The Plan to Defeat ISIS: Mosul by Christmas . . . of 2015

Well, we now have the plan, what of it there is, to degrade and destroy Islamic State. It is a "To-Mosul-by-Christmas" scheme --  not this Christmas, but next year's. The next year will be spent training three new Iraqi Army divisions.

The story, "Iraqis Prepare ISIS Offensive, With U.S. Help," has the feel of a public relations campaign. Written by Michael Gordon and Eric Schmitt, the two reporters inform us that:

The basic strategy calls for attacking fighters from the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, with a goal of isolating them in major strongholds like Mosul. 

That could enable Iraqi troops, Kurdish pesh merga units and fighters that have been recruited from Sunni tribes to take on a weakened foe that has been cut off from its supply lines and reinforcements in Syria, which are subject to American airstrikes. 

To oversee the American military effort, a new task force is being established under Lt. Gen. James L. Terry, who oversees Army forces in the Middle East and who will operate from a base in Kuwait. Maj. Gen. Paul E. Funk II will run a subordinate headquarters in Baghdad that will supervise the hundreds of American advisers and trainers working with Iraqi forces.

As the push to train Iraq’s military gathers momentum, the American footprint is likely to expand from Baghdad and Erbil to additional outposts, including Al Asad Air Base in Iraq’s embattled Anbar Province in the west, and possibly Taji, 20 miles north of Baghdad. 

The effort to rebuild Iraq’s fighting capability faces hurdles, including the risk that the Islamic State will use the intervening months to entrench in western and northern Iraq and carry out more killings. 

The United States currently does not plan to advise Iraqi forces below the level of a brigade, which in the Iraqi Army usually has some 2,000 troops. Nor is it clear under what circumstances the White House might allow American advisers to accompany Iraqi units on the battlefield or to call in airstrikes, as Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has indicated might be necessary.

Gordon and Schmitt don't go into this past summer's spectacular collapse of the U.S.-trained Iraqi Army, or ask why this go-round should yield a different result, though they do mention that

Iraq’s recent history suggests that such a battlefield advisory role is likely to be needed. Iraqi forces faltered during their 2008 offensive against Shiite militias in Basra until American commanders sent their troops to advise Iraqi forces below the brigade level and facilitate airstrikes.

Additionally, Gordon and Schmitt point out numerous high hurdles to the U.S. plan. First off, the Obama administration is committed to disbanding the Shiite militias (which, if you read the dispatches of Patrick Cockburn, you know is not going to happen since Shiite militias are effective fighting forces and a principal line of defense for Baghdad):

Iraq’s Shiite militias, some of which have been supported by Iran, pose another obstacle. Antony J. Blinken, President Obama’s deputy national security adviser, said last week that it was important that the Shiite militias be withdrawn, disband or have their members integrated into Iraq’s security forces.

But Fuad Masum, the Iraqi president, has suggested that the militias could be needed until the Islamic State was thoroughly defeated.

Problem #2: Nothing prevents the ISIS jihadis responding to the U.S.-Iraqi offensive by moving back across the border into Syria:

A major challenge will be synchronizing the Iraqi campaign with the American effort to train the beleaguered moderate Syrian opposition. The Pentagon’s program to train 5,000 Syrian rebel fighters a year in Saudi Arabia and Turkey has yet to get underway, which raises the possibility that Islamic State fighters could be pushed back into Syria well before there is a trained and equipped Syrian rebel force to oppose them.

Problem #3: Mission creep. There is a ceiling of 1,600 military personnel. This will have to be lifted for the "Mosul-by-Xmas" offensive to get off the ground:

Another constraint is self-imposed. Military officials say the White House has limited the number of United States advisers, analysts and security personnel in Iraq to 1,600. There were 1,414 troops in Iraq as of Friday, about 600 of whom were acting in advisory roles from joint operations centers in Baghdad and Erbil, and at division and higher headquarters. 

A White House spokesman, Alistair Baskey, said the figure was not a limit, just the number of troops required for the current missions. One senior United States official, who asked not be identified because he was discussing internal planning, said it was likely that the number would need to be raised. Army planners have drafted options that could deploy up to an additional brigade of troops, or about 3,500 personnel, to expand the advisory effort and speed the push to rebuild the Iraqi military. 

The Iraqi military has been active in recent weeks, but these operations have taken a toll on its forces. United States officials say that the initial force they are planning to advise consists of only nine Iraqi brigades and three similar Kurdish pesh merga units — roughly 24,000 troops. 

The counterattack plan calls for at least doubling that force by adding three divisions, each of which could range from 8,000 to 12,000 troops. 

The United States is relying on allies to augment American trainers. Australia, Canada and Norway have committed several hundred special forces to one or more of the training or advisory missions, a senior United States military official said.

Problem #4 is probably the biggest. There is no sign that the new national guard brigades, the Obama administration's solution to securing Sunni support, are anywhere near coming together:

A parallel effort calls for establishing new national guard brigades in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces — units that would report to the local governors and have the primary responsibility for securing those areas after the Iraqi Army has mounted its counteroffensive. 

The national guard initiative has been promoted by American officials as a way for Sunnis in western and northern Iraq to play a major role in defending their territory, which would ease sectarian frictions. 

But the Iraqi Parliament has yet to enact legislation to establish the brigades, which would still need to be trained and equipped. 

As a result, a “bridge” policy would be needed so that the Iraqi government, with American help, could work directly with Sunni tribes in the meantime, Mr. Blinken said at a conference hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace last week.
General Dempsey said Friday that ISIS’ recent gains in Anbar show “why we need to expand the train, advise and assist mission into” Anbar Province. 

A senior United States official said that much of this bridging initiative has yet to be defined. But an early test is expected to unfold soon in Anbar, where about 5,000 Sunni tribesmen could join the fight against the Islamic State in a replay of the pivotal American effort in 2007 to enlist Sunni tribal leaders to turn against Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Iraq, the forerunner of the Islamic State. 

Overcoming Sunni wariness of the Shiite-led government in Baghdad will be challenging, American officials said.

Challenging, indeed. Islamic State's massacre of the Albu Nimr tribe in Hit, a town in Anbar Province that had been resisting ISIS jihadis, is being laid at the feet Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. According to Ben Hubbard writing last week in "Sunni Tribesmen Say ISIS Exacts Brutal Revenge":

Members of the Albu Nimr tribe fought for months to keep the Islamic State from entering their area, near the Anbar Province town of Hit, about 90 miles west of Baghdad, according to tribal leaders. 

But with no support coming from outside, resupply was difficult, and tribal fighters and police officers were badly outgunned by the Islamic State, which captured many heavy weapons from armories in Syria and Iraq. The jihadists finally conquered Hit this month [October], and have since expanded their control of nearby areas. 

Each time the Islamic State seized an area, residents said, its fighters made a point of hunting down police officers or members of the Iraqi Army who had helped in the fight. 

“Anyone who was in the state, in the government or the security forces, is their enemy,” said Jalal al-Gaood, a tribal leader and businessman based in Jordan. 

If those targeted by the group had already fled, the jihadists would blow up their homes. [A lesson possibly learned from Israel.] 

“That sends a message to everyone else that this is what is coming for you,” Mr. Gaood said. 

One tribe member, Sabah al-Haditheh, said the Albu Nimr had called for military help and arms support from the government in Baghdad but had received nothing. 

“We put the responsibility on the government because they didn’t respond,” he said. “We were fighting ISIS with rifles, and it was fighting us with heavy machine guns.” 

A spokesman for Mr. Abadi’s office, Rafid Jaboori, said he could not comment on whether the tribe had asked for support. 

But he said that Mr. Abadi had met with Sunni tribal leaders several times in the past 10 days to discuss how they could be integrated into the fight against the Islamic State.

 It seems unlikely there will be another Awakening in Anbar anytime soon.