Showing posts with label Najim Rahim. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Najim Rahim. Show all posts

Monday, February 8, 2016

The Super Bowl and Afghanistan

Bettors favored the Carolina Panthers (though I saw the headline to one story that claimed a late load of lucre poured in on Denver, evening things out), as I did, only to be disappointed by the performance of the false idol of the Zeitgeist, Cam Newton. The Panthers star QB's fourth quarter cowardly refusal to dive into a pile to regain his own fumble might prove to be a Fisher King type wound from which his career will never recover. The Broncos defense dominated Carolina like no other team has this season, proving once again the truism that defense wins championships.


The media seems to be going apeshit over Lady Gaga's singing of the national anthem. At one point during her performance, CBS cut away to troops watching the game in a mess hall somewhere in Afghanistan. The picture of course was meant to convey that our men and women are abroad in a savage land so we can sit safely in front of our flat screens and be entertained by athletes sustaining chronic brain injuries. But the CBS cutaway to the troops in Afghanistan, even more so than the Blue Angels flyover after Lady Gaga belted out the last lines of the Star Spangled Banner, struck me as awkward and not anchored in reality.

At the end of 2014 Obama announced the end of combat operations in Afghanistan, except for trainers and special operators to conduct counter-terrorism attacks, meaning, presumably, operations against Al Qaeda. Those pictured during the Star Spangled Banner looked more like support staff, cooks and forklift operators, than Navy SEALs or Army Delta Force.

Along with "ending" combat operations, Obama promised the removal of all troops by the end of 2016. So when Super Bowl LI is televised next February whatever network is hosting the event will have to cut away to a different U.S. theater of war, possibly Iraq, another place where Obama had declared an end to of combat operations; possibly Poland or Bulgaria, where the U.S. is embarked on a reboot of the Cold War; possibly Libya; maybe even Haiti. The only boundary to the U.S. military footprint is the globe itself.

But wait. Not so fast. After Kunduz fell this past September Obama extended the U.S. military commitment to Afghanistan past when he leaves office in 2017. The Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police were decisively outperformed by a much smaller Taliban force; it took U.S. A-10 Warthogs (the aircraft responsible for killing the medical staff and patients at the Doctors Without Borders hospital) and special forces to take Kunduz City back from the Taliban in October.

The problem for the U.S. is even though Obama has committed U.S. troops to Afghanistan through 2017, making them available for a cutaway shot during the next Super Bowl performance of the national anthem (Miley Cyrus?), more and more it is becoming a topic mentioned in the mainstream press that Afghanistan -- at least American/NATO political entity by that name -- might not be around past 2016.

For instance, a story by Najim Rahim, David Jolly and Ahmad Shakib, "Kunduz Residents Live in Fear of Taliban’s Return," spells out clearly that Kunduz Province, for all intents and purposes, is already controlled by the Taliban:
“You can see the white flags of the Taliban along the road as soon as you step out of Kunduz City,” said Mr. Azyanfar, 20, who travels back to his district outside the provincial capital several times a week. The area controlled by the government extends “only to the buildings in which they are based,” he said. “As soon as you step outside, it is totally a different picture: The Taliban’s presence and influence are much larger than the government’s.”
It has been more than four months since the Afghan forces crumbled as Taliban fighters overran Kunduz. But there has been no improvement in the conditions that made the two-week Taliban takeover of the city possible. Disillusionment with the government has only gotten worse; the Afghan forces are still overstretched and demoralized; and the Taliban still control much of the outlying areas and roads.
Now, the worry in and around Kunduz is that it is inevitable that the insurgents will return, strengthened this time by weapons, ammunition and vehicles looted during their capture of the city. 
For a national government already strained by territory losses and infighting, another loss of a provincial capital — whether that is a repeat in Kunduz or a new setback in Helmand or another contested province — is an alarming prospect. 
The initial loss of Kunduz was a national trauma. Many Afghans began fleeing neighboring provincial capitals and district centers. An already huge wave of emigration accelerated after the assault. And, worrisomely in a country torn by warring strongmen in the ’90s, local warlords were threatening to remobilize and settle scores in the absence of a capable government defense. 
The repercussions of Kunduz’s fall were felt all the way to Washington, where President Obama abandoned his goal of ending America’s involvement in the Afghan war this year and instead extended the United States military mission beyond 2016.
The litany of woe for Afghanistan is stunning. Islamic State is on the rise in Nangarhar Province in the east. In the north, in Kunduz and Baghlan, the Taliban is on the march. While in the south, the Afghan government is struggling to maintain a toehold in Helmand Province, the richest region for poppy cultivation. Army and police casualties are at record highs. And there are murmurings of an impending split or coup in the Ghani/Abdullah government in Kabul.

Don't take my word for it. Read Carlotta Gall's think piece, "Pakistan’s Hand in the Rise of International Jihad," in yesterday's paper. It is a breath of fresh air, particularly as it appears in what is basically a government organ, The New York Times. So I quote it whole:
TUNIS — PRESIDENT ASHRAF GHANI of Afghanistan has warned in several recent interviews that unless peace talks with Pakistan and the Taliban produce results in the next few months, his country may not survive 2016. Afghanistan is barely standing, he says, after the Taliban onslaught last year, which led to the highest casualties among civilians and security forces since 2001. 
“How much worse will it get?” Mr. Ghani asked in a recent television interview. “It depends on how much regional cooperation we can secure, and how much international mediation and pressure can be exerted to create rules of the game between states.”
What he means is it depends on how much international pressure can be brought to bear on Pakistan to cease its aggression. 
Critics of the Afghan leadership say it’s not Pakistan’s fault that its neighbor is falling apart. They point to the many internal failings of the Afghan government: political divisions, weak institutions, warlords and corruption. 
But experts have found a lot of evidence that Pakistan facilitated the Taliban offensive. The United States and China have been asking Pakistan to persuade the Taliban to make peace, but Afghanistan argues that Islamabad has done nothing to rein in the Taliban, and if anything has encouraged it to raise the stakes in hopes of gaining influence in any power-sharing agreement. 
This behavior is not just an issue for Afghanistan. Pakistan is intervening in a number of foreign conflicts. Its intelligence service has long acted as the manager of international mujahedeen forces, many of them Sunni extremists, and there is even speculation that it may have been involved in the rise of the Islamic State. 
The latest Taliban offensive began in 2014. United States and NATO forces were winding down their operations in Afghanistan and preparing to withdraw when Pakistan decided, after years of prevarication, to clear Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters from their sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal area of North Waziristan. 
The operation was certainly a serious endeavor — Taliban bases, torture chambers and ammunition dumps were busted, town bazaars were razed and over one million civilians were displaced. 
But the militants were tipped off early, and hundreds escaped, tribesmen and Taliban fighters said. Many fled over the border to Afghanistan, just at the vulnerable moment when Afghanistan was assuming responsibility for its own security. Ninety foreign fighters with their families arrived in Paktika Province that summer, to the alarm of Afghan officials. 
Further along the border in Paktika Province, Taliban fighters occupied abandoned C.I.A. bases and outposts. A legislator from the region warned me that they would use the positions to project attacks deeper into Afghanistan and even up to Kabul. Some of the most devastating suicide bomb attacks occurred in that province in the months that followed. 
Meanwhile, in Pakistan, the Haqqani network, the most potent branch of the Taliban, moved from North Waziristan into the adjacent district of Kurram. From there it continues to enjoy safe haven and conduct its insurgency against American, international and Afghan targets. 
Pakistan regards Afghanistan as its backyard. Determined not to let its archrival, India, gain influence there, and to ensure that Afghanistan remains in the Sunni Islamist camp, Pakistan has used the Taliban selectively, promoting those who further its agenda and cracking down on those who don’t. The same goes for Al Qaeda and other foreign fighters. 
Even knowing this, it might come as a surprise that the region’s triumvirate of violent jihad is living openly in Pakistan. 
First, there’s Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani network, and second in command of the Taliban. He moves freely around Pakistan, and has even visited the Pakistani intelligence headquarters of the Afghan campaign in Rawalpindi. 
Then there is the new leader of the Taliban, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, who has openly assembled meetings of his military and leadership council near the Pakistani town of Quetta. Since he came to power last year, the Taliban has mounted some of its most ambitious offensives into Afghanistan, overrunning the northern town of Kunduz, and pushing to seize control of the opium-rich province of Helmand. 
Finally, Al Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, enjoys sanctuary in Pakistan — one recent report placed him in the southwestern corner of Baluchistan. He has been working to establish training camps in southern Afghanistan. In October, it took United States Special Operations forces several days of fighting and airstrikes to clear those camps. American commanders say the group they were fighting was Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, a new franchise announced by Mr. Zawahri that has claimed responsibility for the killings of bloggers and activists in Karachi and Bangladesh, among other attacks.
Pakistan denies harboring the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and points out that it, too, is a victim of terrorism. But many analysts have detailed how the military has nurtured Islamist militant groups as an instrument to suppress nationalist movements, in particular among the Pashtun minority, at home and abroad. 
Perhaps most troubling, there are reports that Pakistan had a role in the rise of the Islamic State. 
Ahead of Pakistan’s 2014 operation in North Waziristan, scores, even hundreds, of foreign fighters left the tribal areas to fight against President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Tribesmen and Taliban members from the area say fighters traveled to Quetta, and then flew to Qatar. There they received new passports and passage to Turkey, from where they could cross into Syria. Others traveled overland along well-worn smuggling routes from Pakistan through Iran and Iraq.
The fighters arrived just in time to boost the sweeping offensive by ISIS into Iraq and the creation of the Islamic State in the summer of 2014.
If these accounts are correct, Pakistan was cooperating with Qatar, and perhaps others, to move international Sunni jihadists (including 300 Pakistanis) from Pakistan’s tribal areas, where they were no longer needed, to new battlefields in Syria. It is just another reminder of Pakistan’s central involvement in creating and managing violent jihadist groups, one Pakistani politician, who spoke on the condition of anonymity when talking about intelligence affairs, told me.

This has been going on for more than 30 years. In 1990, I shared a bus ride with young Chinese Uighurs, Muslims from China’s restive northwest, who had spent months training in Pakistani madrasas, including a brief foray into Afghanistan to get a taste of battle. They were returning home, furnished with brand-new Pakistani passports, a gift of citizenship often offered to those who join the jihad. 
Years later, just after Osama bin Laden was found and killed in Pakistan, I interviewed a guerrilla commander from the disputed region of Kashmir who had spent 15 years on the Pakistani military payroll, traveling to train and assist insurgents in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir and Afghanistan. 
In 2012 I came across several cases where young clerics, fresh graduates from the Haqqania madrasa in Pakistan, returned to their home villages in Afghanistan, flush with cash, and set about running mosques and recruiting and organizing a band of Taliban followers. 
I visited that madrasa in 2013. It is the alma mater of the Afghan Taliban, where many of the leaders of the movement were trained. The clerics there remained adamant in their support for the Taliban. “It is a political fact that one day the Taliban will take power,” Syed Yousuf Shah, the madrasa spokesman, told me. “We are experts on the Taliban,” he said, and a majority of the Afghan people “still support them.” 
The madrasa, a longtime instrument of Pakistani intelligence, has been training people from the ethnic minorities of northern Afghanistan alongside its standard clientele of Pashtuns. The aim is still to win control of northern Afghanistan through these young graduates. From there they have their eyes on Central Asia and western China. Pakistani clerics are educating and radicalizing Chinese Uighurs as well, along with Central Asians from the former Soviet republics. 
No one has held Pakistan to account for this behavior. Why would Pakistan give it up now?

Wednesday, October 7, 2015

Taliban Northern Offensive Mortally Wounds Ghani Government

All the happy talk emanating from the U.S. military and the Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani that the Taliban have given up on Kunduz City and are drifting into the bush is debunked by an excellent story, "Taliban Gain Advantage in Tug of War in Kunduz," written by Rod Nordland and Najim Rahim. The entire piece should be read, but the last three paragraphs speak directly to the dire situation the Afghan government finds itself in Kunduz:
A senior Afghan military officer blamed a lack of American airstrikes over the past two days for the Taliban advance on Tuesday, in the wake of the American airstrike that destroyed the Doctors Without Borders hospital in Kunduz on Saturday and killed 22 people, mostly hospital staff and patients. 
“The U.S. airstrikes are halted since yesterday evening,” said the officer, who confirmed that the city remains divided between the insurgents and government forces, with some fighting on Tuesday even in the Sare Dawra neighborhood, close to the airport, where the Afghan Army and American Special Operations troops have headquarters. “Until the airstrikes resume, it will be hard to have any progress in the fighting against the Taliban,” he said. 
The senior officer also blamed a lack of coordination among Afghan units. “There are 10 generals from different organs, and they aren’t under the command of one person who should lead the fighting,” the officer said. “This way, it is unlikely for the Afghan security forces to achieve anything so quickly. The fighting might last for months and Kunduz city may not be retaken.”
Residents are streaming out the city, voting with their feet in a display of distrust for the Afghan military and its NATO allies. What makes this all very Tet like is that it is not just Kunduz under siege; it several northern provinces. According to Alissa Rubin reporting yesterday in "Afghan Forces Report Progress in Kunduz as Taliban Press Other Fronts":
With much of the attention still on Kunduz, where fighting continued Monday and where a devastating American airstrike on Saturday deprived the city’s residents of its most important hospital, new fighting was reported near the provincial capital in Faryab, in northwestern Afghanistan. It was the third northern hub to come under Taliban attack in recent days.
The onslaught on the Faryab provincial capital, Maimana, was barely repelled by the Afghan security forces, said the acting governor, Abdul Sattar Barez. He estimated that some 2,000 Taliban fighters had been involved, but that number seemed high, given that the Taliban managed to take Kunduz City last week with an estimated 300 to 400 fighters.
Regardless, the attacking force was said to include insurgent fighters from four nearby provinces as well as from Faryab: Sari Pul, Jawzjan, Badghis and Ghor. The fighting went on for nearly 10 hours as Taliban attacked the city from three directions, Mr. Barez said. He credited the combination of a united Afghan force backed up by Maimana locals as well as air support from the American-led coalition for repelling the attack.
“The reason we managed to push them back was thanks to the Afghan National Security Forces and the people of Faryab who stood against them and stopped them from achieving their ominous goal,” he said. 
“Thanks, too, to NATO for their air support,” he said, referring to the international coalition, adding: “Their jets flew all night in the skies, which demoralized the enemy. If it wasn’t for the NATO air support, we would not have made it.”
Without U.S. air power the Ghani government's days would be significantly limited, as the reported recapture of Kunduz City by the Taliban proves.

The United States Forces in Afghanistan must be trying to work out the protocols for future airstrikes since General John F. Campbell is granting that the rules were broken in the obliteration of the Doctors Without Borders hospital. How an AC-130 gunship can loiter for over 30 minutes blasting to smithereens the only hospital in the region defies understanding, particularly when Doctors Without Borders says it provided GPS coordinates to both the Taliban and the Afghan/U.S. forces, and then alerted the military of its mistake while the attack was in progress.This is a snafu in the same category of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO air war against Yugoslavia. Doctors Without Borders is not going to let this drop quietly; it is calling for an independent investigation under the Geneva Conventions. This is a big, powerful multinational NGO that usually works within the Western imperial system. The attack on the hospital is a war crime if ever there was one.

Before signing off, it is worth one's time to read the lengthy story on Mullah Mansour (Joseph Golstein, "Taliban’s New Leader Strengthens His Hold With Intrigue and Battlefield Victory"), the newly minted leader of the Afghan Taliban riding high now with the success of his northern offensive. What Goldstein's piece brings home, even though it is too reliant on anonymous sources from Afghan intelligence, is the extent to which Mullah Mansour, and hence the Afghan Taliban, is a creature of Pakistan's national security apparatus:
As acting leader of the Taliban over the past few years, he closely kept the secret that Mullah Omar had been dead since 2013. And he wielded that edge powerfully, issuing orders in Mullah Omar’s name, moving against rival Taliban commanders and steadily consolidating power, according to Afghan and Taliban officials. 
He has also benefited from a powerful alliance with the Pakistani military spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, the original sponsor of the Afghan Taliban insurgency. That relationship, along with a hefty dose of cash payouts to fellow commanders, was a crucial factor in his ability to manage the succession crisis this summer after news of Mullah Omar’s death finally got out, Taliban and Afghan officials said. 
Pakistan’s role in Mullah Mansour’s rise and rule has offered a bit of hope to Afghan and Western officials that Pakistani officials might be persuaded to force the Taliban to accept a peace deal. 
But it has also sometimes been a political liability for Mullah Mansour, embittering some Taliban figures who resent Pakistan’s influence on the leadership and who are not likely to forgive his deception about Mullah Omar’s death. Some alienated commanders have sought a new direction with the Islamic State offshoot that is growing in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Mullah Mansour’s biggest mystery to Western and Afghan officials is wrapped up in the question of how he will try to shape Afghanistan’s future now that he has consolidated power: Will he attempt to return the Taliban to power as conquerors, or will he try to turn military victories into a strong hand in peace talks? 
His own words and actions would seem to support either path.
Right now there is no mystery at all. War is working for the Taliban. The Ghani government, already inherently weak, is now mortally wounded.