abdullah, the chief executive. Since the deal was struck in September, Mr. Ghani and Mr. Abdullah have been unable to agree on a new cabinet, leaving the government in the lurch and raising questions about the long-term chances of the power-sharing deal." More here. 
Optimism had grown in recent weeks that Ghani and Abdullah would be able to find a way to work together. Their original agreement allowed the United States to finalize the bilateral security pact. Now, with the fate of Ghani's government uncertain, there are sure to be questions from Washington about whether the pact will hold.
My only quibble with the way Francis and Muscat frame the upswing in Taliban attacks is that they make it seem as if it directly followed Ghani's signing the bilateral security agreement as soon as he took office in September. I think the recent spate of attacks in Kabul come after reports in November that Ghani had lifted Karzai's ban on U.S.-led nighttime raids and airstrikes.

A developing story that has global ramifications not just for the power elite but for every single one of us who consume is the present oil-price war underway. OPEC met last week and decided against any production limits (Stanley Reed, "OPEC Holds Production Unchanged; Prices Fall"). This dropped the price of barrel of oil down around $70.

There is plenty of speculation as to why the Saudis, whose fiscal breakeven is reported to be around $90 a barrel, are opposed to production quotas and willing to let the price drop to $60 level. Some say it is to kill off the U.S. shale oil boom in Texas and North Dakota; some say it is to punish Iran and Russia. Whatever it is I think it is pretty safe to say the Saudis are practicing some form of predatory pricing; they want to maintain market share above all else because that is where their power comes from.

Naked Capitalism's Yves Smith has a helpful post this morning: "OPEC Fires First Shot In Global Oil Price War."

To get a sense of the type of new energy frontier we are in, check out last week's story by Diane Cardwell, "Solar and Wind Energy Start to Win on Price vs. Conventional Fuels":
According to a study by the investment banking firm Lazard, the cost of utility-scale solar energy is as low as 5.6 cents a kilowatt-hour, and wind is as low as 1.4 cents. In comparison, natural gas comes at 6.1 cents a kilowatt-hour on the low end and coal at 6.6 cents. Without subsidies, the firm’s analysis shows, solar costs about 7.2 cents a kilowatt-hour at the low end, with wind at 3.7 cents. 
“It is really quite notable, when compared to where we were just five years ago, to see the decline in the cost of these technologies,” said Jonathan Mir, a managing director at Lazard, which has been comparing the economics of power generation technologies since 2008. 
Mr. Mir noted there were hidden costs that needed to be taken into account for both renewable energy and fossil fuels. Solar and wind farms, for example, produce power intermittently — when the sun is shining or the wind is blowing — and that requires utilities to have power available on call from other sources that can respond to fluctuations in demand. Alternately, conventional power sources produce pollution, like carbon emissions, which face increasing restrictions and costs. 
But in a straight comparison of the costs of generating power, Mr. Mir said that the amount solar and wind developers needed to earn from each kilowatt-hour they sell from new projects was often “essentially competitive with what would otherwise be had from newly constructed conventional generation.”
The Saudis and the Koch brothers will do everything they can to maintain their fossil-fueled hegemony.And at this point it is becoming apparent that it is going to be a very destructive effort.

Thursday, October 23, 2014

A Tolerant Taliban in Kunduz Province Collaborates with U.S.A.I.D.

Finally, after many months, I finished reading Ann Jones' Kabul in Winter (2006). The book is terrific, a first-person account of Jones' experience working for a women's rights NGO in Kabul in the first years after the U.S. toppled the Taliban; she uses her own encounters as a device to unwind the history of Afghanistan. 

The takeaway from Jones' book is the U.S.-led international development effort that followed the defeat of the Taliban was corrupt from the very beginning, never sincerely committed to rebuilding a country torn apart for decades by foreign-supported conflict and that by 2005 had lost the hearts and minds of Afghans.

What took me so long to finish Kabul in Winter is just the basic difficulty of reading books when you work a full-time job requiring a long daily commute. I could read many more books if I stopped reading the newspaper on the train and took a book with me to read instead. But since I choose to try to keep up with what is being reported in the "newspaper of record," this means that with the arrival of regular season football in September I only have Saturday to read in an unimpeded fashion.

As I see it the worker running the normal 9-to-5, Monday-thru-Friday rat race deals with a two-day week: one long long-day of 120 hours and one short long-day of 48 hours. The long long-day is all about routines and basic survival of the work week; free time is doled out in 15-minute increments. The short long-day of the weekend, for me at least, is about exercising and watching the NFL on Sunday, leaving several hours on Saturday when I can read what I wish.

Anyhow, there is another informative story this morning by the Gray Lady's Azam Ahmed, "Taliban Are Rising Again in Afghanistan’s North." The Taliban are now not only a dominant presence in the south and east of Afghanistan but the north as well where they are actually governing in several sections of Kunduz Province. What is noteworthy about this is that the Taliban are governing in a less totalitarian fashion; they are even allowing some girls' schools to stay open:
Leading the charge for the Taliban is Mullah Abdul Salam, a native of Kunduz Province who was the insurgents’ shadow governor before his arrest by the Pakistani authorities in 2010, officials said. He was set free in a negotiated prisoner release between the Afghan High Peace Council and the Pakistani government in 2013. 
Under his leadership this summer, it appears the insurgents have been trying new tactics, showing a flexibility in governing rather than relying on fear, according to interviews with more than two dozen locals and officials across the province. 
Residents and an aid official said that local commanders had been allowing schools to stay open and even distributing pens and notebooks — including at girls’ schools, which were often targets for violence under the Taliban’s rule in the 1990s. They said the insurgents had even given their blessing to international development projects in some areas, which would once have been unthinkable. 
“They have a parallel system to the government, one that approves the development projects,” said a stabilization adviser for a U.S.A.I.D. contractor, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he works in Taliban areas. “We can’t do anything without the Taliban approval.” 
Some residents said that Taliban justice had already proved more attractive than that offered by the government. 
“Their justice is quick, and they do what they say,” said Mohammad Nazar, a local elder who works for the government community development council in Chahar Dara.
If U.S.A.I.D. is collaborating with a newly tolerant Taliban, this strikes me as another enormous barrier to the success of the Ghani administration in Kabul.

Tuesday, October 14, 2014

Why Afghanistan is Important

Picking my through a morning paper choked with stories on Ebola -- now that the virus has arrived in the wealthy West, the column inches devoted to the outbreak have ballooned -- there is not much that jumps out. Azam Ahmed has a useful recapitulation, "Ambush by the Taliban Kills 14 in Afghan Forces," of the Taliban's increased military activity over the last year in the context of a recent spate of terror bombings and attacks on Afghan forces:
The Taliban have waged heavy offensives this year, deeply cutting into Afghan security forces who for the first time have full responsibility for the country’s security. Many areas that had once been considered safe have been roiled, especially in the north. And in traditional areas of insurgent strength, mostly in the south and east, the Taliban have made many gains.
Driving the insecurity in many areas is the lack of international forces, who have completely handed over security to their Afghan counterparts. For the first time in years, there are widespread reports of insurgents massing in large groups to attack, banking on the international coalition’s limited ability to conduct airstrikes. 
In response, American forces have stepped up airstrikes, conducting more in August than they had over the past two years in total, according to the United States Central Command.
For example, officials in the southeastern province of Paktia claimed that such strikes had killed seven civilians, including a child, who were collecting firewood on a mountaintop near the provincial capital, Gardez. 
The International Security Assistance Force rejected that account, however, saying in a statement that the airstrike “resulted in the death of eight armed enemy combatants.”
President Ashraf Ghani’s office released a separate statement saying, “The president is looking at every civilian casualty incident with much importance, and has asked for a full investigation of this unfortunate incident.” 
Taliban violence has been especially heavy around the country in recent days. 
In the highly secure city of Mazar-i-Sharif, the financial capital of northern Afghanistan, attackers dressed as policemen detonated suicide vests at the provincial police headquarters on Sunday, killing at least two officers and wounding nine others. And a mix of bombs, rockets and ambushes in the provinces of Wardak, Nangarhar, Kunduz, Kunar and Laghman, as well as in the capital city, Kabul, resulted in the deaths of at least 18 others in the last two days.
I've been trying to keep up with the news coming out of Afghanistan because like the Iranian Revolution, the civil war in Afghanistan, stoked for decades by foreign powers, is ontologically connected to our currently exhausted globally dominant neoliberal paradigm. Neoliberalism spreads its tentacles at the same time -- the late-1970s -- that Afghanistan is destabilized, becoming a Petri dish for the use of jihadi proxies against communism.

Paying attention to which way Afghanistan is trending, I believe, offers insight into the dialectical path of an enervated neoliberalism. For instance, if the Taliban is successful, routs the Ashraf Ghani government in Kabul, which right now certainly seems a possible outcome, then I think this presages an attempt to maintain neoliberalism by means of a brutal, medieval religious fundamentalism.

In a way, I think we are already there. This is what Islamic State is. Whipped up by the U.S., Turkey and oil-rich Gulf emirates, ISIS seeks to remake boundaries of the Middle East at the expense of the Kurds and the Shia without in anyway questioning the legitimacy of the global neoliberal order.

As Samir Amin notes in a recent article, "The Return of Fascism in Contemporary Capitalism," the "Islamization" of politics in the contemporary South is an acknowledgement by leaders within the U.S. that neoliberalism can only be maintained through chaos:
Can there be a possible return to the national popular model of the Bandung era, maybe with a hint of democracy? Or a more pronounced crystallization of a democratic, popular, and national front? Or a plunge into a backward-looking illusion that, in this context, takes on the form of an “Islamization” of politics and society? 
In the conflict over—in much confusion—these three possible responses to the challenge, the Western powers (the United States and its subaltern European allies) have made their choice: they have given preferential support to the Muslim Brotherhood and/or other “Salafist” organizations of political Islam. The reason for that is simple and obvious: these reactionary political forces accept exercising their power within globalized neoliberalism (and thus abandoning any prospect for social justice and national independence). That is the sole objective pursued by the imperialist powers. 
Consequently, political Islam’s program belongs to the type of fascism found in dependent societies. In fact, it shares with all forms of fascism two fundamental characteristics: (1) the absence of a challenge to the essential aspects of the capitalist order (and in this context this amounts to not challenging the model of lumpen development connected to the spread of globalized neoliberal capitalism); and (2) the choice of anti-democratic, police-state forms of political management (such as the prohibition of parties and organizations, and forced Islamization of morals). 
The anti-democratic option of the imperialist powers (which gives the lie to the pro-democratic rhetoric found in the flood of propaganda to which we are subjected), then, accepts the possible “excesses” of the Islamic regimes in question. Like other types of fascism and for the same reasons, these excesses are inscribed in the “genes” of their modes of thought: unquestioned submission to leaders, fanatic valorization of adherence to the state religion, and the formation of shock forces used to impose submission. In fact, and this can be seen already, the “Islamist” program makes progress only in the context of a civil war (between, among others, Sunnis and Shias) and results in nothing other than permanent chaos. This type of Islamist power is, then, the guarantee that the societies in question will remain absolutely incapable of asserting themselves on the world scene. It is clear that a declining United States has given up on getting something better—a stable and submissive local government—in favor of this “second best.”
But there is also the possibility that the medievalism being forced upon us will fail. Possibly Ashraf Ghani is as great a man as Ralph Nader says he is, and he will clear a new path for Afghanistan. Maybe the Marxist-inspired YPG will triumph over the Islamic State in Kobani, showing us that populist humanism is not dead yet.

Wednesday, September 24, 2014

U.S. Hits Nusra + Crocker Remembers Karzai

An interesting, and I would say unexpectedly positive, report of the U.S.-led airstrikes on Islamic State is the inclusion of Al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, Al Nusra Front, in the target list. Whether the bombing of Nusra positions was due to the group's connection to the shadowy Khorasan Group (an organization that appears to be a spook confection, breathed into life last week when Director of National Intelligence James Clapper mentioned that "in terms of threat to the homeland, Khorasan may pose as much of a danger as the Islamic State") or payback for the false flag Ghouta poison gas attack (that Seymour Hersh argued last spring was a Nusra operation) is not clear.

Ben Hubbard has the story, "Startling Sight Where Blasts Are the Norm":
While Mr. Obama had announced that the Islamic State would be targeted, the United States also hit at least two bases belonging to the Nusra Front, Al Qaeda’s Syria affiliate, exposing the gap between how the United States and many of Syria’s rebels see the group, as well as the hazards of attacking it. 
The United States considers the Nusra Front a terrorist organization, and American officials said the strikes disrupted an imminent plot to attack the West by an offshoot of Qaeda veterans known as Khorasan. 
One strike hit an area of abandoned villas on the western edge of Aleppo Province, killing at least 50 Nusra Front members, most of them foreigners and including at least a dozen leaders, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. 
A second strike in a village farther west, Kafr Dariyan, killed 15 people, including seven Nusra fighters and eight civilians, among them four children, the observatory said. An American military official said this was the strike against Khorasan. 
A video posted online showed residents removing a body from the rubble of a collapsed building.
The Nusra strikes immediately highlighted the shortcoming of Obama's announced strategy of combating IS by supporting "moderate" Syrian rebels. As Hubbard reports, the "moderates" like Al Qaeda and consider Nusra an ally in the fight against the Syrian government:
Even rebels who supported the strikes on the Islamic State criticized the targeting of the Nusra Front, which they consider a loyal partner in the battle against Mr. Assad. 
“It is not the right time to target the Nusra Front,” said Lt. Col. Fares al-Bayyoush, whose rebel group has received support from the United States and its allies. 
Colonel Bayyoush was also angry that the American strike had killed civilians and that the United States was not attacking Mr. Assad and his allies, like the Lebanese group Hezbollah, which the United States also classifies as a terrorist organization. 
“Isn’t Hezbollah a terrorist organization and the coalition wants to target all terrorist organizations in Syria?” he asked.
Hubbard concludes his story with a sensible quote from Shiite villager in northern Syria who worries that the U.S. coalition -- which includes well-known jihad sponsors al-Saud and Qatar -- against Islamic State is inherently unstable and will lead nowhere except to more war:
One activist who had fled Raqqa when the Islamic State took over said he hoped the strikes would weaken the jihadists but worried that Mr. Assad would benefit. 
“Maybe the regime will take over ISIS’ locations if the weak rebels aren’t able to after the strikes,” said the activists, who gave only his nickname, Abu Bakr. 
Many government supporters were worried about where events might lead because some of the countries in the coalition, like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have called for Mr. Assad to step down or actively supported his enemies with money and arms. 
“I don’t trust the coalition,” said a man who gave only his first name, Jamal, from a Shiite village in northern Syria that is besieged by Sunni rebels. “They might take advantage of the situation and hit important locations, like the airport where the regime is, and I am afraid of errors.”
A coalition designed to wage war against a Sunni fundamentalist state, but the reality is that the coalition is secretly at war with itself -- does that sound familiar? It should because it describes the coalition that has fought the Taliban and occupied Afghanistan for the last 13 years.

Which brings us to Hamid Karzai's farewell address yesterday. There is a good interview with Shamil Sultanov on Pravda's web site. In describing the rise of Islamic State, he mentions that Karzai, like Nouri al-Malaki, is an American creation who grew alienated from his parent: "Al-Maliki is a protege, a puppet of the United States. Sometimes, though, a puppet may start wagging its master. We know this by the example of Hamid Karzai."

The Afghan president could not resist telling it like it is when it comes to the wiles and the ways of the U.S. overlord. Rod Nordland has the story -- an excellent report -- "In Farewell Speech, Karzai Calls American Mission in Afghanistan a Betrayal":
KABUL, Afghanistan — In his nearly 13 years as the leader of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai’s most memorable public stances always seemed driven by some deep emotion, and an almost compulsive need to express it. There was heartbreak for families killed by errant airstrikes, outrage at the scheming of hostile neighbors, palpable longing to preside over a peaceful end to the Taliban insurgency. 
On Tuesday, though he delivered a farewell speech in a loose and sometimes jocular way, there was, again, no doubt of the emotion that inspired his words: bitterness at what he saw as an American betrayal of Afghanistan. 
“America did not want peace for Afghanistan, because it had its own agendas and goals here,” he told an audience of hundreds of cabinet and staff members at the presidential palace in Kabul, warning them not to trust the Americans. “I have always said this: that if America and Pakistan want peace, it is possible to bring peace to Afghanistan.” 
Mr. Karzai’s denunciation of the United States came in terms that had become wearily familiar to the diplomats watching the televised speech from the heavily fortified American Embassy just a few blocks and many blast walls from the palace. But what the president did not say, omitting any recognition of the more than 2,000 American lives and hundreds of billions of dollars the United States expended in fighting the Taliban, may have grated more.
*** 
In his speech, he offered his first piece of advice to Mr. Ghani and to Abdullah Abdullah, the presidential rival who is to join a unity government after months of political crises and wrangling over widespread electoral fraud. It was more a warning than a reflection on the recent political peril: “Both wise brothers should be very careful in maintaining their relationship with Western countries and the United States,” Mr. Karzai said. 
He sought to explain to the government officials his dogged refusal to sign a bilateral security agreement with the United States, which would allow American troops to remain in Afghanistan after this year. Mr. Ghani has promised to sign it as soon as he is inaugurated, and many inside Mr. Karzai’s own government were critical of his stance. 
“I believe the stability of Afghanistan is directly related to the United States and Pakistan,” Mr. Karzai said. “This war is for the personal interest of the foreign policies of others, and this is a fight of outsiders in which Afghans are sacrificed.”
The remainder of Nordland's piece is composed of an interview with foreign-policy guru Ryan Crocker. Of all the Establishment figures I find Crocker one of the most sensible. He has called for peace with Iran and caution regarding regime change in Syria. It's worth to quote Nordland at length:
Ryan C. Crocker, dean of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M, was the first American ambassador to the post-Taliban government, and he was among those American officials who supported Mr. Karzai’s initial appointment as Afghanistan’s leader. Mr. Crocker also returned as ambassador in 2011, as Afghan relations were souring under the Obama administration, which Mr. Karzai saw as less attentive than the Bush administration had been. 
“I saw over the years an increasing bitterness on his part particularly vis-à-vis Pakistan and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship,” Mr. Crocker said. 
Mr. Karzai’s view was that the United States should have been able to force Pakistan to stop giving sanctuary to the Taliban’s leaders. The American view has been that the expectation was unrealistic, given the deeply troubled relationship between Washington and Islamabad. 
During Mr. Crocker’s second tour here as ambassador, and throughout Mr. Cunningham’s time since then, Mr. Karzai adopted an increasingly strident tone toward the Americans, particularly on the issue of civilian casualties in American airstrikes, and on two occasions actually threatened to join the Taliban, whom he often referred to as “my brothers.” 
He blamed the Americans, too, for his inability to start any sort of meaningful peace talks with the Taliban. The insurgents have consistently refused to talk to him, denouncing him as an American puppet. 
For all of that, Mr. Crocker still believes Hamid Karzai was the right man for the job Americans effectively chose him for at a conference in Bonn in December 2001. “I don’t think there was a better choice than Karzai,” he said. “I didn’t think so then; I don’t think so now.”
*** 
Mr. Crocker remembered Mr. Karzai saying in 2011 that he was counting the days until he could leave office: “I think I remember his words verbatim: ‘The worst thing that could happen to Afghanistan would be for me to continue in office.’ Then he said: ‘No, that would be the second-worst thing. The worst thing would be if one of my brothers was elected.’ ”