Showing posts with label Rod Nordland. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rod Nordland. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 14, 2018

The War will Rage On Until Kabul is Surrounded

What I've noticed in reading the media reports coming out of Afghanistan as the Taliban have engaged in a pitched battle since Friday to take control of the Ghazni City and cut the vital Kandahar-Kabul highway is that the United States military is just flat-out lying now. A good example is taken from Mujib Mashal's "Why the Taliban’s Assault on Ghazni Matters for Afghanistan and the U.S.":
But much like the Afghan government, the United States military played down the extent of the crisis, in assessments completely at odds with the information from the locals. 
A statement by the United States military said, for example, that the main highway to the south remained open. But passengers on both sides remained stuck, and local Afghan officials said the highway was closed. 
It is unclear how many American troops are on the ground in Ghazni. But in cities such as Farah and Kunduz — assaulted by Taliban militants in 2015, 2016 and this year — the American military sent teams of Army Special Forces to call in airstrikes and fight alongside their Afghan commando counterparts.
An even more telling passage is found in "Were Victims Friend or Foe? U.S. Airstrike Leads to New Dispute With Afghan Allies" by Farooq Jan Mangal and Rod Nordland which was published Friday. The story is about a U.S. airstrike in Logar Province that killed 17 Afghan police and pro-government volunteers who were battling the Taliban. Mangal and Nordland widen their scope to take in other deadly errant U.S. airstrikes of late:
The episode on Tuesday was the latest in a series of cases in which the outcomes of American airstrikes were disputed, and occurred as the tempo of coalition air actions in support of their Afghan allies has risen sharply. With only about 14,000 American soldiers in Afghanistan — compared with 140,000 at the peak of the deployment — most of the ground operations are being conducted by Afghan forces, whose air force is small and poorly equipped.
In the first six months of this year, United States forces dropped more than 3,000 bombs across Afghanistan, nearly double the number for the same period last year and more than five times as many as the number for the first half of 2016.
For this same six-month period, the United Nations documented a 52 percent increase in civilian deaths from airstrikes compared with the first half of 2017.
On July 19, an American airstrike in the Chardara District of northern Kunduz Province killed 14 members of one extended family, including women and children, according to Afghan officials in the area.
On Friday, Colonel O’Donnell said that the American investigation of the July 19 airstrike in Kunduz had been closed after determining that there were no civilian casualties. “After carefully considering all relevant and reasonably available information, which included a review of the Afghan government’s report of findings, our investigation found no credible information to corroborate the allegations,” he said.
Aerial video footage showed a single bomb dropped on two homes where the Taliban had been firing from for more than an hour, he said, and the firing stopped as soon as the bomb was dropped.
The American military spokesman said that no Afghans had come forward to document any civilian deaths, and the only complaints received were two that documented damage to homes and one injured person.
A New York Times reporter at the scene, however, was given a list of the names of all 14 fatalities from the same extended family. The list was provided by family members and verified by government officials and the Kunduz hospital, where 12 of the dead were taken. The victims included five women, seven children aged 2 to 14, and two men, a father and an uncle to the children. 
Told about that, Colonel O’Donnell said, “When we’re presented with any credible evidence, if something is provided to us we will take a look at it.”
The U.S. is in a spot so tight it has very little room to turn. Peace with the Pashtun Taliban would not be recognized by the Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen, not to mention a large part of the 9/11 mythologized U.S. population. The war will rage on until Kabul is surrounded, which the U.S. will deny right up until the moment the last diplomats and military advisers are airlifted away.

Friday, March 24, 2017

Big Win for Taliban in Helmand: Sangin Falls Despite U.S. Air Power

I worked briefly at a plastics factory with a tough German guy, an alcoholic, a wanderer, who also apparently was a Buddhist. After I left the plastics factory I ran into him at the old downtown library. He asked me if I could help him type up a cover letter (this was in the mid-'90s before the Internet explosion). When we parted he shared with me some Buddhist wisdom, something to the effect that you can only think of one thing at a time.

I always think of this is in relation to how the media works. We basically can only think of one thing at a time, and that one thing for what is approaching now quite a bit of time, is Trump.

(If you dip in today to get your Trump fix be sure to read David Brooks' "The Trump Elite. Like the Old Elite, but Worse!" Brooks is a man on fire lately. He has been unchained from his role as house conservative and he is writing column after incendiary column absolutely burning Trump and the GOP to the ground. Of the Gray Lady's regular columnists, I pretty much only read Brooks now. The others are too tainted by Democratic Party Russophobia.)

Trump dominates the news cycle every cycle. Areas that the prestige press were reluctant to cover prior to Trump, like Yemen and Libya, have almost disappeared entirely; those that received regular attention, like Afghanistan, have receded into the shadows.

A must-read story is yesterday's dispatch from Taimoor Shah and Rod Nordland, "Taliban Take an Afghan District, Sangin, That Many Marines Died to Keep." This is big news, frontpage news, not page 6, where it is located in the national edition.

The Taliban have been fighting constantly for eight years to take Sangin, a critical district in Helmand Province that connects to Kandahar Province. The Taliban bloodied the British Army and Royal Marines, and then when the U.S. Marines were rotated in, they bloodied them. When the Brits and Yanks departed the Afghan casualty figures were so high that government officials did not release them.
The Taliban had long dominated most territory in Sangin except for the district center, which was home to the government and police headquarters as well as the army base. According to Mr. Shakir, the insurgents now hold seven of Helmand Province’s 14 districts; in five of the others, he said, the government holds only the district centers. Only two districts and the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah, are completely under government control, he said.
The U.S. is trying to spin this as something other than a retreat, but that's what it is. They couldn't hold the district center even with air power.

Tuesday, December 15, 2015

The Afghanistan Formula for Perpetual War

With all that has been happening in the news -- COP21 in Paris; Trump demagoguery with the Iowa caucus less than two months away; a widening international war in Iraq and Syria; terror attacks here, there and everywhere -- it is easy to lose track of Afghanistan.

But we shouldn't because the Greater Middle East is being "Talibanized." I don't mean by this to say that Mullah Mansour is exporting his fighters to other countries. What I mean is that the model par excellence of state powers using their intelligence agencies to aid various Salafi groups in order to pursue geopolitical objectives, blow back be damned, is Afghanistan. Back at the beginning of the current bankrupt neoliberal/neoconservative paradigm was the U.S./Saudi effort to dislodge the Soviet-backed Afghan leader Babrak Karmal. Thirty-five years, a couple of invasions of Iraq and one Global War on Terror later we now have a world war, not to mention a caliphate, in Syria and Iraq.

Meanwhile the Western quisling in Afghanistan, the Ralph Nader of Kabul, Ashraf Ghani continues to face mounting losses -- in territory, among his security forces and in any hope that his government has a future.

Yesterday's story by David Jolly and Taimoor Shah, "Afghan Province, Teetering to the Taliban, Draws In Extra U.S. Forces," outlines once again how U.S. Special Operations troops and air power are being rushed into theater to keep the Taliban from controlling a province. In October it was the northern Kunduz Province; now it is Helmand in the south:
KABUL, Afghanistan — Alarmed that large stretches of Helmand Province are falling to the Taliban, American Special Operations forces have secretly taken a more central role in the fighting to save crucial areas of the province, as more air power and ground troops have been committed to the battle, according to Western and Afghan officials.
A Western diplomat said last week that United States Special Operations forces had been engaged in combat in Helmand for weeks, and that there were more American forces fighting there than at any time since President Obama last year announced a formal end to combat operations in Afghanistan.
The extent of the American role has been kept largely secret, with senior Afghan officials in the area saying they are under orders not to divulge the level of cooperation, especially by Special Operations forces on the ground. The secrecy reflects the Pentagon’s concern that the involvement may suggest that the American combat role, which was supposed to have ended in December 2014, is still far beyond the official “train, advise and assist” mission.
The elite ground units in Helmand include both Special Operations troops and the United States Air Force’s Special Tactics Squadron, according to the Western diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid angering his colleagues.
The American intervention in Helmand is accelerating amid growing reports of demoralized or trapped Afghan security forces and alarm at the amount of territory the Taliban have been able to seize in Helmand this year. If the insurgents are able to sweep away the tenuous government presence in district centers and the capital, Lashkar Gah, it would be a dire setback for the Afghan government, and would give the Taliban a strong foothold in southern Afghanistan.
Asked whether American forces were taking a larger combat role in Helmand, a United States military spokesman, Col. Michael T. Lawhorn, would not reply directly. But he praised the Afghan forces’ efforts so far.
“There’s little question that Helmand is a contested area,” Colonel Lawhorn said. “But the Afghan National Security Forces have conducted no fewer than five major operations there to disrupt insurgent and Taliban activities.” 
Afghan officials in Helmand, however, gave more dire assessments about the state of the battle. 
“The security situation is really bad,” said Toofan Waziri, a Helmand politician and prominent television commentator. Without more foreign air support, he added, “the entire province would probably fall to the Taliban in three days.”
Helmand is important because it is prime poppy growing country. It was also the location of the ballyhooed Stanley McChrystal-Obama COIN troop surge, now broadly acknowledged to be a terrific failure. Parts of Helmand in the north have never been out of the Taliban's control.

The Ghani government is in dire straits. There is no doubt about it. That is why Ghani went hat in hand last week to Pakistan looking for some kind of peace deal, even while the strip adjoining U.S. air base in Kandahar was being shot up and burned to the ground by Taliban. The story to consult is last Friday's "Afghanistan and Pakistan Agree to Reopen Talks With an Absent Taliban" by Mujib Mashal and Rod Nordland. The last two paragraphs sum it up:
While many in Kandahar criticized Mr. Ghani for reaching out to Pakistan, others were sympathetic, saying he had no choice but to keep pushing for talks.

“This is a scattered, spread war in Afghanistan which also involves several countries,” said Abdul Jabar Qahraman, a member of Parliament. “The Afghan government has no other way but to engage them. The Taliban are also a fractured movement. One of them launched an attack on Kandahar, but it is possible that another faction wants to talk.”
Sounds like Syria and Iraq, doesn't it? It is the formula for perpetual war. A conclusion which is unavoidable is that this is a state of affairs that the U.S., with by far the largest military, favors.

Wednesday, October 14, 2015

Obama to Rescind U.S. Troop Pullout from Afghanistan: Perpetual War the Preferred Option of the Power Elite

A good story by Matthew Rosenberg, "Obama Is Rethinking Pullout in Afghanistan, Officials Say," which directly confirms Putin's observation about U.S. military planners having mush for brains, appears in today's paper. Obama, having announced at the end of last year the wholly fictitious end of U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, is set to rescind the deadline of year-end 2016 for a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops:
But at the very least, those pushing for an expanded mission after 2017 would like to see the United States and its NATO allies maintain at least two or three bases from which drones could be flown and Special Operations Forces could readily strike at militants. The Central Intelligence Agency also wants a larger presence to help protect its assets in Afghanistan.
For now, the option that is being most seriously considered is a proposal made this past summer by Gen. Martin Dempsey, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to keep 3,000 to 5,000 troops for the counterterrorism mission.
The officials said that the Pentagon had also presented other options that range from just an embassy force of about 1,000, which mainly protects American diplomats in Kabul, to maintaining the current force of roughly 9,800, which would also allow American forces to continue training and advising the Afghans.
***
Still, Mr. Obama and some of his closest advisers remain skeptical of the military’s ability to continue training and advising Afghan forces, other officials said. Building the Afghan Army and police was the main imperative of American-led coalition for much of the past five years, and it has cost the United States more than $65 billion since the war’s outset. Yet even with roughly 17,000 NATO troops still on the ground — including the 9,800 Americans — the Taliban still managed last month to take Kunduz, seizing a city for the first time since 2001.
Afghan forces struggled to retake Kunduz, despite American airstrikes clearing a path and American Special Operations forces at times joining the fight. The city appeared to be back in government hands on Tuesday for the first time in more than two weeks after the Taliban said they were pulling out in order to avoid, as they said in a statement, the “unnecessary waste of ammunition.”
The battle for Kunduz also laid bare the risks posed by air power when, on Oct. 3, an American strike was called in by Afghan troops. The air attack hit a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders, killing 22 patients and medical staff — and no insurgents.
The president is determined to avoid a repeat of the strike on the hospital, for which he personally apologized, and wants any mission after next year to be as narrow as possible, officials said.
Seemingly the entire U.S. national security establishment is circling the wagons around a robust military presence to train and assist the Afghan Armed Forces regardless of the price tag.
Beyond the military, though, a powerful cross-section of the American foreign policy and national security establishment is also pushing for as broad a military commitment in Afghanistan as possible. The latest salvo is a paper to be released on Wednesday by the Atlantic Council, a think tank, which bluntly declares: “U.S. and NATO force levels and presence around the country, as well as intelligence assets, should be maintained at or close to present levels.”
The main argument of the paper, which was written by James B. Cunningham, a former ambassador to Afghanistan, centers on the need to continue helping Afghan forces, and to give the next American administration as much flexibility as possible.
But the most striking element of the paper, which was provided to The New York Times ahead of its release, is the list of more than 20 former senior officials, Democrats and Republicans alike, who have signed on to it. The list includes Madeleine Albright, the former secretary of state who served under President Clinton; Stephen Hadley, who was national security adviser to President George W. Bush; two former defense secretaries,Chuck Hagel and Leon Panetta (who also ran the Central Intelligence Agency); and four former American ambassadors to Afghanistan. The paper’s two sponsors are Senators John McCain, Republican of Arizona, and Jack Reed, Democrat of Rhode Island.
After 14 years of war in Afghanistan, the list of American officials who have worked with the Afghans is long. And many have in the past year stepped forward to urge Mr. Obama to keep American troops in Afghanistan; in March, when President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan was in Washington, a group of 23 former ambassadors and senior officials made their point in an open letter to the president.
“Those of us who worked with the Afghans over the last decade or more feel that we’ve established a relationship that is of some enduring value,” said James Dobbins, the Obama administration’s former special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and one of the signatories to the Atlantic Council paper.
He argued that Afghanistan may be the most democratic country in the Muslim world today, and that its government was unambiguously the most pro-American. But without American troops, he said, Afghanistan’s future is grim.ontinue reading the main story
“I can’t promise you that retaining a commitment at the current level will ultimately yield a completely peaceful settled and stable Afghanistan,” he said.
But leaving behind too few troop was lead to “an Afghanistan in complete turmoil.”
“You like Syria?” he said. “How would you like to have another one?”
Of course the United States helped create the chaos in Syria. No acknowledgement of that. Nor is there acknowledgement of the gist of a story by Rod Nordland and Joseph Goldstein, "Afghan Taliban’s Reach Is Widest Since 2001, U.N. Says," from a few days back:
The data, compiled in early September — even before the latest surge in violence in northern Afghanistan — showed that United Nations security officials had already rated the threat level in about half of the country’s administrative districts as either “high” or “extreme,” more than at any time since the American invasion ousted the Taliban in 2001.
That assessment, which has not been publicly released but is routinely shared by the United Nations with countries in the international coalition, appears at odds with the assessment of its American commander, Gen. John F. Campbell, in his testimony to Congress last week.
“The Afghan security forces have displayed courage and resilience,” General Campbell testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday. “They’re still holding. The Afghan government retains control of Kabul, of Highway One, its provincial capitals and nearly all of the district centers.”
Afghan officials in many districts currently under attack by the Taliban depict a significantly different situation. Even Highway One, a ring road connecting all of Afghanistan’s main cities, has long suffered repeated Taliban ambushes and roadblocks in southern Afghanistan; over the past two weeks the insurgents repeatedly cut the highway in the Doshi and Baghlani Jadid districts of Baghlan Province — long an uncontested government stronghold. Few government officials now use the highway along much of its route.
In many districts that are nominally under government control, like Musa Qala in Helmand Province and Charchino in Oruzgan Province, government forces hold only the government buildings in the district center and are under constant siege by the insurgents.
“We do not have any way to escape,” said Wali Dad, the police chief in Charchino, where 400 police officers have been surrounded and pinned down for months. “If we get any means of escaping, I will not stay for a second in the district. The government is failing in their governing, and it’s better to let the Taliban rule.”
General Campbell testified that the Afghan security forces had “reversed almost all of the Taliban gains in northern Helmand after a considerable effort.” He also said they had retaken Musa Qala and held on to other districts, like Sangin and Kajaki, that had been threatened in that area.
On Saturday, however, officials in Musa Qala said the government held only the district government compound, with no freedom of movement outside it because of Taliban threats. 
“Only the government can enter the district center, and there are no government activities outside the district center,” said Haji Mohammad Sharif, the district governor. 
The United Nations data suggests that the tempo of the insurgency has increased in many parts of the country where there had been little Taliban presence in the past, including some areas in the north with scant Pashtun populations. The Taliban have been a largely Pashtun-based insurgency and have been historically strongest in Pashtun-majority areas in southern and eastern Afghanistan, with some pockets in the north, such as Kunduz. 
"We have had fighting in 13 provinces of Afghanistan over the past six months, simultaneously,” President Ashraf Ghani said this month in response to criticism after the fall of Kunduz.
It is a compendium of failure that begs for a policy reversal. Since Obama has already gone the surge route, the logical next step would be to sit down to the bargaining table and hammer out a transition. But we know that won't happen, not only because of the national security elite singing in one voice calling for an indefinite commitment, but also because of the (re)appearance of specific propaganda favorites.

For instance, the old chestnut by Alissa Rubin, "Taliban Waged a Calculated Campaign Against Women in Kunduz"; as if the United States cared anything about the rights of women. This is the same U.S. military that condones sexual slavery as practiced by its mercenary Afghan militia allies.

Another propaganda favorite justifying indefinite, unilateral U.S. military force projection is the image of ISIS on the march, gobbling up and despoiling turf. Mujib Mashal delivers such a report with "Afghan ISIS Branch Makes Inroads in Battle Against Taliban."

The failed occupation will continue. More districts will fall to Taliban. The U.S. and its Afghan puppet government will maintain a cosmetic presence in the district centers. Gradually Kabul will be encircled. But the U.S. elites will have their drones bases and possibly an expanded CIA program for mayhem and murder. The Carter Doctrine can be maintained, I suppose the Beltway thinking goes, as long as you have a sharp stick to stir up the hornet nest.

There is also a pacifying spillover in the homeland. Ever since 9/11 we sing "God Bless America" during the seventh-inning stretch. Back then, we invaded Afghanistan instead of uprooting Al Qaeda's backers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Now, almost 15-years later, we're still in Afghanistan, still losing hearts and minds, and the Saudis have expanded their jihadist terrorism, aided by the CIA, cracking apart the Sykes-Picot Middle East. The U.S. homeland is more militarized than at any time since the Vietnam War.

Then it took Congress to defund the Vietnam War to shut it down. The same thing is going to have to happen now in Afghanistan. The problem is that we are far less democratic a nation than we were 40 years ago. Congress is completely captive to wealth. Both political parties have nothing to do with the interests of ordinary voters. It is going to take a collapse of the system, a crackup, a revolution to get us back on the right path.

Wednesday, October 7, 2015

Taliban Northern Offensive Mortally Wounds Ghani Government

All the happy talk emanating from the U.S. military and the Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani that the Taliban have given up on Kunduz City and are drifting into the bush is debunked by an excellent story, "Taliban Gain Advantage in Tug of War in Kunduz," written by Rod Nordland and Najim Rahim. The entire piece should be read, but the last three paragraphs speak directly to the dire situation the Afghan government finds itself in Kunduz:
A senior Afghan military officer blamed a lack of American airstrikes over the past two days for the Taliban advance on Tuesday, in the wake of the American airstrike that destroyed the Doctors Without Borders hospital in Kunduz on Saturday and killed 22 people, mostly hospital staff and patients. 
“The U.S. airstrikes are halted since yesterday evening,” said the officer, who confirmed that the city remains divided between the insurgents and government forces, with some fighting on Tuesday even in the Sare Dawra neighborhood, close to the airport, where the Afghan Army and American Special Operations troops have headquarters. “Until the airstrikes resume, it will be hard to have any progress in the fighting against the Taliban,” he said. 
The senior officer also blamed a lack of coordination among Afghan units. “There are 10 generals from different organs, and they aren’t under the command of one person who should lead the fighting,” the officer said. “This way, it is unlikely for the Afghan security forces to achieve anything so quickly. The fighting might last for months and Kunduz city may not be retaken.”
Residents are streaming out the city, voting with their feet in a display of distrust for the Afghan military and its NATO allies. What makes this all very Tet like is that it is not just Kunduz under siege; it several northern provinces. According to Alissa Rubin reporting yesterday in "Afghan Forces Report Progress in Kunduz as Taliban Press Other Fronts":
With much of the attention still on Kunduz, where fighting continued Monday and where a devastating American airstrike on Saturday deprived the city’s residents of its most important hospital, new fighting was reported near the provincial capital in Faryab, in northwestern Afghanistan. It was the third northern hub to come under Taliban attack in recent days.
The onslaught on the Faryab provincial capital, Maimana, was barely repelled by the Afghan security forces, said the acting governor, Abdul Sattar Barez. He estimated that some 2,000 Taliban fighters had been involved, but that number seemed high, given that the Taliban managed to take Kunduz City last week with an estimated 300 to 400 fighters.
Regardless, the attacking force was said to include insurgent fighters from four nearby provinces as well as from Faryab: Sari Pul, Jawzjan, Badghis and Ghor. The fighting went on for nearly 10 hours as Taliban attacked the city from three directions, Mr. Barez said. He credited the combination of a united Afghan force backed up by Maimana locals as well as air support from the American-led coalition for repelling the attack.
“The reason we managed to push them back was thanks to the Afghan National Security Forces and the people of Faryab who stood against them and stopped them from achieving their ominous goal,” he said. 
“Thanks, too, to NATO for their air support,” he said, referring to the international coalition, adding: “Their jets flew all night in the skies, which demoralized the enemy. If it wasn’t for the NATO air support, we would not have made it.”
Without U.S. air power the Ghani government's days would be significantly limited, as the reported recapture of Kunduz City by the Taliban proves.

The United States Forces in Afghanistan must be trying to work out the protocols for future airstrikes since General John F. Campbell is granting that the rules were broken in the obliteration of the Doctors Without Borders hospital. How an AC-130 gunship can loiter for over 30 minutes blasting to smithereens the only hospital in the region defies understanding, particularly when Doctors Without Borders says it provided GPS coordinates to both the Taliban and the Afghan/U.S. forces, and then alerted the military of its mistake while the attack was in progress.This is a snafu in the same category of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO air war against Yugoslavia. Doctors Without Borders is not going to let this drop quietly; it is calling for an independent investigation under the Geneva Conventions. This is a big, powerful multinational NGO that usually works within the Western imperial system. The attack on the hospital is a war crime if ever there was one.

Before signing off, it is worth one's time to read the lengthy story on Mullah Mansour (Joseph Golstein, "Taliban’s New Leader Strengthens His Hold With Intrigue and Battlefield Victory"), the newly minted leader of the Afghan Taliban riding high now with the success of his northern offensive. What Goldstein's piece brings home, even though it is too reliant on anonymous sources from Afghan intelligence, is the extent to which Mullah Mansour, and hence the Afghan Taliban, is a creature of Pakistan's national security apparatus:
As acting leader of the Taliban over the past few years, he closely kept the secret that Mullah Omar had been dead since 2013. And he wielded that edge powerfully, issuing orders in Mullah Omar’s name, moving against rival Taliban commanders and steadily consolidating power, according to Afghan and Taliban officials. 
He has also benefited from a powerful alliance with the Pakistani military spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, the original sponsor of the Afghan Taliban insurgency. That relationship, along with a hefty dose of cash payouts to fellow commanders, was a crucial factor in his ability to manage the succession crisis this summer after news of Mullah Omar’s death finally got out, Taliban and Afghan officials said. 
Pakistan’s role in Mullah Mansour’s rise and rule has offered a bit of hope to Afghan and Western officials that Pakistani officials might be persuaded to force the Taliban to accept a peace deal. 
But it has also sometimes been a political liability for Mullah Mansour, embittering some Taliban figures who resent Pakistan’s influence on the leadership and who are not likely to forgive his deception about Mullah Omar’s death. Some alienated commanders have sought a new direction with the Islamic State offshoot that is growing in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Mullah Mansour’s biggest mystery to Western and Afghan officials is wrapped up in the question of how he will try to shape Afghanistan’s future now that he has consolidated power: Will he attempt to return the Taliban to power as conquerors, or will he try to turn military victories into a strong hand in peace talks? 
His own words and actions would seem to support either path.
Right now there is no mystery at all. War is working for the Taliban. The Ghani government, already inherently weak, is now mortally wounded.

Monday, August 3, 2015

Succession Rifts in Both Taliban and U.S. Democratic Party

At the same time that the Democratic Party appears to be fraying so too does the Afghan Taliban. Joe Biden, likely to fulfill the wish of his dead son Beau, is considering a challenge to Hillary Clinton. On Friday, the Taliban announced that Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour had been appointed to succeed Mullah Muhammad Omar, whose death in Karachi during the spring of 2013 was revealed last week.

The Haqqanis appear to be kingmakers here, throwing their support to Mullah Mansour after initially flirting with Omar's son Mullah Yaqoub. Taimoor Shah and Rod Nordland report in a story, "Taliban Pick New Chief and 2 Hard-Line Deputies," that appeared in Saturday's paper:
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — The Taliban leadership announced on Friday that the group’s longtime deputy, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, had been appointed its new supreme leader, and that his two deputies were drawn from its hard-line Haqqani wing, according to messages posted on a website associated with the group. 
The move greatly elevated the standing of the Haqqani network, which unlike the Taliban’s main command is listed by the United States as a terrorist organization. That may also complicate efforts to resume peace talks, which were suspended after confirmation of the death of the Taliban’s former leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar. 
It also threatened a serious split within the Taliban, with Mullah Omar’s son, Mullah Yaqoub, at one point walking out of a meeting called to debate the appointment of Mullah Mansour as leader, according to Taliban officials with knowledge of the process. Mullah Yaqoub, who had sought the leadership himself, later publicly criticized the choice.
Taliban officials with knowledge of the deliberations by the group’s leadership council described several dramatic days of talks this week over choosing a successor, as it became clear to the insurgents that they would no longer be able to keep up the fiction that Mullah Omar was still alive. Notably, the decision was not delayed for deliberation by a larger council of Taliban members, which may hurt its legitimacy in the eyes of some.
Initially, the powerful Haqqani networkfaction was said to be supporting Mullah Yaqoub, as was Mullah Abdul Qayuum Zakir, the Taliban’s top military leader. The talks took on urgency as Afghan government officials announced on Wednesday thatMullah Omar died two years ago in a hospital in Pakistan. A day later the Taliban confirmed that he was dead, although without acknowledging when he died. 
If the new Taliban leadership remains in control, it will pose a dilemma for American policy makers, who have painstakingly tried to draw a sharp distinction between the mainstream Taliban, who were once in government, and the Haqqani faction. 
Now there would be little to distinguish the Taliban factions, with two powerful Haqqani figures sharing senior roles and the new leader, Mullah Mansour, apparently indebted to them for his position.
The new leadership would also be likely to solidify the Pakistani military’s strong influence over the Taliban’s central command, as the Haqqanis have long enjoyed patronage and protection in Pakistan, and Mullah Mansour is also seen as being close to the Pakistani military and intelligence.
The formal announcement of the decision by the leadership council of the Quetta Shura, the Taliban’s governing body, was posted on the Taliban website, Shahamat, in English, Pashto and Dari on Friday. The announcement also said that the Taliban’s two “deputy heads” would be Maulavi Haibatullah Akhunzada, the Taliban’s former judiciary chief and a Haqqani network member, and Mullah Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani network and the son of its founder, Jalaluddin Haqqani.
In an odd coincidence — if that’s what it was — reports began filtering out on Friday that Jalaluddin Haqqani, who was in his 70s and had long been ill, might have also died in secrecy last year. Reached for comment, a member of the Haqqani network in Pakistan said that Mr. Haqqani had died in December, but the report could not be more widely confirmed.
That story, that Jalaluddin Haqqani is also dead, is now being denied. The AP reports in "Internal Dispute Over Taliban Succession Hints at Rifts" that
As the leadership crisis deepened, the Taliban released a statement from one of its most notorious commanders pledging loyalty to Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, who was chosen to lead after the death of the Taliban's reclusive, one-eyed founder was announced last week. 
The statement quoted Jalaluddin Haqqani, the head of the Haqqani Network, a Pakistan-based outfit blamed for scores of complex attacks on U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, as calling for unity. The Taliban denied recent rumors that Haqqani, like Mullah Omar, had died in secret. Haqqani's son Sirajuddin was named Mullah Mansoor's deputy after his promotion.
Also, Friday's complaints from Omar's kin about the anointing of Mullah Mansour have not subsided:
Mullah Omar's brother on Sunday joined a growing challenge to Mullah Mansoor's leadership, telling The Associated Press he had been "selected" by a small clique of his own supporters. 
Mullah Abdul Manan's comments came after Mullah Omar's son, Yacoub, also said the new leader did not have the support of the wider Taliban.
"There should be a (grand council), so everyone has a chance to choose their own leader. I do not accept this selection of Mullah Akhtar Mansoor because only a few chose him," Mullah Abdul Manan said. 
If Mullah Mansoor fails to hold the movement together, the ultimate beneficiary could be the Islamic State group, which has established a small but growing presence in Afghanistan over the past year, in part by recruiting disillusioned Taliban fighters.
An internal split could also jeopardize peace talks which began last month but were indefinitely postponed after the announcement of Mullah Omar's death. Mullah Mansoor is widely seen as having pushed the Taliban into the negotiations at Pakistan's bidding.
One more comment needs to be made here before moving back to Biden's POTUS bid. All the coverage from Friday, since the death of Mullah Omar has been confirmed, has reiterated the extent to which the Afghan Taliban, at least the Quetta Shura, is a creature of Pakistan; in particular, the ISI. One gets the sense that the Quetta Shura is no different from Osama bin Laden kept under lock and key in Abbottabad. The account of Jalaluddin Haqqani by Matthew Rosenberg and Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, "Founder of Haqqani Network Is Long Dead, Aide Says," emphasizes the strong role played by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia:
Mr. Haqqani rose to prominence with the American-backed mujahedeen rebels who fought the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan. He later allied himself with the Taliban when they took power in the 1990s. 
Mr. Haqqani moved most of his family to Waziristan, one of the northwestern tribal regions in Pakistan, in the mid-1970s, and fully based himself and his organization there after the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. In the years that followed, Mr. Haqqani is said to have stepped back from active leadership, ceding control of the militant network to his son Sirajuddin Haqqani, who this week was appointed as one of the Taliban’s deputy leaders. 
As his health grew worse, Mr. Haqqani reached out to his old benefactors, the Saudis, to help him travel for treatment. Saudi diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks said that Nasiruddin Haqqani, one of Mr. Haqqani’s sons, met with the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan in February 2012 to inform him that the elder Haqqani was in ill health and to request that he be treated at a hospital in Saudi Arabia. 
The cables indicate that the elder Haqqani carried a Saudi passport “that had been issued during the Afghani jihad” and that the request for treatment was forwarded to King Abdullah with a favorable note from the Foreign Ministry. The documents did not say whether Mr. Haqqani ever made the trip. 
The senior Haqqani network member said that Mr. Haqqani died in December 2014 and that he and other members attended the funeral prayers for him.
U.S. troops are dying at the hands of U.S. allies. While our erstwhile enemies -- Iran, Hezbollah, Russia -- are actually on our side. This is the American way of war now.

As for the rumored Joe Biden run, clearly what we have here is a case of Bobby Kennedy jumping into the '68 race after Eugene McCarthy proved that LBJ was beatable by coming within 7 points of the incumbent in the New Hampshire primary. Bernie Sanders is playing the McCarthy role; Hillary, LBJ. What makes it worse for Hillary is that all this is taking place more than half a year before New Hampshire. So manifestly weak is Clinton, so torpid and conflicted, that the aged Biden is ready to make the leap now.

I think it is a wise move for Biden. He will draw support from both the Clinton and Sanders camps. Sanders will fade, retaining only his hard-shell supporters. The "Anybody But Hillary" crowd will gravitate to Biden. Hillary will continue to bleed out. It doesn't mean that she can't still finish the primary season on top; it just that, like the Taliban succession, it promises to get very messy before things sort themselves out.

Wednesday, July 1, 2015

U.S. Project in Afghanistan Looking Very Wobbly

Two stories emanating from Afghanistan in the last two days -- "Afghans Protest After U.S. Forces Carry Out Raid on Strongman" by Mujib Mashal; and "In Afghanistan, Suicide Blast and Angry Crowd Target American Soldiers" by Joseph Goldstein and Ahmad Shakib -- highlight the duplicity of the Obama administration's public declaration that U.S. combat operations have ceased in that country.

The first story describes a raid by U.S. military on a local militia (non-Taliban) leader in Parwan Province, home to the U.S. mega-base Bagram Airfield, to destroy a weapons depot. The raid sparked a significant protest:
KABUL, Afghanistan — Protesters in the northern Afghan province of Parwan blocked the main highway there on Monday after American forces raided the village of a local strongman and blew up a weapons depot belonging to him, officials and residents said. 
The raid on Monday morning demonstrated that American troops in Afghanistan, months after President Obama declared their regular combat mission over, are engaged beyond their publicly stated role of advising the Afghan forces and carrying out targeted counterterrorism operations. 
It also highlighted how, despite a lengthy campaign to disarm illegal militias, costing hundreds of millions of dollars, armed groups that have no apparent ties to Al Qaeda or even the Taliban are still considered by American forces to be a significant threat.
The target of Monday’s raid was Jan Ahmad, a local commander who fought the Soviets and then the Taliban. Hours after the raid, shops in Charikar, the capital of Parwan Province, just north of Kabul, remained closed as Mr. Ahmad’s supporters shouted, “Death to America” and “Death to the enemies of Islam.” They expressed outrage at the manner of the raid, saying it was a matter that the Afghan authorities, not foreign forces, should have handled.
“The protesters burned a lot of tires to show their rage,” said Mahmood Hamidy, 20, who runs a private school in Charikar, “and that, if the issue is not taken seriously, they are ready for violence.”
While the American military described the raid as force protection, former commanders and local elders in the north leveled accusations that the raid had been politically motivated and possibly a settling of scores from last year’s election crisis.
Mr. Ahmad has supported Abdullah Abdullah, who was President Ashraf Ghani’s rival in the bitterly contested presidential runoff. At the height of the crisis, Mr. Ahmad was among a group of commanders who threatened to use force to support a breakaway government led by Mr. Abdullah.
Echoing his calls for restraint during the election crisis, Mr. Abdullah, who is now the chief executive in a power-sharing government with Mr. Ghani, called on the protesters Monday to remain calm as he appointed a fact-finding mission and asked Gen. John F. Campbell, the commander of United States forces in Afghanistan, to provide further information on the raid.
The gist of the story is particularly troubling for the U.S.-backed Ghani-Adbullah government. Militias are stockpiling weapons and gearing up for battle in anticipation of a coming collapse of authority in Kabul, and Ghani is using American troops to beat them down.

The second story, filed yesterday by Goldstein and Shakib, describes a suicide attack on a U.S. military convoy moving through Kabul that ended up in an anti-American protest after it appears troops fired on people trying to come to the assistance of those injured by the blast:
KABUL, Afghanistan — A convoy of American troops survived a huge suicide bomb attack in Kabul on Tuesday afternoon, only to find themselves struggling against a gathering crowd of Afghans who were trying to tend to civilians wounded in the bombing. 
The confusing scene left one American soldier wounded, possibly by a knife, as Afghans shouted, “Death to Americans,” and accused the soldiers of opening fire on them in the frightening seconds after the suicide attack, witnesses said.
The episode hinted at a lingering wellspring of anger against American troops even as the United States’ military presence in Afghanistan is receding. Convoys of heavily armored troop carriers are still spotted routinely in Kabul making shuttle runs between bases and embassies and the airport.
Around 1:30 p.m. on Tuesday, in the hot midday hours, a suicide attacker detonated a car bomb amid one such convoy, on Airport Road. The blast did not kill or seriously injure any of the soldiers, but it wounded at least 22 Afghans, including passing motorists and roadside shopkeepers, and killed at least one, officials said.
What happened next is still being pieced together. But at some point, a member of the crowd attacked and most likely stabbed an American soldier who had exited one of the vehicles to form a cordon, witnesses said. A soldier opened fire, although it was unclear whether the shots came before or after the crowd member’s attack. Some witnesses said the American soldiers, along with Afghan security officials who were nearby, had fired only warning shots.
These stories follow a week where there was a suicide attack on the Parliament in Kabul while Afghan lawmakers were trying to confirm a defense minister. The ministry has gone leaderless since the extra-legal Ghani-Abdullah coalition government assumed power from Hamid Karzai last September. Parliament's term has expired; it is in session based on presidential fiat. The Taliban is taking territory in the north.

Joseph Goldstein and Rod Nordland reported last week in "Taliban Strike Afghan Parliament as Lawmakers Meet" that things are dire for the U.S. project in Afghanistan:
KABUL, Afghanistan — The Taliban attacked the Afghan Parliament on Monday [June 22] just as lawmakers were convening for their third attempt to confirm a defense minister, while in northern Afghanistan a second district fell to Taliban insurgents. 
At least two bystanders died in the attack on Parliament and more than two dozen were injured, but government officials said that all members of Parliament had been taken to safety with at most only minor injuries. 
The seizure of the Archi district, which was confirmed by an Afghan Local Police commander, deepened concern that an attack on neighboring Kunduz, the capital of Kunduz Province, was imminent. Archi was the second neighboring district to fall in two days. On Sunday, the Ministry of Defense and other officials confirmed Taliban claims that the Chahar Dara district had fallen to the insurgents that morning.
The Parliament attack was an embarrassment to the government, apparently timed to coincide with the appearance of the acting defense minister, Masoom Stanekzai, in an effort to win confirmation. The attack was initiated just as Mr. Stanekzai and the country’s second vice president, Sarwar Danish, arrived at the hall in southwestern Kabul.
The country has been without a confirmed defense minister for nearly 10 months, since the coalition government of President Ashraf Ghani was inaugurated in September. Mr. Stanekzai was Mr. Ghani’s third choice for the post; his other candidates were rejected by Parliament.
The term of the Afghan Parliament expired Sunday, with no arrangements yet agreed upon between Mr. Ghani and his coalition partners for new elections. Mr. Ghani extended its term in office until new elections are held, although it is unclear whether such a move was constitutional.
As the Ghani-Abdullah government wobbles, the Taliban is softening its image, reaching out to women ("Taliban Are Talking Peace, Though Not With Afghan Government" by Mujib Mashal). One wonders how close the Kabul-based U.S.-dependent government of the former Johns Hopkins professor is to experiencing its own helicopter-on-the-U.S.-embassy-in-Saigon moment.

Tuesday, May 5, 2015

Taliban-Afghan Pugwash Conference a Success

Call me naive, but I think the Pugwash Conference held at a beach resort in Doha, Qatar the last couple of days featuring informal talks between representatives of the Afghan Taliban and the government of Ashraf Ghani was a big success. Tentative, non-binding "common points" were reached on several topics that have proved to be stumbling blocks in the past. Both sides agreed that 1) the current Afghan constitution is not sacrosanct; 2) the Taliban can open and operate a political office in Qatar, something which sent Hamid Karzai through the roof in 2013; and 3) interference by neighboring foreign states and Daesh (ISIS) is not welcome.

Here is the complete list of "common points" as published by the Pugwash Conference:
1. There was a general appreciation of the positive value of the meeting, and a widely shared sense of gratitude towards the State of Qatar for the hospitality and the assistance given to the participants in the meeting. 
2. The idea of bringing about peace in Afghanistan and ending the conflict was wholeheartedly supported by all the participants. 
3. The civilian casualties of the Afghan conflict have been lamented by everybody, even though differences may exist on who bears the main responsibility of these casualties. Protection of civilians is, as it should be, a priority for everybody. 
4. The role of foreign forces that are or have been present in Afghanistan were evaluated in different ways (also in relation to the civilian casualties mentioned above). Everybody agreed that foreign forces have to leave Afghanistan soon. Some expressed concern that there should be an agreement among Afghan political forces before the departure of the foreign forces. 
5. Any political discrimination against any Afghan political party or group would be an obstacle to the peace process. In particular, the delisting of black-listed Taliban would facilitate the peace process. Political prisoners should be released. 
6. Corruption and the production/selling of drugs are among the most serious problems of Afghanistan. 
7. The value of education for both men and women was underlined by everybody. Economic development in Afghanistan will heavily depend on peace. 
8. The structure of the political system (and the constitution of Afghanistan) should be discussed in detail, and, while different opinions may arise in this respect, there is a general agreement that no party should have a monopoly on power. 
9.  In any case, the government of Afghanistan will be an Islamic one. This does not mean that minorities of any sort should be discriminated against. [Pamela Geller will love this one.]
10. The model of the so-called Islamic State (Daesh) is alien to the tradition and the desires of the Afghan people. This point was agreed upon by everybody. 
11.The relation with neighboring countries should be kept amicable, and cooperation with such countries should be strengthened. This does not mean that neighboring countries are welcome to interfere with Afghan internal affairs. 
12. The meeting of 2-3 May 2015 should be followed up by other meetings in order that the peace process be sustained. It is vital that communication among different Afghan parties and groups be kept alive, even at an unofficial level. In general, the peace process should be speeded up! Some would welcome the possibility of talks between the Taliban and the Government. 
13. The Taliban in Doha played an important role in the organization of this meeting. The Taliban’s office should be opened to facilitate meetings and talks. 
14. Qatar, UN and non-governmental international organizations such as Pugwash should hopefully continue to support the Afghan peace process. 
15. The public interest and the well-being of the Afghan people will be at the center of the attention of the participants in this meeting and in the forthcoming ones.
Interestingly, Rod Nordland, back in Kabul after assignment in Iraq, chooses to accentuate point #4 in "Some Progress Is Reported in Informal Afghan-Taliban Talks" as a tentative retraction of the Taliban demand that formal peace negotiations cannot begin until all occupying military forces withdraw from Afghanistan: "The Taliban signaled that they might be willing to drop their demand that all foreign troops, such as the residual American and NATO force of 13,000 trainers and counterterrorism troops, would have to be withdrawn before peace talks could take place."

Nordland cited the Taliban's post-conference statement as proof for his interpretation of point #4: "In a separate statement, the Taliban denounced the American role in the country and demanded a withdrawal, but did not appear to make that a precondition for peace talks, as they often have in the past."

But point #4, as is, says nothing about the Taliban dropping their demand on the removal of all foreign troops as a condition for the start of a formal peace process.

What Nordland's story makes clear, and one that he wrote which appeared in yesterday's paper ("Afghan and Taliban Representatives Meet in Qatar"), is that the Pugwash Conference in Doha was successful to the extent that it cut out Pakistan. This from today's story:
“Peace cannot be achieved just in talks and slogans,” the Taliban statement, posted on the group’s website, read. “There is a need for determination and good intentions.” They also appeared to dismiss a role for Pakistan in future talks, criticizing “peace talk offers that are usually made to neighboring countries.” 
Pakistan has long allowed the Taliban’s senior leadership to take refuge on its side of the border and has been wary of peace overtures that its government does not control.
And from the story yesterday:
Pakistan has long been seen as an important potential broker of any peace process between the Afghan government and the Taliban, given that many insurgent leaders have found continued shelter there. But the Qatari conference represented an effort by the Taliban to strike out independently of the Pakistanis, Mr. Mutmaeen ["an Afghan writer and journalist who previously served as an official in the Taliban government"] said. “The important point is that there are no Chinese, no Saudis or no one from Pakistan, only from Europe and the United Nations” other than the Afghans, he said. “This is a good development.” 
“This is an opportunity,” Mr. Qasimyar ["foreign policy committee chief at the Afghan government’s High Peace Council"] said. “They get together, they may have a chance to have tea or dinner or lunch at the same table, and that’s all right.”
Much has been made recently about China's sizable investment in Pakistan and its plans to build a land bridge to the Arabian Sea, as well as its own efforts to host peace talks. The Pugwash Conference highlights the obvious (something that easily gets lost): the Taliban is not a monolith. There are many different factions and players; some are agents of Pakistan, and some opposed to Pakistan. How this all plays out as the spring offensive in Afghanistan continues to get underway is hard to say. But the results of the Pugwash Conference are better news than we have had for some time.

Friday, February 13, 2015

The Greek Austerity Face Off + Globalized Afghanistan + Cracking Yemen -- This is World War IV

A quick rundown this Friday morning of some critical storylines heading into the weekend. 

First, the state of play between Greece, representing the forces of humanity, versus the eurozone, representing the forces of austerity in defense of an exhausted neoliberal paradigm which worships Mammon, or as Naked Capitalism's Yves Smith says, "Mr. Market."

After arriving at impasse on Wednesday, the parties are reported to resume technical negotiations today. Landon Thomas Jr. and Jack Ewing have a good DealBook piece, "Greek Debt Standoff Awaits a Decisive Move," that forecasts a Cyprus-like conclusion to the showdown: capital controls to keep Greek banks from collapsing, but creating a two-tiered euro, with the Syriza-led government eventually kneeling before Mammon and accepting the austerity diktats.
A growing number of analysts think that Mr. Schäuble, Mr. Dijsselbloem and Mr. Draghi are advancing a combined strategy that aims to wait Greece out.
The thinking goes like this. Say “no” politely, but repeatedly, to Greece’s request for a financial rescue package. As conditions deteriorate, cut off access to emergency loans for the bank’s troubled financial institutions.
If that happens, Greece would have to impose capital controls to help prop up the banks, leading to economic disarray and prompting a public outcry. The Greek government would then be forced to accommodate Europe.
“Game theory only works if the other side wants to keep playing with you,” said Adam Lerrick, a sovereign debt expert.
Under this theory, Greece does not leave the euro, Mr. Lerrick said. A majority of Greeks reject such an outcome.
Instead, the country becomes quarantined within Europe, with Greeks prohibited from removing large sums from banks and sending cash abroad. Such was the case with Cyprus in 2013.
Confidantes of Mr. Varoufakis say that, all along, he has been wary of such an approach — which is why he is pushing so hard for a €10 billion lifeline. With the money comes breathing room to put his government’s plan to work. “Time is our most precious commodity,” he has said repeatedly.
But why not capital controls and default? Why don't Thomas and Ewing game out this scenario? It seems to me that if Greece gets as far as Cyprus in placing limits on banking then why not go whole hog and default? The pressure will then be on Germany and other proponents of hardball within the eurozone as Mr. Market freaks out.

This morning Yves Smith is hedging her bets. In "Fog of Negotiations: Greece and Germany Make Friendlier Noises, Restart Talks, But Press Reports Diverge," she pulls back from her default forecast of yesterday. She has a colleague who is well versed in the German press, and this colleague, normally pessimistic, is telling her that the chances of a forthcoming deal are good -- 60/40 or even 65/35. So the normally cynical Smith is basically punting for the time being.

Next, let's go to Afghanistan where a big story ("U.S. Is Escalating a Secretive War in Afghanistan: Data From Seized Computer Fuels a Surge in U.S. Raids on Al Qaeda," by Matthew Rosenberg and Eric Schmitt) provides a look at what U.S. war-making is going to be in the next decade regardless of the outcome of the vote on Obama's Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) against Islamic State. Despite the announcement of the end of combat operations in Afghanistan at the end of last year, nighttime raids conducted by coalition Special Operations forces with their Afghan counterparts against Taliban and Al Qaeda targets are going gangbusters; drone strikes too:
The spike in raids is at odds with policy declarations in Washington, where the Obama administration has deemed the American role in the war essentially over. But the increase reflects the reality in Afghanistan, where fierce fighting in the past year killed record numbers of Afghan soldiers, police officers and civilians.
American and Afghan officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were discussing operations that are largely classified, said that American forces were playing direct combat roles in many of the raids and were not simply going along as advisers.
“We’ve been clear that counterterrorism operations remain a part of our mission in Afghanistan,” Rear Adm. John Kirby, the Pentagon press secretary, said on Thursday. “We’ve also been clear that we will conduct these operations in partnership with the Afghans to eliminate threats to our forces, our partners and our interests.”
The raids appear to have targeted a broad cross section of Islamist militants. They have hit both Qaeda and Taliban operatives, going beyond the narrow counterterrorism mission that Obama administration officials had said would continue after the formal end of American-led combat operations last December.
The tempo of operations is “unprecedented for this time of year” — that is, the traditional winter lull in fighting, an American military official said. No official would provide exact figures, because the data is classified. The Afghan and American governments have also sought to keep quiet the surge in night raids to avoid political fallout in both countries.
“It’s all in the shadows now,” said a former Afghan security official who informally advises his former colleagues. “The official war for the Americans — the part of the war that you could go see — that’s over. It’s only the secret war that’s still going. But it’s going hard.”
Criticisms of Obama's new AUMF center around its non-repeal of the super-broad "Al Qaeda and associates" 9/11 AUMF and its lack of any geographic boundaries. The ISIS AUMF does sunset in three years, but without the repeal of the 9/11 AUMF what it effectively does is globalize Afghanistan. A precedent is going to be established for super-stealthy Special Operations units -- "Afghan and American officials said the raids over the past few months had been carried out by the elite commandos of the National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan’s main spy agency, and members of a mix of American military Special Operations units, such as Navy SEALs and Army Rangers, and paramilitary officers from the C.I.A." -- a Schutzstaffel to terrorize the planet. This has been the fantasy of war planners all along.

Finally -- quickly -- Yemen is being cracked, like Libya, with the blessing of the United States, which led the rush of Western embassies out of the country the other day despite ongoing negotiations, brokered by the United Nations, between the Houthis and other parties to form a new government. Rod Nordland, who usually toes the State Department line but also finds a way to slip a paragraph or two into his stories that give the reader an idea what is really going on, writes, along with Shuaib Almosawa, in "In Yemen, Militants Are Increasingly Isolated" that
Many saw the move as intended to pressure Yemen’s power brokers to come to an agreement. Although the embassies cited security concerns as the reason behind the closings, they came amid relative calm in Sana, the capital, even on the anniversary of its Arab Spring revolution, with peaceful pro- and anti-Houthi demonstrations.

The British and American embassies in Sana were closed Wednesday, with the last diplomats from both embassies withdrawn. The German Embassy was also closed, a security official said, although its diplomats had not yet left. France urged all its citizens in Yemen to leave and said that the embassy would close Friday.
Nordland, working again with Shuaib Almosawa, reported yesterday that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) captured the "Yemeni National Army’s 19th Brigade after heavy fighting at its headquarters in the Baihan District of Shabwa Province, an important oil-producing area in southeastern Yemen."

This is all about the Saudis who are unwilling to have the Houthis formalize their control of Yemen. Now, instead, we will get yet another cracked state with a civil war raging. This is what the U.S./Saudi axis specializes in. We are going to have to start calling it what it is: World War IV.

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

Afghanistan: This is the End

I'm heading out of town for the holidays. The page will be dormant for a day or two. Before I go I want to draw attention, once again, to the situation in Afghanistan, which is perilous for the Western-installed government of Ashraf Ghani. A story this morning by Rod Nordland describes the situation in Taliban stomping ground Helmand Province, "Taliban Push Into Afghan Districts That U.S. Had Secured":
Nationwide, Afghanistan has lost more than 5,000 police and soldiers in the fighting this year, more than any previous year, according to official Afghan data that has not been formally released, but that was obtained by The New York Times and confirmed by Western officials familiar with the data. 
The year has also hit a new high for civilian deaths in the fighting, which the United Nations estimates will exceed 10,000 by the end of 2014. 
Helmand has been a particular rough spot — not just according to casualty figures, but also taking into account overall views of the government’s performance.
A recent report commissioned by the international community and carried out by an independent consultant, Coffey International Development, found that by almost every measure Afghans in Helmand saw a worsening in corruption, security, government services and delivery of justice since the departure of foreign forces.
If you go to The New York Times home page and you search "Rod Nordland" and sort by "Newest" and then you repeat the process for "Azam Ahmed" you'll see what I mean. These are the Gray Lady's two principal reporters for Afghanistan. Their reporting over the last several months documents an increasingly dire situation; meaning, the Afghan powering-sharing government of Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah has a short half-life. As Azam Ahmed's interview ("Misgivings by U.S. General as Afghan Mission Ends") with outgoing U.S. combat commander Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson made clear, the number of casualties currently being sustained by Afghan security forces cannot be maintained:
KABUL, Afghanistan — Shortly after the speeches concluded, the flags were folded and the band silenced, the last American general to lead combat operations in Afghanistan offered his candid assessment of the war. 
“I don’t know if I’m pessimistic or optimistic,” said Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, the departing commander, considering the United States military’s reduced role next year. “The fact that we are in less places, the fact that there are less of us as a coalition, is obviously concerning.” 
In an interview Monday in his office after the lowering of the flag that signaled the official end of the coalition’s war-fighting mission, General Anderson offered a nuanced take on the final year of America’s longest war. 
The record casualties of Afghan forces are not sustainable, and neither are their astounding desertion rates, he said. Political meddling, not intelligence, drives Afghan military missions. The police and the army do not work together.
It was a reflection on the mission that was in stark contrast to the unbridled renditions of success offered during the ceremony by commanders, including General Anderson.
Nordland's article in today's paper:
Wounded police officers at Emergency expressed concern at the increased scale of the fighting. “Only the asphalt road is under the control of the government in Sangin. Everything else is Taliban,” said Samiullah, a policeman in Sangin for the past four years who goes by just one name. He was shot in the leg during an ambush in a village near the district center. 
Like many of the wounded, he complained about both the Afghan National Army and his own commanders. “Our own commanders sell our bullets to the Taliban instead of giving them to us, and then they buy a nice house in Lashkar Gah and stay there, leaving the little guys out there to do the fighting,” Samiullah said. 
Now that the Americans are gone, the army rarely conducts joint operations with the police, leaving them to do most of the fighting, said Mohammad Saleh, a five-year veteran of the Afghan Local Police in Sangin, who was badly wounded in both legs when his checkpoint was overrun by the insurgents. 
Mr. Saleh remains patriotic and wants to return to the fight, but he conceded that corruption was as big an enemy as the Taliban. “Our commanders all buy their positions, so they have to make money to pay for them,” he said. “The Taliban do not do this with their commanders.”
This is the kind of security force the U.S. leaves in the wake of its occupations -- a venal one. Like Iraq's "ghost army" that disappeared, or, rather, was never really there to begin with, when ISIS captured Mosul this past summer, the numbers of Afghan security forces are fluffed up considerably by phantom conscripts who exist only on paper in order for some official to collect extra paychecks.

Then there is the issue of the Afghan National Army Vs. Afghan Local Police. They fight one another. So already there is a civil war within the Ghani government.

We need to start asking what the fall of Afghanistan portends. Afghanistan's descent into civil war, prompting the Soviet invasion, is an event that heralded the coming neoliberal age. The collapse of the Western occupation of Afghanistan augurs ill for the dominant neoliberal paradigm. I believe the war is coming home to the Western core.

Wednesday, September 24, 2014

U.S. Hits Nusra + Crocker Remembers Karzai

An interesting, and I would say unexpectedly positive, report of the U.S.-led airstrikes on Islamic State is the inclusion of Al Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, Al Nusra Front, in the target list. Whether the bombing of Nusra positions was due to the group's connection to the shadowy Khorasan Group (an organization that appears to be a spook confection, breathed into life last week when Director of National Intelligence James Clapper mentioned that "in terms of threat to the homeland, Khorasan may pose as much of a danger as the Islamic State") or payback for the false flag Ghouta poison gas attack (that Seymour Hersh argued last spring was a Nusra operation) is not clear.

Ben Hubbard has the story, "Startling Sight Where Blasts Are the Norm":
While Mr. Obama had announced that the Islamic State would be targeted, the United States also hit at least two bases belonging to the Nusra Front, Al Qaeda’s Syria affiliate, exposing the gap between how the United States and many of Syria’s rebels see the group, as well as the hazards of attacking it. 
The United States considers the Nusra Front a terrorist organization, and American officials said the strikes disrupted an imminent plot to attack the West by an offshoot of Qaeda veterans known as Khorasan. 
One strike hit an area of abandoned villas on the western edge of Aleppo Province, killing at least 50 Nusra Front members, most of them foreigners and including at least a dozen leaders, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. 
A second strike in a village farther west, Kafr Dariyan, killed 15 people, including seven Nusra fighters and eight civilians, among them four children, the observatory said. An American military official said this was the strike against Khorasan. 
A video posted online showed residents removing a body from the rubble of a collapsed building.
The Nusra strikes immediately highlighted the shortcoming of Obama's announced strategy of combating IS by supporting "moderate" Syrian rebels. As Hubbard reports, the "moderates" like Al Qaeda and consider Nusra an ally in the fight against the Syrian government:
Even rebels who supported the strikes on the Islamic State criticized the targeting of the Nusra Front, which they consider a loyal partner in the battle against Mr. Assad. 
“It is not the right time to target the Nusra Front,” said Lt. Col. Fares al-Bayyoush, whose rebel group has received support from the United States and its allies. 
Colonel Bayyoush was also angry that the American strike had killed civilians and that the United States was not attacking Mr. Assad and his allies, like the Lebanese group Hezbollah, which the United States also classifies as a terrorist organization. 
“Isn’t Hezbollah a terrorist organization and the coalition wants to target all terrorist organizations in Syria?” he asked.
Hubbard concludes his story with a sensible quote from Shiite villager in northern Syria who worries that the U.S. coalition -- which includes well-known jihad sponsors al-Saud and Qatar -- against Islamic State is inherently unstable and will lead nowhere except to more war:
One activist who had fled Raqqa when the Islamic State took over said he hoped the strikes would weaken the jihadists but worried that Mr. Assad would benefit. 
“Maybe the regime will take over ISIS’ locations if the weak rebels aren’t able to after the strikes,” said the activists, who gave only his nickname, Abu Bakr. 
Many government supporters were worried about where events might lead because some of the countries in the coalition, like Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have called for Mr. Assad to step down or actively supported his enemies with money and arms. 
“I don’t trust the coalition,” said a man who gave only his first name, Jamal, from a Shiite village in northern Syria that is besieged by Sunni rebels. “They might take advantage of the situation and hit important locations, like the airport where the regime is, and I am afraid of errors.”
A coalition designed to wage war against a Sunni fundamentalist state, but the reality is that the coalition is secretly at war with itself -- does that sound familiar? It should because it describes the coalition that has fought the Taliban and occupied Afghanistan for the last 13 years.

Which brings us to Hamid Karzai's farewell address yesterday. There is a good interview with Shamil Sultanov on Pravda's web site. In describing the rise of Islamic State, he mentions that Karzai, like Nouri al-Malaki, is an American creation who grew alienated from his parent: "Al-Maliki is a protege, a puppet of the United States. Sometimes, though, a puppet may start wagging its master. We know this by the example of Hamid Karzai."

The Afghan president could not resist telling it like it is when it comes to the wiles and the ways of the U.S. overlord. Rod Nordland has the story -- an excellent report -- "In Farewell Speech, Karzai Calls American Mission in Afghanistan a Betrayal":
KABUL, Afghanistan — In his nearly 13 years as the leader of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai’s most memorable public stances always seemed driven by some deep emotion, and an almost compulsive need to express it. There was heartbreak for families killed by errant airstrikes, outrage at the scheming of hostile neighbors, palpable longing to preside over a peaceful end to the Taliban insurgency. 
On Tuesday, though he delivered a farewell speech in a loose and sometimes jocular way, there was, again, no doubt of the emotion that inspired his words: bitterness at what he saw as an American betrayal of Afghanistan. 
“America did not want peace for Afghanistan, because it had its own agendas and goals here,” he told an audience of hundreds of cabinet and staff members at the presidential palace in Kabul, warning them not to trust the Americans. “I have always said this: that if America and Pakistan want peace, it is possible to bring peace to Afghanistan.” 
Mr. Karzai’s denunciation of the United States came in terms that had become wearily familiar to the diplomats watching the televised speech from the heavily fortified American Embassy just a few blocks and many blast walls from the palace. But what the president did not say, omitting any recognition of the more than 2,000 American lives and hundreds of billions of dollars the United States expended in fighting the Taliban, may have grated more.
*** 
In his speech, he offered his first piece of advice to Mr. Ghani and to Abdullah Abdullah, the presidential rival who is to join a unity government after months of political crises and wrangling over widespread electoral fraud. It was more a warning than a reflection on the recent political peril: “Both wise brothers should be very careful in maintaining their relationship with Western countries and the United States,” Mr. Karzai said. 
He sought to explain to the government officials his dogged refusal to sign a bilateral security agreement with the United States, which would allow American troops to remain in Afghanistan after this year. Mr. Ghani has promised to sign it as soon as he is inaugurated, and many inside Mr. Karzai’s own government were critical of his stance. 
“I believe the stability of Afghanistan is directly related to the United States and Pakistan,” Mr. Karzai said. “This war is for the personal interest of the foreign policies of others, and this is a fight of outsiders in which Afghans are sacrificed.”
The remainder of Nordland's piece is composed of an interview with foreign-policy guru Ryan Crocker. Of all the Establishment figures I find Crocker one of the most sensible. He has called for peace with Iran and caution regarding regime change in Syria. It's worth to quote Nordland at length:
Ryan C. Crocker, dean of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M, was the first American ambassador to the post-Taliban government, and he was among those American officials who supported Mr. Karzai’s initial appointment as Afghanistan’s leader. Mr. Crocker also returned as ambassador in 2011, as Afghan relations were souring under the Obama administration, which Mr. Karzai saw as less attentive than the Bush administration had been. 
“I saw over the years an increasing bitterness on his part particularly vis-à-vis Pakistan and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship,” Mr. Crocker said. 
Mr. Karzai’s view was that the United States should have been able to force Pakistan to stop giving sanctuary to the Taliban’s leaders. The American view has been that the expectation was unrealistic, given the deeply troubled relationship between Washington and Islamabad. 
During Mr. Crocker’s second tour here as ambassador, and throughout Mr. Cunningham’s time since then, Mr. Karzai adopted an increasingly strident tone toward the Americans, particularly on the issue of civilian casualties in American airstrikes, and on two occasions actually threatened to join the Taliban, whom he often referred to as “my brothers.” 
He blamed the Americans, too, for his inability to start any sort of meaningful peace talks with the Taliban. The insurgents have consistently refused to talk to him, denouncing him as an American puppet. 
For all of that, Mr. Crocker still believes Hamid Karzai was the right man for the job Americans effectively chose him for at a conference in Bonn in December 2001. “I don’t think there was a better choice than Karzai,” he said. “I didn’t think so then; I don’t think so now.”
*** 
Mr. Crocker remembered Mr. Karzai saying in 2011 that he was counting the days until he could leave office: “I think I remember his words verbatim: ‘The worst thing that could happen to Afghanistan would be for me to continue in office.’ Then he said: ‘No, that would be the second-worst thing. The worst thing would be if one of my brothers was elected.’ ”