Gray Lady Peddles ISIS-Assad Canard

This morning a frontpage story, "Escaped Inmates From Iraq Fuel Syrian Insurgency," by Tim Arango and Eric Schmitt, traces the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its outsize role in the war in Syria as well as the daily mounting death toll in Iraq to a series of well-planned prison breaks, particularly one at Tikrit in September 2012 and one at Abu Ghraib in July 2013:

That group even had a name for its prison strategy, “Operation Breaking the Walls,” which unfolded during a 12-month campaign from July 2012 until a major break at Abu Ghraib, the main Iraqi prison, on the western outskirts of the capital, in July 2013. In all, American officials estimate, a few hundred of the escapees have joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, several in senior leadership roles.

The reason for the story and its prominent display in today's paper becomes apparent as one approaches its conclusion -- to peddle the oft-repeated canard that ISIS is a construct of the Syrian government. The only wrinkle here is that al-Maliki of Iraq is now being added to the mix:

Among the more moderate fighting groups within Syria, the prison breaks have helped stoke conspiracy theories that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, which has been fighting recently with the groups, is a pawn of the Assad government. While there is no evidence to back that up, some said they believed that the Syrian government — with assistance from the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, which has largely sided with Mr. Assad — helped orchestrate the escapes. 

“By doing this, exporting more foreign fighters to Syrian territory, the Maliki government did Assad’s regime a favor by supporting his claim of fighting terrorism inside Syria,” said Abduljabbar Osso, a rebel leader in Aleppo who has been fighting with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. 

Another rebel commander, Lt. Col. Ahmad al-Aboud, said that the moment his people heard about the prison escapes in Iraq, “We knew we would face more trouble after that.” 

“We have always faced difficulties smuggling light weapons from Iraq to Syria through the Iraq border,” he said, “but it was very easy for ISIS to get full patrols of vehicles, weapons and fighters across to Syria.” 

The Iraqi government has done little to explain how the prison breaks happened, although most agree that the inmates had help from the inside. Parliament members said that when they tried to investigate the Abu Ghraib break, they were stymied by security forces and top government officials. 

“Unfortunately, the government did not allow us to even get close to the prison for a week,” said Shwan Muhammed, a member of Parliament and one of the investigators.

This is not journalism; this is propaganda.

For a thorough refutation of the ISIS-Assad connection, see "The Assad Regime and Jihadis: Collaborators and Allies?" by Aymenn Al-Tamimi, which appeared this week on Joshua Landis' pro-opposition Syria Comment blog. It is a lengthy, detailed post that debunks point by point each element of the ISIS-Assad canard.

The most obvious weakness in the argument is the idea that the Syrian government would create a deadly fighting force in order to inflict damage to itself. Peddlers of the Canard insist that the Syrian Arab Army doesn't actually engage in combat with ISIS. Al-Tamimi convincingly refutes this:

With ISIS, the reasoning goes that the group does not focus on fighting regime forces, such that it even leaves regime areas alone, and in return the regime agrees not to bomb ISIS-held territory. 

This line of argument overlooks that ISIS has a record of fighting the regime on multiple fronts, including the Sheikh Said area of Aleppo province, Kwiris military airbase (where an offensive is ongoing under the leadership of muhajireen battalion Suqur al-Izz, in coordination with the Green Battalion, ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra), Nubl and Zahara, Brigade 17 airbase in Raqqa province, Tabqa military airport, Qalamoun, Sayyida Zainab, Sakhna in Homs desert, the Qamishli area, and Latakia province. Besides these locations, one should also remember ISIS’ leading role in the capture of Mannagh airbase. 

It is of course true that ISIS is now fighting on fewer fronts against regime forces since the wider infighting with other rebels broke out, but that is only to be expected: remaining too thinly spread out would have cost the group even more territorial losses. Even so, following ISIS’ seizure of Raqqa city, Tel Abyad, Tabqa and Ma’adan, it is not true that ISIS has ignored the regime’s airbases in Raqqa province, engaging in clashes with regime forces around Brigade 17 in mid to late January before being cleared out by the end of month through airstrikes on the surroundings. 

As for Tabqa military airport, this area has been subjected to mortar shelling recently by ISIS in collaboration with Liwa Owais al-Qorani, an independent battalion in Tabqa that has not pledged bay’ah (allegiance) to ISIS but rather, as a local anti-ISIS Raqqa contact explained to me, is subordinate to and “takes orders from ISIS.” 

Coming to regime airstrikes, it is untrue that the regime has not hit ISIS strongholds, having struck Raqqa city as recently on February 7. The counter-claim is that since ISIS advertises itself on social media so much, why does the regime not strike these positions? However, this argument firstly presumes that the regime’s air force has any kind of precision in launching airstrikes. Second, as the regime’s record elsewhere demonstrates, targeting of civilian areas in rebel-held territory is part of its tactics. 

In any event, one must ask what the regime would gain strategically by constantly bombing ISIS strongholds in Raqqa province, or ISIS strongholds elsewhere, for that matter, located far beyond the frontlines. As in the wider east of Syria, the regime lacks ground forces to launch an offensive to retake any territory in Raqqa province, and must depend on airlifts from elsewhere to maintain its remaining airbases. Hence, the regime is focusing its airstrikes where it has some real expectations of advancing: most notably in Aleppo city.

Read al-Tamimi's post. It will muffle the constant drum beat of "Assad collaborates with ISIS."

But why is the New York Times now peddling this lie? I think it is of a piece with the regular efforts being made to show that ISIS has a self-sustaining funding source. In both the criminal enterprise funding source and Assad collaboration stories you get a firewall between the main jihadi organization gobbling up territory in Iraq and Syria for the Caliphate and Saudi Arabia, one of the two main U.S. allies in the Middle East.

Plus, by raising the baleful specter of an evil group of ruthless jihadis, you artificially create the impression that there are "good" jihadis, like Islamic Front and Nusra. In reality, as al-Tamimi shows, there is little difference.