Showing posts with label Kunduz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kunduz. Show all posts

Monday, February 8, 2016

The Super Bowl and Afghanistan

Bettors favored the Carolina Panthers (though I saw the headline to one story that claimed a late load of lucre poured in on Denver, evening things out), as I did, only to be disappointed by the performance of the false idol of the Zeitgeist, Cam Newton. The Panthers star QB's fourth quarter cowardly refusal to dive into a pile to regain his own fumble might prove to be a Fisher King type wound from which his career will never recover. The Broncos defense dominated Carolina like no other team has this season, proving once again the truism that defense wins championships.


The media seems to be going apeshit over Lady Gaga's singing of the national anthem. At one point during her performance, CBS cut away to troops watching the game in a mess hall somewhere in Afghanistan. The picture of course was meant to convey that our men and women are abroad in a savage land so we can sit safely in front of our flat screens and be entertained by athletes sustaining chronic brain injuries. But the CBS cutaway to the troops in Afghanistan, even more so than the Blue Angels flyover after Lady Gaga belted out the last lines of the Star Spangled Banner, struck me as awkward and not anchored in reality.

At the end of 2014 Obama announced the end of combat operations in Afghanistan, except for trainers and special operators to conduct counter-terrorism attacks, meaning, presumably, operations against Al Qaeda. Those pictured during the Star Spangled Banner looked more like support staff, cooks and forklift operators, than Navy SEALs or Army Delta Force.

Along with "ending" combat operations, Obama promised the removal of all troops by the end of 2016. So when Super Bowl LI is televised next February whatever network is hosting the event will have to cut away to a different U.S. theater of war, possibly Iraq, another place where Obama had declared an end to of combat operations; possibly Poland or Bulgaria, where the U.S. is embarked on a reboot of the Cold War; possibly Libya; maybe even Haiti. The only boundary to the U.S. military footprint is the globe itself.

But wait. Not so fast. After Kunduz fell this past September Obama extended the U.S. military commitment to Afghanistan past when he leaves office in 2017. The Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police were decisively outperformed by a much smaller Taliban force; it took U.S. A-10 Warthogs (the aircraft responsible for killing the medical staff and patients at the Doctors Without Borders hospital) and special forces to take Kunduz City back from the Taliban in October.

The problem for the U.S. is even though Obama has committed U.S. troops to Afghanistan through 2017, making them available for a cutaway shot during the next Super Bowl performance of the national anthem (Miley Cyrus?), more and more it is becoming a topic mentioned in the mainstream press that Afghanistan -- at least American/NATO political entity by that name -- might not be around past 2016.

For instance, a story by Najim Rahim, David Jolly and Ahmad Shakib, "Kunduz Residents Live in Fear of Taliban’s Return," spells out clearly that Kunduz Province, for all intents and purposes, is already controlled by the Taliban:
“You can see the white flags of the Taliban along the road as soon as you step out of Kunduz City,” said Mr. Azyanfar, 20, who travels back to his district outside the provincial capital several times a week. The area controlled by the government extends “only to the buildings in which they are based,” he said. “As soon as you step outside, it is totally a different picture: The Taliban’s presence and influence are much larger than the government’s.”
It has been more than four months since the Afghan forces crumbled as Taliban fighters overran Kunduz. But there has been no improvement in the conditions that made the two-week Taliban takeover of the city possible. Disillusionment with the government has only gotten worse; the Afghan forces are still overstretched and demoralized; and the Taliban still control much of the outlying areas and roads.
Now, the worry in and around Kunduz is that it is inevitable that the insurgents will return, strengthened this time by weapons, ammunition and vehicles looted during their capture of the city. 
For a national government already strained by territory losses and infighting, another loss of a provincial capital — whether that is a repeat in Kunduz or a new setback in Helmand or another contested province — is an alarming prospect. 
The initial loss of Kunduz was a national trauma. Many Afghans began fleeing neighboring provincial capitals and district centers. An already huge wave of emigration accelerated after the assault. And, worrisomely in a country torn by warring strongmen in the ’90s, local warlords were threatening to remobilize and settle scores in the absence of a capable government defense. 
The repercussions of Kunduz’s fall were felt all the way to Washington, where President Obama abandoned his goal of ending America’s involvement in the Afghan war this year and instead extended the United States military mission beyond 2016.
The litany of woe for Afghanistan is stunning. Islamic State is on the rise in Nangarhar Province in the east. In the north, in Kunduz and Baghlan, the Taliban is on the march. While in the south, the Afghan government is struggling to maintain a toehold in Helmand Province, the richest region for poppy cultivation. Army and police casualties are at record highs. And there are murmurings of an impending split or coup in the Ghani/Abdullah government in Kabul.

Don't take my word for it. Read Carlotta Gall's think piece, "Pakistan’s Hand in the Rise of International Jihad," in yesterday's paper. It is a breath of fresh air, particularly as it appears in what is basically a government organ, The New York Times. So I quote it whole:
TUNIS — PRESIDENT ASHRAF GHANI of Afghanistan has warned in several recent interviews that unless peace talks with Pakistan and the Taliban produce results in the next few months, his country may not survive 2016. Afghanistan is barely standing, he says, after the Taliban onslaught last year, which led to the highest casualties among civilians and security forces since 2001. 
“How much worse will it get?” Mr. Ghani asked in a recent television interview. “It depends on how much regional cooperation we can secure, and how much international mediation and pressure can be exerted to create rules of the game between states.”
What he means is it depends on how much international pressure can be brought to bear on Pakistan to cease its aggression. 
Critics of the Afghan leadership say it’s not Pakistan’s fault that its neighbor is falling apart. They point to the many internal failings of the Afghan government: political divisions, weak institutions, warlords and corruption. 
But experts have found a lot of evidence that Pakistan facilitated the Taliban offensive. The United States and China have been asking Pakistan to persuade the Taliban to make peace, but Afghanistan argues that Islamabad has done nothing to rein in the Taliban, and if anything has encouraged it to raise the stakes in hopes of gaining influence in any power-sharing agreement. 
This behavior is not just an issue for Afghanistan. Pakistan is intervening in a number of foreign conflicts. Its intelligence service has long acted as the manager of international mujahedeen forces, many of them Sunni extremists, and there is even speculation that it may have been involved in the rise of the Islamic State. 
The latest Taliban offensive began in 2014. United States and NATO forces were winding down their operations in Afghanistan and preparing to withdraw when Pakistan decided, after years of prevarication, to clear Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters from their sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal area of North Waziristan. 
The operation was certainly a serious endeavor — Taliban bases, torture chambers and ammunition dumps were busted, town bazaars were razed and over one million civilians were displaced. 
But the militants were tipped off early, and hundreds escaped, tribesmen and Taliban fighters said. Many fled over the border to Afghanistan, just at the vulnerable moment when Afghanistan was assuming responsibility for its own security. Ninety foreign fighters with their families arrived in Paktika Province that summer, to the alarm of Afghan officials. 
Further along the border in Paktika Province, Taliban fighters occupied abandoned C.I.A. bases and outposts. A legislator from the region warned me that they would use the positions to project attacks deeper into Afghanistan and even up to Kabul. Some of the most devastating suicide bomb attacks occurred in that province in the months that followed. 
Meanwhile, in Pakistan, the Haqqani network, the most potent branch of the Taliban, moved from North Waziristan into the adjacent district of Kurram. From there it continues to enjoy safe haven and conduct its insurgency against American, international and Afghan targets. 
Pakistan regards Afghanistan as its backyard. Determined not to let its archrival, India, gain influence there, and to ensure that Afghanistan remains in the Sunni Islamist camp, Pakistan has used the Taliban selectively, promoting those who further its agenda and cracking down on those who don’t. The same goes for Al Qaeda and other foreign fighters. 
Even knowing this, it might come as a surprise that the region’s triumvirate of violent jihad is living openly in Pakistan. 
First, there’s Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani network, and second in command of the Taliban. He moves freely around Pakistan, and has even visited the Pakistani intelligence headquarters of the Afghan campaign in Rawalpindi. 
Then there is the new leader of the Taliban, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, who has openly assembled meetings of his military and leadership council near the Pakistani town of Quetta. Since he came to power last year, the Taliban has mounted some of its most ambitious offensives into Afghanistan, overrunning the northern town of Kunduz, and pushing to seize control of the opium-rich province of Helmand. 
Finally, Al Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, enjoys sanctuary in Pakistan — one recent report placed him in the southwestern corner of Baluchistan. He has been working to establish training camps in southern Afghanistan. In October, it took United States Special Operations forces several days of fighting and airstrikes to clear those camps. American commanders say the group they were fighting was Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, a new franchise announced by Mr. Zawahri that has claimed responsibility for the killings of bloggers and activists in Karachi and Bangladesh, among other attacks.
Pakistan denies harboring the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and points out that it, too, is a victim of terrorism. But many analysts have detailed how the military has nurtured Islamist militant groups as an instrument to suppress nationalist movements, in particular among the Pashtun minority, at home and abroad. 
Perhaps most troubling, there are reports that Pakistan had a role in the rise of the Islamic State. 
Ahead of Pakistan’s 2014 operation in North Waziristan, scores, even hundreds, of foreign fighters left the tribal areas to fight against President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Tribesmen and Taliban members from the area say fighters traveled to Quetta, and then flew to Qatar. There they received new passports and passage to Turkey, from where they could cross into Syria. Others traveled overland along well-worn smuggling routes from Pakistan through Iran and Iraq.
The fighters arrived just in time to boost the sweeping offensive by ISIS into Iraq and the creation of the Islamic State in the summer of 2014.
If these accounts are correct, Pakistan was cooperating with Qatar, and perhaps others, to move international Sunni jihadists (including 300 Pakistanis) from Pakistan’s tribal areas, where they were no longer needed, to new battlefields in Syria. It is just another reminder of Pakistan’s central involvement in creating and managing violent jihadist groups, one Pakistani politician, who spoke on the condition of anonymity when talking about intelligence affairs, told me.

This has been going on for more than 30 years. In 1990, I shared a bus ride with young Chinese Uighurs, Muslims from China’s restive northwest, who had spent months training in Pakistani madrasas, including a brief foray into Afghanistan to get a taste of battle. They were returning home, furnished with brand-new Pakistani passports, a gift of citizenship often offered to those who join the jihad. 
Years later, just after Osama bin Laden was found and killed in Pakistan, I interviewed a guerrilla commander from the disputed region of Kashmir who had spent 15 years on the Pakistani military payroll, traveling to train and assist insurgents in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kashmir and Afghanistan. 
In 2012 I came across several cases where young clerics, fresh graduates from the Haqqania madrasa in Pakistan, returned to their home villages in Afghanistan, flush with cash, and set about running mosques and recruiting and organizing a band of Taliban followers. 
I visited that madrasa in 2013. It is the alma mater of the Afghan Taliban, where many of the leaders of the movement were trained. The clerics there remained adamant in their support for the Taliban. “It is a political fact that one day the Taliban will take power,” Syed Yousuf Shah, the madrasa spokesman, told me. “We are experts on the Taliban,” he said, and a majority of the Afghan people “still support them.” 
The madrasa, a longtime instrument of Pakistani intelligence, has been training people from the ethnic minorities of northern Afghanistan alongside its standard clientele of Pashtuns. The aim is still to win control of northern Afghanistan through these young graduates. From there they have their eyes on Central Asia and western China. Pakistani clerics are educating and radicalizing Chinese Uighurs as well, along with Central Asians from the former Soviet republics. 
No one has held Pakistan to account for this behavior. Why would Pakistan give it up now?

Tuesday, December 15, 2015

The Afghanistan Formula for Perpetual War

With all that has been happening in the news -- COP21 in Paris; Trump demagoguery with the Iowa caucus less than two months away; a widening international war in Iraq and Syria; terror attacks here, there and everywhere -- it is easy to lose track of Afghanistan.

But we shouldn't because the Greater Middle East is being "Talibanized." I don't mean by this to say that Mullah Mansour is exporting his fighters to other countries. What I mean is that the model par excellence of state powers using their intelligence agencies to aid various Salafi groups in order to pursue geopolitical objectives, blow back be damned, is Afghanistan. Back at the beginning of the current bankrupt neoliberal/neoconservative paradigm was the U.S./Saudi effort to dislodge the Soviet-backed Afghan leader Babrak Karmal. Thirty-five years, a couple of invasions of Iraq and one Global War on Terror later we now have a world war, not to mention a caliphate, in Syria and Iraq.

Meanwhile the Western quisling in Afghanistan, the Ralph Nader of Kabul, Ashraf Ghani continues to face mounting losses -- in territory, among his security forces and in any hope that his government has a future.

Yesterday's story by David Jolly and Taimoor Shah, "Afghan Province, Teetering to the Taliban, Draws In Extra U.S. Forces," outlines once again how U.S. Special Operations troops and air power are being rushed into theater to keep the Taliban from controlling a province. In October it was the northern Kunduz Province; now it is Helmand in the south:
KABUL, Afghanistan — Alarmed that large stretches of Helmand Province are falling to the Taliban, American Special Operations forces have secretly taken a more central role in the fighting to save crucial areas of the province, as more air power and ground troops have been committed to the battle, according to Western and Afghan officials.
A Western diplomat said last week that United States Special Operations forces had been engaged in combat in Helmand for weeks, and that there were more American forces fighting there than at any time since President Obama last year announced a formal end to combat operations in Afghanistan.
The extent of the American role has been kept largely secret, with senior Afghan officials in the area saying they are under orders not to divulge the level of cooperation, especially by Special Operations forces on the ground. The secrecy reflects the Pentagon’s concern that the involvement may suggest that the American combat role, which was supposed to have ended in December 2014, is still far beyond the official “train, advise and assist” mission.
The elite ground units in Helmand include both Special Operations troops and the United States Air Force’s Special Tactics Squadron, according to the Western diplomat, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid angering his colleagues.
The American intervention in Helmand is accelerating amid growing reports of demoralized or trapped Afghan security forces and alarm at the amount of territory the Taliban have been able to seize in Helmand this year. If the insurgents are able to sweep away the tenuous government presence in district centers and the capital, Lashkar Gah, it would be a dire setback for the Afghan government, and would give the Taliban a strong foothold in southern Afghanistan.
Asked whether American forces were taking a larger combat role in Helmand, a United States military spokesman, Col. Michael T. Lawhorn, would not reply directly. But he praised the Afghan forces’ efforts so far.
“There’s little question that Helmand is a contested area,” Colonel Lawhorn said. “But the Afghan National Security Forces have conducted no fewer than five major operations there to disrupt insurgent and Taliban activities.” 
Afghan officials in Helmand, however, gave more dire assessments about the state of the battle. 
“The security situation is really bad,” said Toofan Waziri, a Helmand politician and prominent television commentator. Without more foreign air support, he added, “the entire province would probably fall to the Taliban in three days.”
Helmand is important because it is prime poppy growing country. It was also the location of the ballyhooed Stanley McChrystal-Obama COIN troop surge, now broadly acknowledged to be a terrific failure. Parts of Helmand in the north have never been out of the Taliban's control.

The Ghani government is in dire straits. There is no doubt about it. That is why Ghani went hat in hand last week to Pakistan looking for some kind of peace deal, even while the strip adjoining U.S. air base in Kandahar was being shot up and burned to the ground by Taliban. The story to consult is last Friday's "Afghanistan and Pakistan Agree to Reopen Talks With an Absent Taliban" by Mujib Mashal and Rod Nordland. The last two paragraphs sum it up:
While many in Kandahar criticized Mr. Ghani for reaching out to Pakistan, others were sympathetic, saying he had no choice but to keep pushing for talks.

“This is a scattered, spread war in Afghanistan which also involves several countries,” said Abdul Jabar Qahraman, a member of Parliament. “The Afghan government has no other way but to engage them. The Taliban are also a fractured movement. One of them launched an attack on Kandahar, but it is possible that another faction wants to talk.”
Sounds like Syria and Iraq, doesn't it? It is the formula for perpetual war. A conclusion which is unavoidable is that this is a state of affairs that the U.S., with by far the largest military, favors.

Thursday, November 5, 2015

U.S. Project in Afghanistan: Going, Going, Soon to be Gone

The jaw-dropping absurdity that is the Western project in Afghanistan is on display in two stories published yesterday and today in The New York Times. 

Yesterday, Alissa Rubin, in "Life Pulls Back in Afghan Capital, as Danger Rises and Troops Recede," tours a greatly changed Kabul from "the surge" days of yesteryear. Gone are most of the Westerners, as well as the restaurants and nightspots that served them. Helicopters shuttle U.S. embassy staff to and from the airport; driving is considered too dangerous. Afghans stand in line at the Interior Ministry office to get papers stamped in order to exit the the country:
KABUL, Afghanistan — If there had been grumbling before about the deafening intrusion of low-flying American helicopters in the Afghan capital, the discontent has surely multiplied along with the number of flights: packs of them now, coming two, four, six at a time, starting around 7 a.m., then again at midday and at dusk. 
Why so many? 
“The American Embassy’s not allowed to move by road anymore,” a senior Western official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to brief the news media. 
“If you’re at the airport and you have work at the embassy or at R.S.,” he said, referring to the international coalition’s mission, known as Resolute Support, “they fly you over in the morning and back at night.” 
After 14 years of war, of training the Afghan Army and the police, it has become too dangerous to drive the mile and a half from the airport to the embassy.
If that doesn't conjure up the Saigon of 1975, read on. It is fascinating story, the kind of "reporter's notebook" I wish the Gray Lady would indulge in more often:
One favored spot over the years was the Design Cafe, a place with what might be called Kabul chic: sconces on the walls and low Afghan-style seats with cushions indoors and rattan furniture in its leafy courtyard. The cafe made an amazing mint lemonade in the summers, with icy, barely sweet, shredded mint whipped in until the drink turned a frothy green. 
Now, on a hot day in August, the corrugated metal door was locked, and no amount of banging on it brought an answer. Through the small square grate, all that was visible was a dusty courtyard, a couple of plastic bags blowing across it in the late afternoon wind. 
The cafe had a second outpost in a more secure neighborhood, and that one appeared to be open — at least someone answered the door. 
But walking inside was like entering an attic. The upholstered chairs were covered in dust, and a couple of them no longer had cushions, as if this were the last lot for sale at an auction, when all that was left was the furniture nobody bid on. 
Was it possible to get a coffee? The two guards conferred. Then one said, “Yes.” 
He would go look for the cook, he said doubtfully, then appeared relieved when he was told not to worry about it. 
It was not just the expatriates leaving; the Afghans were going, too, and in droves.
But the story that takes the cake is today's. In "Afghan Businessman Convicted in Kabul Bank Fraud Is Still Free to Make Money," Mujib Mashal describes how Khalilullah Frozi, the guy convicted of bilking the Kabul Bank of close to $1 billion, is actually partnering with Ashraf Ghani's government to develop real estate. Ghani endeared himself to his Western backers last year upon assuming the presidency by promising that he would go hard after the people responsible for defrauding Kabul Bank. Brokering deals with the convicted fraudster and allowing him to serve out his 15-year sentence at night by sleeping in a posh cell stuffed with floor cushions and Persian rugs doesn't really conjure up the sobriquet "The Ralph Nader of Afghanistan."
KABUL, Afghanistan — In a big day for development here, a notable Afghan businessman stood with top government officials on Wednesday as he signed the contract for a new township: 8,800 homes across 33 acres of prime real estate in the heart of the capital, with an initial investment of at least $95 million.

There was just one problem: The businessman, Khalilullah Frozi, is supposed to be serving a 15-year prison sentence for his role in defrauding Kabul Bank of nearly $1 billion of depositors’ money. The scheme broughtAfghanistan’s biggest bank, where Mr. Frozi was listed as chief executive, near collapse in 2010, and it deeply shook trust in the Western-backed financial system here. 
But Mr. Frozi, it seems, will be spending his days making money while he serves his sentence at night.

Five years after the banking scandal, the apparent unwillingness of the Afghan authorities to deal firmly with the perpetrators is perhaps one of the most glaring examples of Western impotence in the fight to clean up a system that the United States, chiefly, built and paid for.
But wait. It gets worse:
Mr. Ghani’s coalition government depends on many of the same players [that Mr. Frozi bought when he headed Kabul Bank], and could do little more now than to reach a compromise with Mr. Frozi, the analysts say. 
Mr. Frozi’s enduring influence ensured him luxury even in jail, from where he was reportedly released regularly to watch his soccer team, Ferozi F.C. 
On a daily basis, Mr. Frozi posted photographs and poems on his Facebook page from his cell, which was specially furnished with cushions and maroon Persian rugs, its walls painted a pale yellow. 
Among the images is one of him with his children lounging on the cushions during family visit day. There is even a photograph of Mr. Frozi in the prison yard, hanging out with Taliban prisoners. 
“In Pul-i-Charkhi prison, with the political opponents of the National Unity Government,” the caption reads, in reference to Mr. Ghani’s coalition that he just signed a partnership with.
Obama's decision to extend the presence of U.S. troops through the end of 2016 needs to be seen for what it is: a delaying tactic that dumps the mess on the lap of whomever succeeds him. The Taliban have already won. That's why there is a mass migration underway. In all those stories about refugees flocking to Europe, Afghans are the next nationality mentioned after Syrians.

The U.S. project in Afghanistan is an abject failure. Kingpins like Khalilullah Frozi, who stored the money looted from Kabul Bank in the U.A.E., will be fine, I would imagine, when the Taliban take control of Kabul.

Doctors Without Borders is still waiting after one month for an answer from the Pentagon why its hospital in Kunduz was blown apart and its staff killed. Was the reason for the attack really to assassinate an ISI agent?

U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, tracking all the way back to the days of Jimmy Carter, is inherently part of the global guy-wires of neoliberalism and neoconservatism. Its onrushing collapse portends a great change coming our way.

Thursday, October 22, 2015

Spy vs. Spy: The Kunduz Doctors Without Borders Hospital Info War

One week ago AP reporter Ken Dilanian broke a story, "US analysts knew Afghan site was hospital," which argued that the lethal attack on the Doctors Without Borders hospital in Kunduz was premeditated, not an accident, and that its purpose was to kill a Pakistani agent from the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The ISI operative was purportedly directing the Taliban assault on Kunduz from the Doctors Without Border hospital.

Dilanian has been busted in the past for being a spook conduit. So we have to interpret his "ISI agent using the Kunduz hospital as a command and control outpost" story as a "limited hangout."

The "newspaper of record" has studiously avoided the Dilanian story. Yesterday it published what is known in the propaganda industry as a  "modified limited hangout."

Eric Schmitt and Matthew Rosenberg never refer directly to Dilanian in "Hospital Attack Fueled by Units New to Kunduz." Instead they proffer the position that the hospital attack was due to the inexperience of Fort Lewis Special Forces troops who were new to the theater, as were their Afghan counterparts. In other words, the destruction of the hospital and the murder of civilians was all just a regrettable accident, just another sorrowful tale chalked up to the fog of war.

Towards the end of the Schmitt-Rosenberg piece the reader receives a dismissal of the Dilanian hypothesis:
Since the strike, a number of Afghan officials, including Masoom Stanekzai, the acting defense minister, have publicly claimed that the Taliban were fighting from the hospital, and that the insurgents were storing heavy weapons there. There has also been talk of operatives from Pakistan’s main spy agency, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, using the hospital as a base from which to help direct Taliban fighters in Kunduz.

But the Aghan security official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid directly contradicting other officials, dismissed all those claims as “unfounded — there is no hard evidence.” 
The hospital had treated many wounded Taliban fighters over the years, and some may have been there at the time of the strike. But “they were not fighting right then,” the official said.
Eric Schmitt is the Gray Lady's numero uno conduit for spookery. So what we have here is spy vs. spy. Schmitt vs. Dilanian. The overall purposes is to sow confusion, to go from limited hangout to modified limited hangout in an attempt to obscure a shocking U.S. war crime.

Wednesday, October 14, 2015

Obama to Rescind U.S. Troop Pullout from Afghanistan: Perpetual War the Preferred Option of the Power Elite

A good story by Matthew Rosenberg, "Obama Is Rethinking Pullout in Afghanistan, Officials Say," which directly confirms Putin's observation about U.S. military planners having mush for brains, appears in today's paper. Obama, having announced at the end of last year the wholly fictitious end of U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, is set to rescind the deadline of year-end 2016 for a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops:
But at the very least, those pushing for an expanded mission after 2017 would like to see the United States and its NATO allies maintain at least two or three bases from which drones could be flown and Special Operations Forces could readily strike at militants. The Central Intelligence Agency also wants a larger presence to help protect its assets in Afghanistan.
For now, the option that is being most seriously considered is a proposal made this past summer by Gen. Martin Dempsey, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to keep 3,000 to 5,000 troops for the counterterrorism mission.
The officials said that the Pentagon had also presented other options that range from just an embassy force of about 1,000, which mainly protects American diplomats in Kabul, to maintaining the current force of roughly 9,800, which would also allow American forces to continue training and advising the Afghans.
***
Still, Mr. Obama and some of his closest advisers remain skeptical of the military’s ability to continue training and advising Afghan forces, other officials said. Building the Afghan Army and police was the main imperative of American-led coalition for much of the past five years, and it has cost the United States more than $65 billion since the war’s outset. Yet even with roughly 17,000 NATO troops still on the ground — including the 9,800 Americans — the Taliban still managed last month to take Kunduz, seizing a city for the first time since 2001.
Afghan forces struggled to retake Kunduz, despite American airstrikes clearing a path and American Special Operations forces at times joining the fight. The city appeared to be back in government hands on Tuesday for the first time in more than two weeks after the Taliban said they were pulling out in order to avoid, as they said in a statement, the “unnecessary waste of ammunition.”
The battle for Kunduz also laid bare the risks posed by air power when, on Oct. 3, an American strike was called in by Afghan troops. The air attack hit a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders, killing 22 patients and medical staff — and no insurgents.
The president is determined to avoid a repeat of the strike on the hospital, for which he personally apologized, and wants any mission after next year to be as narrow as possible, officials said.
Seemingly the entire U.S. national security establishment is circling the wagons around a robust military presence to train and assist the Afghan Armed Forces regardless of the price tag.
Beyond the military, though, a powerful cross-section of the American foreign policy and national security establishment is also pushing for as broad a military commitment in Afghanistan as possible. The latest salvo is a paper to be released on Wednesday by the Atlantic Council, a think tank, which bluntly declares: “U.S. and NATO force levels and presence around the country, as well as intelligence assets, should be maintained at or close to present levels.”
The main argument of the paper, which was written by James B. Cunningham, a former ambassador to Afghanistan, centers on the need to continue helping Afghan forces, and to give the next American administration as much flexibility as possible.
But the most striking element of the paper, which was provided to The New York Times ahead of its release, is the list of more than 20 former senior officials, Democrats and Republicans alike, who have signed on to it. The list includes Madeleine Albright, the former secretary of state who served under President Clinton; Stephen Hadley, who was national security adviser to President George W. Bush; two former defense secretaries,Chuck Hagel and Leon Panetta (who also ran the Central Intelligence Agency); and four former American ambassadors to Afghanistan. The paper’s two sponsors are Senators John McCain, Republican of Arizona, and Jack Reed, Democrat of Rhode Island.
After 14 years of war in Afghanistan, the list of American officials who have worked with the Afghans is long. And many have in the past year stepped forward to urge Mr. Obama to keep American troops in Afghanistan; in March, when President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan was in Washington, a group of 23 former ambassadors and senior officials made their point in an open letter to the president.
“Those of us who worked with the Afghans over the last decade or more feel that we’ve established a relationship that is of some enduring value,” said James Dobbins, the Obama administration’s former special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and one of the signatories to the Atlantic Council paper.
He argued that Afghanistan may be the most democratic country in the Muslim world today, and that its government was unambiguously the most pro-American. But without American troops, he said, Afghanistan’s future is grim.ontinue reading the main story
“I can’t promise you that retaining a commitment at the current level will ultimately yield a completely peaceful settled and stable Afghanistan,” he said.
But leaving behind too few troop was lead to “an Afghanistan in complete turmoil.”
“You like Syria?” he said. “How would you like to have another one?”
Of course the United States helped create the chaos in Syria. No acknowledgement of that. Nor is there acknowledgement of the gist of a story by Rod Nordland and Joseph Goldstein, "Afghan Taliban’s Reach Is Widest Since 2001, U.N. Says," from a few days back:
The data, compiled in early September — even before the latest surge in violence in northern Afghanistan — showed that United Nations security officials had already rated the threat level in about half of the country’s administrative districts as either “high” or “extreme,” more than at any time since the American invasion ousted the Taliban in 2001.
That assessment, which has not been publicly released but is routinely shared by the United Nations with countries in the international coalition, appears at odds with the assessment of its American commander, Gen. John F. Campbell, in his testimony to Congress last week.
“The Afghan security forces have displayed courage and resilience,” General Campbell testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday. “They’re still holding. The Afghan government retains control of Kabul, of Highway One, its provincial capitals and nearly all of the district centers.”
Afghan officials in many districts currently under attack by the Taliban depict a significantly different situation. Even Highway One, a ring road connecting all of Afghanistan’s main cities, has long suffered repeated Taliban ambushes and roadblocks in southern Afghanistan; over the past two weeks the insurgents repeatedly cut the highway in the Doshi and Baghlani Jadid districts of Baghlan Province — long an uncontested government stronghold. Few government officials now use the highway along much of its route.
In many districts that are nominally under government control, like Musa Qala in Helmand Province and Charchino in Oruzgan Province, government forces hold only the government buildings in the district center and are under constant siege by the insurgents.
“We do not have any way to escape,” said Wali Dad, the police chief in Charchino, where 400 police officers have been surrounded and pinned down for months. “If we get any means of escaping, I will not stay for a second in the district. The government is failing in their governing, and it’s better to let the Taliban rule.”
General Campbell testified that the Afghan security forces had “reversed almost all of the Taliban gains in northern Helmand after a considerable effort.” He also said they had retaken Musa Qala and held on to other districts, like Sangin and Kajaki, that had been threatened in that area.
On Saturday, however, officials in Musa Qala said the government held only the district government compound, with no freedom of movement outside it because of Taliban threats. 
“Only the government can enter the district center, and there are no government activities outside the district center,” said Haji Mohammad Sharif, the district governor. 
The United Nations data suggests that the tempo of the insurgency has increased in many parts of the country where there had been little Taliban presence in the past, including some areas in the north with scant Pashtun populations. The Taliban have been a largely Pashtun-based insurgency and have been historically strongest in Pashtun-majority areas in southern and eastern Afghanistan, with some pockets in the north, such as Kunduz. 
"We have had fighting in 13 provinces of Afghanistan over the past six months, simultaneously,” President Ashraf Ghani said this month in response to criticism after the fall of Kunduz.
It is a compendium of failure that begs for a policy reversal. Since Obama has already gone the surge route, the logical next step would be to sit down to the bargaining table and hammer out a transition. But we know that won't happen, not only because of the national security elite singing in one voice calling for an indefinite commitment, but also because of the (re)appearance of specific propaganda favorites.

For instance, the old chestnut by Alissa Rubin, "Taliban Waged a Calculated Campaign Against Women in Kunduz"; as if the United States cared anything about the rights of women. This is the same U.S. military that condones sexual slavery as practiced by its mercenary Afghan militia allies.

Another propaganda favorite justifying indefinite, unilateral U.S. military force projection is the image of ISIS on the march, gobbling up and despoiling turf. Mujib Mashal delivers such a report with "Afghan ISIS Branch Makes Inroads in Battle Against Taliban."

The failed occupation will continue. More districts will fall to Taliban. The U.S. and its Afghan puppet government will maintain a cosmetic presence in the district centers. Gradually Kabul will be encircled. But the U.S. elites will have their drones bases and possibly an expanded CIA program for mayhem and murder. The Carter Doctrine can be maintained, I suppose the Beltway thinking goes, as long as you have a sharp stick to stir up the hornet nest.

There is also a pacifying spillover in the homeland. Ever since 9/11 we sing "God Bless America" during the seventh-inning stretch. Back then, we invaded Afghanistan instead of uprooting Al Qaeda's backers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Now, almost 15-years later, we're still in Afghanistan, still losing hearts and minds, and the Saudis have expanded their jihadist terrorism, aided by the CIA, cracking apart the Sykes-Picot Middle East. The U.S. homeland is more militarized than at any time since the Vietnam War.

Then it took Congress to defund the Vietnam War to shut it down. The same thing is going to have to happen now in Afghanistan. The problem is that we are far less democratic a nation than we were 40 years ago. Congress is completely captive to wealth. Both political parties have nothing to do with the interests of ordinary voters. It is going to take a collapse of the system, a crackup, a revolution to get us back on the right path.

Wednesday, October 7, 2015

Taliban Northern Offensive Mortally Wounds Ghani Government

All the happy talk emanating from the U.S. military and the Afghan government of Ashraf Ghani that the Taliban have given up on Kunduz City and are drifting into the bush is debunked by an excellent story, "Taliban Gain Advantage in Tug of War in Kunduz," written by Rod Nordland and Najim Rahim. The entire piece should be read, but the last three paragraphs speak directly to the dire situation the Afghan government finds itself in Kunduz:
A senior Afghan military officer blamed a lack of American airstrikes over the past two days for the Taliban advance on Tuesday, in the wake of the American airstrike that destroyed the Doctors Without Borders hospital in Kunduz on Saturday and killed 22 people, mostly hospital staff and patients. 
“The U.S. airstrikes are halted since yesterday evening,” said the officer, who confirmed that the city remains divided between the insurgents and government forces, with some fighting on Tuesday even in the Sare Dawra neighborhood, close to the airport, where the Afghan Army and American Special Operations troops have headquarters. “Until the airstrikes resume, it will be hard to have any progress in the fighting against the Taliban,” he said. 
The senior officer also blamed a lack of coordination among Afghan units. “There are 10 generals from different organs, and they aren’t under the command of one person who should lead the fighting,” the officer said. “This way, it is unlikely for the Afghan security forces to achieve anything so quickly. The fighting might last for months and Kunduz city may not be retaken.”
Residents are streaming out the city, voting with their feet in a display of distrust for the Afghan military and its NATO allies. What makes this all very Tet like is that it is not just Kunduz under siege; it several northern provinces. According to Alissa Rubin reporting yesterday in "Afghan Forces Report Progress in Kunduz as Taliban Press Other Fronts":
With much of the attention still on Kunduz, where fighting continued Monday and where a devastating American airstrike on Saturday deprived the city’s residents of its most important hospital, new fighting was reported near the provincial capital in Faryab, in northwestern Afghanistan. It was the third northern hub to come under Taliban attack in recent days.
The onslaught on the Faryab provincial capital, Maimana, was barely repelled by the Afghan security forces, said the acting governor, Abdul Sattar Barez. He estimated that some 2,000 Taliban fighters had been involved, but that number seemed high, given that the Taliban managed to take Kunduz City last week with an estimated 300 to 400 fighters.
Regardless, the attacking force was said to include insurgent fighters from four nearby provinces as well as from Faryab: Sari Pul, Jawzjan, Badghis and Ghor. The fighting went on for nearly 10 hours as Taliban attacked the city from three directions, Mr. Barez said. He credited the combination of a united Afghan force backed up by Maimana locals as well as air support from the American-led coalition for repelling the attack.
“The reason we managed to push them back was thanks to the Afghan National Security Forces and the people of Faryab who stood against them and stopped them from achieving their ominous goal,” he said. 
“Thanks, too, to NATO for their air support,” he said, referring to the international coalition, adding: “Their jets flew all night in the skies, which demoralized the enemy. If it wasn’t for the NATO air support, we would not have made it.”
Without U.S. air power the Ghani government's days would be significantly limited, as the reported recapture of Kunduz City by the Taliban proves.

The United States Forces in Afghanistan must be trying to work out the protocols for future airstrikes since General John F. Campbell is granting that the rules were broken in the obliteration of the Doctors Without Borders hospital. How an AC-130 gunship can loiter for over 30 minutes blasting to smithereens the only hospital in the region defies understanding, particularly when Doctors Without Borders says it provided GPS coordinates to both the Taliban and the Afghan/U.S. forces, and then alerted the military of its mistake while the attack was in progress.This is a snafu in the same category of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO air war against Yugoslavia. Doctors Without Borders is not going to let this drop quietly; it is calling for an independent investigation under the Geneva Conventions. This is a big, powerful multinational NGO that usually works within the Western imperial system. The attack on the hospital is a war crime if ever there was one.

Before signing off, it is worth one's time to read the lengthy story on Mullah Mansour (Joseph Golstein, "Taliban’s New Leader Strengthens His Hold With Intrigue and Battlefield Victory"), the newly minted leader of the Afghan Taliban riding high now with the success of his northern offensive. What Goldstein's piece brings home, even though it is too reliant on anonymous sources from Afghan intelligence, is the extent to which Mullah Mansour, and hence the Afghan Taliban, is a creature of Pakistan's national security apparatus:
As acting leader of the Taliban over the past few years, he closely kept the secret that Mullah Omar had been dead since 2013. And he wielded that edge powerfully, issuing orders in Mullah Omar’s name, moving against rival Taliban commanders and steadily consolidating power, according to Afghan and Taliban officials. 
He has also benefited from a powerful alliance with the Pakistani military spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, the original sponsor of the Afghan Taliban insurgency. That relationship, along with a hefty dose of cash payouts to fellow commanders, was a crucial factor in his ability to manage the succession crisis this summer after news of Mullah Omar’s death finally got out, Taliban and Afghan officials said. 
Pakistan’s role in Mullah Mansour’s rise and rule has offered a bit of hope to Afghan and Western officials that Pakistani officials might be persuaded to force the Taliban to accept a peace deal. 
But it has also sometimes been a political liability for Mullah Mansour, embittering some Taliban figures who resent Pakistan’s influence on the leadership and who are not likely to forgive his deception about Mullah Omar’s death. Some alienated commanders have sought a new direction with the Islamic State offshoot that is growing in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
Mullah Mansour’s biggest mystery to Western and Afghan officials is wrapped up in the question of how he will try to shape Afghanistan’s future now that he has consolidated power: Will he attempt to return the Taliban to power as conquerors, or will he try to turn military victories into a strong hand in peace talks? 
His own words and actions would seem to support either path.
Right now there is no mystery at all. War is working for the Taliban. The Ghani government, already inherently weak, is now mortally wounded.

Wednesday, September 30, 2015

Carter Doctrine, Polestar of U.S. Hegemony, is Disintegrating

The reverse side of the neoliberal coin is neoconservatism. Both neoliberalism and neoconservatism got their start in the early 1970s, and by the time of the Carter presidency they had locked in as an essential part of the U.S. body politic.

A neoconservative hallmark is the Carter Doctrine. The Carter Doctrine states that the U.S. will unilaterally use military force to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf.

Though written by Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinki, a famous practitioner of realpolitik, it has been the true north of every Democratic and Republican administration for the last 35 years.

The Carter Doctrine was formulated in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, purportedly to counter Soviet hegemony in the region.

Well, we've come full circle (Neil MacFarquhar, "Russian Pilots Launch First Airstrikes in Syria, Officials Say").

The United States failed experiment in Afghanistan is approaching a flatline. Kunduz, the city, finally fell to the Taliban on Monday (Joseph Goldstein and Mujib Mashal, "Taliban Fighters Capture Kunduz City as Afghan Forces Retreat"). But the surrounding province of Kunduz has been under the control of the Taliban for most of the year. So the city falling should come as no surprise.

The story developing is that the Taliban victory in Kunduz seems to have been well plotted. The Afghan government, guided by it U.S. minders, have not been able to retake the city because of Taliban offensives in adjoining provinces. This is from Joseph Goldstein and Mujib Mashal, "Afghan Crisis Grows as Push to Retake Kunduz From Taliban Fails":
After more than a day of relative silence as the situation worsened around Kunduz, the American military showed the first signs of increased involvement in what the Pentagon called “a setback,” conducting at least two airstrikes, and reportedly more as attacks continued at the airport late Tuesday.

Beyond the Taliban’s gains in Kunduz, there was evidence that the insurgents were also pushing a broader offensive in northern Afghanistan, officials said. One particular point of concern was Takhar Province, just east of Kunduz, where the insurgents were said to be heavily assaulting military checkpoints and government facilities in several districts over the past two days.
And this from a breaking story this morning (Joseph Goldstein, "U.S. Strikes Taliban-Held Land Near Kunduz Airport as Afghan Crisis Deepens"):
KABUL, Afghanistan — American warplanes bombarded Taliban-held territory around the Kunduz airport overnight, and Afghan officials said American Special Forces were rushed toward the fighting. But by Wednesday morning, the crisis in northern Afghanistan had deepened, as the Taliban continued to surge outward from Kunduz, the major city that the militants captured on Monday. 
The militants claimed critical stretches of highway and continued to threaten the area around the airport, where hundreds of Afghan soldiers and civilians have been holed up since the city fell. 
Over the past three days, the Taliban have achieved what appears to be their largest military victory in a war that has gone on for more than a decade. Not only have insurgent forces captured a city of about 300,000 people — the first urban center the Taliban has held since 2001 — but as the reeling Afghan government struggles to respond, it has become clear that not only Kunduz but a large chunk of Afghanistan’s north is at stake.
In Baghlan Province south of Kunduz, Afghan reinforcements on their way to the city have been delayed or stopped altogether amid Taliban ambushes along the main highway. It appeared on Wednesday that before the Afghan government could launch a significant counteroffensive in Kunduz, it would first need to reclaim some of Baghlan.
Reinforcements in large numbers “will not be able to reach Kunduz without a big fight,” said Ted Callahan, a Western security adviser based in northeastern Afghanistan.
Abdul Shaker Urfani, a member of a community council in a northern part of Baghlan, said that more than 1,000 Afghan soldiers and police officers were stuck in the province. They were trying to reach Kunduz, “but they can’t break the Taliban resistance,” Mr. Urfani said.
So much for Obama's ballyhooed "end of U.S. combat operations" in Afghanistan. With superior Taliban planning -- quite a feather in the embattled Mullah Akhtar Mansour's turban -- it appears the north has been lost to the government of Ashraf Ghani, which today marks its one-year anniversary.

Obama has been a profound failure. Back in the heady days following his first landslide election, when I still believed in the illusion that he was a politician who was going to transform the system, in the back of my mind was the shadow that what we had here was another Jimmy Carter.

As it turns out that doubt was indeed prescient. Obama is a two-term Jimmy Carter who will usher in a Trump instead of a Reagan, at the same time as the temple of U.S. unipolar hegemony (i.e., the Carter Doctrine) comes crashing down.

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

Tipping Point Near in Afghanistan

As a grade-school kid I don't recall paying a lot of attention to the news. I remember my mother watching the Senate Watergate hearings; I remember when Nixon resigned -- it was almost time to go back to school after summer vacation. But I don't have any recollection of the Fall of Saigon. I was in the fifth grade.

I think to most people who don't pay much mind to national and international events -- which is to say most people -- the capture of the capital of South Vietnam by the NLF seemed like an afterthought, something along the lines of, "Oh, that hasn't already happened?"

I mention all this because that is basically where we are at with Afghanistan these days. Kabul is at no risk of falling to the Taliban anytime soon. But the news of the last several months has gone from bad to worse. This morning Joseph Goldstein files another dire report, "Taliban Make Gains Across 3 Provinces in Afghanistan."

Bear in mind that the Taliban gains in the north are in the old stomping ground of the Northern Alliance, the United Front of warlords that beat back the Taliban post-9/11 with the aid of U.S. air power and the CIA. As Goldstein points out, the government of Ashraf Ghani is on the verge of losing control of its first major city, Kunduz, on the border of Tajikistan, to the Taliban:
A renewed Taliban push has also imperiled Kunduz, the second most important city in the north, which sits near the border with Tajikistan. On Monday, the Taliban seized towns on the outskirts of the city and took control of scores of villages in a district to its southeast, a leading pro-government militia commander in Kunduz Province, Mir Alam, said by telephone.
The Taliban’s advance occurred amid a retreat by local militias that are allied with the government, said local officials and militia commanders. On Tuesday, militia commanders and their fighters were blaming the government for providing them with little in the way of support or ammunition. “During the fighting, I ran out of mortar rounds — to buy one mortar round would cost me 2,000 afghanis,” or about $33, said a local militia commander, Mohammad Omar Pakhsa Paran. “Where would I get the money to buy rounds?”
Mr. Pakhsa Paran said that he commanded 700 men and that, until Monday, he had managed to hold off the Taliban for two years from the area he controlled in Khanabad, a district to the south and east of the city of Kunduz. “When I called the police chief and the commander of the second army brigade to ask for the support needed to defeat the Taliban, they did not answer,” he said, adding that two of his men had been killed, 16 wounded and seven captured before a number of militias, his included, retreated. He said that, all told, about 2,000 armed pro-government fighters had retreated.
The city has been under threat since April, with the Taliban forces in the area bolstered by militants from Central Asia.
Government security officials believe the Taliban see Kunduz as a major prize: If it falls, it will be the first city they have managed to seize since their government was toppled in late 2001. In recent months, the insurgents have pushed into the city’s outskirts and seized control of neighboring districts, only to disperse before government forces managed to counterattack. Whether insurgent forces will make an all-out push for the city this time remains to be seen.
But already, there is mounting anger at the government’s inability to keep the Taliban at bay, as civilians fear being killed as the front lines have shifted.
“Is Kunduz a part of the government or does it have no importance?” Amruddin Wali, the deputy head of the Kunduz provincial council, asked in an interview. “The government came here once and made a show of pushing back the Taliban, but they are drowning in their own negligence, and they have let the Taliban come back.”
A spokesman for the Afghan Ministry of Defense is quoted by Goldstein saying don't worry; the government has a plan to recapture territory lost to the Taliban. This is becoming a common refrain. Eventually a tipping point is going to be reached. And we seem to be getting nearer that point as local militia flee and the Afghan National Police surrender:
The Taliban’s latest territorial gains were preceded by a demoralizing blow to the nation’s security forces on Saturday, when nearly 110 policemen surrendered to the Taliban after their base in the northeast came under attack. The episode, which is being described as the largest surrender by Afghan forces in years, illustrates a weakness in the government’s war strategy.
In trying to hold all the territory the American-led coalition turned over to Afghan forces in recent years, the military has spread itself thin across an isolated patchwork of bases that are often beyond the reach of reinforcements. Without the benefit of American air power, the military now finds that its units are often cut off and are being overrun by Taliban forces, which can total over 100 men at a time.
The police base that was attacked last week, in a lawless region of Badakhshan Province, was reportedly well-supplied and heavily staffed. In an interview, Badakhshan’s deputy governor, Gul Mohammad Baidar, said it had supplies for 200 men “that could last for at least three months.”
But when the police on the base found themselves surrounded by a larger Taliban force, the battle lasted for just over two days before the police retreated to a nearby mountain. There, they negotiated a surrender.
“They claimed that lack of on-time reinforcements and air support left them no other choice,” Mr. Baidar said. Most of the police officers came from the surrounding areas and were allowed to return home once they handed over their weapons and swore not to rejoin the government, officials said. An additional 50 or 60 men from elsewhere in Badakhshan are believed to have fled while the surrender was being negotiated.
Afghanistan is increasingly going the way of Syria. Ghani like Assad governs a nation in name only. Territory is carved off on a regular basis. The U.S. will prevent Kabul from falling. But the more territory the Taliban is able to clear and hold, the more untenable Ghani's position at the negotiating table becomes. The end game here is some sort of settlement by the U.S. with the Taliban.

This should not be a problem for the realpolitik Obama administration, which is supporting genocide in Yemen alongside its Wahhabi partner Saudi Arabia at the same time it performed a recent somersault in northern Syria by embracing Turkey's war on the Kurds.

Wednesday, July 1, 2015

U.S. Project in Afghanistan Looking Very Wobbly

Two stories emanating from Afghanistan in the last two days -- "Afghans Protest After U.S. Forces Carry Out Raid on Strongman" by Mujib Mashal; and "In Afghanistan, Suicide Blast and Angry Crowd Target American Soldiers" by Joseph Goldstein and Ahmad Shakib -- highlight the duplicity of the Obama administration's public declaration that U.S. combat operations have ceased in that country.

The first story describes a raid by U.S. military on a local militia (non-Taliban) leader in Parwan Province, home to the U.S. mega-base Bagram Airfield, to destroy a weapons depot. The raid sparked a significant protest:
KABUL, Afghanistan — Protesters in the northern Afghan province of Parwan blocked the main highway there on Monday after American forces raided the village of a local strongman and blew up a weapons depot belonging to him, officials and residents said. 
The raid on Monday morning demonstrated that American troops in Afghanistan, months after President Obama declared their regular combat mission over, are engaged beyond their publicly stated role of advising the Afghan forces and carrying out targeted counterterrorism operations. 
It also highlighted how, despite a lengthy campaign to disarm illegal militias, costing hundreds of millions of dollars, armed groups that have no apparent ties to Al Qaeda or even the Taliban are still considered by American forces to be a significant threat.
The target of Monday’s raid was Jan Ahmad, a local commander who fought the Soviets and then the Taliban. Hours after the raid, shops in Charikar, the capital of Parwan Province, just north of Kabul, remained closed as Mr. Ahmad’s supporters shouted, “Death to America” and “Death to the enemies of Islam.” They expressed outrage at the manner of the raid, saying it was a matter that the Afghan authorities, not foreign forces, should have handled.
“The protesters burned a lot of tires to show their rage,” said Mahmood Hamidy, 20, who runs a private school in Charikar, “and that, if the issue is not taken seriously, they are ready for violence.”
While the American military described the raid as force protection, former commanders and local elders in the north leveled accusations that the raid had been politically motivated and possibly a settling of scores from last year’s election crisis.
Mr. Ahmad has supported Abdullah Abdullah, who was President Ashraf Ghani’s rival in the bitterly contested presidential runoff. At the height of the crisis, Mr. Ahmad was among a group of commanders who threatened to use force to support a breakaway government led by Mr. Abdullah.
Echoing his calls for restraint during the election crisis, Mr. Abdullah, who is now the chief executive in a power-sharing government with Mr. Ghani, called on the protesters Monday to remain calm as he appointed a fact-finding mission and asked Gen. John F. Campbell, the commander of United States forces in Afghanistan, to provide further information on the raid.
The gist of the story is particularly troubling for the U.S.-backed Ghani-Adbullah government. Militias are stockpiling weapons and gearing up for battle in anticipation of a coming collapse of authority in Kabul, and Ghani is using American troops to beat them down.

The second story, filed yesterday by Goldstein and Shakib, describes a suicide attack on a U.S. military convoy moving through Kabul that ended up in an anti-American protest after it appears troops fired on people trying to come to the assistance of those injured by the blast:
KABUL, Afghanistan — A convoy of American troops survived a huge suicide bomb attack in Kabul on Tuesday afternoon, only to find themselves struggling against a gathering crowd of Afghans who were trying to tend to civilians wounded in the bombing. 
The confusing scene left one American soldier wounded, possibly by a knife, as Afghans shouted, “Death to Americans,” and accused the soldiers of opening fire on them in the frightening seconds after the suicide attack, witnesses said.
The episode hinted at a lingering wellspring of anger against American troops even as the United States’ military presence in Afghanistan is receding. Convoys of heavily armored troop carriers are still spotted routinely in Kabul making shuttle runs between bases and embassies and the airport.
Around 1:30 p.m. on Tuesday, in the hot midday hours, a suicide attacker detonated a car bomb amid one such convoy, on Airport Road. The blast did not kill or seriously injure any of the soldiers, but it wounded at least 22 Afghans, including passing motorists and roadside shopkeepers, and killed at least one, officials said.
What happened next is still being pieced together. But at some point, a member of the crowd attacked and most likely stabbed an American soldier who had exited one of the vehicles to form a cordon, witnesses said. A soldier opened fire, although it was unclear whether the shots came before or after the crowd member’s attack. Some witnesses said the American soldiers, along with Afghan security officials who were nearby, had fired only warning shots.
These stories follow a week where there was a suicide attack on the Parliament in Kabul while Afghan lawmakers were trying to confirm a defense minister. The ministry has gone leaderless since the extra-legal Ghani-Abdullah coalition government assumed power from Hamid Karzai last September. Parliament's term has expired; it is in session based on presidential fiat. The Taliban is taking territory in the north.

Joseph Goldstein and Rod Nordland reported last week in "Taliban Strike Afghan Parliament as Lawmakers Meet" that things are dire for the U.S. project in Afghanistan:
KABUL, Afghanistan — The Taliban attacked the Afghan Parliament on Monday [June 22] just as lawmakers were convening for their third attempt to confirm a defense minister, while in northern Afghanistan a second district fell to Taliban insurgents. 
At least two bystanders died in the attack on Parliament and more than two dozen were injured, but government officials said that all members of Parliament had been taken to safety with at most only minor injuries. 
The seizure of the Archi district, which was confirmed by an Afghan Local Police commander, deepened concern that an attack on neighboring Kunduz, the capital of Kunduz Province, was imminent. Archi was the second neighboring district to fall in two days. On Sunday, the Ministry of Defense and other officials confirmed Taliban claims that the Chahar Dara district had fallen to the insurgents that morning.
The Parliament attack was an embarrassment to the government, apparently timed to coincide with the appearance of the acting defense minister, Masoom Stanekzai, in an effort to win confirmation. The attack was initiated just as Mr. Stanekzai and the country’s second vice president, Sarwar Danish, arrived at the hall in southwestern Kabul.
The country has been without a confirmed defense minister for nearly 10 months, since the coalition government of President Ashraf Ghani was inaugurated in September. Mr. Stanekzai was Mr. Ghani’s third choice for the post; his other candidates were rejected by Parliament.
The term of the Afghan Parliament expired Sunday, with no arrangements yet agreed upon between Mr. Ghani and his coalition partners for new elections. Mr. Ghani extended its term in office until new elections are held, although it is unclear whether such a move was constitutional.
As the Ghani-Abdullah government wobbles, the Taliban is softening its image, reaching out to women ("Taliban Are Talking Peace, Though Not With Afghan Government" by Mujib Mashal). One wonders how close the Kabul-based U.S.-dependent government of the former Johns Hopkins professor is to experiencing its own helicopter-on-the-U.S.-embassy-in-Saigon moment.

Thursday, October 23, 2014

A Tolerant Taliban in Kunduz Province Collaborates with U.S.A.I.D.

Finally, after many months, I finished reading Ann Jones' Kabul in Winter (2006). The book is terrific, a first-person account of Jones' experience working for a women's rights NGO in Kabul in the first years after the U.S. toppled the Taliban; she uses her own encounters as a device to unwind the history of Afghanistan. 

The takeaway from Jones' book is the U.S.-led international development effort that followed the defeat of the Taliban was corrupt from the very beginning, never sincerely committed to rebuilding a country torn apart for decades by foreign-supported conflict and that by 2005 had lost the hearts and minds of Afghans.

What took me so long to finish Kabul in Winter is just the basic difficulty of reading books when you work a full-time job requiring a long daily commute. I could read many more books if I stopped reading the newspaper on the train and took a book with me to read instead. But since I choose to try to keep up with what is being reported in the "newspaper of record," this means that with the arrival of regular season football in September I only have Saturday to read in an unimpeded fashion.

As I see it the worker running the normal 9-to-5, Monday-thru-Friday rat race deals with a two-day week: one long long-day of 120 hours and one short long-day of 48 hours. The long long-day is all about routines and basic survival of the work week; free time is doled out in 15-minute increments. The short long-day of the weekend, for me at least, is about exercising and watching the NFL on Sunday, leaving several hours on Saturday when I can read what I wish.

Anyhow, there is another informative story this morning by the Gray Lady's Azam Ahmed, "Taliban Are Rising Again in Afghanistan’s North." The Taliban are now not only a dominant presence in the south and east of Afghanistan but the north as well where they are actually governing in several sections of Kunduz Province. What is noteworthy about this is that the Taliban are governing in a less totalitarian fashion; they are even allowing some girls' schools to stay open:
Leading the charge for the Taliban is Mullah Abdul Salam, a native of Kunduz Province who was the insurgents’ shadow governor before his arrest by the Pakistani authorities in 2010, officials said. He was set free in a negotiated prisoner release between the Afghan High Peace Council and the Pakistani government in 2013. 
Under his leadership this summer, it appears the insurgents have been trying new tactics, showing a flexibility in governing rather than relying on fear, according to interviews with more than two dozen locals and officials across the province. 
Residents and an aid official said that local commanders had been allowing schools to stay open and even distributing pens and notebooks — including at girls’ schools, which were often targets for violence under the Taliban’s rule in the 1990s. They said the insurgents had even given their blessing to international development projects in some areas, which would once have been unthinkable. 
“They have a parallel system to the government, one that approves the development projects,” said a stabilization adviser for a U.S.A.I.D. contractor, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he works in Taliban areas. “We can’t do anything without the Taliban approval.” 
Some residents said that Taliban justice had already proved more attractive than that offered by the government. 
“Their justice is quick, and they do what they say,” said Mohammad Nazar, a local elder who works for the government community development council in Chahar Dara.
If U.S.A.I.D. is collaborating with a newly tolerant Taliban, this strikes me as another enormous barrier to the success of the Ghani administration in Kabul.