The Russian-Turkish Demilitarized Zone in Idlib

Niqnaq posts several translated items from Colonel Cassad which deal with the Russia-Turkey agreement creating a demilitarized zone in Syria's Idlib Province:

On the demilitarized zone.

1. Let’s move on to what, apparently, we already know by Oct 15 will be established area with a width of 9-12 miles. It will not include heavy weapons or extreme elements of the insurgency (rebels associated with AQ). The zone will be patrolled by Turkish and Russian forces.

2. The first critical point is to note whether this transaction will ensure that the highway that passes through Idlib and connects the north and the south of the country passes under government control. This was one of the strategic goals of Damascus in any operation in Idlib.

3. Damascus approved the deal, providing the highway will be considered as an immediate benefit. The deal will mean a delay in the plan of the state to reclaim “every inch” of its territory. Damascus is wary of the fact that the uprising has turned into a separatist project.

4. Turning to the armed groups in the transaction indicates that the area will not include heavy weapons or HTS/Nusra, but all other armed groups can stay. What we will likely see is a wholesale change of image, rebranding HTS/Nusra to become Ahrar al-Sham, Failaq al-Sham, etc.

5. There are various scenarios: A) Turkey has effective control over HTS/Nusra and therefore the ability to withdraw them from the new zone. B) the group agrees to obey, but rebrands itself and stays. C) Turkey will not be able to fulfill its end of the bargain and HTS/Nusra will remain as it is.

6. Regardless of whether HTS/Nusra disappears just visually or for real, this transaction is based on the assumption that all armed forces will carry out their part of the bargain and adhere to the requirements of Turkey to cease all military operations against the Syrian state from this area.

7. When it comes to Turkey, there is no doubt that Erdogan was able to delay/prevent a military operation in Idlib for the moment. But now he has to make the Idlib train arrive by the time scheduled at the final station. The behaviour of the armed groups in the province now explicitly depends on Ankara.

8. As for Russia, its own military will now officially patrol one area with a NATO member. Putin is patient and will see that this transaction will exacerbate divisions within NATO. All he had to pay for it, is to promise a delay in any military operations in Idlib.

9. The United States, of course, is absent in today’s agreement, but nevertheless Washington ascribes to itself the merits of preventing the attack on Idlib by means of pressure on Russia. In fact, Moscow and Ankara are now the leading foreign capitals in the matter of Idlib.

10. Like most of the previous “deals” in Syria, time will tell whether this agreement “demilitarized zones” different from those who preceded it. It’s an obvious assumption in this agreement that Erdoğan will be able to control all these armed people gathered in the province.

11. At the moment, Erdogan has strengthened his legendary status in the Syrian opposition. He personally voted to prevent military strikes against the province, and it will add points to his very high popularity in most opposition.