Future of Caliphate at Risk in Battle for Kobani

Turkey, a NATO ally, is insistent that Syria under Assad is a greater threat than Islamic State; hence, the Turkish demand for a buffer zone along its border as a quid pro quo for the country's participation in the U.S.-led coalition to degrade and destroy ISIS. As Tim Arango and Ceylan Yeginsu report today in "Turkey Seeks Buffer Zone on the Border With Syria":

While Turkey has largely described the plan in humanitarian terms — to protect refugees and also Turkey’s border — the argument made privately is that a buffer zone would quickly evolve into a place where moderate rebels would be trained to fight Mr. Assad’s government; in other words, a fledgling rebel state.

“It would mainly be a place where an alternate government structure would take root and for the training of rebels,” said Frederic C. Hof, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former American envoy to the Syrian opposition.

It should be noted that Fred Hof has been an advocate for regime change in Syria from the outset, and he remains the go-to guy in the prestige press for an easy warpig quote.

Make no mistake, the buffer zone is not about toppling Assad; it is about beating down the Kurds. Erdogan prefers a caliphate on his southeastern flank to a "fledging" Marxist-inspired Kurdish state:

Some analysts say that Turkey’s call for a buffer zone would allow it to forestall any bid for Kurdish autonomy within northern Syria, and the Kurds have opposed the idea. 

“Turkey is ultimately using the no-fly zone and talk of taking part in the coalition against ISIS as a cover for seeking international legitimacy for what they actually want to do, which is to crush the Kurds,” said Halil M. Karaveli, an expert on Turkey and a senior fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in Stockholm.

For a brief presentation of the enormous importance of the ISIS vs. YPG battle over Kobani, check out yesterday's Syria Comment post by Carl Drott, "What is at Stake in Kobani: Islamic State and Kobani Calculations." Drott sees the current struggle for the Kurdish enclave as basically determining whether the caliphate will survive or a Kurdish homeland in northern Syria will:

To conclude: If IS forces capture Kobani, their victory will be definite and irrevocable. If YPG manages to hold IS at bay, its forces will eventually have to take back enough territory to create sustainable living conditions. The scale of their ambitions will depend on what is feasible. In their very different ways, IS and YPG both have the capacity to govern these areas over time.

U.S. dithering makes more sense in light of Kobani's importance. After all, the U.S. has an ownership stake in ISIS; it does not want Islamic State to collapse before Sykes-Picot can be remade according to plan, whatever exactly that plan is (though it definitely includes a non-Baathist Syria and a tripartite, federalized Iraq). If the Leftist Kurds, the Syrian branch of the PKK, were to successfully beat back the jihadis, it would represent a great strategic victory, as Drott explains:

Before the attack started, YPG controlled some territory between Shiukh bridge and Qara Quzak bridge along the eastern shore of the Euphrates. Even more importantly, YPG controlled a stretch of the main motorway east of Qara Quzak bridge. This territory has now been captured, which means significantly improved communications within the northern parts of the “caliphate.” Kobani town itself is relatively insignificant, but the survival of a YPG-controlled enclave would tie up military resources and constitute a security problem for IS in the longer term. 

If the tables are turned at some point in the future, YPG will certainly look east towards Tel Abyad. The capture of this town would enable the isolated Kobani enclave to be connected with the much larger Jazira area that also borders the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (a successful attack would most likely come from this side). For IS, on the other hand, getting expelled from this area would mean losing all access to Turkey east of Jarabulus.

Erdogan has apparently risked all -- scrapping the peace process with the PKK, butting heads with the Obama administration, outing Turkish support of ISIS -- because the future of the caliphate is at risk in Ayn al-Arab. We can expect the Turks to do everything in their power to make sure the YPG does not triumph. The Obama administration, given its split between State Department neocons and Pentagon reluctant warriors, will continue to dither.