Significant Defeat for Islamic State at Kobani

There is more to the headline "Turkey to Let Iraqi Kurds Cross to Syria to Fight ISIS" than meets the eye. Less a change of heart or the result of concessions won from the United States, it is Turkey acknowledging that the Kurdish People's Protection Units, the YPG, have won the critical battle for Kobani.

The Turks are not allowing PKK-affiliated fighters transit to the battle zone; rather, it is the Kurdish pesh merga, with whom Ankara has cordial relations. As Kareem Fahim and Karam Shoumali report,

The decision to permit fighters aligned with different Iraqi Kurdish factions — groups that are aligned with Turkey — to join the battle in Kobani allows Mr. Erdogan to maintain his stance against the P.K.K. while addressing some of the criticism of his policy.

“Opening a passage for the pesh merga creates the impression that Turkey has changed its stance, and is on board with the coalition against ISIS,” said Halil M. Karaveli, an expert on Turkey and a senior fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in Stockholm. “But this move is actually in Turkey’s own interests.” Mr. Karaveli said the pesh merga would counterbalance the Kurdish groups in Kobani that Turkey opposes.

The U.S. decision to resupply the YPG with arms (supplied by Iraqi Kurdistan), including antitank weapons, and ammunition by means of airdrop seems to have forced Erdogan's hand. Islamic State fighters have been pushed back and, in a sign of losing tactical advantage, have resorted to car bombings and torching homes.

This is a significant defeat for ISIS. Jihadis were massed along with APCs and tanks to take the town, which, contrary to initial Obama administration claims that the area was of little strategic value, was of utmost importance to the caliphate (for the reasons why, see Carl Drott's "What is at Stake in Kobani"). Now, the People's Protection Units, bolstered by the pesh merga, can go on the offensive, pushing east against the jihadis.

A senior Pentagon official said on Monday, speaking on the condition of anonymity, that “it will be a significant change to be able to have a free flow of fighters going into Kobani.” 

A Kurdish defense official in Kobani, Ismet Sheikh Hassan said he had not been given any information about when the pesh merga would arrive. He welcomed the influx, while asserting that the Kurdish fighters already in the city — members of the People’s Protection Forces, the Y.P.G. — were not desperate for more fighters. 

“We are short on ammunition and weapons,” he said “not on human power.” 

But Mohamed Arif Ali, a doctor working in Kobani, said that the arrival of even a few pesh merga fighters was symbolically important, and would bolster Kurdish unity. “It means a lot to the civilians and fighters,” he said. “They are not left alone facing ISIS.”

Future of Caliphate at Risk in Battle for Kobani

Turkey, a NATO ally, is insistent that Syria under Assad is a greater threat than Islamic State; hence, the Turkish demand for a buffer zone along its border as a quid pro quo for the country's participation in the U.S.-led coalition to degrade and destroy ISIS. As Tim Arango and Ceylan Yeginsu report today in "Turkey Seeks Buffer Zone on the Border With Syria":

While Turkey has largely described the plan in humanitarian terms — to protect refugees and also Turkey’s border — the argument made privately is that a buffer zone would quickly evolve into a place where moderate rebels would be trained to fight Mr. Assad’s government; in other words, a fledgling rebel state.

“It would mainly be a place where an alternate government structure would take root and for the training of rebels,” said Frederic C. Hof, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former American envoy to the Syrian opposition.

It should be noted that Fred Hof has been an advocate for regime change in Syria from the outset, and he remains the go-to guy in the prestige press for an easy warpig quote.

Make no mistake, the buffer zone is not about toppling Assad; it is about beating down the Kurds. Erdogan prefers a caliphate on his southeastern flank to a "fledging" Marxist-inspired Kurdish state:

Some analysts say that Turkey’s call for a buffer zone would allow it to forestall any bid for Kurdish autonomy within northern Syria, and the Kurds have opposed the idea. 

“Turkey is ultimately using the no-fly zone and talk of taking part in the coalition against ISIS as a cover for seeking international legitimacy for what they actually want to do, which is to crush the Kurds,” said Halil M. Karaveli, an expert on Turkey and a senior fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in Stockholm.

For a brief presentation of the enormous importance of the ISIS vs. YPG battle over Kobani, check out yesterday's Syria Comment post by Carl Drott, "What is at Stake in Kobani: Islamic State and Kobani Calculations." Drott sees the current struggle for the Kurdish enclave as basically determining whether the caliphate will survive or a Kurdish homeland in northern Syria will:

To conclude: If IS forces capture Kobani, their victory will be definite and irrevocable. If YPG manages to hold IS at bay, its forces will eventually have to take back enough territory to create sustainable living conditions. The scale of their ambitions will depend on what is feasible. In their very different ways, IS and YPG both have the capacity to govern these areas over time.

U.S. dithering makes more sense in light of Kobani's importance. After all, the U.S. has an ownership stake in ISIS; it does not want Islamic State to collapse before Sykes-Picot can be remade according to plan, whatever exactly that plan is (though it definitely includes a non-Baathist Syria and a tripartite, federalized Iraq). If the Leftist Kurds, the Syrian branch of the PKK, were to successfully beat back the jihadis, it would represent a great strategic victory, as Drott explains:

Before the attack started, YPG controlled some territory between Shiukh bridge and Qara Quzak bridge along the eastern shore of the Euphrates. Even more importantly, YPG controlled a stretch of the main motorway east of Qara Quzak bridge. This territory has now been captured, which means significantly improved communications within the northern parts of the “caliphate.” Kobani town itself is relatively insignificant, but the survival of a YPG-controlled enclave would tie up military resources and constitute a security problem for IS in the longer term. 

If the tables are turned at some point in the future, YPG will certainly look east towards Tel Abyad. The capture of this town would enable the isolated Kobani enclave to be connected with the much larger Jazira area that also borders the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (a successful attack would most likely come from this side). For IS, on the other hand, getting expelled from this area would mean losing all access to Turkey east of Jarabulus.

Erdogan has apparently risked all -- scrapping the peace process with the PKK, butting heads with the Obama administration, outing Turkish support of ISIS -- because the future of the caliphate is at risk in Ayn al-Arab. We can expect the Turks to do everything in their power to make sure the YPG does not triumph. The Obama administration, given its split between State Department neocons and Pentagon reluctant warriors, will continue to dither.