The Case Against Standard & Poor's

Peter Eavis in a story that appears on page A3 of today's paper explains that the heart of DOJ's case against Standard & Poor's has to do with the computer models the company used to analyze both collateralized debt obligations and the underlying mortgages. The models were cooked, bogus, jiggered with to produce the high credit rating that the issuer wanted. As Eavis explains,

As home prices soared and buyers clamored for properties, banks began to churn out more loans and bundle them into mortgage securities. To analyze mortgages, S.& P. used a program called Levels version 5.6 at the time. S.& P. used that data to come up with its credit ratings for mortgage-backed bonds.

As early as 2004, S.& P. considered broadening the pool of loans in the model. The upgrade was intended to create a more realistic model called Levels 6.0, and S.& P. announced it was forthcoming. But the model was never released, the lawsuit claims.

Instead, S.& P. introduced a more modest upgrade in 2006, Levels 5.7, according to the suit. But the Justice Department contends that model did not provide an accurate picture of the loans. The suit said that an executive made a change to the model that would keep ratings artificially high. 

Ms. Mathis, the S.& P. spokeswoman, said the description of the adjustment to Levels 5.7 was inaccurate. “We are not aware of any changes made to the 5.7 model that were not analytically justified, nor that any changes were made by an individual as opposed to a committee,” she said.

As to the inference by the S&P spokeswoman that model adjustments were kosher as long as they were made by committee, Mary Williams Walsh and Ron Nixon address it in their frontpage story about Attorney General Eric Holder's announcement of the lawsuit to the media yesterday:

Remarks that S.& P. employees made in internal memos and electronic communications show that as early as spring 2004, certain executives wanted to change the firm’s rating methodology, but only after polling “an appropriate number of issuers and investment bankers” as to the “rating implications.” 

The idea of asking bankers what they thought about a change in the firm’s methods shocked some S.& P. analysts and executives, including one who fired back, “What does ‘rating implication’ have to do with the search for truth? Are you implying that we might actually reject or stifle ‘superior analytics’ for market considerations?” 

In May 2004, an analyst warned that S.&. P. had just lost to its competitor Moody’s Investors Service the chance to rate a very large deal by being too hard-nosed about the amount of collateral that would be required to get a good rating. More collateral would mean less profit for Mizuho, the bank putting that deal together. 

“We must address this now,” she said — otherwise the firm would lose more deals. 

The complaint describes a debate in 2004 and 2005 about whether S.& P. should change its model for rating C.D.O.’s and what effect the proposed changes might have on its business. The change was scheduled for July 2005, but before it could happen, an analyst sent an e-mail saying that according to the investment bank Bear Stearns, the older model “had been the ‘best’ ” at rating weaker pools of mortgages, compared with Moody’s and Fitch.

DOJ's case looks solid and easy to understand. In order to make garbage look like gold S&P ran the garbage through a computer model; it popped out as gold. If the computer model popped out something different, say, lead or bronze, a new computer model was devised. People can understand that. It's called fraud.

Fraud at the Rating Agencies

Since the meltdown of the economy in 2008 a narrative has formed as to how we got there. At the center of that narrative are the rating agencies -- Standard & Poor's, Fitch, Moody's Investor Service -- because without their AAA ratings of collateralized debt obligations, CDO's, it's hard to see how the house of cards that collapsed five years ago gets erected in the first place. 

Finally, as revealed in a frontpage story today by Andrew Ross Sorkin and Mary Williams Walsh, the Department of Justice is charging one of the credit-rating agencies, S&P, with fraud: 

From September 2004 through October 2007, S.&P. “knowingly and with the intent to defraud, devised, participated in, and executed a scheme to defraud investors” in certain mortgage-related securities, according to the suit filed against the agency and its parent company, McGraw-Hill Companies. S.&P. also falsely represented that its ratings “were objective, independent, uninfluenced by any conflicts of interest,” the suit said.

S.& P., first contacted by federal enforcement officials three years ago, said in a statement Monday in anticipation of the suit that it had acted in good faith in issuing the ratings.

“A D.O.J. lawsuit would be entirely without factual or legal merit,” it said, adding that its competitors had given exactly the same ratings to all the securities it believed to be in question.

Settlement talks between S.& P. and the Justice Department broke down in the last two weeks after prosecutors sought a penalty in excess of $1 billion and insisted that the company admit wrongdoing, several people with knowledge of the talks said. That amount would wipe out the profits of McGraw-Hill for an entire year. S.& P. had proposed a settlement of around $100 million, the people said.

S.& P. also sought a deal that would allow it to neither admit nor deny guilt; the government pressed for an admission of guilt to at least one count of fraud, said the people. S.& P. told prosecutors it could not admit guilt without exposing itself to liability in a multitude of civil cases. 

It was unclear whether state and federal authorities were looking at the other two major ratings agencies, Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch.

This morning's naked capitalism blog points out that the previous dismal track record of investor suits against the rating agencies doesn't apply here because the DOJ is relying on a new legal theory. As Sorkin and Walsh explain in their DealBook story:

The federal action will be the first time a credit-rating agency has been charged under a 1989 law intended to protect taxpayers from frauds involving federally insured financial institutions, which since the financial crisis has been used against a number of federally insured banks, including Wells Fargo, Bank of America and Citigroup.

The government is taking a novel approach by accusing S.& P. of defrauding a federally insured institution and therefore injuring the taxpayer.

Among others, the compliant includes the demise of Wescorp, a federally insured credit union in Los Angeles that went bankrupt after investing in mortgage securities rated by S.& P. Wescorp is included as one example of the contended fraud, and as a way to bring the case in California. The suit was filed in Federal District Court for the Central District of California.

The naked capitalism post says that if successful this prosecution could be a watershed moment:

As indicated, the reason this suit might fly is that the causes of action rely on different statues than previously invoked, and the focus is on SPs misrepresentation of its own process: that it presented it as objective and unbiased, when it had significant conflicts of interests and its employees believed it was concerned only about profit, and that it may also have failed to adhere to its own procedures.

While getting a ratings agency scalp is small potatoes compared to getting the executives at one of the many financial institutions that helped bring about the crisis, Ill take my victories where I can get them. Winning a case against a public company that is really keen not to lose (tons of private litigation would follow) would break a long losing streak in the DoJ and SEC on the finance front. Although the agencies have been craven, they apparently really were demoralized after losing their misguided suit against Bear Stearns hedge fund managers, and theyve been gun shy. That does not mean they would not have lost in a fight against the Treasury if they had wanted to go after any targets, but lets not kid ourselves: these fights never occurred. Breuer in a significant role was also a big part of the problem, but people who know something about the DoJ say the agencys learned timidity was an even bigger impediment. They really lost their mojo after the Bear Stearns fiasco. You could have imagined a less cowardly DoJ filing suits against safe and obvious targets like WaMu.

Lets hope that the DoJs prosecutorial efforts live up to the caliber of their filing. Too often the Feds have proven to be great draftsmen but lousy prosecutors. Well see if they can up their game.

It would be amazing -- almost too grand a thought to think -- if Obama's second term turned out to be the opposite of the usual fecklessness and avariciousness (just think Bill Clinton) that define administrations headed out to pasture.