This is the gist of Dutch election postmortems. Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom didn't come out on top. Prime minister Mark Rutte's People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, though losing seven seats, maintained its pole position thanks to pro-EU sentiment and record voter turnout. According to Alissa Rubin's "Geert Wilders Falls Short in Election, as Wary Dutch Scatter Their Votes":
According to an unofficial tally compiled by the Dutch Broadcasting Foundation, the country’s public broadcaster, the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy was likely to capture 33 of the 150 seats in Parliament — a loss of seven seats, but still far more than any other party.
Mr. Wilders’s Party for Freedom was expected to finish second, with 20 seats (an increase of eight); and the right-leaning Christian Democratic Appeal and the left-leaning Democrats 66 were tied for third, with 19 each, the broadcaster reported.Given the loss of seven seats by his governing party, and given that few were predicting a Wilders victory even when he was touching the clouds with impressive poll numbers earlier this year, pictures of a beaming Rutte communicate the desperation of a collapsing neoliberal center.
Rutte saved his bacon by fabricating a national dust-up with another bogeyman, one far more real than the marginal Wilders -- Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
The debate that will rage until next month and the first round of voting in the French presidential election is the extent to which the returns in the Netherlands apply to the rest of Europe.
I think the Dutch vote was an accurate snapshot of the status quo. But it cannot be directly overlaid to France because the mainstream parties in Holland have not eroded to the extent that they have in France -- with Hollande a zombie and Fillon charged with embezzlement. Nonetheless, as Rubin reminds us, "The big loser was the center-left Labor Party, which was expected to drop from being the second largest party in Parliament, with 38 seats and a position as Mr. Rutte’s coalition partner. The party was expected to win only nine seats."
Democrats in the U.S. should take note; Macron in France too. If Macron wants to win in May he should swing to the right, possibly by throwing a punch at Erdogan.

The real political divide can be expressed in various ways: “insiders vs; outsiders”, “soveriegnists vs. Euro-integrationists” or even the centre vs. the periphery. When we look at the figures in these ways, they begin to make sense.
Take the French case for example. There, the last reliable polls show that the two Presidential candidates for the “traditional”, “insider” parties, one of which currently forms the government, the other of which previously did so, can barely muster a third of the French electorate between them. This may even have reduced over the last few days as Fillon continues to weaken, and people keep forgetting who Hamon is. This is astonishing.
By contrast, “soverignist” candidates, who want major changes in Europe and more independence from Brussels can muster about 40%. A lot of this is Le Pen, but Mélenchon (allegedly on the far Left) and Dupont Aignan (allegedly the traditionalist Right) are expressing fundamentally the same ideas. The “integrationist” candidates (Fillon, Hamon and Macron) have a majority, but that’s largely because the elites of those parties are absolutely wedded to Euro-integrationist ideology. Their voters don’t necessarily feel the same. And finally, if you take the candidates from “outside” the system (Le Pen, Mélenchon and Macron for the most part) a clear majority of the French electorate (about 65%) supports one or the other. (OK, Macron is pretending but his whole campaign is based on an allegedly new start and a repudiation of the existing system).
So traditional categories of “Left” and “Right” mean little, and so-called “nationalists” can be found everywhere. That’s what you get for using outdated analytical tools.
Finally, as I have said before, it will be difficult, and probably impossible, for Le Pen to form an FN government. But it will be even more difficult for Macron, because he scarcely has a party, and needs to find 577 candidates and win enough seats to be the dominant party in the National Assembly, to form a coalition; I think that’s very unlikely, and the country will probably be ungovernable after the summer.
traditional loyalties will be weakened with somewhat unpredictable consequences?
The one thing to bear in mind is that, with its weird two-round electoral process, the French system (like the British one) seldom hands out seats in parliament proportional to votes. Even then, local deals may be done in the second round – in 2012 candidates of the major parties conspired to keep the National Front out. So almost any outcome is possible. Don’t forget though that the major parties are very well dug in to many of their traditional seats, and have powerful machines and large patronage systems. I think it’s perfectly possible that the Socialists and the Republicans will do rather better in the parliamentary elections than they will in the presidential ones, thus making it impossible for either Macron or Le Pen to form a government. What fun.