Showing posts with label Syria Comment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Syria Comment. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 3, 2015

The ISIS-Assad Canard Reappears

When it's time to post the newest installment in the information war against the Syrian government, one can always count on NYT's Anne Barnard to be front and center, as she is today with "Assad’s Forces May Be Aiding New ISIS Surge."

The gist of the story, built out of Twitter posts from the shuttered U.S. Embassy in Syria and interviews from spokesmen for Islamic Front (Syria), is that the Syrian air force bombed rebel-held positions northeast of Aleppo, softening them up for an ISIS offensive:
At stake is the survival of one of the few pockets of insurgent-held territory not dominated by the Nusra Front or the Islamic State. Northeast of the city of Aleppo, which is divided between government and rebel control, the main insurgent groups are Islamist factions not affiliated with the two most extreme groups. 
Khaled Khoja, the president of the main Syrian exile opposition group, accused Mr. Assad of deploying his warplanes “as an air force for ISIS.”
Echoing those claims, the Twitter account of the long-closed United States Embassy in Syria made its strongest statement yet about Mr. Assad’s tactics. 
“Reports indicate that the regime is making airstrikes in support of #ISIL’s advance on #Aleppo, aiding extremists against Syrian population,” the embassy said in a series of Twitter posts. In another post, it added that government warplanes were “not only avoiding #ISIL lines, but actively seeking to bolster their position.”
Neither American officials nor Syrian insurgents have provided proof of such direct coordination, though it has long been alleged by the insurgents. The State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf told reporters Tuesday that United States officials were looking into the claims but had no independent confirmation. 
What is clear is that Mr. Assad and the Islamic State reap benefits by eliminating or weakening other insurgent groups. Mr. Assad can claim he is the only alternative to the Islamic State, and the Islamic State can claim it carries the banner of oppressed Syrians and Iraqis. 
But insurgents said the recent fighting around Aleppo provided by far the strongest indication of active coordination. “It was never this blatant,” said Abu Abdo Salabman, a spokesman for the Sham Revolutionary Brigades, a rebel group that has sent reinforcements to the battle.
Besides the demurrer (in bold red above), Barnard provides no counterpoint, whether from a Syrian government official or a third-party expert, to the claim that Assad is acting as Islamic State's air force. Like her recent reports with Somini Sengupta on the Syrian Arab Army's use of barrel bombs of chlorine gas, Barnard acts as stovepipe for anti-Assad propaganda direct to the pages of the "newspaper of record."

My sense of what is going on here is the desire of the U.S. to appropriate some of the language and argumentation that has gained a wide popular purchase in the information war, despite the close coordination of the mainstream media with Western governments, and that is the idea that the U.S. is publicly, officially at war with ISIS and Nusra while working behind the scenes to make sure the jihadis continue to hold and acquire Iraqi and Syrian turf. In other words, if you can't beat 'em, join em.

The ISIS-Assad canard is not new. It was trotted out and then thoroughly debunked in February 2014.

The point that Barnard makes in the first paragraph of the above quote, that the insurgent-held territory between Aleppo and the Turkish border that is under ISIS assault is somehow pristine and free from the Salafist infection of Nusra, is disingenuous. Islamic Front is part of the Nusra-led Army of Conquest that has racked up victories in Idlib on its drive to Alawite-populated Mediterranean coast. As Barnard acknowledges, Nusra is rushing fighters to defend Islamic Front's turf in Aleppo:
Insurgents said they had been able to slow the Islamic State’s advance on Aleppo by diverting fighters, ranging from Nusra to nationalist groups, from other fronts where they had been facing government troops.
The jihadis are an alphabet soup, mixed and matched, moved here and there on the battlefield under different names, but they share the same goal with the United States and its despotic partners in the GCC, cracking Iran's power base.

The jihadis can share the same goal without being unified. Islamic State has proven itself time and again to be adept at devouring low-hanging fruit. An argument can be made that the Turkish/Saudi desire for a no-fly zone in northern Syria is one step closer to realization if it's Islamic State that controls the territory.

Friday, October 10, 2014

Future of Caliphate at Risk in Battle for Kobani

Turkey, a NATO ally, is insistent that Syria under Assad is a greater threat than Islamic State; hence, the Turkish demand for a buffer zone along its border as a quid pro quo for the country's participation in the U.S.-led coalition to degrade and destroy ISIS. As Tim Arango and Ceylan Yeginsu report today in "Turkey Seeks Buffer Zone on the Border With Syria":
While Turkey has largely described the plan in humanitarian terms — to protect refugees and also Turkey’s border — the argument made privately is that a buffer zone would quickly evolve into a place where moderate rebels would be trained to fight Mr. Assad’s government; in other words, a fledgling rebel state.
“It would mainly be a place where an alternate government structure would take root and for the training of rebels,” said Frederic C. Hof, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former American envoy to the Syrian opposition.
It should be noted that Fred Hof has been an advocate for regime change in Syria from the outset, and he remains the go-to guy in the prestige press for an easy warpig quote.

Make no mistake, the buffer zone is not about toppling Assad; it is about beating down the Kurds. Erdogan prefers a caliphate on his southeastern flank to a "fledging" Marxist-inspired Kurdish state:
Some analysts say that Turkey’s call for a buffer zone would allow it to forestall any bid for Kurdish autonomy within northern Syria, and the Kurds have opposed the idea. 
“Turkey is ultimately using the no-fly zone and talk of taking part in the coalition against ISIS as a cover for seeking international legitimacy for what they actually want to do, which is to crush the Kurds,” said Halil M. Karaveli, an expert on Turkey and a senior fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in Stockholm.
For a brief presentation of the enormous importance of the ISIS vs. YPG battle over Kobani, check out yesterday's Syria Comment post by Carl Drott, "What is at Stake in Kobani: Islamic State and Kobani Calculations." Drott sees the current struggle for the Kurdish enclave as basically determining whether the caliphate will survive or a Kurdish homeland in northern Syria will:
To conclude: If IS forces capture Kobani, their victory will be definite and irrevocable. If YPG manages to hold IS at bay, its forces will eventually have to take back enough territory to create sustainable living conditions. The scale of their ambitions will depend on what is feasible. In their very different ways, IS and YPG both have the capacity to govern these areas over time.
U.S. dithering makes more sense in light of Kobani's importance. After all, the U.S. has an ownership stake in ISIS; it does not want Islamic State to collapse before Sykes-Picot can be remade according to plan, whatever exactly that plan is (though it definitely includes a non-Baathist Syria and a tripartite, federalized Iraq). If the Leftist Kurds, the Syrian branch of the PKK, were to successfully beat back the jihadis, it would represent a great strategic victory, as Drott explains:
Before the attack started, YPG controlled some territory between Shiukh bridge and Qara Quzak bridge along the eastern shore of the Euphrates. Even more importantly, YPG controlled a stretch of the main motorway east of Qara Quzak bridge. This territory has now been captured, which means significantly improved communications within the northern parts of the “caliphate.” Kobani town itself is relatively insignificant, but the survival of a YPG-controlled enclave would tie up military resources and constitute a security problem for IS in the longer term. 
If the tables are turned at some point in the future, YPG will certainly look east towards Tel Abyad. The capture of this town would enable the isolated Kobani enclave to be connected with the much larger Jazira area that also borders the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (a successful attack would most likely come from this side). For IS, on the other hand, getting expelled from this area would mean losing all access to Turkey east of Jarabulus.
Erdogan has apparently risked all -- scrapping the peace process with the PKK, butting heads with the Obama administration, outing Turkish support of ISIS -- because the future of the caliphate is at risk in Ayn al-Arab. We can expect the Turks to do everything in their power to make sure the YPG does not triumph. The Obama administration, given its split between State Department neocons and Pentagon reluctant warriors, will continue to dither.

Thursday, February 13, 2014

Gray Lady Peddles ISIS-Assad Canard

This morning a frontpage story, "Escaped Inmates From Iraq Fuel Syrian Insurgency," by Tim Arango and Eric Schmitt, traces the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its outsize role in the war in Syria as well as the daily mounting death toll in Iraq to a series of well-planned prison breaks, particularly one at Tikrit in September 2012 and one at Abu Ghraib in July 2013:
That group even had a name for its prison strategy, “Operation Breaking the Walls,” which unfolded during a 12-month campaign from July 2012 until a major break at Abu Ghraib, the main Iraqi prison, on the western outskirts of the capital, in July 2013. In all, American officials estimate, a few hundred of the escapees have joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, several in senior leadership roles.
The reason for the story and its prominent display in today's paper becomes apparent as one approaches its conclusion -- to peddle the oft-repeated canard that ISIS is a construct of the Syrian government. The only wrinkle here is that al-Maliki of Iraq is now being added to the mix:
Among the more moderate fighting groups within Syria, the prison breaks have helped stoke conspiracy theories that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, which has been fighting recently with the groups, is a pawn of the Assad government. While there is no evidence to back that up, some said they believed that the Syrian government — with assistance from the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, which has largely sided with Mr. Assad — helped orchestrate the escapes. 
“By doing this, exporting more foreign fighters to Syrian territory, the Maliki government did Assad’s regime a favor by supporting his claim of fighting terrorism inside Syria,” said Abduljabbar Osso, a rebel leader in Aleppo who has been fighting with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. 
Another rebel commander, Lt. Col. Ahmad al-Aboud, said that the moment his people heard about the prison escapes in Iraq, “We knew we would face more trouble after that.” 
“We have always faced difficulties smuggling light weapons from Iraq to Syria through the Iraq border,” he said, “but it was very easy for ISIS to get full patrols of vehicles, weapons and fighters across to Syria.” 
The Iraqi government has done little to explain how the prison breaks happened, although most agree that the inmates had help from the inside. Parliament members said that when they tried to investigate the Abu Ghraib break, they were stymied by security forces and top government officials. 
“Unfortunately, the government did not allow us to even get close to the prison for a week,” said Shwan Muhammed, a member of Parliament and one of the investigators.
This is not journalism; this is propaganda.

For a thorough refutation of the ISIS-Assad connection, see "The Assad Regime and Jihadis: Collaborators and Allies?" by Aymenn Al-Tamimi, which appeared this week on Joshua Landis' pro-opposition Syria Comment blog. It is a lengthy, detailed post that debunks point by point each element of the ISIS-Assad canard.

The most obvious weakness in the argument is the idea that the Syrian government would create a deadly fighting force in order to inflict damage to itself. Peddlers of the Canard insist that the Syrian Arab Army doesn't actually engage in combat with ISIS. Al-Tamimi convincingly refutes this:
With ISIS, the reasoning goes that the group does not focus on fighting regime forces, such that it even leaves regime areas alone, and in return the regime agrees not to bomb ISIS-held territory. 
This line of argument overlooks that ISIS has a record of fighting the regime on multiple fronts, including the Sheikh Said area of Aleppo province, Kwiris military airbase (where an offensive is ongoing under the leadership of muhajireen battalion Suqur al-Izz, in coordination with the Green Battalion, ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra), Nubl and Zahara, Brigade 17 airbase in Raqqa province, Tabqa military airport, Qalamoun, Sayyida Zainab, Sakhna in Homs desert, the Qamishli area, and Latakia province. Besides these locations, one should also remember ISIS’ leading role in the capture of Mannagh airbase. 
It is of course true that ISIS is now fighting on fewer fronts against regime forces since the wider infighting with other rebels broke out, but that is only to be expected: remaining too thinly spread out would have cost the group even more territorial losses. Even so, following ISIS’ seizure of Raqqa city, Tel Abyad, Tabqa and Ma’adan, it is not true that ISIS has ignored the regime’s airbases in Raqqa province, engaging in clashes with regime forces around Brigade 17 in mid to late January before being cleared out by the end of month through airstrikes on the surroundings. 
As for Tabqa military airport, this area has been subjected to mortar shelling recently by ISIS in collaboration with Liwa Owais al-Qorani, an independent battalion in Tabqa that has not pledged bay’ah (allegiance) to ISIS but rather, as a local anti-ISIS Raqqa contact explained to me, is subordinate to and “takes orders from ISIS.” 
Coming to regime airstrikes, it is untrue that the regime has not hit ISIS strongholds, having struck Raqqa city as recently on February 7. The counter-claim is that since ISIS advertises itself on social media so much, why does the regime not strike these positions? However, this argument firstly presumes that the regime’s air force has any kind of precision in launching airstrikes. Second, as the regime’s record elsewhere demonstrates, targeting of civilian areas in rebel-held territory is part of its tactics. 
In any event, one must ask what the regime would gain strategically by constantly bombing ISIS strongholds in Raqqa province, or ISIS strongholds elsewhere, for that matter, located far beyond the frontlines. As in the wider east of Syria, the regime lacks ground forces to launch an offensive to retake any territory in Raqqa province, and must depend on airlifts from elsewhere to maintain its remaining airbases. Hence, the regime is focusing its airstrikes where it has some real expectations of advancing: most notably in Aleppo city.
Read al-Tamimi's post. It will muffle the constant drum beat of "Assad collaborates with ISIS."

But why is the New York Times now peddling this lie? I think it is of a piece with the regular efforts being made to show that ISIS has a self-sustaining funding source. In both the criminal enterprise funding source and Assad collaboration stories you get a firewall between the main jihadi organization gobbling up territory in Iraq and Syria for the Caliphate and Saudi Arabia, one of the two main U.S. allies in the Middle East.

Plus, by raising the baleful specter of an evil group of ruthless jihadis, you artificially create the impression that there are "good" jihadis, like Islamic Front and Nusra. In reality, as al-Tamimi shows, there is little difference.