U.S. Shows its Hand: Key to P5+1 Deal is Assad's Head

Kerry traveled to Russia yesterday to meet with Lavrov and Putin. Michael Gordon files the story, "Kerry Arrives in Russia for Talks With Vladimir Putin on Cooperation," which emphasizes that the talks dealt with Syria. Niqnaq posts a bit of speculation from El-Murid that the U.S. is attempting to cut a deal with Russia at Assad's expense. This makes a great deal of sense to me. Kerry's powwow with Lavrov comes just before he returns to D.C. to toast the sheikhs of the GCC. What better palliative to deliver to Wahhabi billionaires paranoid about the rise of Iranian power in the Middle East than the promise that Putin was cutting Syria loose? Short of a message from Obama that the U.S. is pulling out of the P5+1 negotiations, it is the sweetest music to the sheikhs ears. Syria under new pro-GCC/Western leadership would be devastating to Iran and even more so to Lebanon's Hezbollah; it might definitely be enough to buy the sheikhs' acquiescence in an Obama deal with Iran on its nuclear program

The Kremlin of course can be ruthlessly calculating as befits a great state power. But in this case, selling Assad down the river and shattering the Shiite crescent, would require a trade-off that the U.S. is unwilling to make; it would require the U.S. and EU to drop Russian sanctions and abandon their puppet government in Kiev.

That's not going to happen. So Kerry will return to Washington empty handed, and the spurious chlorine gas stories will multiple. No doubt the keening over Russian incursions into Ukraine will rise as well.

One thing that is helpful about Kerry's trip to Sochi is that it clarifies that the Obama administration believes Syria to be the key to unlocking the opposition to the P5+1 deal with Iran. (Israel would be mollified because it would be a huge body blow to Hezbollah.) Assad will have some sleepless nights from now until the end of June when a final deal with Iran on its nuclear program will either be completed or collapse.

Iran War Looms

The problem with the rich is that they are out of touch with reality as lived by the overwhelming majority of the world's population, the 99%. The problem for the overwhelming majority of us who populate the 99% is that the rich run the world. 

Billionaire royals govern the Gulf Cooperation Council; these are the leaders to whom this week in Washington Obama will be pitching the P5+1 accord on Iran's nuclear program. Citizens of the "indispensable nation" will be treated to the unseemly spectacle of their elected leader feting despots.

The GCC has registered its disapproval of the P5+1 negotiations. Only two of six heads of state will be in attendance. Saudi King Salman, after indicating last Friday that he would come to Washington, has cancelled. This has caused some soul searching of the special relationship between the U.S. and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to reach the front page of the "newspaper of record."

As far as it goes, "King’s Absence at Meeting Signals a Saudi-U.S. Marriage Adrift," by Peter Baker and Michael Shear (labeled "News Analysis") is a so-so summary of the recent estrangement of the House of Saud with Obama. The reporters even toss in an acknowledgement of what the Gray Lady has previously denied -- that the Saudi-engineered oil-price drop was a conspiracy hatched with the U.S. to punish Russia:

In the 70 years since Franklin D. Roosevelt met with King Abdul Aziz, the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has been a complicated marriage of shared interests, clashing values and cynical accommodations. The common denominator was a desire for stability. But now the two sides define that differently. 

For Mr. Obama, a diplomatic agreement with Iran curbing its nuclear program offers the strongest chance of keeping conflict in the region from escalating. For the Sunni-led Saudi government, the relaxation of sanctions in the proposed deal would simply give Iran, a predominantly Shiite state, billions of dollars to foment more instability around the region. 

While the Americans and the Saudis are now cooperating to fight the Islamic State, Riyadh wants more action to force out the government of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, while Mr. Obama has been reluctant to intervene. Similarly, while Mr. Obama has portrayed the drive for greater democracy in the region as a force for good, the Saudis see the still simmering Arab Spring movement as a threat to their hold on power. 

In the midst of all that, the politics of energy have shifted along with the surge in oil production in North Dakota and Texas. No longer so dependent on foreign crude, the United States can flex muscles without worrying about the Saudis cutting its energy supply. Yet Washington still relies on Riyadh to keep the price of oil low to pressure Russia’s energy-based economy in the standoff over Ukraine.

Iran is a rising power. It has far more "people power" behind it than anything the GCC can muster. The only broadly popular active initiative that the Obama administration is supporting -- it is certainly not the TPP or drilling in the Arctic -- is the peace deal with Iran.

One huge problem with the rich, and particularly the super-rich, is that they believe that their money can alter any reality. So you have the unprecedented Netanyahu appearance before a joint session of Congress in March, a foreign leader using "the people's House" as a backdrop for a campaign commercial, criticizing a sitting president's chief foreign policy initiative, an appearance that was apparently facilitated by billionaire casino magnate Sheldon Adelson. The no show by King Salman is more of the same.

But one hopeful note sounded by Ben Hubbard in an accompanying story, "Despite Displeasure With U.S., Saudis Face Long Dependency," is that money doesn't always buy love. Take for instance the reticence of Egypt and Pakistan, despite billions spent by al-Saud, to supply cannon fodder for Yemen:

Saudi Arabia has, however, asked for help from fellow Muslim countries like Pakistan in its Yemen campaign. But despite bankrolling the Pakistani nuclear program and offering other aid over the years, the Saudis were shocked when the Pakistani parliament unanimously voted not to send troops.

Egypt, whose government has been kept afloat by billions of dollars in Persian Gulf aid in recent years, has also declined to send ground troops. 

Despite the reluctance of would-be allies to step up, the gulf nations appear to be at the beginning of what could be a long process of learning to rely more on themselves and other allies. 

“They would prefer for the U.S. to be the godfather and protector, but they also realize that they have to stand on their own feet,” Dr. Seznec said.

Hubbard's story is useful in that it clearly outlines the deep, structural ties between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The special relationship is not going to end in divorce:

Decades of cooperation and billions of dollars in weapons contracts have left the gulf nations deeply entwined with the United States and Britain in ways that cannot be quickly undone, analysts say. Qatar hosts the largest United States air base in the region, and Bahrain is the home port of the Navy’s Fifth Fleet. And their efforts to make reliable military partners of fellow Muslim nations like Pakistan and Egypt have met little success, despite tens of billions of dollars in aid.

American-made fighter jets are being used in the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen, but “none of these airplanes would fly if the United States refused to send parts,” Dr. Seznec said. ["Jean-Francois Seznec, a professor of Persian Gulf political economy at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.']

***

[T]he Saudis remain heavily reliant on the United States, and to a lesser extent on Britain, in nearly every branch of their security apparatus. 

“The Saudi air force could not carry out day-in, day-out bombing missions without help from U.S. trainers and maintenance experts and the flow of spare parts and ammunition,” said Bruce Riedel, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, speaking about the Saudi-led bombing campaign against Shiite rebels in Yemen.

A recent report by the Congressional Research Service said Saudi Arabia’s decision to update and expand its air force with American F-15 fighter jets would perpetuate Saudi reliance on parts and training provided by the United States military and defense contractors.

The United States is also involved in training the army and modernizing the Saudis’ national guard, and American advisers paid for by the Saudi government are “embedded in industrial, energy, maritime and cybersecurity offices within the Saudi government,” the report said.

Saudi Arabia, the United States and Britain also have close intelligence ties, with top officials from the three countries meeting frequently and sharing information.

In addition, contracts for fighter jets include agreements on maintenance, spare parts and software upgrades that can go on for years, Mr. Riedel said, keeping the countries’ security operations bound tightly together far into the future.

Dr. Seznec, of the School of Advanced International Studies, estimates that Saudi Arabia has spent about $500 billion to build its military in the last 20 years. About three-quarters of that money has gone to the United States.

“Those are huge amounts of money,” he said.

What motivates the realpolitik bloc behind Obama's peace initiative with Iran is the realization that to do otherwise means an eventual war, sooner now than later. The Saudi/Israeli bet is that whoever succeeds Obama will be amenable to scrapping the P5+1 accord, assuming it is finalized, which is anything but certain, and to maintaining the financial architecture of Iranian sanctions; or, absent that, another war.

The big hurdle in all of this for the billionaire despots and the deep state power brokers who answer to them is public opinion. Maybe I am wrong here, but I don't think the public will stomach an Iran war. If one is launched, it will destroy the country. But that is where things are heading.

Officials Walk Back Talk of U.S.-Iraq Split While Hope for P5+1 Agreement Dims

Two stories today both confirm the importance of Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq's efforts to defeat Islamic State at the same time quoting Iraqi and U.S. officials denying that there is any rift between the two countries.

First, Helene Cooper, reporting from Washington D.C., writes in "U.S. Strategy in Iraq Increasingly Relies on Iran" that

“The only way in which the Obama administration can credibly stick with its strategy is by implicitly assuming that the Iranians will carry most of the weight and win the battles on the ground,” said Vali R. Nasr, a former special adviser to Mr. Obama who is now dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. “You can’t have your cake and eat it too — the U.S. strategy in Iraq has been successful so far largely because of Iran.”

***

Landon Shroder, an intelligence analyst for corporations in Iraq who was in Baghdad last summer when Mosul fell, countered that the worry that Iran will gain influence in Iraq ignores the reality that Iran’s Shiite government is already a key Iraqi ally.

“By this stage, everybody who observed what happened in Iraq with the Islamic State should know that the main influencer in Iraq is Iran,” he said in a telephone interview on Wednesday. “That’s an unpopular perception in the United States, after spending so much money and lives lost in the conflict, but it’s reality.”

Mr. Shroder said that at the moment, the only force with the ability to bring Kurdish troops, the Iraqi Army and the Shiite militias together to fight the Islamic State is Iran.

Rafid Jaboori, the spokesman for Mr. Abadi, the Iraqi prime minister, said in an interview Wednesday that Iraq had urged the United States and Iran not to play out their bilateral conflict in Iraq’s battle against the Islamic State.

“So far in general there was no clash within the two,” Mr. Jaboori said.

He drew a comparison to World War II. “Countries with different ideologies, different priorities, different systems of government, cooperated to defeat the Nazis,” he said. “It’s foreseeable that we see countries which might not get along very well in terms of their bilateral relations working to help Iraq to defeat this threat.”

Then, Anne Barnard in "Iraqis Want Lead Role in Driving ISIS From Mosul":

But as the battle continued in Tikrit, American officials, as well as some of their Iraqi counterparts, insisted that the countries’ relationship was healthy and that close military collaboration would continue against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, ISIL or by the Arabic acronym Daesh.

Even though United States warplanes are not participating in the Tikrit battle, as they have in others, the Iraqi government still welcomes continued international assistance, said Ali al-Alaaq, a close aide to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. 

“Today in Salahuddin, we were hoping that the Americans could participate in the battle against ISIS, but we have launched against ISIS alone,” he said. “We are expecting that the support will be continued, especially since we are facing a very important task in Mosul and other cities in Iraq.” 

American officials, too, tried to play down signs of strain between the United States and Iraq. 

“The United States is proud of its partnership with Iraqi forces, which has made huge impacts in weakening Daesh, and we are looking forward to more coordination with the Iraqi forces,” the United States ambassador to Iraq, Stuart E. Jones, said after meeting with Adnan al-Zurufi, the governor of Najaf, in southern Iraq. He appeared to be reassuring Iraqi officials that the United States did not oppose the use of Shiite militias known as popular mobilization forces. They have played a crucial role in the ground fight since many regular army units disintegrated as ISIS seized much of northern and western Iraq in June.

“Our direct coordination is with the Iraqi security forces, and we count on the security forces to coordinate with the popular mobilization forces and other forces that are cooperating in the fight against Daesh,” Mr. Jones said.

The problem for the Obama administration is that it has to deal with Israel's Likudniks and the sheikhs of the Gulf Cooperation Council.  Both groups are dead set against anything that smacks of a victory for Iran, including a deal on its nuclear program emerging from the P5+1 talks in Switzerland.

Michael Gordon's opaque "John Kerry Flies to Saudi Arabia to Discuss Iran Nuclear Talks" is clear enough for the reader to discern that the make or break aspect of the negotiations center on how long uranium processing restrictions should remain in effect. Ten years? Fifteen years?

Obama administration officials have said that a central goal of accord would be to preclude Iran from being able to develop enough nuclear material for a bomb within a year, should it decide to repudiate the agreement. American officials have said the breakout restrictions should last at least 10 years. Mr. Kerry, who took no questions from reporters in his appearance here, said the United States would be interested only in the “right deal.”

“Time is of the essence,” he said, “and important decisions need to be made.”

American officials have not said how long the agreement with Iran might be in effect. One possibility that has been discussed is an accord that lasts 15 years, with restrictions on Iran’s ability to enrich uranium relaxed during the final years.

This will be the petard Obama and Kerry will be hoisted upon. No sunset date will be long enough for the venal pay-to-play Congress and its Saudi and Israeli paymasters. Obama can rescind some of the Iranian sanctions himself, but he needs Congressional approval to relax all of them.

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell's signaling his willingness to push legislation requiring Congressional approval for any agreement that results from the P5+1 talks prior to their March 24 deadline points to the eventual necessity of an Obama veto.

If the P5+1 talks fail we will have to wait and see if there is a spillover effect on U.S.-Iranian cooperation in the war against ISIS. Failure to reach an agreement will create an even messier mess in a region that is already cracked and reeling.

Islamic State's Funding and the Battle for Mosul

Iraq launched a military operation on Monday to rout Islamic State from Tikrit (Omar al-Jawoshy and Tim Arango, "Iraqi Offensive to Retake Tikrit From ISIS Begins"), and today The New York Times features a timely unsigned editorial, "To Hurt ISIS, Squeeze the Cash Flow." The editorial is a gloss of a recent Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report, "Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)." FATF is an international organization set up by the G-7 to monitor and deal with money laundering. The Gulf Cooperation Council is a member.

The report, after a quick scan, seems to be extremely light on the historic funding streams of ISIS; it assumes an ISIS post-June of 2014 and its capture of Mosul -- in other words, after al-Baghdadi declared ISIS to be the Islamic State -- as the steady state. This is fundamentally misleading. How did ISIS grow so quickly after it took Fallujah in January 2014 that it could effortlessly capture Mosul, one of Iraq's largest cities, five months later? The oil revenue and looting of banks that followed the fall of Mosul became an explanation -- I am not kidding you -- for how ISIS funded its far flung potent military campaigns. To my mind, the early non-interference of the Kurds as they moved to take Kirkuk and the melting away of Iraqi Army commanding officers in Mosul indicated high-level coordination.

Now there appears to be a shift underway. Iraq's prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, originally pegged to succeed Nuri al-Maliki because of Abadi's pro-Western, more-Sunni-inclusive sensibilities, is ready to lead the assault on Islamic State. The campaign to recapture Mosul, when it was first announced, was to take place during Christmas of this year. Now that has been moved up to this spring. This is causing some consternation in the U.S. According to al-Jawoshy and Arango,

In a speech Monday to Parliament, Mr. Abadi echoed the words of President George W. Bush in the aftermath of 9/11, saying that the residents of Tikrit were either with Iraq or with the Islamic State.

“There is no neutrality in the battle against ISIS,” Mr. Abadi said. “If someone is being neutral with ISIS, then he is one of them.”

From a military perspective, capturing Tikrit is seen as an important precursor to an operation to retake Mosul, which lies farther north. Success in Tikrit could push up the timetable for a Mosul campaign, while failure would most likely mean more delays.

The American military, though, appears divided on the question of when the Iraqi military — which collapsed last summer in the face of the Islamic State onslaught — would be ready for a wide-scale offensive on Mosul, or in Anbar Province in the west of the country, which is also in the militants’ hands. Some American officials have backed off earlier estimates that it could happen as early as April.

Even a victory in Tikrit could be costly, given the prominent role of Shiite militias, which are feared by the Sunni population. And reports that the militias have carried out sectarian abuses in some areas have complicated efforts to persuade Sunnis to work with the government.

The United States, in returning to a military role in Iraq, has pushed for reconciliation between Iraq’s Shiite-led government and the country’s Sunni minority, but there has been little apparent progress. The United States has also insisted that Iraq establish Sunni fighting units to retake and hold Sunni areas, and it warned against using Shiite forces to invade those areas.

Yet it has been almost exclusively Shiite fighters that have protected Baghdad since the Islamic State offensive last summer, and it has been Iranian-directed militias that have secured some of the most significant gains on the battlefield, often fighting with the support of American airpower.

Further, the fight against the Islamic State has brought the United States and Iran into an awkward alliance in Iraq. While the United States’ effort has been most apparent in its airstrike campaign, Iran has taken the most prominent role on the ground, not just with the militias but with Iranian generals sometimes directing the fighting. 

On Monday, Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, the Iranian spymaster who once directed the militias’ deadly campaign against American forces in Iraq, was on the ground near Tikrit, according to a prominent Iraqi militia leader and the Iranian Fars news agency.

What we are seeing, and have been seeing since last summer, is a third Iraq war since its invasion of Kuwait. And just as the last war left Iran in a more powerful strategic position after Saddam Hussein was ousted and a pro-Iranian, Shiite-majority government installed, so too this one is moving in the same direction.

The goal all along of the West and the Gulf Cooperation Council has been regime change in Iran. But Iran and it proxies and allies have proven to be formidable opponents on the battlefield.

So the fighting will continue, with the U.S. position -- working with Iran to fight ISIS at the same time working with the GCC to fight Iran -- becoming more obvious and untenable.

No Iran War

The takeaways from Obama's announcement yesterday are delay and obfuscation. Sending 300 military advisers to Iraq, as well as filling its skies with surveillance aircraft, will do nothing to roll back the jihadi gains in the north. The U.S., operating with its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), wants Maliki gone, as they want to be rid of Assad in neighboring Syria. (A senior administration official was quoted as saying that future U.S. airstrikes could include Syria.) 

The plan appears to be the creation of a federalized or partitioned Iraq with an augmented Kurdistan in control of its own oil sales and Kirkuk; re-Baathification in the form of Sunnis given control of the ministry of defense or interior, as well additional patronage-rich departments; while the Shia get a more U.S./GCC-friendly head of state. Alissa Rubin and Rod Nordland have the story, which appears to have been written with the ample help of USG, "Challengers Emerge to Replace Divisive Maliki":

The Kurds want the Iraqi central government to recognize the contested city of Kirkuk, endowed with oil, as part of the autonomous Kurdish territory they have carved out in the north. The Kurds also want assurances that they can sell the oil from Kurdistan without oversight from the central government.

The Sunnis want to lead at least one security ministry, such as defense or interior, and control some of the other powerful ministries such as education or higher education, both rich in patronage and jobs. 

So far the only point of near agreement among Iraq’s political factions is that Mr. Maliki, who has been prime minister since 2007 and is in his second term, must go. 

“We will not allow a third term for the prime minister; they must change him if they want things to calm down,” Nabil al-Khashab, a senior political adviser to Osama al-Nujaifi, the former speaker and most prominent of the Sunni leaders, said Thursday.

Washington's man in Baghdad orchestrating Maliki's ouster is Brett McGurk, assistant secretary of state for Iran and Iraq. Rubin and Nirdland continue,

It is far from clear, however, whether any of the suggested successors could gather enough votes. The names floated so far — Adel Abdul Mahdi, Ahmed Chalabi and Bayan Jaber — are from the Shiite blocs, which have the largest share of the total seats in the Parliament. 

Mr. Mahdi came within a vote of winning the prime minister’s job in 2006 and previously served as one of Iraq’s vice presidents. He is viewed as a moderate who has long worked well with the Kurds. 

Mr. Chalabi is a complex figure who has alternately charmed and infuriated the Americans but has ties both to them and to Iran. His biggest liability could be his uncompromising support for the systematic purge of many Sunnis from government jobs after the American-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party a decade ago. Mr. Chalabi now says he supports terminating the basis for that purge, the so-called de-Baathification law. 

Mr. Jaber, a minister of interior in the transitional Iraqi government and later finance minister, could also face problems. He is alleged to have allowed abuse and torture of prisoners when he was in the Interior Ministry, and it is unclear whether he has much widespread support. 

Other names are beginning to surface, and while the Americans are urging quick action, it could take weeks, if not months, for the factions to reach consensus. 

*** 

Senior American officials in Baghdad, including the ambassador, Robert S. Beecroft, and the deputy assistant secretary of state for Iran and Iraq, Brett McGurk, have been encouraging the Iraqi political factions to work together. At least two Iraqi political officials said the Americans were urging the factions to agree on a replacement for Mr. Maliki.

“They want to see the back of him,” said an Iraqi official, who met with the Americans this week and spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the nature of the talks.

With a whisper campaign of Ahmed Chalabi to succeed Maliki we're back to the future. Chalabi was the neocon's man. They wanted him to run the show in Baghdad after the U.S. invasion. But things didn't go according to plan. Chalabi was seen as a puppet. He then recreated himself by allegedly cozying up to Iran.

The last great mobilization of anti-government sentiment in the United States, excepting the brief Occupy flowering of the fall of 2011, was in the run up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  The "No Iraq War" yard sign was ubiquitous.

Shortly after Bush-Cheney invaded Iraq, people started altering there "No Iraq War" signs by duct-taping over the 'Q' and handwriting a 'N' to read "No Iran War." Then after not too long the manufactured yard sign below appeared:

People put up these "No Iran War" signs because the chatter in Washington was that "Everyone wants to go to Baghdad. Real men want to go to Tehran." Everyone knew that the neocons were going after Iran. Saddam Hussein's Iraq, weakened by a decade of sanctions, would quickly topple thanks to U.S. military shock and awe and then it was on to Tehran.

But things don't work out the way elites draw them up in the board room.

After a quiescent anti-war movement hitched its cart to an attractive candidate in the Democratic Party things have gone from bad to worse. Now we're back on the road to Tehran.

The fact the Kerry is being sent out to rally support in the Middle East for regime change in Iraq is not a good sign. At this point all Kerry does is lie sonorously. More mayhem is to come.

Rebels Apoplectic Over Possibility of Peace + Anne Barnard Wising Up

Now that the focus of the Syrian civil war has shifted away from a vote in the U.S. Congress authorizing military force to diplomacy in Geneva the warmongering opposition is growing increasingly agitated. The Syrian National Coalition and its paymasters in the Gulf Cooperation Council don't want any talks regardless of their content, except possibly for a discussion of the details of an unconditional surrender of the Alawite-led Baathist government. That's what jumped out at me after reading this morning's news. Take Michael Gordon and Steven Lee Myers' "Syria Talks Yield Plan to Discuss Peace Conference":

Sitting on a dais with Mr. Kerry, Mr. Lavrov hailed effort of the Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, to persuade President Bashar al-Assad of Syria to join the treaty banning chemical arms, and stressed the need to resume peace talks in Geneva. 

Mr. Lavrov said it was “very unfortunate, that for a long time, the Geneva communiqué was basically abandoned,” referring to the 2012 document that outlined basic terms for the peace talks. 

Despite the public facade of unity, however, the United States and Russia have been sharply divided over how to organize a political settlement and who should attend a peace conference.

After Mr. Kerry flew to Moscow and proposed a peace conference in May, Russia wanted to include Iran, which along with the Kremlin is one of the principal backers and arms suppliers of the Assad government. 

The United States has opposed including Iran and has argued instead for including the “London 11,” a group of European and Arab nations that have been supporting the Syrian resistance. But that has been rejected by Moscow. 

Another possible complication is getting the Syrian opposition to attend. Syrian rebel leaders are bitter about Mr. Obama’s decision to put off military action and explore a disarmament plan with the Russians. 

In a recent statement, Gen. Salim Idris, the head of the military wing of the Syrian opposition, rejected the Russian initiative and said the Syrians who carried out the Aug. 21 chemical attack near Damascus that started the current crisis must be punished.

In an effort to address their fears, Mr. Kerry spoke Thursday with General Idris and Ahmad al-Jarba, the president of the Syrian opposition, and sought to assure them that the military option remained on the table and that the Obama administration would insist that any understanding about Syria’s chemical weapons be verifiable and enforceable, a State Department official said.

But it remains to be seen whether Mr. Kerry made any headway in calming the opposition’s anxieties.

The Syrian National Coalition depends on many lies, first and foremost of which is that it represents the aspirations of Syrians who rose up in protest during the Arab Spring. Another big lie that is told repeatedly by both the opposition and the United States Government is that Assad and his Russian backers resist negotiations; in fact, the Russians have been pushing for months for Geneva II talks to begin. It is the U.S. and the rebels that have resisted diplomacy, something that was clear back in the late spring and early summer but which has grown increasingly obscure as the reporting tended to focus predominantly on the ascension of Al Qaeda-affiliated jihadists on the battlefield and then last month the chemical attack in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta.

But now peace talks are back in the news and the opposition is apoplectic. What does that tell you? It tells you that the chemical attack was designed to spur a U.S.-led attack on Syria that would significantly weaken the Syrian Arab Army and force Assad from office. Regime change a la Libya. The opposition and its supporters didn't factor public opinion into its calculations. Overwhelming voter opposition representing the entire political spectrum scared politicians in the West to hold off on an illegal, unilateral military intervention.

The next immediate concern for the warmongers is to try to spin the United Nations report on the Ghouta chemical attack before it comes out. The media is already rife with stories from anonymous sources saying that the investigation shows the Syrian government is to blame.

The Syrian National Coalition has no popular support. Even its advocates in the press are wising up. Check out Anne Barnard's story today, "Syrian Rebels Say Saudi Arabia Is Stepping Up Weapons Deliveries":

Rebels in southern Syria who nominally answer to the loose-knit, Western-backed Free Syrian Army said Thursday that they had received new infusions of arms from Saudi Arabia, delivered through Jordan, and that the weapons had helped them gain ground near the border. 

At the same time, Gen. Salim Idris, the nominal commander of the Free Syrian Army, declared on Thursday his “absolute rejection” of the chemical weapons deal offered by the Syrian and Russian governments. He said rebel fighters felt they were being “left alone,” without “direct military support” from the United States.

The repeated insertion of "nominal" is noteworthy, as is the petulance of Free Syrian Army commander Gen. Salim Idris set off in quote marks. Barnard has been a strong proponent of the rebels, but of late her support seems to be slipping. Her article today is actually a sensible exposition of the power politics of the proxy war underway in Syria.