Showing posts with label Fayssal Mekdad. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fayssal Mekdad. Show all posts

Friday, September 12, 2014

Obama's War on ISIS Crashes on the Launch Pad

Obama made his speech announcing a new iteration of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), this one ostensibly directed against the Islamic State rising in northern Iraq and Syria, on Wednesday evening. The day-after coverage faithfully repeated the president's message -- that U.S. airstrikes on ISIS in its Syrian stronghold are in the works; that Syria's president Bashar al-Assad cannot be a partner in this struggle; that Sunni allies in the Middle East will be organized; and that local "moderate" Sunni fighters will trained in Saudi Arabia with half-a-billion dollars Congress has yet to approve -- with the exception of one discordant frontpage "news analysis" article by Peter Baker which sounded the alarm that what Obama was proposing amounted to perpetual war.

This morning the discordant notes have multiplied. All the main stories in the Gray Lady today regarding Obama's commitment to wage war on ISIS are thoroughly negative.

The place to begin . . . or, better yet, if you are to read only one article today, make sure it is "U.S. Pins Hope on Syrian Rebels With Loyalties All Over the Map" by Ben Hubbard, Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzetti. It punctures the lie at the heart of the president's war plans: the training of a "moderate" Sunni fighting force to take on ISIS. Point by point it goes through and debunks the hooey being peddled by the administration:

1) The idea that there is a "moderate" group, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), ready to partner with the U.S. is a fiction:
Analysts who track the rebel movement say that the concept of the Free Syrian Army as a unified force with an effective command structure is a myth. 
***
The Syrian rebels are a scattered archipelago of mostly local forces with ideologies that range from nationalist to jihadist. Their rank-and-file fighters are largely from the rural underclass, with few having clear political visions beyond a general interest in greater rights or the dream of an Islamic state. 
Most have no effective links to the exile Syrian National Coalition, meaning they have no political body to represent their cause. And the coalition’s Supreme Military Council, which was intended to unite the moderate rebel forces, has all but collapsed. 
“There’s a lot of skepticism about this piece of the president’s strategy,” said Representative Adam B. Schiff, Democrat of California, a member of the House Intelligence Committee. “The so-called moderate rebels have often been very immoderate and ineffective.”
2) Arms intended for the "moderates" end up with the jihadis:
Even as they line up to support Mr. Obama’s strategy against ISIS, some European allies remain skeptical about the efficacy of arming the Syrian rebels. Germany, for instance, has been arming and training Kurdish pesh merga forces in Iraq, but has resisted doing the same for any groups in Syria — partly out of fear that the weapons could end up in the hands of ISIS or other radical groups. 
“We can’t really control the final destination of these arms,” said Peter Wittig, the German ambassador to the United States.
3) Forming local fighters into an armed fighting force has a poor track record (i.e., Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.):
The approach — training and arming local fighters — has also not been effective in other arenas, whether Iraq, where the military melted away when ISIS attacked, or in Mali, where forces trained in counterterrorism switched sides to join Islamist fighters.
4) The U.S. experience so far -- the April 2013 approved CIA covert operations in Jordan and Turkey -- in arming and training the Syrian opposition has been a bust:
American involvement with the rebels so far has largely been through so-called operations rooms in Jordan and Turkey staffed by intelligence officials from the United States and other countries that have provided arms to limited numbers of vetted rebels. So far, the support provided has included light arms, ammunition and antitank missiles, which have helped the groups destroy government armor but have not resulted in major rebel advances or helped control the spread of ISIS.
“The United States can probably work with them to some extent, but they haven’t been hugely effective so far, which is why the Islamic State is there in the first place,” said Mr. Lund, the Syria analyst. 
The support so far has been limited, leaving many rebels feeling that the aid is prolonging the war, not helping them win. And the fluidity of battlefield alliances in Syria means that even mainline rebels often end up fighting alongside the Nusra Front, whose suicide bombers are relied on by other groups to soften up government targets.
Combine the Hubbard, Schmitt and Mazzetti story with one by Anne Barnard and David Kirkpatrick, "Arabs Give Tepid Support to U.S. Fight Against ISIS," and you get a sense of Obama's GWOT relaunch crashing on the pad. The only nations in the region, Syria and Iran, expressing an interest in partnering with the U.S. to eradicate ISIS are being shunned:
While Arab nations allied with the United States vowed on Thursday to “do their share” to fight ISIS and issued a joint communiqué supporting a broad strategy, the underlying tone was one of reluctance. The government perhaps most eager to join a coalition against ISIS was that of Syria, which Mr. Obama had already ruled out as a partner for what he described as terrorizing its citizens. 
Syria’s deputy foreign minister, Fayssal Mekdad, told NBC News that Syria and the United States were “fighting the same enemy,” terrorism, and that his government had “no reservations” about airstrikes as long as the United States coordinated with it. He added, “We are ready to talk.”
Turkey, the nation most critical to a successful crackdown on the caliphate, refused to even sign a communique pledging military support:
At a meeting in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, to build a coalition for the American mission, at least 10 Arab states signed a communiqué pledging to join “in the many aspects of a coordinated military campaign,” but with the qualification “as appropriate” and without any specifics. Turkey attended the meeting but declined to sign.
Turkey is critical because its border is the main jihadi route to the Syrian battlefield. As Patrick Cockburn made clear  in "Isis Consolidates," the only way to deal with ISIS is for Turkey to crack down on the jihadis crossing its borders. (Also worthy of mention here is Seymour Hersh's article pointing blame at Turkey for the Ghouta poison gas attack last summer that was used as a false flag to prompt a U.S. attack on Damascus.) Turkey's non-committal stance is a strong tell that ISIS will survive.

Thursday, January 23, 2014

The Silver Lining so Far at Montreaux

Based on the reporting from "the paper of record" one of the most noteworthy things that happened at yesterday's peace conference in Montreaux was that Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem spoke for longer than he should have in making his opening statements. The gist of the story by Michael Gordon and Anne Barnard is don't expect much from the ongoing negotiations:
By the end of the day, the sense that the new peace talks were headed for trouble was compounded when the proceedings ended without any hint of progress toward imposing local cease-fires or opening humanitarian corridors for the delivery of food and medicine to besieged towns and cities.
The role of the Western media in the Syrian conflict is to make sure the script stays focused on the brutality of the Assad regime as well as the fiction that the opposition actually represents Syrians inside Syria (rather than foreign intelligence agencies).

On the first point, there is another big story today about the Qatari-funded dossier of alleged Assad regime murder and torture, pictures of which were smuggled out of the country by an anonymous policeman, code named Caesar. Two things about this piece by Mark Landler and Ben Hubbard, "State Dept. Learned in November of Photos Said to Show Torture in Syria": 1) Even while promoting the report, significant questions about its reliability are raised:
The report on the photos, though led by three experts with experience in international war crimes trials, also raised some questions. While saying that the full archive consists of about 55,000 photographs, indicating the execution of around 11,000 people, the investigators acknowledged they had examined only 5,500 photos showing 835 individuals. 
The timing of the report’s release also suggested that it had been timed to undermine Mr. Assad’s government as talks began. The report says investigators interviewed the photographer, Caesar, on Jan. 12, 13, and 18, meaning the report was prepared within days of the last interview. 
One of the investigators said the timing of the report’s release had no bearing on the credibility of its findings. 
“Whether it was a month ago or a month from now, this is clear and convincing evidence of an industrial killing machine that is indicative of what Assad is doing in this civil war,” said David M. Crane, who previously indicted President Charles G. Taylor of Liberia. 
Much also remains unclear about how the photos made it out of Syria and what will be done with them now. Mr. Rashid, whose group helped smuggle them out, said it had worked for months with contacts in Syria and in unnamed “neighboring countries” to get the defector and his photos out of Syria. 
Mr. Crane played down the role of Qatar, which commissioned the report, and denied that the release of the report before the conference was political. 
“That report is to serve the rights of the victims, but we see this as a legal, humanitarian document,” he said. “It is not political at all.”
And 2), as can be seen in the passage above, the main advocate for the code name Caesar report is David Crane, who is always described as being someone who prosecuted Charles Taylor at The Hague. But what is never mentioned is his long service in the United States Government in prestigious positions such as Director of the Office of Intelligence Review and assistant general counsel of the Defense Intelligence Agency. It is hard to believe that this omission is just lazy journalism.

But a silver lining for the Syrian government in the last 48 hours is the success it has had in asking the question that concludes the report from Montreaux by Gordon and Barnard:
In an interview, Fayssal Mekdad, the Syrian deputy foreign minister, said he welcomed sitting face to face with the government’s opponents. “We look forward to looking them in the eye,” he said, “and asking them, ‘Who do you represent?’ ”
This question -- "Who does the opposition really represent?" -- was also raised, and I think quite effectively, by al-Assad himself in his interview with Agence France Presse:
AFP: The opposition that will participate in Geneva is divided and many factions on the ground don't believe it represents them. If an agreement is reached, how can it be implemented on the ground? 
President Assad: This is the same question that we are asking as a government: when I negotiate, who am I negotiating with? There are expected to be many sides at Geneva, we don't know yet who will come, but there will be various parties, including the Syrian government. It is clear to everyone that some of the groups, which might attend the conference, didn't exist until very recently; in fact they were created during the crisis by foreign intelligence agencies whether in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, France, the United States or other countries. So when we sit down with these groups, we are in fact negotiating with those countries. So, is it logical that France should be a part of the Syrian solution? Or Qatar, or America, or Saudi Arabia, or Turkey? This doesn't make any sense. Therefore, when we negotiate with these parties, we're in fact negotiating with the countries that are behind them and that support terrorism in Syria. There are other opposition forces in Syria that have a national agenda; these are parties that we can negotiate with. On the issue of the vision for Syria's future, we are open for these parties to participate in governing the Syrian state, in the government and in other institutions. But as I mentioned earlier, anything that is agreed with any party, whether in Geneva or in Syria, must be subject to people's endorsement, through a referendum put to Syrian citizens.
***
AFP: Are you prepared to have a prime minister from the opposition in a future government? 
President Assad: That depends on who this opposition represents. When it represents a majority, let’s say in parliament, naturally it should lead the government. But to appoint a prime minister from the opposition without having a majority doesn’t make any political sense in any country in the world. In your country, for example, or in Britain or elsewhere, you can’t have a prime minister from a parliamentary minority. This will all depend on the next elections, which we discussed in the Syrian initiative; they will reveal the real size of support for the various opposition forces. As to participation as a principle, we support it, of course it is a good thing.
AFP: Are you prepared to have, for example, Ahmed Jarba or Moaz Khatib, be your next prime minister? 
President Assad: This takes us back to the previous question. Do any of these people represent the Syrian people, or even a portion of the Syrian people? Do they even represent themselves, or are they just representatives of the states that created them? This brings us back to what I mentioned earlier: every one of these groups represents the country that created them. The participation of each of these individuals means the participation of each of those states in the Syrian government! This is the first point. Second, let’s assume that we agreed to the participation of these individuals in the government. Do you think that they would dare to come to Syria to take part in the government? Of course they wouldn’t. Last year, they claimed that they had control of 70% of Syria, yet they didn’t even dare to come to the areas that they had supposed control of. They did come to the border for a 30-minute photo opportunity and then they fled. How can they be ministers in the government? Can a foreigner become a Syrian minister? That’s why these propositions are totally unrealistic, but they do make a good joke!

Wednesday, September 25, 2013

Gray Lady's Anne Barnard Interviews Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Fayssal Mekdad

Anne Barnard has a decent story this morning built around her Tuesday interview in Damascus with Syria's deputy foreign minister, Fayssal Mekdad. It's worth checking out. Some of the highlights:
  • Geneva II is unlikely to happen anytime soon. So the Syrian government is talking about the possibility of staging its own peace talks with "religious and community leaders 'who have influence on the ground' with fighters."
"But Mr. Mekdad suggested the government doubted the usefulness of talking to leaders of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, the exile group that the West and its Arab allies have tried to set up as the government’s opposition counterpart and the civilian leadership of the loose-knit rebel Free Syrian Army. Excluding that group would be a nonstarter for the United States and its allies.
"But Mr. Mekdad and prominent government supporters in Damascus said the coalition was increasingly irrelevant, not only lacking control over its own forces, but over foreign jihadist groups increasingly prominent on the battlefield — a view widely shared by Syrians who oppose the government."
  • Following Syria's agreement to get rid of its chemical weapons, "Mr. Mekdad said the natural next step was an international push for Israel to relinquish its arsenal of nuclear weapons, which the neighboring state has never formally acknowledged."
  • The Syrian deputy foreign minister said that the government was "100 percent sure" that the rebels were behind the August 21 Ghouta chemical weapon attack.
  • Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is consolidating its position in northern Syria and hardening its drive for a caliphate by attacking other rebel groups:
"A Syrian journalist said recent fighting between armed groups in the rebel-held north changed the calculations of Syrian and Western leaders regarding the proposed talks in Geneva.

"The journalist, who supports the government but requested anonymity to go beyond official statements, said he believed the extremist Islamic State in Iraq and Syria was trying to seize ground from other rebel groups. 
"'I don’t think Geneva is really close to us, but what is close to us is a huge problem,' he said. 'If we don’t fight it in next two, three, four weeks, this means that inside of the Middle East, near Europe’s border, there is a state auto-financed and controlled by terrorists.'
"He said he could even envision a situation in which an international coalition was formed to fight alongside the Syrian Army against the jihadists, a prospect that seemed unlikely for now as the West continues to insist Mr. Assad leave power.
"Mr. Mekdad dismissed that notion and said the government sought a “peace coalition” to end the financing of armed opposition groups by America’s allies Saudi Arabia and Qatar, adding that aid to the Syrian government from its allies Russia and Iran was permissible within relations between sovereign states."
I think that there's a greater chance that the West will use the existence of an Al Qaeda enclave in northern Syria as an excuse to launch strikes against the Syrian government rather than cooperate with it. It's part of pattern that we've come to expect from the United States and its allies: foment unrest and then use that unrest as an excuse to exercise military force.