Showing posts with label Geert Wilders. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Geert Wilders. Show all posts

Thursday, March 16, 2017

Dutch General Election Postmortem: Warning Sign for U.S. Democrats, Silver Lining for France's Macron

Inflate a bogeyman. Then puncture bogeyman. Celebrate.

This is the gist of Dutch election postmortems. Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom didn't come out on top. Prime minister Mark Rutte's People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, though losing seven seats, maintained its pole position thanks to pro-EU sentiment and record voter turnout. According to Alissa Rubin's "Geert Wilders Falls Short in Election, as Wary Dutch Scatter Their Votes":
According to an unofficial tally compiled by the Dutch Broadcasting Foundation, the country’s public broadcaster, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy was likely to capture 33 of the 150 seats in Parliament — a loss of seven seats, but still far more than any other party.
Mr. Wilders’s Party for Freedom was expected to finish second, with 20 seats (an increase of eight); and the right-leaning Christian Democratic Appeal and the left-leaning Democrats 66 were tied for third, with 19 each, the broadcaster reported.
Given the loss of seven seats by his governing party, and given that few were predicting a Wilders victory even when he was touching the clouds with impressive poll numbers earlier this year, pictures of a beaming Rutte communicate the desperation of a collapsing neoliberal center.


Rutte saved his bacon by fabricating a national dust-up with another bogeyman, one far more real than the marginal Wilders -- Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

The debate that will rage until next month and the first round of voting in the French presidential election is the extent to which the returns in the Netherlands apply to the rest of Europe.

I think the Dutch vote was an accurate snapshot of the status quo. But it cannot be directly overlaid to France because the mainstream parties in Holland have not eroded to the extent that they have in France -- with Hollande a zombie and Fillon charged with embezzlement. Nonetheless, as Rubin reminds us, "The big loser was the center-left Labor Party, which was expected to drop from being the second largest party in Parliament, with 38 seats and a position as Mr. Rutte’s coalition partner. The party was expected to win only nine seats."

Democrats in the U.S. should take note; Macron in France too. If Macron wants to win in May he should swing to the right, possibly by throwing a punch at Erdogan.

Wednesday, March 15, 2017

Wilders Won't Win but Mainstream Rhetoric is Already Moving His Way

A surprisingly balanced story this morning about today's Dutch election is "Dutch Vote Watched Across Europe With a Finger in the Wind," by Alissa Rubin and Christopher Schuetze (particularly when compared with Michael Birnbaum's dispatch for WaPo, which is your standard "Wilders is an anti-immigrant bogeyman" story).

A synopsis of the Rubin and Schuetze report goes something like this: The political mainstream is still in trouble, but Europeans in general and the Dutch in particular are becoming more cautious about supporting the far right given Trump's election and Brexit; Geert Wilders' Party of Freedom will not participate in any new government, but Wilders' impact will be felt as the mainstream parties co-opt a portion of his anti-immigrant rhetoric:
Even as support for centrist parties craters nearly everywhere, some analysts see new hints of wariness of the protest and anti-elite votes that aided the rise of recent populist politicians, given the uncertainty and conflict ushered in by the first weeks of the Trump administration and the British vote last year to exit the European Union, or Brexit.
Hajo Funke, a political scientist at the Free University in Berlin, said he had detected early signs in the past several weeks of a backlash against populism.
In Germany, for example, the far-right Alternative for Germany party has slipped in the polls. Mr. Funke said he thought that voters in Europe were looking at Brexit and the Trump presidency not as points of inspiration, but rather with deep concern.
“There is no Trump effect,” he said. “Nothing happened.” On the current moment for populist parties, he said, “I see stagnation, or decline.”
In the Netherlands, Mr. Funke noted, Geert Wilders, one of the most stridently anti-Muslim politicians in Europe, has struggled to improve his standing in recent weeks after climbing quickly in the polls.
“There is a danger that it can go out of control, as far as the voting for Wilders,” he said, “but I doubt that will be the case.”
Even if populists like Mr. Wilders do not prevail, other analysts said, their high profiles and often inflammatory presence had moved much of the political debate to the far right’s turf. The battle in many ways is already won.
“Since the entrance of Geert Wilders into the political arena, he hasn’t had any office but he has exerted influence,” said Bert Bakker, a communications professor at the University of Amsterdam.
Discussions in the Netherlands now often center on restrictions on immigrants, identity politics and nationalism.
Professors, pollsters and others who closely watch elections emphasize that, at least in the Netherlands, the far right is not going to win or control the government — or even come close — not least because the other right-leaning parties have promised publicly not to work with Mr. Wilders in a coalition.
That has not stopped them from adopting somewhat milder versions of the far right’s positions on many issues. One result is that the far right’s views have dominated the debate, crowding out other views and issues.
“Even if these parties are not actually winning or part of the government, everything is moving to a more anti-immigration stance, more pro-nationalist, to try to win voters who are the losers in globalization,” said Jasper Muis, a professor of sociology at the Free University of Amsterdam, who studies populism.
“Immigration and asylum seekers become the focus on the one hand and values and norms on the others,” he said, “but not much is said about economic development or employment and that’s a part of the success story of the populist right: that they’ve been able to make it difficult to talk about other subjects.”
In the most optimistic outlooks, Mr. Wilders, who heads the Freedom Party, will get about 15 percent of the vote. Even if his votes were combined with those of other far-right and anti-establishment parties, the combined number of likely seats in the 150-seat Parliament would not exceed about 30, or 20 percent of the Parliament.
However, the Christian Democratic Appeal party is promoting a line almost as conservative on immigration as that of Mr. Wilders, a change from its more moderate position of several years ago. That party now looks likely to win about as many seats as Mr. Wilders, and if the mainstream right’s seats are added to that, the far-right and center-right parties would have a majority.
Even if the right has dominated the campaign, the reality is that the Netherlands is deeply divided and its centrist parties are losing ground in an increasingly fractured political landscape.
There are 28 parties on the ballot. Only between 10 and 12 will get enough votes to win a seat in Parliament. There are still likely to be four or five parties in the governing coalition — all but guaranteeing it will include both left- and right-leaning parties.
For that reason some experienced observers of European politics say the rightward drift by the Dutch may be more important as a harbinger of trends on the Continent than for its practical impact.
Some analysts are far more worried about the French vote, because the far-right leader of the National Front, the presidential candidate Marine Le Pen, has a bloc of voters that is much more solidified behind her.
“The bloc for Le Pen is very consistent, which is different than the other populists,” said Mr. Funke of the Free University in Berlin.
An even greater concern may be Italy, where the populist Five Star party and the Northern League could win if elections are held, in part on a platform proposing a referendum on whether Italy should continue to use the euro. That could trigger a loss of confidence by foreign investors and capital flight from the Continent. 
“Italy is potentially the worst case because if they are forced by election results to have a euro referendum,” Mr. Funke said, “then there would be a big danger.”
Wilders has been puffed to a certain extent as a charismatic bogeyman. If he under-performs, the prestige press is going to spin it as a blow to Le Pen. But it will be nothing of the sort. Rutte's Punch-&-Judy with Erdogan confirms that the neoliberal center acknowledges it can no longer win elections without co-opting the far right's rhetoric. This is a new development, the latest attempt by the governing corporate elite to buy more time.

Thursday, March 9, 2017

Recent Polling Unfavorable to Wilders & Le Pen

An interesting post today on Naked Capitalism, "Nationalists Slipping in European Polls," predicts a poor showing for Geert Wilders' Party of Freedom in Holland's general election next Wednesday. Apparently the Party of Freedom has dropped 14 points of late.

Yves Smith, who is usually bearish when it comes to predictions of fundamental change delivered by conventional politics, re-posts a story by David Llewellyn-Smith from an Aussie website, MacroBusiness. The analysis is thin and is pervaded with the same tongue-clucking that preceded Trump's upset. 

We should recall that most polls predicted that Hillary would win easily last November. Even the young sage Nate Silver was caught with his pants down, though he did hedge enough to say that Trump might hit a trifecta: huge white turnout, reduced Obama coalition turnout, and resistant Republicans returning to the fold.

There is no such hedging in Llewellyn-Smith's piece. Wilders will shit the bed, and Le Pen might not even make it to the second round. And even if she does, Macron, who, according to the polls enjoys a 20-point advantage over Le Pen in round two, will humiliate her.

It's unfortunate to see the usually flinty Yves Smith fall for this. The exchange in the comments section is illuminating. Smith gets straightened out. Undecideds and low turnout taint those impressive poll numbers of Macron:

  1. Moneta
    Sounds like Brexit and Trump election…. polls and media convinced there is not much threat for the establishment.
    Reply ↓
    1. Yves Smith
      No, the gap in the runoff is vastly larger than for Trump v. Clinton. Most of the time, Clinton was 4 points ahead of Trump, with a range of being barely ahead to very briefly down 11 (after the Khan gaffe) with the normal range down 2 points to down 7. 4-5 points is the margin of errors on polls and so Trump being down 2 points in the final tally is entirely consistent with the polls.
      And that’s before you get to the fact that the state level polling, which matters in the US, was less precise. Lambert pointed out in his piece yesterday on the election that he had been keeping tabs on the Electoral College paths to victory per each candidate, and he said several times Trump had more ways to eke out a win than the media was giving him credit for.
      A 30 point gap is a totally different matter. Yes, 2 months is a way away, but a LOT would have to change in two months.
      Reply ↓
      1. visitor
        What you say is accurate, but there is a big issue that may throw political calculations out of the window: massive abstention.
        The latest polls in France show that abstention will reach at least a third of the electorate — double the historical value — and that it may well grow further.
        Besides, when evaluating voting intentions, it appears that 78% of Le Pen voters are already committed to their vote, and 70% of those intending to vote for Fillon, whereas only 50% of Macron voters are. Macron’s base is fragile.
        In France just like in the UK, the USA or the Netherlands, polls have been repeatedly wrong in the past. Expecting that the typical left-wing voter will, just like in 2002, rally under a right-wing (Fillon) or an opportunist (Macron) candidate to stop Le Pen is a risky bet. Their experience with the outcome of “tactical voting” has been dismal, and they might really wash their hands of the whole affair in the second round.
        Reply ↓
  2. David
    This kind of superficially impressive analysis is what you get when you work with an outdated analytical model of “Left and “Right” or “nationalist” and “European”; That’s not where the game is, and so much of the analysis is beside the point. It also confuses electability with ability to govern.
    The real political divide can be expressed in various ways: “insiders vs; outsiders”, “soveriegnists vs. Euro-integrationists” or even the centre vs. the periphery. When we look at the figures in these ways, they begin to make sense.
    Take the French case for example. There, the last reliable polls show that the two Presidential candidates for the “traditional”, “insider” parties, one of which currently forms the government, the other of which previously did so, can barely muster a third of the French electorate between them. This may even have reduced over the last few days as Fillon continues to weaken, and people keep forgetting who Hamon is. This is astonishing.
    By contrast, “soverignist” candidates, who want major changes in Europe and more independence from Brussels can muster about 40%. A lot of this is Le Pen, but Mélenchon (allegedly on the far Left) and Dupont Aignan (allegedly the traditionalist Right) are expressing fundamentally the same ideas. The “integrationist” candidates (Fillon, Hamon and Macron) have a majority, but that’s largely because the elites of those parties are absolutely wedded to Euro-integrationist ideology. Their voters don’t necessarily feel the same. And finally, if you take the candidates from “outside” the system (Le Pen, Mélenchon and Macron for the most part) a clear majority of the French electorate (about 65%) supports one or the other. (OK, Macron is pretending but his whole campaign is based on an allegedly new start and a repudiation of the existing system).
    So traditional categories of “Left” and “Right” mean little, and so-called “nationalists” can be found everywhere. That’s what you get for using outdated analytical tools.
    Finally, as I have said before, it will be difficult, and probably impossible, for Le Pen to form an FN government. But it will be even more difficult for Macron, because he scarcely has a party, and needs to find 577 candidates and win enough seats to be the dominant party in the National Assembly, to form a coalition; I think that’s very unlikely, and the country will probably be ungovernable after the summer.
    Reply ↓
    1. Anonymous2
      David
      Thank you. That is very interesting. Do you forsee an Assembly with four or more parties sharing the seats? I can see the traditional parties holding on to many seats but guess that, if neither of those parties can get their candidate into the second round,
      traditional loyalties will be weakened with somewhat unpredictable consequences?
      Reply ↓
      1. David
        Well, there are currently five separate “Groups” in the Assembly, as well as about 25 independents. The governing coalition itself consists of three parties. By and large, the many parties involved have had understandings with each other, so the situation is not quite as anarchic as it may appear, but that could change.
        The one thing to bear in mind is that, with its weird two-round electoral process, the French system (like the British one) seldom hands out seats in parliament proportional to votes. Even then, local deals may be done in the second round – in 2012 candidates of the major parties conspired to keep the National Front out. So almost any outcome is possible. Don’t forget though that the major parties are very well dug in to many of their traditional seats, and have powerful machines and large patronage systems. I think it’s perfectly possible that the Socialists and the Republicans will do rather better in the parliamentary elections than they will in the presidential ones, thus making it impossible for either Macron or Le Pen to form a government. What fun.

Monday, February 27, 2017

Does Populism Change Everything?

I'm reading Naomi Klein's This Changes Everything. It is fantastic but dispiriting. It provides a historical account of how collective recognition of climate change corresponded with a corporate-dominated globalized free trade system -- the latter effectively negating a plan for addressing the former. In fact, the primacy of trade was memorialized at the outset at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio.

One theme that Klein stresses throughout is localism. In order to deal with the planet's changing climate we are going to have to craft local solutions. The problem is that the neoliberal global trade architecture that has been erected the last 25 years makes localism illegal. Local goods and services cannot be privileged over those from foreign countries.

And this is why there is such hostility from the neoliberal center towards the populism that is rising throughout the West. At root this fast-growing populism is a rejection of corporate-managed international trade and banking. Being anti-immigrant is just the flower of the populist plant that has taken root.

This morning online, which means it will be printed in tomorrow's national edition, The New York Times has a good, long article by Alissa Rubin, "Geert Wilders, Reclusive Provocateur, Rises Before Dutch Vote," devoted to the "Dutch Trump":
Geert Wilders, far-right icon, is one of Europe’s strangest politicians, not least because he comes from the Netherlands, one of Europe’s most socially liberal countries, with a centuries-long tradition of promoting religious tolerance and welcoming immigrants. 
How he and his party fare in the March 15 elections could well signal how the far right will do in pivotal elections in France, Germany and possibly Italy later this year, and ultimately determine the future of the European Union. Mr. Wilders (pronounced VIL-ders) has promised to demand a “Nexit” referendum on whether the Netherlands should follow Britain’s example and leave the union.
“The Netherlands is kind of a bellwether, a lot of trends manifest themselves here first,” said Hans Anker, a Dutch political strategist who has worked both in the Netherlands and the United States. 
“I wouldn’t rule out that Wilders could be prime minister,” he added. “This one is fundamentally unpredictable.”
The problem for Wilders, even if he wins, will be forming a government:
Right now Mr. Wilders’s party looks set to win more seats than any other or to come in second. However, he has historically polled better before elections than he has performed in them. [Same problem that Le Pen and the National Front have.] Still, after pollsters underestimated the likelihood of both Brexit and the victory of Donald Trump last year, no one is relying on predictions.
The bigger question is whether even if Mr. Wilders comes in first or second, he would be willing to form or join a governing coalition. For more than 20 years, no one party has had a majority. Other parties say they will not work with him and he has shown little interest in compromise and working with others.
What I find curious is how balanced Rubin's story is compared to, say, The Times' reporting on Labour's Jeremy Corbyn, which is always dismissive. It is as if the neoliberal center sees a possibility of collaborating or co-opting the rising populism. This is the dance underway with Trump. And at this point I think it should be apparent to all of us that Trump is willing to play along with the neoliberal center.

There are of course contradictions. The future of the EU is problematic. A Wilders wins means a Nexit vote, as a Le Pen win means a Frexit. The Trump talking point is that capitalism, for all intents and purposes, is contained in one country, and that is the United States. Multilateral trade agreements will be scrapped in favor of bilateral negotiations. Easier said than done. Globalized free trade is the key to the neoliberal unipolar world; that, and full spectrum U.S. military dominance. A kaleidoscope of bilateral trade agreements leads to a multipolar world.

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For a good assessment of the Thomas Perez's election over Keith Ellison this weekend to lead the DNC, read Glenn Greenwald's "Key Question About DNC Race: Why Did Obama White House Recruit Perez to Run Against Ellison?"

The answer? Money, of course. It doesn't bode well for Democrat hopes of picking up seats at the midterm.