Thursday, March 16, 2017

Dutch General Election Postmortem: Warning Sign for U.S. Democrats, Silver Lining for France's Macron

Inflate a bogeyman. Then puncture bogeyman. Celebrate.

This is the gist of Dutch election postmortems. Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom didn't come out on top. Prime minister Mark Rutte's People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, though losing seven seats, maintained its pole position thanks to pro-EU sentiment and record voter turnout. According to Alissa Rubin's "Geert Wilders Falls Short in Election, as Wary Dutch Scatter Their Votes":
According to an unofficial tally compiled by the Dutch Broadcasting Foundation, the country’s public broadcaster, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy was likely to capture 33 of the 150 seats in Parliament — a loss of seven seats, but still far more than any other party.
Mr. Wilders’s Party for Freedom was expected to finish second, with 20 seats (an increase of eight); and the right-leaning Christian Democratic Appeal and the left-leaning Democrats 66 were tied for third, with 19 each, the broadcaster reported.
Given the loss of seven seats by his governing party, and given that few were predicting a Wilders victory even when he was touching the clouds with impressive poll numbers earlier this year, pictures of a beaming Rutte communicate the desperation of a collapsing neoliberal center.


Rutte saved his bacon by fabricating a national dust-up with another bogeyman, one far more real than the marginal Wilders -- Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

The debate that will rage until next month and the first round of voting in the French presidential election is the extent to which the returns in the Netherlands apply to the rest of Europe.

I think the Dutch vote was an accurate snapshot of the status quo. But it cannot be directly overlaid to France because the mainstream parties in Holland have not eroded to the extent that they have in France -- with Hollande a zombie and Fillon charged with embezzlement. Nonetheless, as Rubin reminds us, "The big loser was the center-left Labor Party, which was expected to drop from being the second largest party in Parliament, with 38 seats and a position as Mr. Rutte’s coalition partner. The party was expected to win only nine seats."

Democrats in the U.S. should take note; Macron in France too. If Macron wants to win in May he should swing to the right, possibly by throwing a punch at Erdogan.

Wednesday, March 15, 2017

Wilders Won't Win but Mainstream Rhetoric is Already Moving His Way

A surprisingly balanced story this morning about today's Dutch election is "Dutch Vote Watched Across Europe With a Finger in the Wind," by Alissa Rubin and Christopher Schuetze (particularly when compared with Michael Birnbaum's dispatch for WaPo, which is your standard "Wilders is an anti-immigrant bogeyman" story).

A synopsis of the Rubin and Schuetze report goes something like this: The political mainstream is still in trouble, but Europeans in general and the Dutch in particular are becoming more cautious about supporting the far right given Trump's election and Brexit; Geert Wilders' Party of Freedom will not participate in any new government, but Wilders' impact will be felt as the mainstream parties co-opt a portion of his anti-immigrant rhetoric:
Even as support for centrist parties craters nearly everywhere, some analysts see new hints of wariness of the protest and anti-elite votes that aided the rise of recent populist politicians, given the uncertainty and conflict ushered in by the first weeks of the Trump administration and the British vote last year to exit the European Union, or Brexit.
Hajo Funke, a political scientist at the Free University in Berlin, said he had detected early signs in the past several weeks of a backlash against populism.
In Germany, for example, the far-right Alternative for Germany party has slipped in the polls. Mr. Funke said he thought that voters in Europe were looking at Brexit and the Trump presidency not as points of inspiration, but rather with deep concern.
“There is no Trump effect,” he said. “Nothing happened.” On the current moment for populist parties, he said, “I see stagnation, or decline.”
In the Netherlands, Mr. Funke noted, Geert Wilders, one of the most stridently anti-Muslim politicians in Europe, has struggled to improve his standing in recent weeks after climbing quickly in the polls.
“There is a danger that it can go out of control, as far as the voting for Wilders,” he said, “but I doubt that will be the case.”
Even if populists like Mr. Wilders do not prevail, other analysts said, their high profiles and often inflammatory presence had moved much of the political debate to the far right’s turf. The battle in many ways is already won.
“Since the entrance of Geert Wilders into the political arena, he hasn’t had any office but he has exerted influence,” said Bert Bakker, a communications professor at the University of Amsterdam.
Discussions in the Netherlands now often center on restrictions on immigrants, identity politics and nationalism.
Professors, pollsters and others who closely watch elections emphasize that, at least in the Netherlands, the far right is not going to win or control the government — or even come close — not least because the other right-leaning parties have promised publicly not to work with Mr. Wilders in a coalition.
That has not stopped them from adopting somewhat milder versions of the far right’s positions on many issues. One result is that the far right’s views have dominated the debate, crowding out other views and issues.
“Even if these parties are not actually winning or part of the government, everything is moving to a more anti-immigration stance, more pro-nationalist, to try to win voters who are the losers in globalization,” said Jasper Muis, a professor of sociology at the Free University of Amsterdam, who studies populism.
“Immigration and asylum seekers become the focus on the one hand and values and norms on the others,” he said, “but not much is said about economic development or employment and that’s a part of the success story of the populist right: that they’ve been able to make it difficult to talk about other subjects.”
In the most optimistic outlooks, Mr. Wilders, who heads the Freedom Party, will get about 15 percent of the vote. Even if his votes were combined with those of other far-right and anti-establishment parties, the combined number of likely seats in the 150-seat Parliament would not exceed about 30, or 20 percent of the Parliament.
However, the Christian Democratic Appeal party is promoting a line almost as conservative on immigration as that of Mr. Wilders, a change from its more moderate position of several years ago. That party now looks likely to win about as many seats as Mr. Wilders, and if the mainstream right’s seats are added to that, the far-right and center-right parties would have a majority.
Even if the right has dominated the campaign, the reality is that the Netherlands is deeply divided and its centrist parties are losing ground in an increasingly fractured political landscape.
There are 28 parties on the ballot. Only between 10 and 12 will get enough votes to win a seat in Parliament. There are still likely to be four or five parties in the governing coalition — all but guaranteeing it will include both left- and right-leaning parties.
For that reason some experienced observers of European politics say the rightward drift by the Dutch may be more important as a harbinger of trends on the Continent than for its practical impact.
Some analysts are far more worried about the French vote, because the far-right leader of the National Front, the presidential candidate Marine Le Pen, has a bloc of voters that is much more solidified behind her.
“The bloc for Le Pen is very consistent, which is different than the other populists,” said Mr. Funke of the Free University in Berlin.
An even greater concern may be Italy, where the populist Five Star party and the Northern League could win if elections are held, in part on a platform proposing a referendum on whether Italy should continue to use the euro. That could trigger a loss of confidence by foreign investors and capital flight from the Continent. 
“Italy is potentially the worst case because if they are forced by election results to have a euro referendum,” Mr. Funke said, “then there would be a big danger.”
Wilders has been puffed to a certain extent as a charismatic bogeyman. If he under-performs, the prestige press is going to spin it as a blow to Le Pen. But it will be nothing of the sort. Rutte's Punch-&-Judy with Erdogan confirms that the neoliberal center acknowledges it can no longer win elections without co-opting the far right's rhetoric. This is a new development, the latest attempt by the governing corporate elite to buy more time.

Tuesday, March 14, 2017

GOP Got What it Needed from the CBO

The GOP got the score it wanted from the CBO. Not the 24 million people without health insurance by 2026, but the $337 billion reduction in the federal deficit over ten years. Now the Freedom Caucus, who has been calling the House plan to repeal the Affordable Care Act, "Obamacare-lite," can more easily support the bill.

I don't have a clear sense if the Republicans can whip this out of the House. If they are able to, it will be an enormous defeat for the post-election Democratic reboot and campaigns like #ResistanceRecess.

What appears to be happening is that there is a lot of legitimate grassroots organizing going on, but it is having difficulty projecting its power because it is either aligned with or butting up against the established institution of the Democratic Party.

We'll have a front-row seat for this conflict in my city when a progressive coalition that goes by the name "Trump Proof Seattle" attempts to push a citywide wealth tax through the city council of 1.5% on every dollar over $250,000 of annual income. The coalition will soon realize that politicians, even at the district level of a smallish large city like Seattle, are captive to an elite donor class.

What then for the "Resistance"? A mass movement to anarchism? That would be nice. Greater though are the odds that activism will go the way of the anti-war movement of the last decade, receding into a cyber-Panglossian tending of one's own garden.

Monday, March 13, 2017

Obamacare Repeal to be Scored by CBO this Week

Despite all the news last week about division in Republican ranks over their plan to repeal Obamacare, I wouldn't bet against it passing out of the House. The Senate is another story. The Republicans only have a slim majority, 52-48, there.

The House Republican plan to repeal Obamacare, for all its shortcomings, achieves two fundamental GOP goals: it redistributes wealth back up to the 1%, and it block-grants Medicaid.

Jessie Drucker reports in "Wealthy Would Get Billions in Tax Cuts Under Obamacare Repeal Plan" that "Two of the biggest tax cuts in Republican proposals to repeal the Affordable Care Act would deliver roughly $157 billion over the coming decade to those with incomes of $1 million or more, according to a congressional analysis."

Thad Kouusser wrote in The Hill recently, "GOP's Medicaid block grant plan should trump other concerns" --
Medicaid block grants seem at first glance like an obscure debate for the few policy wonks who care about federal funding formulas. But the outcome of this particular fight in D.C. will reverberate across all 50 states for decades to come.
Shifting from “matching rates” to a block grant for Medicaid is not a new demand from the insurgent populist Trump, but the recycling of an idea that has been proposed by small-government advocates from Newt Gingrich to George W. Bush to Paul Ryan. In January, Kellyanne Conway made it clear that they will form a centerpiece of the Trump administration’s health care policy, and they have appeared in what Trump called on Twitter “Our wonderful new Healthcare Bill.”
Though they have garnered little attention in the campaign or even today, block grants would allow Trump to unwind the biggest gains that ObamaCare made for our most vulnerable citizens, radically reduce government investment in healthcare over time, force states to make even deeper cuts when the next recession comes along, but leave no political fingerprints.
A lot is riding on the CBO scoring of the House bill. According to Kevin Quealy and Margo Sanger Katz in "The Five Big Numbers to Look For in the C.B.O. Report on Health Care Reform":
The Republican plan to replace the Affordable Care Act was released early last week, and it has already marched through consideration in two important committees. Yet members of Congress debated the policy details without essential information: The bill had not yet been “scored” by the Congressional Budget Office, a nonpartisan group of budget analysts and economists whose job is to forecast the bill’s consequences over the next decade or so.
That score is expected this week, and its estimates could make or break the Republicans’ plan. (The White House has pre-emptively cast doubt on the C.B.O. report.)
We'll see how politicized the CBO is. The big number for political purposes will be the increase in the federal deficit over ten years. If it is large, it will be hard for the Tea Party wing of the GOP to back it.

Friday, March 10, 2017

Hippies vs. Punks: Jackson Browne's Late for the Sky (1974)


A critical scene in Taxi Driver (1976) is the one where Travis Bickle, played by Robert De Niro, is sitting in front of his black-&-white television, pointing his Smith & Wesson .44 at the screen as youth slow dance to Jackson Browne's "Late for the Sky" on American Bandstand.

It is a critical scene, representing a dividing line for the character, who kicks the TV over and thereafter fully commits to his mission as an assassin.

What's interesting is that it is the only clear, popular musical marker in the film. Everything else is Bernard Herrmann's anachronistic film noir score. There are a few minor sonic references -- background music in the diner where the drivers hang out; Harvey Keitel's pimp character Sport singing in the brothel to a record I haven't been able to identify -- but nothing like the prominent placement of "Late for the Sky."

Scorsese is communicating something to us. But what?

"Late for the Sky" is of course the lead and title track off Jackson Browne's masterpiece, Late for the Sky. Late for the Sky appeared at the end of summer 1974, not too long after Nixon's resignation. It was nominated for a Grammy, reached as high as #14 on the Billboard album charts, and cracked the top ten of the hipster Pazz & Jop Critics Poll for 1974, though Christgau dismissed the record as follows:
Late for the Sky [Asylum, 1974]
Browne reminds me of Nixon: no matter how hard I listen to his pronouncements--important sociologically if nothing else, right?--my mind begins to wander. They're getting longer, too; the eight songs here average over five minutes. I admit that the longest is also the best, an intricate extended metaphor called "Fountain of Sorrow." But his linguistic gentility is inappropriate, his millenarianism is self-indulgent, and only if he sang as good as Dylan Thomas might I change my mind. B-
"Fountain of Sorrow" is indeed a terrific song that holds up to this day. One evening I think I listened to it on repeat five times:


My parents owned this album. It was one of their favorites. I think my father identified with Jackson Browne. He looked something like him and used to dress in brown corduroy pants and a white t-shirt, as Browne appears on the cover of The Pretender (1976) -- an album my Dad and I listened to a lot when my parents were going through their divorce.

From 1972 to 1977 Jackson Browne is pretty much at the top of the heap of singer-songwriters, He enjoyed critical acclaim and robust record sales. If Late for the Sky represents Brown's zenith, what we can take away from it, I think persuasively, is that the end of the line for the Hippies is synonymous with The Flying Burrito Brothersesque Los Angeles country rock of the Watergate era and Ford presidency. (Eagles Don Henley and J.D Souther sing backup on Late for the Sky.)

Like Hotel California, Late for the Sky is a very cynical document packaged in a slick, mellifluous studio sound. Browne is preoccupied with apocalyptic floods and planet-ravaging catastrophes that will scrub man's decadent civilization clean. You could say he was ahead of his time. (It is too bad that he doesn't keep his website more up-to-date.)

Scorsese gives the song its privileged spot in Taxi Driver because it is a refutation of Romantic love and the idea that we can ever satisfy our beloved. Love is a delusion where we are forever trying to become someone who we are not.

Once Travis Bickle receives this message, he is on his way. He kicks his TV over, and with it the Hippies. The Punk era is born from a Jackson Browne song.

Thursday, March 9, 2017

Recent Polling Unfavorable to Wilders & Le Pen

An interesting post today on Naked Capitalism, "Nationalists Slipping in European Polls," predicts a poor showing for Geert Wilders' Party of Freedom in Holland's general election next Wednesday. Apparently the Party of Freedom has dropped 14 points of late.

Yves Smith, who is usually bearish when it comes to predictions of fundamental change delivered by conventional politics, re-posts a story by David Llewellyn-Smith from an Aussie website, MacroBusiness. The analysis is thin and is pervaded with the same tongue-clucking that preceded Trump's upset. 

We should recall that most polls predicted that Hillary would win easily last November. Even the young sage Nate Silver was caught with his pants down, though he did hedge enough to say that Trump might hit a trifecta: huge white turnout, reduced Obama coalition turnout, and resistant Republicans returning to the fold.

There is no such hedging in Llewellyn-Smith's piece. Wilders will shit the bed, and Le Pen might not even make it to the second round. And even if she does, Macron, who, according to the polls enjoys a 20-point advantage over Le Pen in round two, will humiliate her.

It's unfortunate to see the usually flinty Yves Smith fall for this. The exchange in the comments section is illuminating. Smith gets straightened out. Undecideds and low turnout taint those impressive poll numbers of Macron:

  1. Moneta
    Sounds like Brexit and Trump election…. polls and media convinced there is not much threat for the establishment.
    Reply ↓
    1. Yves Smith
      No, the gap in the runoff is vastly larger than for Trump v. Clinton. Most of the time, Clinton was 4 points ahead of Trump, with a range of being barely ahead to very briefly down 11 (after the Khan gaffe) with the normal range down 2 points to down 7. 4-5 points is the margin of errors on polls and so Trump being down 2 points in the final tally is entirely consistent with the polls.
      And that’s before you get to the fact that the state level polling, which matters in the US, was less precise. Lambert pointed out in his piece yesterday on the election that he had been keeping tabs on the Electoral College paths to victory per each candidate, and he said several times Trump had more ways to eke out a win than the media was giving him credit for.
      A 30 point gap is a totally different matter. Yes, 2 months is a way away, but a LOT would have to change in two months.
      Reply ↓
      1. visitor
        What you say is accurate, but there is a big issue that may throw political calculations out of the window: massive abstention.
        The latest polls in France show that abstention will reach at least a third of the electorate — double the historical value — and that it may well grow further.
        Besides, when evaluating voting intentions, it appears that 78% of Le Pen voters are already committed to their vote, and 70% of those intending to vote for Fillon, whereas only 50% of Macron voters are. Macron’s base is fragile.
        In France just like in the UK, the USA or the Netherlands, polls have been repeatedly wrong in the past. Expecting that the typical left-wing voter will, just like in 2002, rally under a right-wing (Fillon) or an opportunist (Macron) candidate to stop Le Pen is a risky bet. Their experience with the outcome of “tactical voting” has been dismal, and they might really wash their hands of the whole affair in the second round.
        Reply ↓
  2. David
    This kind of superficially impressive analysis is what you get when you work with an outdated analytical model of “Left and “Right” or “nationalist” and “European”; That’s not where the game is, and so much of the analysis is beside the point. It also confuses electability with ability to govern.
    The real political divide can be expressed in various ways: “insiders vs; outsiders”, “soveriegnists vs. Euro-integrationists” or even the centre vs. the periphery. When we look at the figures in these ways, they begin to make sense.
    Take the French case for example. There, the last reliable polls show that the two Presidential candidates for the “traditional”, “insider” parties, one of which currently forms the government, the other of which previously did so, can barely muster a third of the French electorate between them. This may even have reduced over the last few days as Fillon continues to weaken, and people keep forgetting who Hamon is. This is astonishing.
    By contrast, “soverignist” candidates, who want major changes in Europe and more independence from Brussels can muster about 40%. A lot of this is Le Pen, but Mélenchon (allegedly on the far Left) and Dupont Aignan (allegedly the traditionalist Right) are expressing fundamentally the same ideas. The “integrationist” candidates (Fillon, Hamon and Macron) have a majority, but that’s largely because the elites of those parties are absolutely wedded to Euro-integrationist ideology. Their voters don’t necessarily feel the same. And finally, if you take the candidates from “outside” the system (Le Pen, Mélenchon and Macron for the most part) a clear majority of the French electorate (about 65%) supports one or the other. (OK, Macron is pretending but his whole campaign is based on an allegedly new start and a repudiation of the existing system).
    So traditional categories of “Left” and “Right” mean little, and so-called “nationalists” can be found everywhere. That’s what you get for using outdated analytical tools.
    Finally, as I have said before, it will be difficult, and probably impossible, for Le Pen to form an FN government. But it will be even more difficult for Macron, because he scarcely has a party, and needs to find 577 candidates and win enough seats to be the dominant party in the National Assembly, to form a coalition; I think that’s very unlikely, and the country will probably be ungovernable after the summer.
    Reply ↓
    1. Anonymous2
      David
      Thank you. That is very interesting. Do you forsee an Assembly with four or more parties sharing the seats? I can see the traditional parties holding on to many seats but guess that, if neither of those parties can get their candidate into the second round,
      traditional loyalties will be weakened with somewhat unpredictable consequences?
      Reply ↓
      1. David
        Well, there are currently five separate “Groups” in the Assembly, as well as about 25 independents. The governing coalition itself consists of three parties. By and large, the many parties involved have had understandings with each other, so the situation is not quite as anarchic as it may appear, but that could change.
        The one thing to bear in mind is that, with its weird two-round electoral process, the French system (like the British one) seldom hands out seats in parliament proportional to votes. Even then, local deals may be done in the second round – in 2012 candidates of the major parties conspired to keep the National Front out. So almost any outcome is possible. Don’t forget though that the major parties are very well dug in to many of their traditional seats, and have powerful machines and large patronage systems. I think it’s perfectly possible that the Socialists and the Republicans will do rather better in the parliamentary elections than they will in the presidential ones, thus making it impossible for either Macron or Le Pen to form a government. What fun.

Trump Will Be Hard to Beat at the Polls in the Near Term

Thomas Edsall makes the case today in "Donald Trump’s Political Stew" that the commonly accepted view that the Democratic Party is all but assured to be a beneficiary of a "demographic destiny" thanks to the "swelling population of single women, knowledge workers, minorities and millennials [that] guarantees the emergence of a majority left coalition," is not such a slam dunk after all.

The "Obama coalition" has been shrinking at the polls. Clinton did not perform as well as Obama among millennial voters. Trump could make inroads here. Bannon is following the Kevin Phillips playbook -- The Emerging Republican Majority (1969), the book that lies at the foundation of the modern Republican Party -- and catering directly to non-college white working-class sentiment:
In fact, Trump’s impact on voting patterns was not to increase the share of the white vote won by the Republican presidential candidate. Both Trump and Mitt Romney carried whites by the same 20-point margin.
The big shift Trump wrought was to change the type of whites who voted Republican.
From 1948, when American National Election Studies began polling, to 1964, college-educated voters were decisively Republican and those with high school degrees or less were reliably Democratic. In 1960, for example, voters with high school degrees or less voted 54-46 for John F. Kennedy while those with college and postgraduate degrees voted 62-38 for Richard Nixon.
Beginning in 1968, when Southern whites and some working class whites in the North began to abandon the Democratic Party, Republican candidates made major inroads among non-college voters. Nixon won voters with high school degrees with 52 and 67 percent in 1968 and 1972; Ronald Reagan won them with 55 and 58 percent in 1980 and 1984.
As a result, from 1980 to 1992, whites with and without college degrees generally cast similar margins for Republican presidential candidates. The pattern of white college and non-college voting is shown in the accompanying chart, which relies on data from the Pew Research Center.
Starting in the 2000 election between George W. Bush and Al Gore, non-college whites became substantially more Republican in their presidential voting than whites with degrees. By 2012, Mitt Romney won whites with degrees by 14 points and those without degrees by 25 points.
In 2016, however, Trump won college-educated whites by four points and non-college whites by a record-setting 39 points, a larger margin than Ronald Reagan, the previous record-holder at 29 points.
Put another way, insofar as Trump voters define the contemporary Republican electorate, non-college whites are the majority, 55.1 percent, with college -educated whites becoming the minority at 44.9 percent.
The Republican Party, then, has moved closer toward the goal Kevin Phillips outlined 47 years ago:
"I wish we could drop into the Potomac all those obsolescent conservatives who are still preoccupied with Alger Hiss and General MacArthur, and who keep trotting out laissez faire economics and other dead horses. They make the Republican party look musty to millions of ignored working‐class people who are looking for a party that relates to their needs."
Trump has oriented the party toward heightened anger, intensified racial resentment, animosity to immigrants and opposition to trade.
This is an exceptionally volatile mix. Trump is fanning rather than quelling the flames — everything he has done so far has been to raise, not lower, the heat. The next question is whether the Republican Party will be able to continue to exploit this mix or whether it will boil over in ways that cannot be predicted.
Trump is going to be hard to beat at the polls in the near term. Unless Trump can be toppled internally by some scandal or he presides over another great recession or commits the U.S. to another major land war, he will be with us for eight years.